such memorandum, would indicate that no prejudicial error could be said to result from the action of the court in permitting the memorandum for the purpose for which it was used. [4] Appellant criticises the leading character of certain questions permitted upon the trial. This is but a criticism of the action of the court in the exercise of a discretion. Nothing in the record indicates an abuse thereof, and no prejudicial error will be pre sumed. [5] We see no error in the action of the court sustaining objections to questions concerning a policy of an entirely different character which was considered by the parties before application was made for the one actually issued. power of the board coming from the act of the Legislature. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Counties, Dec. Dig. $ 50.*] 3. BRIDGES (§ 20*)-CONSTRUCTION-POWERS OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS-STATUTES. There is no inconsistency between Pol. Code, § 4041, subd. 4, authorizing county boards bridges, etc., to be built by the county surveyor, of supervisors to order, in certain instances, and section 4041 [a] that the road commissioners or road overseers in their respective disthe conduct of work of any kind on all public tricts shall employ all labor required and direct roads, or section 2645, providing that road commissioners under the direction of the board of supervisors must take charge of the highways within their respective districts and employ all men, teams, etc., and all help necessary to do the work in their respective districts when the same is not let by contract, the former section providing for an exceptional, the latter for the The policy which was is-ordinary condition. sued, and which is the basis of the action, is in no sense ambiguous or uncertain in its terms as to any matter involved in the issues presented. There was therefore no reason for explanation and no uncertainty therein warranting evidence of the character proposed. The rights of the parties were to be determined by the terms of the instrument issued, and, being certain and unambiguous, all parties were by its terms concluded. We find no prejudicial error in the record, and the judgment and order are affirmed. JAMES, J.; SHAW, J. We concur: Under Pol. Code, § 4041, subd. 4, requiring county boards of supervisors when the cost of construction of any bridge, etc., exceeds $500 to advertise for bids, but providing that, on being advised by the county surveyor that the work can be done for less than the lowest bid, the board may reject all bids and order the work done or structure built by days' work under the "supervision and control" of such surveyor, the latter to be held personally responsible under his official bond to construct such structure at a cost not exceeding the lowest bid, the board did not exceed its power in directing the surveyor on his being instructed to construct a bridge to purchase material therefor, "supervision" implying oversight, and the word "control" being used to authorize additional power, such as is contained in one of its definitions, "to exercise a restraining or governing influence over, to regulate." [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bridges, Cent. Dig. $$ 37-47; Dec. Dig. § 20.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2. pp. 1549-1552; vol. 8, p. 7617; vol. 8, p. 6797.] 2. COUNTIES (8 50*)-CONSTRUCTION-POWERS OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. Such authorization was not an unwarranted delegation of authority by the supervisors; the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bridges, Dec. Dig. § 20.*] 4. BRIDGES (§ 20*)-CONSTRUCTION-STATUTES. Pol. Code, § 4041, subd. 4. authorizing county boards of supervisors to order, in certain instances, bridges, etc., to be built by the county surveyor, is not inconsistent with section 4074, providing that no county officer shall, except for his own services, present any claim against the county, etc., there being no contractual relation in such case, as the only compensation the surveyor can receive is the fee fixed by law for his services, though an additional duty is cast on him. [Ed. Note.-For, other cases, see Bridges, Dec. Dig. § 20.*] 5. EVIDENCE (§ 83*)-PUBLIC OFFICERS-PRE SUMPTIONS. The presumption is that public officials will do their duty. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. § 83.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Merced County; E. N. Rector, Judge. Action by D. J. McCarthy against the Board of Supervisors of the County of Merced and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. F. G. Ostrander and J. J. Griffin, for appellant. H. S. Shaffer, for respondents. BURNETT, J. The action was brought in the superior court of the county of Merced to restrain defendants from constructing a steel bridge over the Merced river in said county. The court below sustained a demurrer to the complaint for the insufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff declined to amend his complaint, and judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of defendants, and plaintiff has appealed. The facts alleged in the complaint, which we deem necessary for an understanding of the case, are as follows: A petition of the taxpayers of said county was presented to the board of supervisors of said county praying for the construction of a bridge at a certain point over Merced river in Merced county. At a regular session of said board, held on the 9th of July, 1909, an order was duly made by said board directing the county * surveyor to submit plans and specifications | lars they must cause to be prepared and for the construction of a steel bridge at the must adopt plans and specifications, straindesignated point, and to have the plans ready sheets and working details, and must adverfor the next regular meeting of said board tise for bids for the construction of such in July. The plans and specifications were bridge, wharves, chutes or other shipping faprepared by the surveyor and submitted to cilities, unless otherwise provided by law, the board and were regularly accepted and in accordance with the plans and specificaadopted by said board on July 19, 1909. The tions so adopted. All bidders shall be afboard thereupon ordered the clerk of said forded opportunity to examine such plans board to advertise for bids for the construc- and specifications and said board shall award tion of said bridge in accordance with the the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, plans and specifications that were adopted. * provided, that after the submisThis was done, and certain bids were re- sion of the bids as herein provided, the board ceived and they were opened and inspected by of supervisors being advised by the county said board. At the same session of the board surveyor that the work can be done for a the county surveyor advised said board that sum less than the lowest responsible bid, it said bridge could be constructed for a sum shall then be their privilege to reject all bids less than the amount of the lowest bid, and and to order the work done or structure built thereupon the said board refused to award by days' work under the supervision and the construction of said bridge to the lowest control of the said surveyor; provided furresponsible bidder, or to any bidder, and ther, that the surveyor in such cases shall rejected all the bids and adjourned without be held personally responsible (under his oftaking further action as to the construc- ficial bond to construct said bridge or struction of the bridge. Thereafter, at a special ture) according to his plans and specifications session, held on October 6, 1909, called for at a cost not to exceed the amount of the the purpose of considering the construction lowest responsible bid received." It is perof said bridge by days' work under the direc- fectly apparent that the board did not extion and control of said county surveyor, the ceed the privilege granted by said section board unanimously adopted a certain resolu- unless in the command and direction to the tion which, after reciting the circumstance surveyor to purchase material for the said of the opening of the bids and the advice of structure, but even in this particular we are the county surveyor, “ordered that A. E. of the opinion that the action of the board Cowell, surveyor of Merced county, be and was entirely within the purview of said prohe is hereby authorized and directed to pro- vision. The work is to be done, not simply ceed and construct said bridge by days' work under the "supervision," but also under the according to his plans and specifications, "control," of the surveyor. "Supervision" and to purchase all necessary material for implies oversight and direction. "Control" the same. * * The said defendant A. E. must have been used to authorize additional Cowell, pursuant to the order of said board, power, such as is contained in one of its defiis proceeding, and threatens to continue to nitions, "to exercise a restraining or governproceed, to construct said bridge, and to con- ing influence over, to regulate." How could tract for labor, material, and supplies neces- the surveyor govern or regulate the construcsary for the construction of said bridge, and tion of the bridge without a supervision over the said board of supervisors and the mem- the employment of labor and the purchase bers thereof are aiding and advising the said of material? He could supervise the strucA. E. Cowell in the construction of said ture by directing its completion in accordbridge and in contracting, and providing ance with the plans and specifications. He funds, for said supplies, labor, and materials could not "control" it without a directing out of the funds of said county and road dis- power as to the cost. This power manifestly trict and threaten to continue to so aid and could not be exercised without the privilege advise said Cowell and provide for said of employing the labor and purchasing the funds." The said bridge will exceed in cost material. This view, that it was the intenof construction the sum of $500. tion of the Legislature in the contingency mentioned to clothe the surveyor with the ample power suggested, is strengthened and confirmed by a consideration of the purpose of this alternative plan and of the bond required of the surveyor to do the work in accordance with his advice to the board. The scheme was devised to protect the county against collusion on the part of bidders or the payment of exorbitant charges for such public improvements. To indemnify the county against loss in consequence of the award to the surveyor, he is required to give a bond to construct the bridge at a sum not to exceed the lowest bid. It must be apparent [1] Respondents claim that authority for their action is found in the language of subdivision 4 of section 4041 of the Political Code. This is a part of the enumeration of the general powers of the boards of supervisors in their respective counties, and it relates specifically to the maintenance, control, construction, etc., of public roads, turnpikes, ferries, wharves, chutes, and bridges within the county, and it provides that "when the cost of the construction of any bridge, wharf, chute, or other shipping facilities that may be built under the provisions of this subdivision exceeds the sum of five hundred dol that no surveyor, without the privilege of have ordered the surveyor to do the work, hiring the labor and purchasing the material, the Legislature has given him express auwould enter into such an undertaking. By thority and made it his duty to comply with the construction contended for by appellant, said order. In brief, the case is this: The the manifest purpose of the law would there Legislature is the source of all power in the fore be defeated. premises. In the first instance, it authorized the board of supervisors to have complete control over the work. Subsequently it modified this grant of power by authorizing, in a certain contingency, the county surveyor, when directed by the board, to perform this public duty. The matter is for the Legislature, and not for the courts. [2] We can see nothing in the position of respondent that implies an unwarranted delegation of authority on the part of the supervisors. In fact, there is no delegation of authority whatever by the supervisors. The power of the board comes from the act of the Legislature. It may be admitted that, independent of the provision in question, the Legislature has empowered the board of supervisors to let the work to the lowest responsible bidder or to do it themselves. But the authority that confers power can withhold or withdraw it. It may take it away from one and confer it upon another, unless, of course, there is some constitutional barrier. As to the power of the Legislature, Judge Redfield says: "It has never been questioned that the American Legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parliament, except where they are restrained by written Constitutions. That must be con ceded, I think, to be a fundamental principle in the political organization of the American states. We cannot well comprehend how, upon principle, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess all legislative power originally. They have committed this, in the most general and unlimited manner, to the several state Legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States or of the particular state in question." Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 142, 62 Am. Dec. 625. Indeed, there is in our Constitution (article 11, § 5) a specific command that "the Legislature by general and uniform laws shall provide for the election or appointment in the several counties of boards of supervisors, sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys and such other county, township and municipal officers as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties and fix their terms of office." In harmony with this mandate the Legislature has prescribed the duties of the supervisors and at various times has amended certain provisions of the statute, and in 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 367) was added this clause whereby in a certain contingency it was made the duty of the county surveyor to do the work therein prescribed. It is true that the board is not deprived of all discretion in the matter. The law contemplates that the supervisors shall act, of course, for the best interest of the public. It is fitting that they should be advised by the county surveyor who is presumably particularly qualified for that duty. They may reject his advice or they may supplement it by [3] There is no inconsistency between this provision and the succeeding one providing that the road commissioners or road overseers in their respective districts "shall employ all labor required and direct the conduct of work of any kind upon any and all public roads," or section 2645 of the Political Code, providing that "road commissioners, under the direction and supervision and pursuant to orders of the board of supervisors, must: (1) Take charge of the highways within their respective districts, and shall employ all men, teams, watering carts, and all help necessary to do the work in their respective districts when the same is not let by contract." The section before us provides for an exceptional, the other sections for the ordinary, condition. The former is specific, the latter general in their operation. Manifestly the road commissioner has general supervision over the roads, including the bridges, and he must atquired to keep the highways in proper conditend to repairs and to the many details retion. But by this later specific provision the duty of the road commissioner has been modified somewhat in a particular instance, and, reading these various sections together, it is easy to give effect to all of them without reach the conclusion that, in special cases violating any principle of construction and to requiring bids, the work may be let by the board of supervisors to the lowest responsible bidder or, to save expense, it may be done under the direction and control of the county surveyor. [4] Nor do we see anything herein inconsistent with section 4074 of the Political Code providing that "no county officer shall, except for his own services, present any claim, account or demand for allowance against the county, or in any way except in the discharge of his official duty advocate the relief asked in the claim or demand made by any other." The contention is that the said arrangement constitutes a contract between the supervisors and the county surveyor and therefore prohibited by the above-mentioned provision. But we do not understand that there is any such contractual relation as the statute contemplates. Under the circumstances mentioned, it rather becomes the official duty of the county surveyor to perform the work. He is to derive no profit therefrom, and the only The judgment is affirmed. by the law for his services. In other words, | county expense should not be thwarted by it seems plain that by virtue of this provi- the courts. sion an additional duty is cast upon the county surveyor without any increase whatever of his compensation in those counties where he is paid a salary for his entire of ficial service and in other counties with simply an allowance of the legal fee for his actual work. Herein, as we view it, there is We concur: CHIPMAN, P. J.; HART, J. (15 Cal. App. 567) PIERSON v. PIERSON. (Civ. 960.) nothing opposed to the letter or spirit of the (District Court of Appeal, Second District, Cali law or in contravention of sound public policy. [5] To the suggestion that respondents' construction of the law is likely to encourage great abuse and afford an attractive allurement for designing county surveyors, it is sufficient to say that the presumption is that public officials will do their duty, although, admittedly, under any administrative scheme or system, gross wrong will sometimes be perpetrated against the public by dishonest men in official station. Neither is it a fair interpretation of the law to hold that it deprives the Legislature of any part of its power to prescribe the duties of the county surveyor. These duties are set forth generally in sections 4214 to 4220, inclusive, of the Political Code, but the Legislature, by the provision before us, as before mentioned, has added an additional duty to be performed when directed by the board of supervisors. Nor in the work required is there anything so foreign to the general scope of the functions of the county surveyor as to compel the inference that said duty could not have been contemplated by the Legislature. It is mostly, if not entirely, ministerial in its nature and of such a character that by training and experience the county surveyor should be specially qualified to perform it. Even upon the theory of appellant that the board of supervisors alone has the power to purchase material for the construction of the bridge, it is doubtful whether the complaint stated a cause of action, in view of the allegation as to the board of supervisors ordering and advising the said A. E. Cowell in the construction of said bridge and in contracting therefor. If the supervisors are aiding and advising in the execution of the plan, it is not unreasonable to hold that Cowell is simply their agent in the purchase of the materials and in the employment of the labor. We would then have no more than what appellant says the Legislature intended; that is, the selection of the county surveyor "to supervise the construction of a bridge when built by days' work to the end that it should be constructed according to the plans and specifications adopted." At any rate, after a consideration of all the points made by appellant, most of which we have mentioned, we are satisfied that they are more technical than substantial and that the efforts of the officers in question to save the fornia. March 9, 1911.) DIVORCE (§ 186*)-JUDGMENT-FINDINGS-NE CESSITY. Where parties to a divorce action have not waived findings of fact, and the record shows that no findings sufficient to support a judgment were signed or filed in the action, the judgment will be reversed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Divorce, Dec. Dig. § 186.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; William D. Dehy, Judge. Action for divorce, brought by Carrie D. Pierson against Charles J. Pierson. Plaintiff appeals. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. Winslow P. Hyatt, for appellant. Morton, Riddle & Hollzer and S. A. D. Gray, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Action for divorce. The parties hereto, through their respective attorneys, having filed a stipulation that reversible error exists in the record, and upon examination of such record, it appearing that findings of fact were not waived, and that no findings suficient to support a judgment were by the court signed or filed in the cause, it is therefore ordered that the judgment in the above-entitled cause be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. (15 Cal. App. 496) LAWSON V. LAWSON. (Civ. 935.) (District Court of Appeal, First District, California. Feb. 25, 1911. Rehearing Denied by Supreme Court April 26, 1911.) 1. EXEMPTIONS (§ 16*)-DEBTOR'S EARNINGS -"FAMILY." Under Civ. Code, § 206, requiring a child to support an indigent parent, and though a mother not living with her son is not strictly a member of his family, where she is in poor health, destitute, is supported by him, and resides within the state, she is a member of his family, within Code Civ. Proc. § 690, exempting a debtor's earnings within 30 days preceding attachment, when necessary for the use of his "family." Cent. Dig. §§ 15-19; Dec. Dig. § 16.* [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2673-2691; vol. 8, p. 7661.] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1212*)-REVERSALNEW TRIAL. On reversal of an order declaring a debtor's earnings exempt, and upon rehearing in the trial court, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit him to show facts relating to his moth *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes necessary for the use of his family, residing in this state, supported in whole or in part by his labors. * * Defendant claimed attached constituted his earnings, and that the exemption upon the ground that the fund the said earnings were necessary for the support of his family residing within this state. In substantiation of this claim, defendant introduced evidence tending to show that he contributed to the support of his mother. The evidence on this point discloses that, while the defendant and his mother do not dwell under the same roof, she is nevertheless a resident of this state; that she is old, in poor health, and unable to maintain herself, and looks to defendant for her sole means of support. Upon this evidence the court concluded that defendant's mother was a member of his family, within the meaning of the section quoted; and after careful consideration we are of the opinion that this conclusion is sound and correct. [1] Section 206 of the Civil Code imposes upon a child the legal obligation to support an indigent parent to the extent of his ability. While in a strict sense, or perhaps we should say in a narrow sense, a mother not living in the same household as her son is not a member of his family, yet where, as here, she is in poor health, destitute of property or the means of subsistence, is supported by him and resides within the state, we think she is a member of his family within the meaning of the language employed in the section. Any other construction would make the provisions of the law inconsistent; for, on the one hand, it would require a son to support his parent by reason of the family tie, and yet deprive him of an exemption specially created for the purpose of enabling him to discharge his obligations to his family. Furthermore, the question of whether the parent occupies the same abode as the judgment debtor should not be the exclusive test; for it is apparent that the debtor's wife or children might not be living with him, and yet it would not be seriously contended that they did not form part of his family. In Lawson v. Lawson, 111 Pac. 354. the Supreme Court, after stating that the language of subdivision 10 of section 690, Code of Civil Procedure, "for the use of his family residing in this state" clearly implies that one may be a member of a debtor's fam KERRIGAN, J. In an action for divorce, plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant, which provided, among other things, that defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $100 per month for her support and maintenance. The defendant having failed to comply with this provision of the judgment, the plaintiff took proceedings under section 710, Code of Civil Procedure, and filed with the auditor of the city and county of San Francisco (defendant being at that time a justice of the peace of said city and county receiving a monthly salary of $300) a duly authenticated copy of the judgment, whereupon said auditor paid into court the sum of $1,200, the amount of salary at that time due defendant. In due time plaintiff moved the court for an order that the whole of this sum be paid to her in part satisfaction of said judgment. After hearing had, the court ordered that of the sum of $600, representing defendant's salary for two months, the plaintiff be paid $400, and that $200 was exempt from execution and should be paid to defendant. Plaintiff appeals from this order, and asks for its reversal upon the ground, among others, that the defendant was not entitled to any exemption whatever; and this is the principal question to be deter-ily although residing apart from him, promined. Section 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: "The following property is exempt from execution or attachment, except as herein otherwise specially provided: ** (10) The earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services rendered at any time within thirty days next preceding the levy of execution or attachment, when it appears by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise that such earnings are ceeded to say (speaking through Mr. Justice Angellotti): "But it seems clear that they are the only relatives who can properly be held to be members of 'his family' within the meaning of the statute, with the possible exception of such other relatives as to whom exists on his part the legal obligation of support and maintenance." In discussing this question the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Sallee v. Waters, 17 Ala. 482, said: "To constitute a family within the meaning of the |