CHAPTER itia laws. These were various and discordant; and hence no general system could prevail. Discipline was lax; disorders frequent.

VII.

1775.

Want of ammunition.

Appoint

ment of off

isfactory.

But the most alarming want was that of ammunition, respecting which the officers themselves seem to have been deceived, till General Washington discovered, to his great astonishment, that there was not powder enough in the whole camp for nine cartridges to a man.

Out of these materials, and in the midst of these emcers not sat- barrassments, it was General Washington's first task to form, commission, and systematize an army. Another circumstance caused great perplexity from the beginning. The appointment of general officers by Congress had given much dissatisfaction. The pretensions to rank, on the score of former services, had not been well adjusted. The subordinate officers and private soldiers mingled their sympathies and complaints, and threatened to leave the army unless these grievances should be redressed. Symptoms of discontent appeared in every quarter, and threatened to destroy the little that remained of method and discipline. The ferment was gradually allayed by the prudence of Washington, who referred the matter to Congress, and proceeded steadily to mature his plans.

Arrange

ment of the army.

Officers commission

ed anew.

He arranged the army into six brigades, of six regiments each, in such a manner, that the troops from the same colony should be brought together, as far as practicable, and act under a commander from that colony. Of the whole he made three grand divisions, each consisting of two brigades or twelve regiments. The division forming the left wing was stationed at Winter Hill, and commanded by Major-General Lee; the centre division was at Cambridge, under Major-General Putnam; and the right wing at Roxbury, under Major-General Ward. The headquarters of the Commander-in-chief were with the centre at Cambridge.

Thus was planted the original germ of the Continental army, to foster the growth and strength of which required the utmost care and address. All the officers were com

VII.

1775.

missioned anew by Congress, although no changes of rank CHAPTER were attempted, and no appointments made, except of the major and brigadier generals. By degrees the system worked itself into a tolerable method; but, after all, it was full of imperfections, which no art or skill could remedy. The soldiers had been enlisted by their respective governments for a definite time and object, and they looked upon this contract as one which they were bound to fulfil, but not such as could put them under any other power. Each individual regarded himself as a party concerned, and claimed his rights as a citizen.

Hence, when the rules and regulations of the Continental army, which had been prescribed by Congress, were presented to them, many would not accede, because they did not enlist on such terms, and they were apprehensive some new obligations might devolve on them by giving their assent. Having left their homes to fight for liberty, they chose to assert it first in their own behalf. However repugnant this temper was to the existence of an army, the commander yielded to his good sense, and resorted to no other force than that of argument and facts, judiciously set forth from time to time in the general orders; tenacious of his authority no farther than the public good exacted, and forbearing to oppose prejudices, which could not be softened by persuasion nor subdued by severity. He left it optional with the men to subscribe the articles or not, making it a necessary condition only with the new recruits, who enlisted into the Continental ranks.

The soldiers luctantly to rangement.

accede re

the new ar

jealous of

power.

In addition to the management and direction of the Congress armies in the field, which is all that is usually expected military from a commander-in-chief, a most responsible service of a different kind was thrown upon General Washington. Congress, as the civil head of the confederacy, was as yet feeble in its powers, imperfectly organized, distrustful of its control over the public will, and wholly unversed in military concerns. Nor did unanimity reign among its members. On the great point of resistance, till wrongs should be redressed, there was but one voice. As to the

CHAPTER means of attaining this end, a wide difference prevailed. Some were timid, fixing their hopes upon a speedy recon1775. ciliation; others doubted the ability of the country to sustain a contest; others were influenced by local interests; while others again were resolute, and allowed all thoughts of future consequences to be swallowed up in the single consideration of the justice of their cause. The majority were of this last description. Yet even these men, dauntless in spirit, and willing to risk every thing on their own account, were haunted by a spectre, which gave them great uneasiness. History had told them of the danger of military power, the ambition of aspiring leaders, and the chains that had been forged and riveted on an unsuspicious people by standing armies. These lessons made a deep impression, and infused a distrust incompatible with enlarged schemes or energetic action. Thus it was, that the same ardor of patriotism, which impelled them to encounter every hazard, operated as a check to the only measures by which their object could be gained.

Washington unmoved by the suspicions of Congress.

His task in directing the

fairs of the

country.

These misgivings were early discovered by Washington. He respected the motive, although he could not but lament its effects. Conscious, on his own part, of the highest purity of purpose, and harboring no latent thought, which was not directed to the best good of his country, if he felt wounded at this suspicion, he did not suffer it to appear in his conduct, nor to alter his opinion of the watchful guardians of the people's liberty. Example, he wisely thought, would be more regarded than complaint, more persuasive than words. If ability and courage are necessary in a commander, he soon saw, that, in his case at least, patience, forbearance, and fortitude, were not less so.

A regular army and a military system were to be creatmilitary af ed, and on such principles as would insure their stability and continuance. This great work was to be executed mainly by the Commander-in-chief. Congress might approve, sanction, and aid; but it was his task to invent, combine, organize, establish, and sustain. To this end he

VII.

1775.

kept up an unremitted correspondence with Congress dur- CHAPTER ing the whole war. His letters were read to the House in full session, and almost every important resolution respecting the army was adopted on his suggestion or recommendation, and emanated from his mind. He was thus literally the centre of motion to this immense and complicated machine, not more in directing its operations, than in providing for its existence, and preserving from derangement and ruin its various parts. His perplexities were often increased by the distance at which he was stationed from Congress, the tardy movements of that body, and the long time it took to obtain the results of their deliberations. By a constant watchfulness and forethought, and by anticipating the future in his communications, he contrived to lessen this inconvenience as far as it could be done.

with numerous public

bodies.

Besides his unceasing intercourse with Congress, he was Corresponds obliged to correspond with the heads of the provincial governments, and afterwards with the governors and legislatures of the States, with conventions, committees, and civil magistrates. In these were really vested the executive powers of the confederated government. Congress recommended, advised, resolved; they voted men and supplies, assigning due proportions to the respective States; here their authority ceased. The rest was left to the will of the people, exercised through their representatives in the State legislatures. These bodies required the perpetual promptings of the Commander-in-chief, with forcible representations of the weakness and wants of the army, and appeals to all the motives which could stimulate patriotism or touch the springs of interest. One advantage, however, attended these harassing relations, which might compensate for so extraordinary a weight of care and responsibility. They brought him into more direct contact with the sources of power, and enabled him to extend his influence, and the fruits of his wisdom, into channels where they were most needed, and would produce the best ef

CHAPTER fects; thus enlarging the compass of his own consideration, and promoting public harmony and union.

VII.

1775.

His firmness in resisting

the calls of the States

ry force.

July 31.

He had not been long in camp, when he was called upon to exercise his firmness in a manner, that for a moment threatened disagreeable consequences. The enemy's for a milita- armed vessels were hovering on the coast, seizing small craft, and menacing towns on the seaboard. The inhabitants were alarmed, and claimed protection. The legislature of Massachusetts and the governor of Connecticut applied to Washington with a formal request, that he would detach troops from the army for that purpose. To refuse this request was delicate; to grant it, dangerous. In the former case, it would excite the clamors of the people and the dissatisfaction of their rulers; in the latter, it would weaken the army so much, as to leave the camp exposed to a successful assault, and the country around Boston to insult and ravage. The army itself might be dispersed, and the hopes of the continent blighted in the bud. did not hesitate. He declined, and stated his reasons in language so judicious and forcible, as to avoid giving offence, and to blunt the edge of disappointment. This precedent was followed throughout the war. It was established as a rule, that attacks of the enemy at isolated points along the coast must be repelled by the militia in the vicinity, except when the Continental army was in a condition to make detachments without jeoparding the general cause.

Opposes the project of a

Nova Scotia.

August 11.

He

There was a project on foot for an expedition from descent upon Maine against Nova Scotia, which some members of the Massachusetts legislature were disposed to aid. Washington discouraged it as inexpedient, if not improper. He said the inhabitants of Nova Scotia had committed no hostilities, and that such an enterprise would be a measure of conquest rather than defence, which he conceived to be contrary to the principles upon which the colonies had hitherto acted. They had taken up arms to defend their liberties, and not to disturb the quiet of their neighbors.