IX. 1776. the first intention of General Howe, and his troops lay CHAPTER on their arms all that night. In writing to Congress the next morning, General Washington's secretary said; "After gaining the hill (upon which they are intrenching), and leaving a sufficient number of men and artillery to prevent our repossessing it, they proceeded to advance by our left; and, as far as I can discover, their posts or encampments now form nearly a semicircle. It is evident their design is to get in our rear according to their original plan. Every measure is taking to prevent them; but the removal of our baggage is attended with infinite difficulty and delays. Our post, from its situation, is not so advantageous as could be wished, and was only intended as temporary and occasional, till the stores belonging to the army, which had been deposited here, could be removed. The enemy coming on so suddenly has distressed us much. They are now close at hand, and most probably will in a little time commence their second attack; we expect it every hour; perhaps it is beginning; I have just heard the report of some cannon." Nothing more occurred, however, than slight skirmishes between the advanced parties. On reconnoitring the camp, General Howe thought it too strong for an assault, and resolved to wait for a reinforcement from Earl Percy, then at Haerlem. This arrived in two days, and the 31st of October was fixed on for the attack; but a heavy rain caused it again to be deferred. The same night General Washington drew all his troops to another position on the hills in his rear, which the delays of his opponent had allowed him time to fortify, and which could be more easily defended than his first camp. So judiciously was this movement planned and conducted, that it was carried into effect without loss or molestation, and even without being discovered by the British army. The idea of a battle was now abandoned Army takes another po sition. October 31. retreat. by General Howe; he despaired of being able to dislodge the Americans from this strong position; and it was soon The British ascertained, that he was withdrawing his army towards the Hudson and Kingsbridge. CHAPTER IX. 1776. As this might be a feint to entice the American forces from the hilly country, Washington remained in his new camp for a few days, till it was found that the enemy were actually retracing their steps. It was then foreseen, of the army. that their first grand manœuvre would be to invest Fort New ar rangements General Washington; and their next to pass the Hudson, and carry the war into New Jersey, and perhaps make a push for Philadelphia. To meet these changes in the best manner he could, he ordered all the troops belonging to the States west of the Hudson, five thousand in number, to cross the river at King's Ferry, all the crossing places below being obstructed by British vessels. The rest of the army, composed of New York and eastern troops, was separated into two divisions. One of these, under General Heath, was stationed on both sides of the river in the Highlands, to defend those passes. The other, amounting to about four thousand men, of whom many were militia, whose times of service were soon to expire, was left in the camp near White Plains, commanded by GenGeneral Lee. eral Lee, with discretionary instructions to continue on that side of the Hudson, or to follow the Commander-inchief into New Jersey, as he should judge expedient when the designs of the enemy were unfolded. Having given these orders, General Washington inspected the posts at Washington the Highlands, and then repaired to Hackinsac, at which place the troops that had crossed the river assembled, after a circuitous march of more than sixty miles. crosses the Hudson. General Howe arrives at Kingsbridge. Nov. 12. General Howe moved his whole army to the neighborhood of Kingsbridge. At his approach the Americans retired from Fort Independence, destroyed the bridge over Haerlem River, and withdrew to the lines near Fort Washington. Thirty flat-boats had passed up the Hudson undiscovered in the night, and entered Haerlem River, which, joined to others brought in from the East River, afforded ample means to the British army for crossing to New York Island. It was resolved to make the assault on the fort from four different points. The British adjutantgeneral was sent to Colonel Magaw, the commander in IX. the fort, with a summons to surrender, which Colonel CHAPTER Magaw rejected, saying he would defend himself to the last extremity. The next morning, November 16th, General Knyphausen advanced with a body of Hessians to the north of the fort, and commenced the attack. Earl Percy nearly at the same time assailed the outer lines on the south; and two parties landed at some distance from each other, after crossing Haerlem River, and forced their way up the steep and rugged ascents on that side. The lines in every part were defended with great resolution and obstinacy; but, after a resistance of four or five hours, the men were driven into the fort, and Colonel Magaw was compelled to surrender the whole garrison prisoners of war. The American loss was about fifty killed, and two thousand eight hundred and eighteen prisoners, including officers and privates. The number of men originally left with Colonel Magaw was only two thousand; but, when the attack was threatened, General Greene sent over reinforcements from Fort Lee. 1776. Capture of ington. Fort Wash Nov. 16. of the capture of Fort Washington. This was the severest blow which the American arms Particulars had yet sustained, and it happened at a most unpropitious time. That there was a great fault somewhere, has never been disputed. To whom it belongs, has been made a question. The project of holding the post, after the British began to retreat from White Plains, was General Greene's; and, as he had commanded at the station several weeks, he was presumed to be perfectly acquainted with the condition of the garrison and its means of defence, and deference was paid to his judgment. Eight days before the attack, Washington wrote to General Greene; "If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post, from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think, that it will not be prudent to hazard the stores and men at Mount Washington; but, as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders, IX. CHAPTER as to evacuating Mount Washington, as you may judge best." Nothing more decisive could be said without giv1776. ing a positive order, which he was always reluctant to do, when he had confidence in an officer on a separate command. His opinion, that the troops ought to be withdrawn, is clearly intimated. General Greene replied; "I cannot help thinking the garrison is of advantage; and I cannot conceive it to be in any great danger. The men can be brought off at any time, but the stores may not be so easily removed. Yet I think they may be got off, if matters grow desperate." To this opinion General Greene adhered to the last. The evening before the assault, General Washington went from Hackinsac to Fort Lee; and while crossing the river, with the view of visiting the garrison, he met Generals Greene and Putnam returning, who told him "the troops were in high spirits, and would make a good defence." He went back with them to Fort Lee. The summons to surrender had already been received by Colonel Magaw; the attack was expected the next morning, and it was now too late to withdraw the troops. Washington's letter to his brother. Nov. 19. In a letter to his brother, written from Hackinsac three days after the surrender, General Washington said; “This post, after the last ships went past it, was held contrary to my wishes and opinion, as I conceived it to be a hazardous one; but, it having been determined on by a full council of general officers, and a resolution of Congress having been received, strongly expressive of their desire, that the channel of the river, which we had been laboring to stop for a long time at that place, might be obstructed, if possible, and knowing that this could not be done, unless there were batteries to protect the obstruction, I did not care to give an absolute order for withdrawing the garrison, till I could get round and see the situation of things, and then it became too late, as the fort was invested. Upon the passing of the last ships, I had given it as my opinion to General Greene, under whose care it was, that it would be best to evacuate the place; but, as the order was discretionary, and his opinion differed from CHAPTER mine, it unhappily was delayed too long." From these facts it seems plain, that the loss of the garrison, in the manner it occurred, was the consequence of an erroneous judgment on the part of General Greene. How far the Commander-in-chief should have overruled his opinion, or whether, under the circumstances of the case, he ought to have given a peremptory order, it may perhaps be less easy to decide. IX. 1776. evacuated. Nov. 20. Sir William Howe followed up his successes. A de- Fort Lee tachment of six thousand men, led by Earl Cornwallis, landed on the Jersey side, six or seven miles above Fort Lee, gained the high grounds with artillery, and marched down between the Hudson and Hackinsac Rivers. The whole body of troops with Washington not being equal to this force, he withdrew the garrison from Fort Lee to the main army at Hackinsac, leaving behind the heavy cannon, many tents, and a large quantity of baggage, provision, and other stores, which the rapid advance of the enemy made it impossible to secure. Being now in a level country, where defence was difficult, pent up between rivers, and pressed by a force double his own, no resource remained but a rapid retreat. The Jersey shore, from New York to Brunswic, was open to the British vessels, and a landing might be effected at any place without opposition. It was necessary, therefore, that he should move towards the Delaware, pursuing a route near the Rariton River, that he might be in the way to prevent General Howe from throwing in a strong detachment between him and Philadelphia. through While on the march, he wrote earnest letters to the Retreat governor of New Jersey and to Congress, describing his New Jersey. situation, and requesting the support of all the militia from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, that could be called into the service. When he arrived at Brunswic, the army then with him amounted to less than four thousand. He was closely pursued by Cornwallis; but the retreat was effected, without loss, to Trenton, where he crossed the |