Peterson & W. Co. v. Akron. In the last mentioned case, the contract between the city and the proprietors of the lands is set forth, and will be found to be very similar to the contract in this case, yet Judge Shauck, on page 517 of his opinion says: "That instrument was a license." Decree may be entered for plaintiff, as prayed for, but not to go into effect until the city has had reasonable time in which to make other arrangements for taking care of the sewage now flowing through the sewer in question. DEEDS. [Summit Circuit Court, April 20, 1912.] Winch, Marvin and Niman, JJ. PORTAGE PARK LAND CO. v. ROSE B. BURCH ET AL. Construction of Building Restriction with Reference to Porch Roof. A restriction in a deed which requires that no building, except an open porch, be erected nearer the street line than twenty-five feet, is not violated by the erection of an open porch upon the restricted territory, although the roof of said porch is but a continuation of the roof of the main building. ERROR. Stuart & Stuart, for plaintiff in error. Wilcox, Parsons, Burch & Adams, for defendant in error. WINCH, J. The land company in this appealed action asks for the enforcement of a building restriction contained in defendants' deed, which requires that no building, except an open porch, be erected upon defendants' lot nearer the street line than twentyfive feet. The main part of defendants' home, recently erected, is about two feet farther back from the street line than the restriction requires, but the roof of the front porch is a continuation of the main roof of the house as it slopes toward the street. Exhibition of this kind of roof is common in the architecture of the day, but it is said that by reason of the siding on the main part Summit County Circuit. of the house being carried out to the front into the triangular space included between the roof and ceiling of the porch and the front of the house, the view from a second-story porch on any house which might be built to the east of defendants' house, would be obstructed. The porch, outside of this roof, is a remarkably open one. The few posts supporting the roof are not large; the railings are slight and graceful. In order to make light and view for two chamber windows upstairs in the front of the house, the porch roof is cut down and a deck roof constructed, leaving at each side thereof the sloping roof complained of, perhaps six feet wide on each side of this deck roof. The pitch of the main roof, which is the pitch of that part of the porch roof that is complained of, is nearly forty-five degrees. It is conceded that defendants are entitled to a substantial roof over their porch, so that in the last analysis, the only objection plaintiff can have to defendants' porch roof is that it is too steep on the side part. In view of the fact that this roof begins two feet back of the restricted area, it is apparent that it is about two feet lower at the twenty-five-foot line than it would have been if the front of the house had been on that line. This undoubtedly explains the fact that a photograph of the premises taken from the west with another house and porch between the camera and defendant's porch hardly shows the latter, while a photograph taken from the east, with no intervening house, rather magnifies plaintiff's contention. The court viewed the premises, however, and finds the construction of defendants' porch and roof thereof to be within the language of the restriction; it is an open porch and requires no alteration to make it conform to the requirements of the deed. Upon the argument of the case, counsel for plaintiff suggested that to permit the construction here complained of, might encourage some other lot owner in the restricted territory to extend the main part of the second-story of his house out over the porch in the manner sometimes seen. Portage Park Land Co. v. Burch. So far as this case is concerned, the suggestion has no influence, for defendants have not done such a thing and disclaim all intention of so doing. It will be time enough to complain of what somebody else may do, when he does it. The petition is dismissed. Marvin and Niman, JJ., concur. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. [Cuyahoga Circuit Court, April 20, 1912.] CARRIE G. PRENTISS V. EZRA WOODS. Allowance to Administrator for Extraordinary Services to Estate not Disturbed on Error. The mere fact that an allowance to an administrator for extraordinary services rendered his estate seems somewhat large will not warrant the circuit court, on error, in reversing the judgment, the probate judge, with his expert knowledge of the value of such services having first fixed the amount, and the common pleas court, on appeal, having fixed the same amount. ERROR. Otis, Beery & Otis, for plaintiff in error. Grant, Seiber & Mather, for defendant in error. WINCH, J. This case originated in the probate court of Summit county, by plaintiff filing exceptions to the account of defendant as administrator of the estate of Prof. Bates, deceased, in which he claimed $500 extra compensation for extraordinary services rendered the estate. The probate judge heard the parties and their evidence on these exceptions and allowed the claim of the administrator. On appeal to the common pleas court, it did the same thing. The case is here on error, with a bill of exceptions showing all the evidence taken on the hearing in the common pleas court, Cuyahoga County Circuit. and we are asked to reverse its judgment solely on the weight of the evidence. It appears that Prof. Bates died in California, leaving some personal and real property there. He left some personal property located here at the time of his death, and some located in Massachusetts. Defendants applied for and was granted letters of administration in Summit county, Ohio, and at once set about obtaining possession of the assets in the other two states. He was met with the claim that Prof. Bates was a resident of California at the time of his death. This claim was important, for if true, it altered the distribution of the estate. Prof. Bates left a widow and no children. Under the laws of Ohio, his widow would inherit his entire estate; under the laws of California, she would inherit but half of it, and his sister, plaintiff herein, would inherit the other half. In the settlement of this question, depositions had to be taken in Oregon and in California; services of counsel were required, with many consultations and directions; the hearing on this question was long and it was hotly contested; defendant lost the point, but still continued, under advice of counsel; in his effort to bring all the assets of the estate under one administration here, so as to save expense and loss. He succeeded, with some considerable labor, in securing possession of the Massachusetts assets; meanwhile the public administrator in California made claim to the assets there, but the administrator here, after much delay, considerable trouble and by good management, secured control of the personal assets in California. The real estate there remains for administration by the California public administrator under the laws of that state. In all, defendant has administered upon about $25,000 of assets. The foregoing is a summarized statement of defendant's unusual service in this estate; it does not set forth the many little things he did in connection with the collection of the Massachusetts and California assets, and some unusual trouble he had in the collection of part of the Ohio assets. Prentiss v. Woods. It is apparent that defendant performed some services for the estate in his charge which on administrator in this state is not ordinarily called upon to perform. Ordinarily the estate of a deceased resident of Ohio is located at his residence, and the administrator has little trouble in reducing it to his possession, converting it into money and distributing it. For these services he is compensated by a percentage, not large, as any other agent is compensated. But where, as here, he renders unusual services, they are by statute denominated extraordinary services, and for them he is entitled. to additional compensation. The two courts below undertook to fix the value of the extraordinary services, which were without doubt rendered by this administrator. That he was entitled to some extra compensation is equally without doubt. The amount fixed, $500, seems large, but it is not so large that this court, without recent experience in such matters, can say that the probate judge, with his intimate knowledge of the value of such services, got it too large. The probate judge is an expert in such cases. We bow to his judg ment. Judgment affirmed. Marvin and Niman, JJ., concur. HEALTH. [Lorain (8th) Circuit Court, April, 1912.] Winch, Marvin and Niman, JJ. R. H. SHUTE V. ELYRIA (CITY). 1. Reasonable Construction Given Health Rules of Board of Health. A reasonable construction should be given to a rule of the board of health of a city, intended for the protection of the health of its inhabitants, to the end that it may be enforced. 2. Reasonableness of Health Rule Governing the Slaughter of Chickens. One who dresses chickens in a room in the same building with his meat market and connected with it on the same floor, can be punished for the violation of a rule of the board of health providing: "No fowls or animals shall be kept confined, nor shall |