sy between plaintiff and defendant; that de- Action by Louise B. Goddard and others fendant [doubtless meaning plaintiff] accept- against C. E. Emerson, as Sheriff of Lassen ed said payments in full satisfaction and dis- County. From a judgment for defendant, charge of all claims and demands whatsoev- plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. er against defendant, and particularly of the demand set up in the complaint herein."

Appeal from Superior Court, Lassen ister's office. The filing was made in the County; F. D. Burroughs, Judge. recorder's office one day after the entry of

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

the judgment and in the register's office | fice, the annulments shall be canceled by eight days after the judgment was entered. said officer, and the rights of the purchasers The statute law, as found in the Political shall thereby be fully restored." Code, is as follows:

The act of 1881 seems not to interfere "Sec. 3550. Twenty days after the entry with or change the duty of the district atof judgment the district attorney must file torney in the requirement of section 3550 to in the office of the register, and in the re-file copies of the decree as there directed, corder's office of the county in which the land is situated, certified copies thereof.

"Sec. 3351. The holder of the certificate of purchase may, at any time before such filing, pay to the sheriff the amount due the state, and the costs of suit that have accrued up to the time of payment; whereupon the district attorney must dismiss the suit or vacate the judgment, and the purchaser or holder of the certificate of purchase is restored to his rights in the premises."

The provisions relating to proceedings against delinquent purchasers of state land are found in title 8, c. 1, art. 6, §§ 3546 to 3556, of the Political Code, and appear to be a codification of parts of the act of March 28, 1868. St. 1868, p. 507. Section 66 of that act provided that: "When a decree shall have been obtained, and within twenty days after the entering up of said decree, the district attorney shall cause a certified copy of said decree to be filed in the office of the register of the state land office and another certified copy in the recorder's office of the county in which the land is situate. The holder of the certificate of purchase may, at any time before the expiration of the twenty days provided for filing, a certified copy * * pay to the sheriff," etc.; the provision being much the same as in section 3551 of the Political Code, supra. Section 66 of the act of 1868 is carried into the Political Code and made the subject of the two sections, supra.

On March 7, 1881 (St. 1881, p. 65), the Legislature passed an “act to enable purchasers of state lands to redeem the same, where their title has been or may hereafter be foreclosed for nonpayment of interest." It reads:

but it does appear to change and enlarge the right of redemption by the holder of the certificate of purchase. The right under the act of 1881 may be exercised at any time within 12 months "after said foreclosures are or have been completed," which would be upon the entry of judgment. In the case of Marshall et al. v. Farmers' Bank of Fresno, 115 Cal. 330, 42 Pac. 418, 47 Pac. 52, the copies "were filed within 20 days after the entry of the judgment" (Pol. Code, § 3550), and redemption was "before the expiration of a year from the entry of the judgment," under the act of 1881. The case, however, turned upon the conclusiveness of the patent thereupon issued, and did not determine the question here. It does, inferentially, nevertheless, seem to recognize the force of the act of 1881, as superseding the provisions of section 3551 of the Political Code. It seems to us that, in view of the later act, the right to redeem is no longer restricted to the time or conditions mentioned in section 3551, but is derived from the act of 1881, and is no longer to be governed by the filing or failure to file copies of the decree as provided in section 3550. A duty is by that section still cast upon the district attorney, and, whether he discharges it before or after the expiration of 20 days from the entry of the decree, the purchaser has 12 months, and no longer, from the completion of the foreclosure-i. e., the entry of the decree within which to redeem. The act of 1881 changes the rule which would govern if the right of redemption depended wholly upon the two Code sections cited. Appellant did not offer to redeem until 18 months after the entry of the decree. This was too late. The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: HART, J.; BURNETT, J.

(15 Cal. App. 453)

OPMENT CO. (Civ. 889.)

Feb. 23, 1911.)

"Section 1. In all cases where the title of purchasers of land from the state has been foreclosed, or attempted to be foreclosed, for non-payment of interest, said purchasers, their executors, administrators, or successors in interest shall have, twelve SCOTT v. MONTE CRISTO OIL & DEVELmonths after said foreclosures are or have been completed, within which to redeem (Court of Appeal, Second District, California. such land by paying to the county treasurer, for the benefit of the fund, or parties entitled thereto, all delinquent interest, and interest that would have accrued in case there had been no foreclosure; also all costs of foreclosure to be paid to the fund, or the parties who paid said costs. When said payments are made, and indorsed on the certificate of purchase, specifying the amount paid as interest and for costs, and duly reported to the register of the land of

1. CORPORATIONS (8 406*) - AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT.

Where the president of a corporation had general charge of the corporation's business in a county other than that in which its office was located, and, on a servant being injured, the president directed that medical treatment and nursing be furnished him at the expense of the corporation, which paid the expense of taking him from the corporation's works to a private hospital, where he was cared for, such facts, in the absence of anything to the con

trary, were sufficient to justify an inference that the president acted within the scope of his authority.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1611-1614; Dec. Dig. § 406.*] 2. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS (§ 13*)-EM

to care for and furnish all medical aid necessary in the treatment of his said illness caused by the injuries so received while in the

employ of defendant; that the president of the corporation, in the presence of the field PLOYMENT-CONTRACT-CONSIDERATION. superintendent thereof, promised and agreed The moral obligation resting on an employ on behalf of said corporation that it would er to furnish assistance and care to an injured pay him for such services so rendered and to employé, though the employer was not respon- be rendered on behalf of said Ingalls, who sible for the injury, constituted a sufficient consideration for the agreement of the employer's was totally unable to act for himself and in president to pay a physician for professional a helpless condition; that plaintiff did attend services rendered such servant. said Ingalls and gave him medical aid and [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Physicians surgical assistance during the period extendand Surgeons, Cent. Dig. §§ 18-20; Dec. Dig. ing from February 22d to and including April 3. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS (§ 13*)-EM-5th, which services were of the reasonable value of $500; that one Anderson was the Where the president of a corporation em- proprietor of a sanatorium, known as the ployed a physician to care for an injured em- Bakersfield Sanatorium, to which the presiployé, the fact that the injury was not received dent of the corporation, in the presence of the while the servant was performing the duties of his employment did not prevent a recovery field superintendent, ordered the said Leslie for the physician's services. Ingalls to be taken and to be there nursed and cared for during his said illness, and the president of said corporation did promise and

§ 13.*]

PLOYMENT.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Physicians and Surgeons, Dec. Dig. § 13.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Kern County; agree on its behalf that it would pay to said J. W. Mahon, Judge.

Action by W. P. Scott against the Monte Cristo Oil & Development Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Henry Ach, Geo., E. Whitaker, and G. E. Lawrence, for appellant. Matthew S. Platz, for respondent.

SHAW, J. Plaintiff is a physician and surgeon and brought this action, both in his own behalf and as assignee of other claims, to recover for professional services rendered and medicines furnished to an employé of defendant, which services and medicines are alleged to have been rendered and furnished at defendant's request. Defendant is a corporation having its principal place of business at San Francisco, but at the times mentioned in the complaint was engaged in mining oil and the development of oil lands in Kern county. No question is made as to the rendition or value of the services alleged to have been performed, but defendant denies that the same were rendered at its request. The chief question therefore presented is whether defendant authorized plaintiff to render the services.

Anderson the expense and cost of the care and nursing of said Ingalls during his said illness; that from said 22d day of February to and including the 5th day of April the said Anderson did care for, shelter, attend, and nurse said Ingalls during his said illness, the reasonable value of which service was the sum of $456, which claim was duly assigned to this plaintiff. A like finding is made with reference to the claim of the drug company which is alleged to have furnished medicines and drugs for the use of said Ingalls during his said illness. It is further found that the corporation partially ratified the acts of its president in ordering medical aid, care, and nursing of said Ingalls, by paying part of the expense that was incurred, in that the corporation paid the bill for the hire of the wagon wherein said Ingalls was conveyed from its property in the oil fields to the Bakersfield Sanatorium.

Judgment went for plaintiff for the sum of $966.90, from which, and an order denying its motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.

Defendant offered no evidence, but at the close of plaintiff's case moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence failed to show that Henry Ach, the president of the company, had authority to make contracts on its behalf. This motion was denied.

As disclosed by the record, the evidence tended to establish the following facts: Jones was superintendent of the company in charge of its local affairs. Ach was president of the company, and Jones received his orders and instructions pertaining to the management of the local affairs of the company from Ach as president acting for and on its behalf. All of the business transacted in the community, other than that attended to by the superintendent, was transacted through Ach, its president. "What the superintendent

It appears from the findings that on or about the 22d day of February, 1908, one Leslie Ingalls was in the employ of defendant as a laborer upon certain oil lands which defendant was then engaged in developing; that while so in the employ of defendant, and while performing the duties of his said employment, said Ingalls received great bodily injury and was so dangerously hurt that he lost all consciousness and was absolutely helpless and unable to do or act for himself by reason thereof; that on said date defendant requested plaintiff, in his capacity of physician and surgeon, to attend said Ingalls and •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 115 P.-5

thority vested in one charged with the general power shown to have been exercised by Ach as president of the corporation. The directors did not meet in Kern county, all of its business there was transacted through

said generally went." On February 22d, Ingalls, then in the employ of the company, in some manner not disclosed by the record, was seriously injured; his skull being fractured, necessitating an operation of trephining. In response to a telephone message, plaintiff | Ach, its president, and, since he was held out went to the plant of defendant, located in the by the corporation as possessing full power Kern county oil fields, where he found In- to act in its behalf in all matters arising and galls in an unconscious condition in the bunk- transacted in that vicinity, then, in the abhouse, at which time Ach, for and on behalf sence of anything to the contrary, the eviof the corporation, as its president, ordered dence was sufficient to raise a presumption Ingalls transferred to the private sanatorium that he was vested with the authority which of Louise Anderson, the expense of making he purported to exercise in making the agreesuch transfer being paid by defendant, and ment. Under the circumstances disclosed by then stated to plaintiff, in the presence of the the record, we deem it but a reasonable insuperintendent, that defendant would pay ference to conclude that the making of this the bills. Thereafter, Ach, in his capacity as agreement by Ach as president of the compresident, authorized the employing of nurses pany was within the scope of the powers to attend Ingalls, and ordered the superinten- vested in him by the corporation. Toledo, dent to see that everything possible was done | W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188, 95 for him. During the period from February | Am. Dec. 484; Mt. Wilson Gold & Silver Min. 22d to April 5th Ingalls remained at the hospital, where he was attended by nurses employed for that purpose, and was treated by plaintiff, who procured drugs and medicines required for his use, all of which was done in reliance upon the promises made by the president of the corporation for and on its behalf, and by the superintendent of the corporation pursuant to instructions given him by the president of the corporation.

The contention of appellant is that the evidence fails to show any authority, either express or implied, on the part of the president or superintendent of the corporation to act for it in making such agreement or incurring such liability.

[1] No question of ultra vires is involved. The superintendent received his orders and instructions on behalf of the corporation from Mr. Ach. Jones, the superintendent, testifies that Ach instructed him "to put on an extra nurse." "That was his instruction, to do all that I could for the boy. That was his instruction always." "That was the drift of the whole thing at all times, even to the letters. If any mention was made of the boy in any letter, it was to see that everything possible was to be done for the boy." There is also evidence to the effect that plaintiff, after dressing the wounds of Ingalls at the bunkhouse, asked whether they would send him to the hospital as a county charge, or to the private sanatorium, where the hospital charges would be $25 per week. If the injury to Ingalls was due to the negligence of the corporation, then, in the absence of contributory negligence on his part, the corporation would be liable to him for these claims and he might recover therefor. Such circumstances

would constitute a sufficient consideration for the making of the agreement and raise a presumption that it was in the interest of the corporation to do what it could to reduce its liability for damages on account of such injury. It could not be said that an agree ment of this character made under such con

Co. v. Burbidge, 11 Colo. App. 487, 53 Pac. 826; Railroad Co. v. Taft, 28 Mich. 294; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Winterbotham, 52 Kan. 433, 34 Pac. 1052; Scott v. Oil Co., 144 Cal. 140, 77 Pac. 817; Crowley v. Genesee M. Co., 55 Cal. 273.

Conceding that defendant was not responsible for the injuries received by Ingalls and might have refused to assist or care for him in any way, nevertheless the company recognized an obligation to do something towards relieving his suffering and assisting him and did send him to the sanatorium and paid for the services rendered in such transportation, fication of the acts of its president. In the which, however small, constituted some raticase of Railway Company v. McVay, 98 Ind. 391, 49 Am. Rep. 770, it is said: "There is no evidence as to how Barnett was injured; but inasmuch as the general manager ratified contracts for taking care of him, and the company paid for such service (except the claim of appellee), it should be presumedthere being no evidence to the contrary-that the injury was so inflicted as that the contract for his care was not ultra vires."

[2] The case at bar is not unlike that of

Fraser v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 103 Cal. 79, 36 Pac. 1037, where it was held under the circumstances of that case that the moral obligation resting on the defendant to furnish for which the corporation was in no wise reassistance and care to an injured employé, tion for the agreement made by the president sponsible, constituted a sufficient consideraof the company to pay a physician for professional services rendered such employé.

[3] The finding to the effect that the injuwas received by Ingalls while performing the duties of his employment finds no supof the case, the error is not prejudicial and port in the evidence; but, under our view hence should be disregarded as immaterial. We find no merit in appellant's contention as to the commission of other alleged errors. The judgment and order are affirmed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 155-158; Dec. Dig. § 65.*] 8. ESTOPPEL (§ 98*)-PERSONS AFFECTED. Where one person owns all the stock of a [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and ration is destroyed, and statements and admiscorporation, the separate entity of the corpoError, Cent. Dig. § 1232; Dec. Dig. § 193;*sions by such owner may be received as estabPleading, Cent. Dig. § 1348.] lishing facts from which an estoppel might arise as to the corporation.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Dec. demanded, or in any other sum, on account Dig. 8 74.*]

Where defendant, on employing a broker to procure a tenant for property held in the the trial to the receipt of evidence in supname of a corporation, stated to the broker port thereof. The parties seem to have asthat he individually owned the property and sumed that the issues were properly prethat the execution of the lease in the corporate sented. Evidence was received, without obname was to avoid personal liability, defendant's admissions were competent to bind him-jection, and the court finds that within two self personally. years preceding the commencement of the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, action the services were performed for deCent. Dig. §§ 768-808; Dec. Dig. § 222.*] fendant Obear; that they were of the char

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes