in cases of contracts depends chiefly upon the nature of the service or engagement, and is lim ited to such subjects as are purely maritime, and have respect to commerce and navigation within the meaning of the Constitution. Wide differences of opinion have existed as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction; but it may now be said, without fear of contradiction, that it extends to all contracts, claims and services essentially maritime, among which are bottomry bonds, contracts of affreightment and contracts for the conveyance of passengers, pilotage on the high seas, wharfage, agreements of consortship, surveys of vessels damaged by the perils of the seas, the claims of material men and others for the repair and outfit of ships belonging to foreign nations or to other States, and the wages of mariners; and also to civil marine torts and injuries, among which are assaults or other personal injuries, collision, spoliation and damage, illegal seizures or other depredations on property, illegal dispossession or withholding of possession from the owners of ships, controversies between the part owners as to the employment of ships, municipal seizures of ships, and cases of salvage and marine insurance. Conkl. Tr., 5th ed,, 254. Wharf accommodation is a necessity of navigation, and such accommodations are indispensable for ships and vessels and water-craft, of every name and description, whether employed in carrying freight or passengers, or engaged in the fisheries. Erections of the kind are constructed to enable ships, vessels and all sorts of water-craft to lie in port in safety, and to facilitate their operation in loading and unloading cargo and in receiving and landing passengers. Piers or wharves are a necessary incident to every well regulated port, without which commerce and navigation would be subjected to great inconvenience, and be exposed to vexa tious delay and constant peril. Conveniences of the kind are wanted, both at the port of departure and at the place of desti nation, and the expenses paid at both are everywhere regarded as properly chargeable as expenses of the voyage. Commercial privileges of the kind cannot be enjoyed where neither wharves nor piers exist; and it is not reasonable to suppose that such erections will be construct ed for general convenience, unless the proprie tors are allowed to make reasonable charges for their use. Compensation for wharfage may be claimed upon an express or an implied contract, accord ing to the circumstances. Where a price is agreed upon for the use of the wharf, the contract furnishes the measure of compensation; and when the wharf is used without any such agreement, the contract is implied, and the pro prietor is entitled to recover what is just and reasonable for the use of his property and the benefit conferred. Such erections are indispensably necessary for the safety and convenience of commerce and navigation, and those who take berth along. side them to secure those objects derive great benefit from their use. All experience supports that proposition, and shows to a demonstration that the contract of the wharfinger appertains to the pursuit of commerce and navigation. Instances may, doubtless, be referred to where wharves are erected as sites for stores and store houses; but the great and usual object of such erections is to advance commerce and navigation, by furnishing resting places for ships, vessels and all kinds of water-craft, and to facilitate their operation in loading and unloading cargo and in receiving and landing passengers. Nor is the nature of the service or the character of the contract changed by the circumstance that the water craft which derived the benefit in the case before the court was without masts or sails or other motive power of her own. Sailships, and even steamships and vessels, are frequently propelled by tugs; and yet, if they secure a berth at a wharf, or in a slip at the place of landing or at the port of destination, and actually occupy the berth as a resting place or for the purpose of loading or unloading, no one, it is supposed, will deny that the ship or vessel is just as much liable to the wharfinger as if she had been propelled by her own motive power. Neither canal-boats nor barges ordinarily have sails or steam power, but they usually have towlines; and it clearly cannot make any difference, as to their liability for wharfage, whether they are propelled by steam or sails of their own, or by tugs, or horse or mule power, if it appears that the boat or barge actually occupied a berth at the wharf or slip at the commencement or close of the trip as a resting place, or for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo or for receiving or landing passengers. Goods to a vast amount are transported by such means of conveyance, and all experience shows that boats of the kind require wharf privileges as well as ships and vessels, or any other water-craft engaged in navigation. The Northern Belle, 9 Wall., 526 [76 Ŭ. S., XIX., 748]. Access to the ship or vessel rightfully occupying a berth at a wharf, for the purpose of lading and unlading, is the undoubted right of the owner or charterer of such ship or vessel for which such right has been secured. Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494. Privileges of the kind are essential to the carrier by water, whether he is engaged in carrying goods or passengers. Repairs, to a limited extent, are sometimes made at the wharf; but contracts of the kind usually have respect to the voyage, and are made to secure a resting place for the vessel during the time she is being loaded or unloaded. Such contracts, beyond all doubt, are maritime, as they have respect to commerce and navigation, and are for the benefit of the ship or vessel when afloat. Carrying vessels would be of little or no value unless they could be loaded; and they are usually loaded from the wharf, except in a limited class of cases, where lighters are employed, the vessel being unable to come up to the wharf in consequence of the shoalness of the water. Accommodations at the port of destination are equally indispensable for the voyage as those at the port of departure. Consignments of goods and passengers must be landed, else the carrier is not entitled to freight or fare. Where the contract is to carry from port to port, an actual delivery of the goods into the possession of the owner or consignee, or at his warehouse, is not required in order to discharge the carrier from his liability. He may deliver them on the wharf; but, to constitute a valid delivery there, the master should give due and reasona- | ship and the ship herself may be proceeded ble notice to the consignee, so as to afford him against in admiralty to enforce the payment of a fair opportunity to remove the goods, or to wharfage, when the vessel lies alongside the put them under proper care and custody. De- wharf, or at a distance, and only uses the wharf livery on the wharf, under such circumstances, temporarily for boats or cargo. Ben. Adm., 2d is valid, if the different consignments be prop ed., sec. 283. erly separated, so as to be open to inspection, and conveniently accessible to their respective owners. The Eddy, 5 Wall., 481 [72 U. S., XVIII., 486]. These remarks are sufficient to show that wharves, piers or landing-places are well nigh as essential to commerce as ships and vessels, and are abundantly sufficient to demonstrate that the contract for wharfage is a maritime contract, for which, if the vessel or water craft is a foreign one, or belongs to a port of a State other than the one where the wharf is situated, a maritime lien arises against the ship or vessel in favor of the proprietor of the wharf. Standard authorities, as well as reason, principle, and the necessities of commerce, support the theory that the contract for wharfage is a maritime contract, which, in the case supposed, gives to the proprietor of the wharf a maritime lien on the ship or vessel for his security. From an early period, wharf owners have been allowed to exact from ships and vessels using a berth at their wharves a reasonable compensation for the use of the same; and the ship or vessel enjoying such a privilege has always been accustomed to pay to the proprietor of the wharf a reasonable compensation for the use of the berth. The Kate Tremaine, 5 Ben., 61. Ancient codes and treatises, such as are frequently recognized as the source from which the rules of the maritime law are drawn, usually treat such contracts as maritime contracts, for which the ship or vessel is liable. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall., 435 [76 U. S,, XIX., 772]; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall., 398. Application for the writ of prohibition is properly made in such a case, upon the ground that the District Court has transcended its jurisdiction in entertaining the described proceeding; and whether it has or not must depend not upon facts stated dehors the record, but upon those stated in the record upon which the District Court is called to act, and by which alone it can regulate its judgment. Mere matters of defense, whether going to oust the jurisdiction of the court or to establish the want of merits in the libelants' case, cannot be admitted under such a petition here to displace the right of the District Court to entertain suits; the rule being that every such matter should be propounded by suitable pleadings as a defense for the consideration of the court, and to be supported by competent proofs, provided the case is one within the jurisdiction of the District Court. Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292. Congress has empowered the Supreme Court to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts "when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," by which it is understood that the power is limited to a proceeding in admiralty. Conkl. Tr., 5th ed., 56. Such a writ is issued to forbid a subordinate court to proceed in a cause there depending, on sugges tion that the cognizance thereof belongeth not to the court. F. N. B., 39; 3 Bl. Com., 112; 2 Pars. Ship., 193; 8 Bac. Abr., 206. Viewed in the light of these considerations, it is clear that a contract for the use of a wharf, by the master or owner of a ship or vessel, is a maritime contract and, as such, that it is cogCharges for wharfage were adjudged to be nizable in the admiralty; that such a contract, lien claims in the District Court of the Third being one made exclusively for the benefit of the Circuit more than seventy years ago, and, in ship or vessel, a maritime lien in the case supspeaking of that case, Judge Story says, that it posed arises in favor of the proprietor of the seems to him that the decision was fully sup wharf against the vessel for payment of reasonported in principle by the doctrines as well of able and customary charges in that behalf for the common law as of the civil law, and by the the use of the wharf, and that the same may be analogous cases of materials furnished and re-enforced by a proceeding in rem against the pairs made upon the ship. Gardner v. The New vessel, or by a suit in personam against the Jersey, 1 Pet. Adm., 223; Ex parte Lewis, 2 owner. Gall., 483, where it was expressly adjudged that the contract was necessarily maritime, giving as the reason for the conclusion that the use of the wharf is indispensable for the preservation of the vessel. Johnson v. The McDonough, Gilpin, 101. Many other questions were discussed at the bar which will not be decided at the present time, as they are not properly involved in the application before the court. Petition for prohibition denied. Cited-15 Blatchf., 504; 2 Flipp., 407, 425; 87 N. Y., Other eminent admiralty judges have decided in the same way, and among the number the 245. late Judge Ware, whose opinion in cases involving the question of admiralty jurisdiction is entitled to the highest respect. The Phoebe, 1 Ware, 265; 2 Conkl. Adm., 2d ed., 515; The Alaska, 3 Ben., 391; Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet., 108; The Mercer, 1 Sprague, 284; The Ann Ryan, 7 Ben., 20; Dunlap, Adm., 75; Abb., Ship., 5th ed. 423. Water-craft of all kinds necessarily lie at a wharf when loading and unloading; and Mr. Benedict says that the pecuniary charge for the use of the dock or wharf is called wharfage or dockage, and that it is the subject of admiralty jurisdiction; that the master and owner of the THE LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN D. PETER ROSE, COLLECTOR, etc. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 78-80.) Tax on railroad bonds. A tax of five per cent. upon the amount paid by a railroad company to its bond holders, is warranted by the Act of June 30, 1864, as amended by the Act | ject. This limitation was not in the original of July 13, 1866, and amended finally by the Act of Internal Revenue Act of August 5, 1861, 12 July 14, 1870. [No. 51.] Stat. at L., 292, although that Act imposed the Submitted Oct. 25, 1877. Decided Nov. 5, 1877. income tax. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought by the plaintiff in error. It was decided in the court below upon a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. The demurrer was sustained and judgment was given for the defendant. We must, therefore, look | to the petition for the point to be decided. The facts well pleaded are to be taken as true. The case made by the petition is as follows: The plaintiff was bound to pay the interest upon certain bonds. The interest accruing from the 1st of January to the 1st of July, 1870, amounting to $185,500, matured upon the latter day, and within ten days from that time were paid to the bond holders respectively. Neither five per cent, nor any other sum was withheld on account of taxes. On the 14th of July, 1870, Rose, the proper internal revenue officer of the United States, assessed against the plaintiff the sum of $9,279.50 as a tax of five per cent. upon the amount so paid over to the bond holders. Payment was compelled, by the seizure of property. The amount of the tax paid to the collector is alleged to have been exacted without warrant of law, and this suit was instituted to recover it back. The limitation appeared first in the Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat, at L., 474, sec. 92. It ap peared again successively in the Act of June, 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L.,283,sec. 119; in the Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 138, and in the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at L., 480. In all these instances, the collocation of the provision and the context which precedes it, and that which follows as well, show, with a clearness approaching to a demonstration, that the construction we have given to it is the proper one. The subject was exhaustively examined in the concurring opinion in Stockdale v. Ins. Co., 20 Wall., 333 [87 U. S., XXII., 351], and as a consequence, the conclusion was reached to which we have come. It would be a waste of time to reproduce anything said in that opinion. It is sufficient for our purpose to refer to the argument there to be found. If this view be correct, it is conclusive of the case. But conceding, for the purposes of this opinion, that we are in error upon the point we have considered, and that the limitation did terminate the tax prescribed in the 122d section and in the other sections specified in the 17th section of the Act of 1870, then it is clear that the section last named revived the sections therein named, including section 122, and gave them the same effect down to the 1st of August, 1870, in all respects as if those sections had not been intermediately suspended or abrogated. This proposition is maintained, and every objection taken to it elaborately considered and answered, by the opinion of this court in Stockdale v. Ins. Co., 20 Wall., 328 [87 U. S., XXII., 350], before referred to. We are entirely satisfied The question presented for our determination with respect to the soundness of that judg is, whether the imposition of this tax was war-ment, and feel no disposition to re-examine the ranted by law. We think it was. grounds upon which it was placed. This, also, is conclusive of the present controversy. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Waite did not sit at the argument of this case and took no part in its decision. Cited 101 U. S., 549. KEOKUK NORTHERN LINE PACKET V. CITY OF KEOKUK, IOWA. The tax was levied under the 122d section of the Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L., 284, as amended by the Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat, at L.,138, and amended finally by the Act of July 14, 1870.sec. 17, 16 Stat. at L.,261. The purport of the amendment last mentioned was to give continuity to section 122, and other sections named, of the Act of 1864, as amended, until the 1st of August, 1870, the taxes imposed by all those sections then to cease. The tax specified in section 122 was levied upon railroad, canal, turnpike,canal navigation and slack-water companies. The section did not include the tax upon the income of individuals. That was provided for, always, in other separate and distinct sections. The section 122, as amended, was in force when the Act of 1870 was passed, and without further legislation, would have continued in force indefinitely, unless there was a previous limit to its duration imposed by the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at L., 480. After a careful examination of the subject, we are of the opinion that this limitation in the Act of 1867 had not and was not intended to have any effect upon section 122, as amended; and that the sole intent and effect of that limit ation was to designate the 30th of April, 1870, as the time when the tax upon the income of individuals should cease. Nothing else was within its scope. It was confined to that sub-prohibited parts are severable. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 80-89.) Wharfage, when collectible--constitutional statute. 1. A municipal corporation of a State having, by the law of its organization, an exclusive right to wharfage rates, can, consistently with the Constitumake wharves, collect wharfage, and to regulate tion of the United States, charge and collect wharfage proportioned to the tonnage of the vessels, from the owners of enrolled and licensed steamboats mooring and landing at the wharves constructed on the banks of a navigable river. 2. Statutes that are constitutional in part only, with the Constitution, provided the allowed and will be upheld, so far as they are not in conflict [No. 923.] Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; Smith v. TurSubmitted Oct. 17, 1877. Decided Nov. 5, 1877. ner. 7 How., 283; Brown v. Md., 12 Wheat., 419: Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How., 227 (63 U. Iowa. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of The plaintiff in error, the Keokuk Northern Line Packet Company, a Corporation of the State of Missouri, was sued in the District Court of Lee Co., Iowa, by defendant in error, the City of Keokuk, Iowa, for $286, for wharfage on boats belonging to plaintiff in error (which boats navigate the Mississippi River from St. Louis, Missouri, to St. Paul, Minnesota), under the ordinances of the City of Keokuk, a municipal Corporation, existing by virtue of a special charter from the Legislature of Iowa. Plaintiff in error answered, and defendant in error demurred. The demurrer was sustained by the district court, in which the suit was brought. Plaintiff in error duly excepted to said ruling, and thereupon final judgment was rendered in said district court for $289, which was duly excepted to. Plaintiff in error thereupon appealed from this judgment to the Supreme Court of Iowa, and upon hearing, it was affirmed. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. Robert H. Gilmore, James H. Anderson and J. H. Davidson, for plaintiff in error: Under the ordinance it is provided that six | and one half miles of the free Mississippi River shall not be free to persons navigating the river; that no person may use the bank to land on, unless he pays a toll to the City of Keokuk; no matter where in that six and a half miles he lands, or whether he lands at all or not, he is liable for the tax, should he send a skiff ashore with a passenger or a trunk. It is a toll for the privilege of arriving at and departing from the port. It is not for the use of a wharf or dock; none have been constructed; and it makes no difference as to liability for wharfage, whether the boat lands where the City has paved Water Street or not. All the boats described in the petition have been duly licensed and enrolled, and were American vessels, and entitled to all the priv ileges of American ships, among others the privilege of entering any port of the United States, without the exaction of any tax or toll for the privilege of entering or departing. These boats were engaged in commerce between the States and, as such, had the right to enter the Port of Keokuk without the payment of any tax. Story, Const., secs. 1016, 1018. S., XVI., 243); Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall., 581 (86 U. S., XXII., 201 ); Almy v. State of Cal., 24 How., 169 (65 U. S., XVI., 644); Čannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall., 577 (87 U. S., XXII., 417); Steamship Co. v. Port- Wardens, 6 Wall., 31 (73 U. S., XVIII., 749); State Ton. Tax Cases, 12 Wall., 204 (79 U. S., XX., 370). These constitutional questions have been frequently before state courts, and they have had no hesitancy in declaring statutes, in contravention of the United States Constitution, void. Hackley v. Geraghty, 34 N. J. L., 332; People v. Raymond, 34 Cal., 492; People v. Moring, 47 Barb. (N. Y.), 642; Alexander v. R. R. Co., 3 Strob., 598; Sheffield v. Parsons, 3 Stew. & P., 302; Lott v. Morgan, 41 Ala., 250; Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill. C. C., 454. The claim of the City, we believe is, that the wharfage is a tax for the use of the street, a public highway, for the purposes of landing for steamboats, and is not within the constitutional provisions; that it is within the exception noticed in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall., 582 (87 U. S., XXII., 420). Webster defines a wharf to be a perpendicular bank or mound of timber, or stone and earth, raised on the shore of a harbor, river, canal or the like, or extending some distance into the water, for the convenience of lading or unlading ships or other vessels. A pier, he defines to be a projecting wharf or landing-place. There is nothing appearing in the pleadings demurred to, showing that the City has ever built any such wharf or pier, or that it has built anything but a street for the use of the public. The ordinance provides (section 2) that nothing contained in the section shall be construed to interfere with the use of Water Street as a public street; that it is not exclusively a wharf, landing-place or pier, built for the accommodation of vessels, to facilitate their business, for the use of which they might be expected to pay a rent. It is a public street for public use for everything else as well as steamboats, and being a public highway, a toll cannot be exacted from a steamboat for using it, any more than a tax could be levied against a footman for the privilege of using the same street. The streets are in the general public; the Corporation has no ownership over them. Messrs. John H. Craig and Wm. Collier, for defendant in error: high water-mark, is in the State of Iowa. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet., 367; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How., 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How., 471; Barney v. Keokuk (ante, 224), decided at the last Term of this court. The numerous adjudications on these clauses It is the settled doctrine of this court and the of the Constitution, demonstrate how many dif- Supreme Court of Iowa, that in Iowa, the title ferent plans have been invented for the pur-to the shore and bed of the Mississippi below pose of levying a tribute on commerce, and how carefully the provisions of that instrument have been upheld by state and federal authority. Exclusive privileges to steam vessels, owned by certain parties in New York, by law of that State; passenger duties by Massachusetts and New York; quarantine duties by Texas; port-warden's fees and wharfage dues by Louisiana; taxes on vessels by Alabama, stamps on bills of lading by California; importer's license by Maryland; wharfage by Minnesota, have all been upheld to be unconstitutional and void by the courts, as being in contravention of the Constitution or Acts of Congress. By virtue of its charter from the State, and the dedication of Water Street, for not only street purposes, but for wharf and levee purposes, the City of Keokuk has all the rights of a riparian proprietor, subject only to the qualification that the uses to which it is subjected shall be public. In the case of New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet., 662, the court says: "If the City can claim the original dedication to the river, it has all the rights and privileges of a riparian owner." One of these riparian rights is the right to construct wharves, and to charge and receive a reasonable compensation for their use. The exercise of this right by private individuals and municipal corporations, is not an obstruction to navigation or a tax on commerce, but it is in aid of both. It is a necessity of navigation. The natural shores of navigable waters do not afford the facilities for landing, and the receiving and discharging of freight and passengers, which navigation and commerce absolutely require. Navigable waters would be of but little use without safe and convenient landing-places. That mode is to allow the riparian owner, in cluding cities entitled to riparian rights, to construct and maintain wharves, etc., which shall be open to the use of all upon the payment of a reasonable compensation, holding them responsible for their safe condition, and liable in dam ages for failing to keep them in safe condition. This is exactly the provision of the common law, and is an illustration of its wisdom, suggested, in this instance, by the necessities of navigation, and by experience in providing for them. as the land described in the foregoing section, should be open for the uses and purposes of a wharf, subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by ordinance for its government, and that all boats, rafts and water-craft that are moored to or landed at any part of Water Street, and the persons owning, claiming and having charge of the same, should be subject to the same rules, regulations, wharfage and penalties as were provided by the ordinance in relation to boats, rafts and other water-craft landing or mooring at the wharf, as defined by the 3d section. The 3d section ordained that any steamboat that should make fast to any part of said wharf or Water Street, or to any vessel or other thing at or upon said wharf or street, or should receive or discharge any passengers or freight thereon, or should use any part of said wharf or street for the purpose of discharging, receiving or landing any freight or passenger, should be liable to a wharfage fee. This fee, the ordinance declared, should be $1, if the tonnage of the boat was less than fifty tons; $1.50, if the tonnage of the boat was less than one. hundred tons and more than fifty; $2, if the tonnage was one hundred tons and less than two hundred; $3 for boats of two hundred tons and less than three hundred; $4 for boats of three hundred tons and less than four hundred; and $5 for all boats of four hundred tons and upwards. The section also ordained that each boat that should remain at the wharf or street over two and less than five days should pay a wharfage fee of $1.50 for each day after the first two days, and $1 per day for every day over five days it might remain at the wharf or street. The 4th section of the ordinance applied the provision of the 3d section to barges, canal-boats or keel-boats used in the carrying trade, landing at the wharf, whether in tow or otherwise. This ordinance the plaintiffs in error claim to be in conflict with the Constitution. They are the owners of several steamboats which have landed at the wharves of the City from time to time, and The principal question presented by the rec- occupied them for the purpose of receiving and ord of this case is, whether a municipal corpo-discharging freight and passengers. Wharfage ration of a State, having by the law of its or- dues were regularly demanded but refused. ganization an exclusive right to make wharves, Their boats were engaged in navigating the Miscollect wharfage and regulate wharfage rates, sissippi River between St. Louis, Missouri and can, consistently with the Constitution of the St. Paul, Minnesota, and they landed at Keokuk, United States, charge and collect wharfage pro- one of their regular ports. While so employed, portioned to the tonnage of the vessels from the they were duly licensed and enrolled for the owners of enrolled and licensed steamboats coasting trade, under the Acts of Congress, for mooring and landing at the wharves constructed the regulation of commerce. on the banks of a navigable river. Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 1 (66 U. S., XVII., 29): R. R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 7 Wall., 289 (74 U. S., XIX., 78); Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall.. 497 (77 U. S., XIX., 984); Baltimore Wharf case, 3 Bland, Ch., 383; Dugan v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & J., 357; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa., 54; Buckbee v. Brown, 21 Wend., 110; Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, Ch., 313; Schwartz v. Flatboats, 14 La. Ann., 243; Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla., 325; Murphy v. Montgomery, 11 Ala., 586; Sacramento v. The Confidence, 4 Cal., 45; People v. Broadway Wharf Co., 31 Cal., 34; Haight v. Keokuk, 4 la., 199; Grant v. Davenport, 18 Ia., 181. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: The City of Keokuk is such a Corporation, existing by virtue of a special charter granted by the Legislature of Iowa. The Act creating it gave to the City Council power to establish and regulate wharves, and to fix the rates of landing and wharfage of all boats, rafts and water-craft moored at or landing at the wharves. By virtue of this power, the City Council, on the 26th of February, 1872, passed an ordinance, the 1st section of which ordained that all the ground then lying, or which might thereafter be made, between Water Street, in the said City, and the middle chan nel of the Mississippi River, should be declared a wharf, and should be subject to be used for such purposes, under such conditions as might be prescribed by ordinance. The 2d section declared that the whole of Water Street, as well These are all the material facts of the case, except that the landing of the boats was at an improved wharf which the City had built within its limits, extending about one thousand feet along the line of the river; a wharf which the City had paved, and in building, extending and repairing of which it had expended a large sum of money. The money had been borrowed; and to pay the interest of the debt, it became necessary to charge and collect reasonable wharfage. That the rates charged, if any charge is lawful, were reasonable is not denied. They were no more than sufficient to meet the interest of the debt incurred for building and im proving the wharf. Suit having been brought to recover the wharfage prescribed by the ordinance, and a judgment for the amount having been recovered and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the |