claims adjudicated. The court in New York has proceeded to adjudicate upon the rights of these parties, and such judgment is final and conclusive, and is entitled to full faith and credit in all other courts whatsoever. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat., 234, McGilvray v. Avery, 30 Vt., 538; see, also, Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat., 532; Stearns v. Stearns, 16 Mass., 171; Winn v. Albert, 2 Md. Ch. Dec., 42; Ex parte Robinson, Marshal of U. S., 6 McLean, 355; Peck v. Jenness,7 How.,612; Wallace v. Mc Connell, 13 Pet., 136; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall.,350 (85 U.S., XXI., 959); Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y., 156. In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must determine it conclusively. Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat., 532; Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How., 56; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S., 256 (XXIII., 346); Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S., 524 (XXIII., 404); Gould v. R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 527 (XXIII., 416); Lower v. U. S., 91 U. S., 539 (XXIII.,421); Gilman v. Telegraph Co.,91 U.S., 616 (XXIII., 410); Lamp Chimney Co. v. Brass etc. Co., 91 U. S., 661 (XXIII.,338); Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S., 684 (XXIII., 458); French v. Hay, 22 Wall., 253 (89 U.S., XXII., 858); High, Inj., secs. 44, 47, 57-60, are in full accord with the decision in French v. Hay. Messrs. F. W. Brune and J. Morrison Harris, for appellee: The decree will not be reversed, except for error appearing in the record, and on the case as presented to the court below, on the date of the decree. All subsequent proceedings must be rejected as out of the case and improperly in the record. Bradstreet v. Potter, 16 Pet.,318; Mills v. Brown, 16 Pet., 527; Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S., 2 (XXIII., 521). To sustain the refusal of the court below to grant the injunction, the appellee says that a pending litigation in a foreign country or another State, not being a good plea, cannot support a bill for an injunction to stay proceedings in a court of law on a legal instrument. See, Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet., 590; Seevers v. Clement, 28 Md.,433–4; Thomas v. Hatch,3 Sum., 176-7; White v. Whitman, 1 Curt. (C. C.), 494; Lyman v. Brown, 2 Curt. (C. C.), 559; Loring v. Marsh,2 Cliff.,321; Colt v. Partridge,7 Met.,570; Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns., 221; 5 Sandf., 342; Williams v. Chamberlin,31 Barb.,364; Wood v. Lake, 13 Wis.,91; Lowry v. Hall,2 W. & S.,133; Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa., 328. Still less can such pending suit support the injunction when the parties are different, and the pending suit is an equity proceeding, and the suit to be enjoined is a suit at law. Wadleigh v. Veazie, 3 Sum., 167-8; Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sum.,593; Colt v. Partridge, 7 Met., 574-5; Wood v. Lake, 13 Wis., 92; Humphries v. Dawson, 38 Ala., 204; Blanchard v. Stone, 16 Vt., 234; Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn., 495. Even when the pendency of a suit in a court of concurrent jurisdiction is set up to defeat or enjoin an action, the case must be the same. There must be the same parties, or at least such as represent the same interest; there must be the same rights asserted, and the same relief prayed; the relief must be founded on the same facts, and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall., 715-717 (80 U. S., XX., 671); Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall.,345 (70 U.S., XVIII., 261). Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: In the circuit court this was a bill for an injunction upon Horatio L. Whitridge, assignee of William H. Brune, enjoining him against further prosecuting two actions at law which he had commenced against the complainant in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland. The suits were founded upon two policies of insurance on the life of John S. Barry, issued by the complainant the 18th of January 1872, in the name of William H. Brune; one for $20,000, and the other for $5,000. The material averments of the bill are the following: 1. That the complainant, a New York Corporation, on the 11th of January, 1867, issued a policy of life insurance to Rosalie C. Barry, wife of John S. Barry, for $20,000 on the life of her husband; and on the 9th of December, 1870, issued to her a second policy, on the same life, insuring $5,000. 2. That the premiums were regularly paid until December, 1871, and January, 1872. 3. That about the latter part of December, 1871, and the beginning of January, 1872, an agreement was made between Mrs. Barry, Mr. Barry, and Mr. Brune, for the assignment or transfer of the policies to the latter, and that in pursuance of the agreement, and in accordance with a mode of proceeding before used by the complainant in cases of insurance on the lives of married women, the policies were permitted, with the consent of all parties interested, except the complainant, to lapse, that is to say, to become forfeited, with the intent, however, to have the same renewed or re-issued in Brune's name. 4. That, as evidence of such intention, Brune (as whose assignee Whitridge, the defendant, claimed) united with John S. Barry in signing a paper called "A declaration to be made and signed in case of issuing new policy after lapse," dated December 16, 1871, referring to and adopting the original application made by Mrs. Barry for insurance, dated December 9, 1870, and signed by her; that he also united with Mr. Barry in signing another paper dated January 12, 1872, adopting Mrs. Barry's original application for insurance, dated January 11, 1867. 5. That Mr. Barry did not undergo a new medical examination; that no other applications were made for the two insurances, upon which the suits were brought, than those made by Mrs. Barry in 1867 and 1870, and so, as aforesaid, adopted by Mr. Brune; and that thereupon the two policies issued to Mrs. Barry were surrendered and canceled. 6. That, at the time when the original policies issued to Mr. Barry were canceled, two others for the same amount, on the life of the said John S. Barry, were substituted therefor: that they were issued to William H. Brune with like premiums and having the same numbers as those of the canceled policies; differing only in the fact that the premiums were made payable semi annually, instead of annually as therefofore, and that Brune paid up the premiums that had before fallen due and that remained unpaid. 7. That in February, 1872, Brune assigned these policies to Whitridge (Harris being now | plainant's bill. We agree with the counsel for substituted as Brune's assignee or trustee in place of Whitridge). 8. That John S. Barry died in March, 1872. 9. That shortly after or about April 4, 1872, Mrs. Barry filed in the Supreme Court for the City and County of New York, her bill of complaint against the complainant in this bill, and against both Brune and Whitridge, in which she alleged substantially what is hereinbefore set forth, and also complained that the novation of the policies, or the lapsing and re-issue as aforesaid, was without her consent; that it was done after her signing some paper by reason of certain persuasions of her husband when he was embarrassed in business and disturbed in mind; that she did not act voluntarily and freely; that Brune acquired no rights under the said new policies, nor did Whitridge by the assignment to him; and she prayed the Company might be enjoined against paying to Whitridge the amounts due thereon. The bill and proceedings in the New York case were filed, and made a part of the present complainant's bill. 10. That, as appeared in those proceedings, pursuant to an agreement of the parties and an order of the court, this complainant, the Insurance Company, deposited the sums named in the two policies in a trust company, to the credit of the case; and the court ordered that the complainant should be discharged, and that the action should be discontinued as to it. 11. That, notwithstanding the agreement and order and the payment, Whitridge, the defendant, had afterwards, in September, 1872, brought two suits on the two new policies in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, the same suits the prosecution of which the complainant sought by this bill to have enjoined. 12. That the prosecution of these suits, if successful, would result in compelling the complainant to pay the same policies twice, and might give to Whitridge double payment. Most of the material averments of this bill were admitted by the answer. It averred, in addition, that the original policies were assigned to Brune as collateral securities for loans Brune had made to Mr. Barry, and that the permitted lapse and the issue of the new policies were intended only to make the assignment effective. It denied, however, that the new policies were in substitution for the policies surrendered, and asserted that they were separate and new contracts. It admitted the execution of the agreement or stipulation in the New York case: but alleged that it was without Brune's knowledge or consent, and alleged also that it was not intended to surrender or affect in any way the right of the defendant under the two policies issued to Brune and assigned to him. the appellee, that whether the Circuit Court erred or not must be determined in view of the facts as they appeared when the decision was made. But we do not admit, as it is argued, that Mrs. Barry in her bill claimed only what was assured to her by the original policies. She claimed a decree against the insurers, that they should pay to her. She asserted that the original policies had been surendered and canceled, and she claimed that Brune and Whitridge were asserting rights adverse to hers. She charged, in effect, that the assignments of those policies. she had made, had been obtained from her by duress, through misrepresentation and without any present consideration. The surrender and re-issue to Brune concerted between him and Mr. Barry, the payment of the premium of the substituted policies with Mrs. Barry's dividends and money, the identity of the numbers of the new policies with those of the old, and the fact that the stipulated premiums were the same, adjusted according to the age of Mr. Barry when the first policies were granted, and paid from the times when under those policies they were due, were set forth as proofs that the substituted ones were only continuations of the first insurance, and that in equity they were her property. Neither Brune's nor Whitridge's answer, both of which were in evidence, effectually controverted this. Mr. Brune's substantially admitted it. In his answer, he every where speaks of himself as the assignee of the original policies, asserts Mrs. Barry's assignments as the foundation of his right, alleges that the policies were suffered to lapse and were surrendered, that they might be renewed and continued for his benefit, and alleges expressly that "The two policies issued in January, 1872, constituted the only claim on the said Mutual Life Insurance Company, on account of insurance on the life of the said Barry, and that the plaintiff has no claim whatsoever to the said policies, or either of them, or to the sums secured thereby, until the indebtedness of the said Barry and of his firm, to secure which the said policies were assigned as aforesaid, shall have been fully paid and satisfied." Thus the answer implies a clear admission, that in equity Mrs. Barry is the owner of the new policies, subject only to Brune's right (whatever it may be) to hold them as a collateral security. The case in the New York Supreme Court, therefore, involved the same controversy as that exhibited in the two Maryland suits; and the complainant here and Whitridge are parties in each. Alike in the bill and in the action at law, it is a vital question whether the insurers are liable for the sums insured by the policies of January, 1872, and whether they are liable to Whitridge as assignee of Brune. Hence, if there were a final decree in the New Such was the case when it came on for hear- York case against the complainant here, the ing; the parties having agreed that Mrs. Barry's present appellee would necessarily fail in the bill of complaint might be read, as also the an-action he has brought in Maryland. That deswers of Brune and Whitridge thereto, the stipulation made in the case, the order of the court that the Company pay the amount of the policies, less the costs, into court, a subsequent order abrogating the former and the stipulation, together with a pending appeal therefrom. Upon this showing, the Circuit Court refused the injunction asked for, and dismissed the com cree would be pleadable in bar to his suits, and the complainant would have complete protection at law. But the difficulty in the appellant's way is, that when this case was heard in the court below, the record of the New York case exhibited no final decree. The order that the amount of the policies might be paid into the trust A. J. GREGORY, Plff. in Err., V. W. A. MORRIS ET AL. (See S. C., 6 Otto, 619-626.) company to the credit of the case, and that the company should be discharged, had been set aside; and the money paid under the order had been directed to be returned. All that appeared, then, was that a bill in equity was pending in a foreign jurisdiction, when the appellee's Lien for purchase money-when lost-contract suits at law were brought to enforce the payment of the policies to Mrs. Barry, rather than to Brune or his assignee, and that both the present complainant and the present defendant were parties to that bill. This, we think, was not sufficient to justify the injunction for which the appellant prayed. At law the pendency of a former action between the same parties for the same cause is pleadable in abatement to a second action, because the latter is regarded as vexatious. But the former action must be in a domestic court; that is, in a court of the State in which the second action has been brought. Maule v. Murray, 7 T. R., 470; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet., ·586; Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns., 221; Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa., 326. The rule in equity is analogous to the rule at law. Story, Eq. Pl., sec. 741. In Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk., 587, Lord Hardwicke said: "The general rule of courts of equity with regard to pleas is the same as in courts of law. but exercised with a more liberal discretion." In Dillon v. Alvares, 4 Ves., 357, a plea of a pending suit in a court of chancery in Ireland was overruled in the English Court of Chancery. Certain it is that the plea of a suit pending in equity in a foreign jurisdiction will not abate a suit at law in a domestic tribunal. This was shown in a very able decision made by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn., 485, where the authorities are learnedly and logically reviewed. See, also, Colt v. Partridge, 7 Metc., 570, and Blanchard v. Stone, 16 Vt., 234. If, then, a bill in equity pending in a foreign jurisdiction has no effect upon an action at law for the same cause in a domestic forum, even when pleaded in abatement; if, still more, it has no effect when pleaded to another bill in equity, as the authorities show, it is impossible to see how it can be a basis for an injunction against prosecuting a suit at law. It follows that the refusal of an injunction by the circuit court was not erroneous. It is contended, however, that if the appellant was not entitled to the injunction asked for, the bill should not have been dismissed, but that it should have been retained, until the final disposition of the case in New York. The Supreme Court in that State having first obtained possession of the subject matter of the controversy, as well as jurisdiction of the parties, it is argued, had a right to proceed to a final determination. In view of this fact, we concede the circuit court might have retained this bill. It does not appear, however, that such a reten tion was asked. Nor was it necessary for the purposes of justice. As we have already remarked, if a final decree be made by the Supreme Court, it will, if pleaded, be a bar in the Maryland courts; and if a judgment be rendered in the latter, the New York court having jurisdiction of the parties, will be able to determine to whom in equity the judgment belongs The decree of the Circuit Court is, therefore, affirmed. payable in gold-jury-evidence. 1. The lien at common law, of the vendor of personal property, to secure the payment of purchase money, is lost by the voluntary and unconditional delivery of the property to the purchaser. tracting for a lien which, as between themselves, 2. But this does not prevent the parties from conwill be good after delivery. cordingly. 3. Where the contract is to pay for property in gold, the court may direct the jury to find the value of the gold in currency, and bring in a verdict ac-. 4. Where a jury did not find contrary to the instruction of the court, the presumption is that they followed it. 5. Where a party testified that he had purchased the property in question, it was proper on cross-examination, to ask him if his contract of purchase was in writing, and, if so, to identify the paper. [No. 227.] Argued Feb. 14, 1878. Decided Mar. 25, 1878. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of Wyoming Territory. This was an action in replevin, brought in the District Court in and for the County of Albany, in the Second Judicial District of the Territory of Wyoming. The record of the case shows that Feb. 26, 1873, W. A. Morris, one of the defendants in error, and A. J. Gregory, plaintiff in error, entered into a written contract in the City of Austin,in the State of Texas, stipulating for the sale of a large number of cattle to A. J. Gregory, in accordance with a certain schedule of prices. One of the terms of the said contract was, that the said Morris, having sold and delivered to the said Gregory the cattle referred to in the written contract, was to retain a lien on the cattle until the whole of the purchase money, amounting to between $7,000 and $8,000 should be paid by Gregory; and that, in the event of the balance of said purchase money not being paid on or before Oct. 1, 1873, then the agent of Morris, viz. : C. E. Poteet, was to sell all or such portion of said cattle as would pay the purchase money then remaining due and unpaid, as well as the wages and other expenses of said Poteet, as had been stipulated for in the said written contract. The written contract having been duly signed by the parties, Morris gave Poteet a power of attorney, authorizing him to accompany and retain the lien provided for in said contract. The parties arrived on the Laramie plains with the said cattle some time in September, 1873, and the cattle remained in the possession of Gregory from that time until Oct. 4, 1873, at which time, the purchase money not having been paid, Poteet took forcible possession of the cattle and drove them from the ranch at which they were grazing, to the ranch of Mr. Alsop, some distance from there. Gregory then brought his action of replevin to recover possession of the cattle and damages for the wrongful detention thereof, against both Morris and Poteet, setting up the ordinary count in his petition; the defendant filed an answer, denying all the allegations of plaintiff's petition, and denying specially that they wrongfully detained the said property. The case coming on for trial in the district court, the plaintiffs proved the possession, own ership.taking, demand and retention of the prop erty, with the value, etc. The defendant then undertook to introduce the written contract and other documentary evidence, which was objected to by plaintiff's at torneys, and the objection was sustained by the -court. Defendants then asked leave to amend their answer, setting up the special matter which had been refused under the original answer. This was also objected to by attorneys for plaintiff, but the objection was overruled. Written evidence was admitted, to which the plaintiff's attorneys reserved their exceptions. All the evidence on the part of the defendants was then given, together with certain rebutting evidence on the part of the plaintiff, and the case went to the jury under certain instructions of the court, and the jury returned a verdict for defendants, assessing the damages at $7,454.90, and the judgment was duly entered on the ver dict. After the arguments to the jury were concluded, the court instructed the jury as follows, viz.: 1. That the written contract between Morris and Gregory in connection with the bill of sale, the receipt and the power of attorney to Poteet necessarily explained and defined the rights and interests of the parties to this action in the property in question. 2. That, by and under these papers, the defendants had a legal right to take possession of the cattle in question, on or after the first day of October last, and retain such possession for the purpose of selling them, according to the terms of said contract. 3. That if the jury find that Poteet, in pursu ance of his power of attorney took possession of said cattle and removed them to Alsop's ranch, for the purpose of selling them, according to the terms of said contract, then they must find the right of possession in the defendant at the commencement of this action, and must assess such damages for the defendants as are just and proper. 66 4. That the pleadings in this case put in issue only the right of possession at the time of the service of the writ of replevin, and you are in structed that the rights of the plaintiff in these cattle at that time was only a right of redemp. tion as a mortgagor after condition broken, and that he had no right to the possession of the cattle, and no right to take them by replevin or otherwise from these defendants, or either of them, until he had paid or tendered the amount due on them under the contract. 5. That the defendants had the right under the contract to take and hold possession of the cattle, all of them, until sold or redeemed, and you will so find unless there is evidence before you to convince you that the defendants have released, or in some way lost, that right. written contract, which must govern in this case, the defendants, Oct. 1. 1873, had a right to sell these cattle, the right to sell necessarily carries with it the right of possession. To all which said instructions the plaintiff, by counsel, there and then excepted. The judgment of the district court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, whence this writ of error. Messrs. M. C. Brown, Chas. W. Bramel and W. W. Corlett, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Saml. Shellabarger & J. M. Wilson, for defendants in error. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and tenth assignments of error may be considered together. They relate entirely to the construction and effect given the contract between Gregory and Morris, as shown by the several instruments in writing put in evidence. There was no real controversy as to the facts; but Gregory claimed that he was the purchaser of the cattle in dispute from Morris, and that the lien provided for in favor of Morris was one which a delivery of the property under the contract extinguished. There was no pretense of payment on his part further than that shown by the contract itself, or of title, except such as was acquired through this purchase. The lien at common law of the vendor of personal property to secure the payment of purchase money is lost by the voluntary and unconditional delivery of the property to the purchaser; but this does not prevent the parties from contracting for a lien which, as between themselves, will be good after delivery. So, ordinarily, when the possession of a pledge is relinquished, the rights of the pledgee are gone. In this case, however, Morris was not willing to rely upon the lien which the law gave him as vendor, or upon a mere pledge of the property, but required a special contract on the part of Gregory, securing his rights. This contract created a charge upon the property, not in the nature of a pledge, but of a mortgage. The lien, as between the parties, was not made to depend upon possession, but upon a contract, which defined the rights both of Morris and Gregory, and the power of Morris for the enforcement of his security. When Poteet assumed the exclusive possession of the property, no rights of third persons had intervened, and there was nothing to prevent the execution of the agreement according to its terms. clearly gave Morris the right, after October 1, if the purchase money was not paid, to take the cattle into his own possession, detain them until the balance due him was discharged, and sell them if necessary to obtain his money. We think the court defined correctly the rights of the parties, and that there was no error in this particular, either in the charge or the refusal to charge. This The first assignment of error brings up for consideration the rule of damages laid down by the court. By the laws of Wyoming Territory, property taken in replevin is delivered to the plaintiff upon his entering into an undertaking to the defendant, with one or more sufficient sureties in at least double the value of the 6. The jury must compute the damages and determine their verdict on that computation in dollars and cents; and if the jury find the contract on the part of the plaintiff was to pay a certain sum of money in gold, they will compute the difference between gold and currency, and render their verdict in dollars and cents in cur. rency. 7. If the jury find that, by the terms of the property taken, to the effect that the plaintiff * shall duly prosecute his action, and pay all costs and damages which may be awarded against him. Civil Code, 1869, sec. 190. If the property is so delivered, and the jury find for the defendant upon the issues joined, they are also required to find Whether the defendant has the right of property or the right of possession only and if they find either in his favor, they shall assess such damages as they think right and proper for the defendant; for which, with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for the defendant." Sec. 195. The delivery of the property to the plaintiff passes the title to him as against the defendant, who must look for his protection to a recovery in damages, if the writ is wrongfully sued out. In this case, the finding for the defendant is, under the pleadings, in effect, that Morris was the mortgagee of the property in possession after condition broken, and that Gregory had by the replevin wrongfully deprived him of his possession. That rendered Gregory liable for such damages, in consequence of his wrongful act, as were "right and proper" under the circumstances. The obligation secured by the mortgage or lien under which Morris held was for the payment of gold coin, or, as was said in Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall., 229 [74 U. S., XIX., 141], "An agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins, each of which is certified to contain a definite proportion of that weight," and is not distinguishable "From a contract to deliver an equal weight of bullion of equal fineness." In that case, it was held that judgment might be rendered upon such a contract payable in coined dollars; but here the suit is not upon the contract for the recovery of the amount agreed to be paid, but, in effect, for damages on account of the wrongful detention of property mortgaged to secure the debt. Gregory himself asked the court to charge that The jury must compute damages and return their verdict in dollars and cents. This was undoubtedly correct, and it was done; but he further asked the court to say that "No agree ment or contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold can be enforced. The national currency is by law a legal tender at its face value for all debts and demands, public or private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt." This was in conflict with Bronson v. Rodes, and therefore properly re fused. ful act in taking the property, subjected himself to damages. If the contract had been in terms for the delivery of so much gold bullion, there is no doubt but the court might have directed the jury to find the value of the bullion in currency, and bring in a verdict accordingly. But we think, as was thought in Bronson v. Rodes, such a case is not really distinguishable from this. The question is not whether Gregory had the right to pay in gold dollars after his debt had become due, but whether, having wrongfully got the property into his possession without payment at all, the damages he is required to pay on account of this wrongful act must, as a matter of law, be estimated in gold, or whether they may be in currency. We think it clear that, under such circumstances, it was within the power of the court, so far as Gregory was concerned, to treat the contract as one for the delivery of so much gold bullion; and, if Morris was willing to accept a judgment which might be discharged in currency, to have his damages estimated according to the currency value of bullion. Certainly, if Morris had in good faith sold the cattle under his power of sale for currency, and received payment in that kind of money, he would have been entitled to convert the currency into gold before crediting it upon his debt. Šo here, if, with the approbation of the court, he takes a judgment that may be discharged in currency. the judgment should be for an amount which would be the equivalent in currency of the specified amount of coin as bullion. This was the rule adopted by the court, and we think it correct. The eighth and ninth assignments of error relate to the form of the verdict. As has already been seen, where the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, the jury, if they find for the defendant, must also find whether the defendant has "the right of property or the right of possession only." In this case the verdict, though for the defendant, is silent upon that point; but the record shows that by consent the court charged the jury if they found for the defendants they should find " that they had the right of possession only." This cures any defect there may have been in the verdict in this particular. The whole record must be taken together; and, as the jury did not find to the contrary of the instruction, the presumption is that they followed it. All the other assignments relate to the adBut the court did say to the jury, that, if missibility of evidence, and as to them it is they found the contract on the part of the sufficient to say we are satisfied with the rulplaintiff was to pay a certain sum of money in ings that were made. Certainly, the instrugold, they should compute the difference be- ments in writing which were objected to were tween gold and currency, and render their ver- admissible. They tended directly to prove the dict in dollars and cents in currency; and in defense set up in the amended answer, and no this we see no error. While we have decided objection appears to have been made at the that a judgment upon a contract payable in trial as to the proof of their execution. The gold may be for payment in coined dollars, we cross examination of Gregory, which was ob have never held that in all cases it must be so. jected to, was clearly legitimate, under the While gold coin is in one sense money, it is in most stringent rules governing_that_subject. another an article of merchandise. Gregory He had testified that he had purchased the catwas required to discharge his debt in gold be- tle from Morris. It was clearly proper, therefore he could rightfully take the property into fore, on cross-examination, to ask him if his his possession under the replevin. If the pay-contract of purchase was in writing, and, if so, ment had been so made, Morris would have to identify the paper. had his coin at that time to use as money or merchandise, according to his discretion. But it was not made; and Gregory, by his wrong Judgment affirmed. Cited-105 U. S., 405; 107 U. S., 3. |