X.

1777.

high ground near Chad's Ford. His right wing, so post- CHAPTER ed as to guard the fords above, was commanded by General Sullivan; and the Pennsylvania militia, under General Armstrong, was stationed on the left about two miles below.

At the same time the British advanced to Kennet Square, seven miles from Chad's Ford. At daybreak, on the morning of the 11th of September, Sir William Howe put his army in motion in two divisions; one, under Knyphausen, taking the direct road to Chad's Ford; the other, led by Lord Cornwallis, moving along the Lancaster road, which ran for several miles nearly parallel with the Brandywine River. Sir William Howe was with this division. As soon as Knyphausen's advanced parties approached near Chad's Ford, they were attacked by General Maxwell with a body of light troops, and a very sharp rencounter ensued; but the enemy's columns pressed forward, and Maxwell was compelled to retire. From this time Knyphausen kept up a heavy fire of artillery, which was returned across the river; but he made no serious attempt to pass the ford. Parties went over and skirmished, and there was brisk firing at different points, without much execution on either side. It was the plan of the Hessian general to amuse the Americans in front, till Cornwallis should have time to gain their right flank and rear.

Battle of the

Brandy

wine.

Sept. 11.

of Cornwal

This design was early suspected by Washington, and Movements he waited with extreme anxiety for intelligence from the lis. patroles, who had been sent to watch the roads leading to the fords, which were all guarded as high up as the fork of the Brandywine, six or seven miles above Chad's Ford. At length, between eleven and twelve o'clock, a message came from General Sullivan, stating that a large body of the enemy had been discovered marching towards the upper fords. Washington ordered Sullivan to push over the river and meet that division, while he crossed and attacked Knyphausen in front. Before this order could be executed, counter information was received. This contradiction and uncertainty caused the order to be sus

CHAPTER pended.

X.

1777.

Result of the

battle.

A little after two o'clock, however, all doubt was removed. Having taken a wide circuit of seventeen miles and crossed two branches of the Brandywine above the fork, Cornwallis had gained the heights near Birmingham meeting-house, within two miles of Sullivan's right flank. Sullivan marched with the three divisions under his command, being his own, Stephen's, and Stirling's, and began to form his troops for action; but, before the arrangement could be completed, Cornwallis opened the attack with such impetuosity, that after a short resistance the right of the American line was broken, the remainder thrown into confusion, and the whole forced to a precipitate retreat. Some of them rallied, and took another stand, where they maintained a short and spirited conflict, till again driven by a greatly superior force from their ground.

The firing in this quarter was the signal for Knyphausen to cross the river, and assault the American intrenchments at Chad's Ford. He was met by General Wayne, who defended the post with his usual gallantry; but, at the head of a single division only, he was in no condition to withstand half the British army. General Greene with another division had removed to a central point between Chad's Ford and Sullivan's scene of action, where he could give support to either party as circumstances might require. Covering Sullivan's retreat, and seizing a pass about a mile from Dilworth, he checked the pursuit of the enemy, and sustained a warm engagement till dark. The firing then ceased. The British remained on the field of battle, and the Americans retreated in much disorder by different routes to Chester, where they all arrived in the course of the night. *

* Deborre, a French general of thirty-five years' service, commanded in Sullivan's division the brigade, which first broke and gave way. Congress voted an inquiry into his conduct, at which he took umbrage and resigned his commission. In his letter to Congress, he complained of hard usage, averring that he did all in his power to rally his men, being wounded in the attempt, and said, if the American troops would

X.

engaged in

The numbers engaged in this action have never been CHAPTER accurately ascertained. Chief Justice Marshall estimates the British army, when it landed, at eighteen thousand 1777. men, healthy and well supplied with all the implements Numbers of war. He supposes the American army, including mili- the action. tia, amounted to fifteen thousand; but, from sickness and other causes, he thinks the effective strength on the day of battle was not more than eleven thousand. Sir William Howe reported his loss to be ninety killed, four hundred and eighty-eight wounded, and six missing. He stated that about three hundred Americans were killed, six hundred wounded, and four hundred taken. This could be only a conjectural estimate, since General Washington made no return of his loss to Congress; such a return being impracticable in the disconnected and moving condition of his army. The Marquis de Lafayette, while Lafayette dismounted and endeavoring to rally the troops, was wounded in the leg, which caused him to retire from active service for two months.

The expediency of fighting this battle with a force so much inferior, and under many disadvantages, has been questioned by foreign writers. If the subject be viewed in a military light only, there may perhaps be just grounds for criticism. But it should be differently regarded. General Washington knew the expectation of the country and of Congress; and he was persuaded, that a defeat would be less injurious in its effects on the public mind, than the permitting of the enemy to march to Philadelphia without opposition. He doubtless hoped to make a better resistance; which he would have done, if he had not been deceived by contradictory intelligence in the time. of battle, against which no foresight could guard. Although some of his troops behaved ill, yet others, and

run away, it was unjust to censure him for the consequences. There was some truth perhaps in this remonstrance; but Deborre, by his ignorance of the character and habits of the American people, had rendered himself very unpopular in the army, and Congress accepted his resignation without reluctance.

wounded.

Motives for battle.

fighting the

X.

CHAPTER the larger part, fought with signal bravery, and inspired him and themselves with a confidence, which could have been produced only by the trial.

1777.

Washington

retreats to

Philadelphia,

Sept. 12.

Invested with new powers.

Recrosses the Schuylkill, and retires to the Yellow Springs.

Sept. 16.

The day after the action he retreated to Philadelphia, and encamped near Germantown. So far from being dismayed by the late disaster, Congress were inspirited to new exertions, and resolved to strengthen the army and bring together all the means of defence in their power. Fifteen hundred Continental troops were ordered down from General Putnam's command on the Hudson, and the militia in Pennsylvania and the adjoining States were summoned to join the main army with all possible despatch. Anticipating the necessity of removing from Philadelphia, Congress again invested General Washington with extraordinary powers. He was authorized to suspend officers, who should misbehave, and fill up vacancies; to take provisions and other articles for the subsistence and comfort of the army within seventy miles of head-quarters, paying or giving certificates for the same; and to remove, or secure for the benefit of the owners, all goods and effects, which might be serviceable to the enemy. This last clause was of special importance; as a great number of disaffected persons in and around Philadelphia would take no pains to withdraw their property, preferring that it should fall into the hands and contribute to the supplies of the enemy.

After allowing his men one day for rest and refreshment, Washington returned across the Schuylkill, and took the Lancaster road leading to the left of the British army, fully determined to offer battle. This bold step,

taken before the enemy had left the field of action at the Brandywine, was a proof that the late repulse had in no degree unsettled his own resolution, or damped the ardor of his troops. The two armies met twenty-three miles from Philadelphia, and an engagement was actually begun between the advanced parties, when a heavy rain came on and rendered both armies totally unfit to pursue the contest. Washington retired to the Yellow Springs, but

X.

was not followed by the British; and he finally passed CHAPTER over the Schuylkill at Parker's Ford. The account of these movements is best related in his own words.

1777.

of the late

"The enemy," he says, "by a variety of perplexing Particulars manœuvres through a country from which I could not movements. derive the least intelligence (being to a man disaffected), Sept. 23. contrived to pass the Schuylkill last night at the Fatland and other fords in the neighborhood of it. They marched immediately towards Philadelphia, and I imagine their advanced parties will be near that city to-night. They had so far got the start before I received certain intelligence that any considerable number had crossed, that I found it in vain to think of overtaking their rear, with troops harassed as ours had been with constant marching since the battle of Brandywine.

"When I last recrossed the Schuylkill, it was with a firm intent of giving the enemy battle wherever I should meet them; and accordingly I advanced as far as the Warren Tavern upon the Lancaster road, near which place the two armies were upon the point of coming to a general engagement, but were prevented by a most violent flood of rain, which continued all the day and following night. When it held up, we had the mortification to find that our ammunition, which had been completed to forty rounds a man, was entirely ruined; and in that situation we had nothing left for it, but to find out a strong piece of ground, which we could easily maintain till we could get the arms put in order, and a recruit of ammunition. Before this could be fully effected, the enemy marched from their position near the White Horse Tavern, down the road leading to the Swedes' Ford. I immediately crossed the Schuylkill above them, and threw myself full in their front, hoping to meet them on their passage, or soon after they had passed the river. The day before yesterday they were again in motion, and marched rapidly up the road leading towards Reading. This induced me to believe that they had two objects in view; one to get round the right of the army, the other perhaps to detach