CHAPTER VIII. 1775. prise of General Howe. CHAPTER VIII. Plans for an Attack on Boston. Condition of the Army. - Dorchester -- Heights fortified. Evacuation of Boston. TOWARDS the end of December it was ascertained, that General Howe was fitting out a part of his fleet in the harbor of Boston for some secret enterprise. Its destinaSecret enter- tion could only be conjectured; but the season of the year and other circumstances induced a belief, that an operation at the south was in view. Fears were entertained for New York, then in a defenceless condition, feeble from the timid counsels of its provincial Congress, awed by a British man-of-war, and distracted by the artifices of Governor Tryon, whose presence and address had kept together on Long Island a formidable body of Tories, some concealed, others undisguised. General Lee sent to take the com mand in In No efforts were to be spared to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of so important a post as New York, New York. which, with Hudson's River, opened a direct channel to Canada, through which an invading army might pass, to the great injury of the interior country, if not to the discomfiture of the army in the northern department. the present state of General Washington's forces, he could not send a detachment from camp. As the most promisJanuary 8. ing scheme that offered, General Lee was despatched, with instructions from the Commander-in-chief to raise volunteers in Connecticut, hasten forward to New York, call to his aid other troops from New Jersey, put the city VIII. in the best posture of defence which his means would CHAPTER permit, disarm the Tories and other persons inimical to the rights and liberties of America, and guard the forti- 1776. fications on Hudson's River. Lee's opera York. The duty was delicate in itself, and difficult in the General execution, requiring energy and firmness, tempered with tions in New a moderation seldom conspicuous in the character of General Lee. In this instance, however, he was judicious and successful. A committee from Congress met him at New York, by whose prudence his exuberant ardor was restrained, and who, by bracing up the civil authorities with a little more courage, brought about a coöperation favorable to vigorous measures. The alarm for the safety of New York was premature. The fleet from Boston, having on board several regiments under the command of General Clinton, sailed to North Carolina, in the prosecution of a plan previously formed in the British cabinet, at the recommendation of Governor Martin, for making a descent upon that colony. An attack on commended, Boston re but disap proved by a council of war. Meantime General Washington became more and more impatient to make an attack on Boston. He summoned a council of officers on the 16th of January, to whom with strong arguments he urged the necessity of such an attempt before the enemy should be reinforced, and re- January 16. quested their opinion. They agreed that the attack ought not to be deferred a moment after there should be a fair hope of its succeeding; but, with the force then in the field, they believed it impracticable. That his feelings were keenly affected by his situation, is apparent from the tone of a letter written at the time. "Could I have foreseen the difficulties," said he, "which have come upon us; could I have known that such backwardness would have been discovered by the old soldiers to the service, all the generals upon earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston till this time." He alludes here to the soldiers of the first army, who had refused to enlist, and gone home, in much greater numbers than he had anticipated. CHAPTER VIII. 1776. Call for thirteen regiments of militia. News of the repulse at Quebec. Want of powder and arms. The The new regiments were increasing very tardily. time for which the five thousand militia engaged to serve had expired, and a few only could be prevailed upon to stay longer. Another call for militia was indispensable. Seven regiments were apportioned to Massachusetts, four to Connecticut, and two to New Hampshire. By the time these should come in, it was hoped the ice on the waters around Boston would be frozen hard enough to facilitate an assault on the town. Just at this moment arrived the news of the repulse at Quebec, and the death of General Montgomery, with an urgent request from General Schuyler, that three thousand men should be immediately sent into Canada, as the smallest force necessary to retrieve the loss, and to sustain the cause in that colony. Such a detachment from Washington's army was impossible, without ruin to himself; but, ever prompt to provide for exigencies and to act for the general good, he instantly applied to the governments of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire to furnish each a regiment, which should continue in service one year, and march forthwith to Canada. To relieve these colonies from an increased burden, he allowed the three regiments to be taken from his last requisition, reserving ten for the main army. The proposal was well received, and the troops were raised and marched to Canada during the winter. Besides the want of powder, which had at no time been supplied in any adequate quantity, the deficiency of arms threatened serious consequences. There were nearly two thousand men in camp without firelocks. Every expedient was tried to procure them, but with little effect. The New England governments had none to furnish. The militia, reluctant to part with their arms, carried them away when they returned home. Officers were sent into the country with money to purchase them. A few were obtained in this way, but not enough to arm all the men. Despondency was seldom known, perhaps never, to unsettle the constancy or self-command of Washington. He VIII. 1776. Prospects of discourag the future ing. seemed to gather new strength by resisting the pressure CHAPTER of difficulties thickening around him. Borne up by a conscious integrity, weighing well every act of his life, convinced of the justice of his cause, and habitually trusting in the direction of an overruling Providence, his farreaching mind looked steadily to the end, and he went onward, resolute in purpose, strong in hope. The events of the last six months, however, and the position in which he was now placed, could not but awaken anxious forebodings, and touch his sensibility. He saw his own reputation and the vital interests of his country in jeopardy. The means of rescuing the one from unmerited censure, and securing the other on a solid basis, were feeble, remote, uncertain. The following is his language on the occasion, contained in a letter to a friend. seph Reed. February 10. "I know the unhappy predicament in which I stand; Letter to JoI know that much is expected of me; I know, that, without men, without arms, without ammunition, without any thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring my wants, which I am determined not to do, farther than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them. My situation is so irksome to me at times, that, if I did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put every thing on the cast of a die. So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men well armed, I have been here with less than half that number, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situation has been such, that I have been obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers." As a contrast to this representation, proving the buoyancy of his mind and his determined spirit under the heaviest depression, another passage is here quoted from the same letter. CHAPTER "With respect to myself, I have never entertained an idea of an accommodation, since I heard of the measures, which were adopted in consequence of the Bunker's Hill fight. The King's speech has confirmed the sentiments specting the I entertained upon the news of that affair; and, if every VIII. 1776. His senti ments re conduct of the British ministry. Proposes an assault on Boston. man was of my mind, the ministers of Great Britain should know, in a few words, upon what issue the cause should be put. I would not be deceived by artful declarations, nor specious pretences; nor would I be amused by unmeaning propositions; but, in open, undisguised, and manly terms, proclaim our wrongs, and our resolution to be redressed. I would tell them, that we had borne much, that we had long and ardently sought for reconciliation upon honorable terms, that it had been denied us, that all our attempts after peace had proved abortive, and had been grossly misrepresented, that we had done every thing which could be expected from the best of subjects, that the spirit of freedom rises too high in us to submit to slavery. This I would tell them not under covert, but in words as clear as the sun in its meridian brightness." By degrees the affairs of the army assumed a more favorable aspect. Owing to the mildness of the winter, little ice was formed till the middle of February, when it was sufficiently strong to enable the troops to march over it from Roxbury and Dorchester. The Commanderin-chief proposed to take advantage of this opportunity, and make an immediate assault on Boston. His opinion was overruled by a council of officers, much to his disappointment and chagrin. "Though we had been waiting all the year," said he, "for this favorable event, the enterprise was thought too dangerous. Perhaps it was; perhaps the irksomeness of my situation led me to undertake more than could be warranted by prudence. I did not think so, and I am sure yet, that the enterprise, if it had been undertaken with resolution, must have succeeded; without it, any would fail." It was resolved, however, that active operations should commence, and that posses |