IX. 1776. es the Delaware. CHAPTER Delaware, and took a stand on the western side of that river, securing the boats, and guarding the crossing-places from Coryell's Ferry to Bristol. At this time the number Army cross- of his men, fit for duty, was about three thousand. The enemy did not attempt to pass the river. For the present, December 7. General Howe was contented with having overrun New Jersey; and he covered his acquisition by a chain of cantonments at Pennington, Trenton, Bordentown, and Burlington. In these positions, the two armies continued with little change for nearly three weeks. Enlistment of prisoners ton. The troops, constituting the Flying Camp heretofore disapproved mentioned, were all enlisted in the middle States, and enby Washinggaged for a year. Their term of service expired during the march, and none, except a small part of those from Pennsylvania, could be prevailed on to stay longer. The Board of War suggested a plan for enlisting prisoners, and appealed to the example of the enemy. General Washington opposed the measure, as not accordant with the rules of honorable warfare, and said he should remonstrate on the subject to Sir William Howe. He moreover thought it impolitic. In times of danger, such recruits would always be the most backward, fearing the punishment they would receive if captured, and communicating their fears to the other soldiers. Prisoners would likewise be tempted to enlist with the intention to desert and carry intelligence to the enemy, for which they would be largely rewarded. Under no circumstances, therefore, could confidence be placed in such men; and the chance was, that they I would do much harm. Conduct of ture. From the time the army separated at White Plains, and his cap- General Lee had acted a very extraordinary part. Washington requested him, in a letter written at Hackinsac, to lead his division into New Jersey, and join the army on its march. This was soon followed by a positive order, which was often repeated. General Lee sent back various excuses, lingered on the east side of the Hudson, endeavored to draw away two thousand of General Heath's men from the Highlands, contrary to the instructions given by IX. 1776. General Washington to the latter; and, after crossing CHAPTER with apparent reluctance into Jersey, his progress was so slow, that, in three weeks from the time he first received orders to march, he had only reached Morristown. The truth is, that he had schemes of his own, which he was disposed to effect at the hazard of disobeying the Commander-in-chief. In the first place, he hoped to make a brilliant stroke upon New York, when it should be exhausted of troops for the expedition towards the Delaware; and next, after crossing the Hudson, he still fostered the design of performing some signal exploit by attacking the enemy in their rear. But his ambitious projects and hopes were suddenly cut short. While on his march, not far from Baskingridge, he lodged one night at a private house three miles from his army, with a small guard. A Tory in the neighborhood gave notice of his situation to the enemy, and early in the morning the house was surrounded by a party of light-horse, commanded by Colonel Harcourt, who took him prisoner, and bore him off in triumph to the British camp. This event created a strong sensation of surprise and regret throughout the country. The military talents, experience, and activity of General Lee had inspired universal confidence, and raised high expectations in the minds of the people. He had served in America during the last war, and afterwards with distinguished reputation in different parts of Europe. His recent enterprise and successes at the south had confirmed the good opinion before entertained of his abilities and skill. His capture, therefore, considering the circumstances, appeared inexplicable. Public sentiment, ever prone to extremes, took a direction unfavorable to his character. As no plausible reason could be assigned for his conduct in exposing himself so incautiously, it was surmised that he was a voluntary prisoner, and sought this method of joining the enemy without incurring the odium of desertion. But there was no just ground for such a suspicion. As a soldier, he was true to the interests of his adopted country; as a friend to Dec. 13. Suspicions motives of as to the General Lee. CHAPTER American freedom, his sincerity may be questioned. HarIX. boring the most bitter resentment against the British Character of Strength of the army. King and ministry, for reasons not fully understood, he wished to see them humbled; and this motive alone would have impelled him to embrace any cause tending to such a result. Violent in his temper, hasty in his resolves, reckless in adventure, possessing an inordinate self-confidence and unbounded ambition, he looked upon the American war as presenting an opportunity for gratifying at the same time his animosity and his passion for glory. He entered heartily into the measures of opposition to the British arms, and in the first year of the contest rendered important services; but, believing himself superior to every other officer in the American ranks, impatient of control even by Congress or the Commander-in-chief, and always pressing on the verge of disobedience, his arrogance had risen to a pitch, that must soon have led to mischievous consequences to himself, and perhaps to the country, if he had escaped the misfortune of captivity. He was a man of genius, well educated, and a skilful writer; but eccentric in his habits, unsettled in his principles, often offensive in his manners, showing little deference to the opinions and feelings of others, and little regard to the usages of society. The command of Lee's division devolved on General Sullivan, who marched with it as soon as possible to the main army. Four regiments under General Gates also arrived from Ticonderoga, being relieved at that place by the retreat of General Carleton to Canada for winterquarters. These were all the regular forces, which General Washington could draw to his support. Heath was ordered to advance with a part of his division from the Highlands; but the taking of Rhode Island by the British, and the threatening appearance of the enemy's vessels in the Sound, made it imprudent to weaken that post, or to call away any of the eastern troops, and the order was countermanded. Three regiments on their march from IX. 1776. Ticonderoga were ordered to halt at Morristown, that, in CHAPTER conjunction with a body of militia there assembled, they might inspirit the inhabitants and protect the country in that quarter. Congress adBaltimore. journs to As soon as the ice should become sufficiently strong, it was expected the enemy would pass the Delaware, and bring all their force to bear upon Philadelphia. Anticipating this event, Congress adjourned to Baltimore. General Putnam took the command of the militia in Phila- General Putdelphia, being instructed to throw up a line of intrenchments and redoubts from the Delaware to the Schuylkill, and prepare for an obstinate defence. nam. state of af fairs. This was the gloomiest period of the war. The cam- Gloomy paign had been little else, than a series of disasters and retreats. The enemy had gained possession of Rhode Island, Long Island, the city of New York, Staten Island, and nearly the whole of the Jerseys, and seemed on the point of extending their conquests into Pennsylvania. By the fatal scheme of short enlistments, and by sickness, the effective force with General Washington had dwindled away, till it hardly deserved the name of an army. A proclamation was published jointly by Lord Howe and General Howe, offering pardon in the King's name to all, who should take the oath of allegiance, and come under his protection within sixty days. Many persons, among whom were men of wealth and consideration, accepted these terms, and went over to the enemy. Others, especially in New Jersey, took the oath, but remained at their homes. In short, so great was the panic and so dark the prospect, that a general despondency pervaded the continent. ton's firm spirit under his reverses. In the midst of these scenes of trial and discourage- Washingment, Washington stood firm. Whatever his apprehen- Dess and sions may have been, no misgivings were manifest in his conduct or his counsels. From his letters, written at this time on the western bank of the Delaware, it does not appear that he yielded for a moment to a sense of immediate danger, or to a doubt of ultimate success. On the CHAPTER contrary, they breathe the same determined spirit, and are IX. marked by the same confidence, calmness, and forethought, 1776. which distinguish them on all other occasions. When Letter of exhortation to Congress. Dec. 20. asked what he would do, if Philadelphia should be taken, he is reported to have said; "We will retreat beyond the Susquehanna River; and thence, if necessary, to the Allegany Mountains." Knowing, as he did, the temper of the people, the deep rooted cause of the controversy, and the actual resources of the confederacy, he was not disheartened by temporary misfortunes, being persuaded that perseverance would at last overcome every obstacle. While even the shadow of an army could be kept in the field, the war must be carried on at an enormous expense by the British government, which the wealthiest nation could not long sustain. Deeply impressed with this conviction, and making it both the groundwork of his policy and his rule of action, he applied all his energies to a renovation of the army, boldly exposing to Congress the errors of their former systems, and earnestly exhorting them to a more effectual exercise of their authority in giving support and vigor to the military establishment. On the 20th of December he wrote as follows to the President of Congress. We "My feelings as an officer and a man have been such as to force me to say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than I have. It is needless to add, that short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. find, Sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball, by rolling, will increase, unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while, also, and the militia of those States, which have been frequently called upon, will not turn out at all; or, if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Penn |