IX. 1776. Construction of the new army. CHAPTER apportioned in quotas to the several States according to their ability. The largest quota was fifteen battalions, which number was assigned respectively to Virginia and Massachusetts. The men were to serve during the war, this great point being at last gained. To encourage enlistments, a bounty of twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land was offered to each non-commissioned officer and private; and lands in certain quantities and proportions were likewise promised to the commissioned officers. The business of enlisting the troops to fill up the quotas, and of providing them with arms and clothing, devolved upon the several States to which they belonged. The expense of clothing was to be deducted from the soldiers' pay. Colonels and all lower officers were to be appointed by the States, but commissioned by Congress. The rules for the government and discipline of the army were at the same time revised and greatly amended. Original Thus matured, the plan was sent to the Commanderin-chief, and was soon followed by a committee from Congress, instructed to inquire into the state of the army. From this committee the views of Congress were more fully ascertained; but General Washington perceived defects in the scheme, which he feared would retard, if not defeat, its operation. The pay of the officers had not been increased; and he was persuaded, that officers of character could not be induced to retain their commis sions on the old pay. The mode of appointing them was defective, it being left to the State governments, which would act slowly, without adequate knowledge, and often under influences not salutary to the interests of the army. The pay of the privates was also insufficient. Congress partially remedied these defects in conformity to his advice, by raising the officers' pay, giving a suit of clothes annually to each private, and requesting the States to send commissioners to the army, with full powers to arrange with the Commander-in-chief the appointment of all the officers. With the jealousy of State sovereignty, and the fear of a standing army, this was all that could be IX. 1776. obtained from the representatives of the States. And per- CHAPTER haps it was enough, considering their want of power to execute their resolves, and the necessity of being cautious to pass such only as the people would approve and obey. The above plan was modified before it went into effect, by allowing men to enlist for three years; these men not receiving the bounty in land. Hence the army from that time was composed of two kinds of troops, those engaged for the war, and those for three years. At length, also, the States being negligent and tardy in providing for the appointment of officers, Congress authorized General Washington to fill up the vacancies. A circular letter was written by the President of Congress to the States, urging them to complete their quotas without delay. The proper steps were immediately taken; but an evil soon crept into the system, which produced much mischief throughout the war. To hasten enlistments, some of the States offered bounties in addition to those given by Congress; and in many cases the towns, to which quotas were assigned by the State governments, raised the bounties still higher, differing from each other in the amount. Again, when the militia were called out on a sudden emergency, it was usual to offer them extraordinary rewards for a short term of service. This practice was injurious on many accounts. It kept back men from enlisting by the hope of higher bounties; and, when they were brought together in the field, although the Continental pay was uniform, yet many were receiving more from incidental bounties, and in various proportions, which created murmurings and jealousies between individuals, companies, and regiments. Nor was there the salutary check of interest to operate as a restraint upon the States. The war was a common charge, and, when money or credit could be applied to meet the present exigency, it was a small sacrifice to be bountiful in accumulating a debt, which the continent was pledged to pay. There could be no other remedy than a supreme power in Congress, which did not exist; and the evil was Injurious irregular effects of an system of bounties. IX. 1776. ties of the in-chief. CHAPTER at all times a source of irregularities in the military arrangements, and of vexation to the Commander-in-chief. The arduous duties of General Washington's immediate Arduous du- command were now increased by the task of organizing Commander- a new army, and holding conferences with commissioners from the States for the appointment of officers, in the midst of an active campaign, while the enemy were pressing upon him with a force vastly superior in discipline, at times superior in numbers, and abundantly supplied with provisions, clothing, tents, and all the munitions of war. British troops ad vance into the country. October 12. Sir William Howe was soon in motion. Having prepared his plans for gaining the rear of the American army, by which he hoped either to cut off its communication with the country, or bring on a general action, he first sent two ships, a frigate, and tenders up the Hudson. These vessels passed the batteries, and ran through the obstructions in the river, without receiving any apparent damage; and thus secured a free passage to the Highlands, thereby preventing any supplies from coming to the American army by water. This experiment having succeeded even better than he had expected, the British commander, on the 12th of October, embarked his troops on the East River on board flat-boats, sloops, and schooners, passed through Hell Gate into the Sound, and landed the same day at Frog's Point. Two brigades of British troops, and one of Hessians, amounting to five thousand men, were left under Earl Percy at Haerlem to cover the city of New York. General Howe remained five days at Frog's Point, waiting, as he says, for stores, provisions, and three battalions from Staten Island; but, according to the American accounts, the strong defences, guarded by detachments from Washington's army, and the destruction of the causeway connecting the Point with the main land, discouraged him from attempting to march into the country at that place. He reëmbarked, landed again at Pell's Point, and advanced to the high grounds between East Chester and New Rochelle. Four days later he was joined by General Knyphausen with the second IX. American army pre pares to leave New York Island. October 16. division of Hessians, and a regiment of Waldeckers, just CHAPTER arrived from Europe. General Washington took measures to counteract these 1776. movements and the designs of them. He arranged his army in four divisions, commanded respectively by MajorGenerals Lee, Heath, Sullivan, and Lincoln. The last was not a Continental officer, but had recently come forward with a body of Massachusetts militia. It was decided in a council of war, that the army should leave New York Island, and be extended into the country, so as to outflank General Howe's columns. At the same time it was agreed, "that Fort Washington should be retained as long as possible." Two thousand men were left for that object. marches to Plains. One of the four divisions crossed Kingsbridge, and Army threw up breast works at Valentine's Hill. The others White followed and formed a line of detached camps, with intrenchments, on the heights stretching along the west side of the River Brunx, from Valentine's Hill to White Plains. This disposition was necessary in order to protect the baggage, stores, and cannon, which were removed with great difficulty for the want of wagons and horses. General Washington proceeded with the advanced division to White Plains, where he fortified a camp in such a manner, as to afford security to the whole army, and where he intended to hazard a general engagement, if pushed by the enemy. The camp was on elevated ground, defended in front by two lines of intrenchments nearly parallel to each other, and between four and five hundred yards apart. The right wing rested on the Brunx, which, by making a short bend, encompassed the flank and part of the rear. The left wing reached to a pond, or small lake, of some extent, by which it was effectually secured. As Sir William Howe marched his army directly forward in solid columns, without detaching any considerable parties towards New York and the Hudson, it was evident he intended to seek an opportunity to force a Camp at White Plains. British army marches to Plains. IX. CHAPTER general action. As soon as the baggage and stores were brought up, therefore, Washington drew all his troops into the camp at White Plains. In the interim, parties of Americans attacked the enemy's outposts at different points, and spirited skirmishes took place. 1776. Battle of Hill. October 28. Expected at tack on the camp. Before noon, on the 28th of October, the British army came in view, and displayed itself on the sides of the hills in front of Washington's lines, and within two miles of his camp. A commanding height, called Chatterton's Hill, stood half a mile to the south of the American right flank, and was separated from it by the Brunx, and low marshy ground. A militia regiment had been posted there, which was joined in the morning by Colonel Haslet, with his Delaware regiment, and afterwards by a battalion of Maryland troops, and others, mostly militia, to the number of about sixteen hundred, the whole being under the command of General McDougall. The British commander made it his first object to dislodge these troops. For this purpose a battalion of Hessians, a brigade of British commanded by General Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers under Colonel Donop, were ordered to cross the Brunx and attack in front; while Colonel Rahl, with another brigade of Hessians, should cross farther down the river and advance by a circuitous march upon the American right flank. They forded the Brunx, and formed in good order on the other side under the fire of their cannon, though not without being galled by the troops at the summit of the hill. They then ascended the heights, and, after a short but severe action, drove the Americans from their works; but, contented with gaining the post, and fearing they might be cut off by venturing too far from the main body, they desisted from pursuit. The American loss has been variously represented. According to a return made by General Howe himself, the prisoners were four officers and thirty-five privates. The number killed was not known. It was expected that this advantage would be followed by an immediate attack on the camp. Such indeed was |