See, 2 Smith, L. C., 6th Am. ed., 665, 787, | 791 and cases cited; Big. Estop., 45; Howlett v. Tarte, 10 C. B. N. S., 813; 100 Eng. C. L..813; Carter v. James, 13 Mees. & W., 137; Hooker v. Hubbard, 102 Mass., 239; Hughes v. Alexander, 5 Duer, 488; Van Alstyne v. R. R. Co., 34 Barb., 28. These six cases, decided in as many different courts, are all diametrically opposed to the doctrine laid down in Beloit v. Morgan. It seems also to be inconsistent with the prior decisions of this court, in Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How., 333 (65 U. S., XVI., 650), and S. C., 5 Wall., 580 (72 U. S., XVIII., 550), and is certainly in direct conflict with the rule laid down by Nelson, J., delivering the court's opinion in the last named case. All that, under any view, was in question, or determined in the Smith case, as to the character of the plaintiff's ownership, was limited to the twenty-five coupons then in suit. Nothing was alleged, nor needful to be alleged or proved, as to ownership of the bonds themselves, or of any of the other coupons belonging to them. Mr. Galusha Parsons, for defendant in error: This court has, at least three times within the last eight years, decided the exact question which counsel for the plaintiff in error claims to be now here. Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall., 82 (74 U. S., XIX., 42); Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall., 619 (74 U. S., XIX., 205); Gould v. R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 526 (XXIII., 416). The question argued, however, is not involved in this case. It was not, as the argument as sumes it to have been in the former action, some "collateral, fortuitous or accidental" circum stance, but it was the precise question raised by the issues and decided by the court in that action; "the same cause of action, within the meaning of the rule, as declared by this court." 7 Wall., 96 (74 U. S., XIX., 47). "The title involved was the same." 7 Wall., 621 (74 U. S., XIX., 206). Whatever may be the weight of the authorities as to the force of an adjudication as an estoppel upon matters purely collateral, there is no difference of opinion as to such as are directly in issue and actually decided. parties are concluded by the judgment." Sec. 175. To the same effect are Greenleaf, secs. 522, 523, and Taylor, Evidence, sec. 1513, both of which are referred to by this court in the cases above cited. "It is by no means true that in order to constitute an estoppel by judgment, the parties on the record must be the same. The term has a broader meaning. It includes the real and substantial parties who, although not upon the record, had a right to contest the proceedings." Castle v. Noyes, 14 N. Y., 335. "Holding, as the plaintiff did, the legal title to the judgment by assignment, he could sue upon it, and his right to recover could not be defeated by simply showing that another was the party beneficially interested in the action. This alone would not constitute a defense." Cottle v. Cole, 20 Ia., 485. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: This was an action on four bonds of the County of Sac, in the State of Iowa, each for $1,000, and four coupons for interest, attached to them, each for $100. The bonds were is sued in 1860, and were made payable to bearer, in the City of New York, in the years 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871, respectively, with annual interest at the rate of ten per cent. a year. To defeat this action, the defendant relied upon the estoppel of a judgment rendered in favor of the County in a prior action brought by one Samuel C. Smith upon certain earlier maturing coupons on the same bonds, accompanied with proof that the plaintiff, Cromwell, was at the time the owner of the coupons in that action, and that the action was prosecuted for his sole use and benefit. The questions presented for our determination relate to the operation of this judgment as an estoppel against the prosecution of the present action, and the admissibility of the evidence to connect the present plaintiff with the former action as a real party in interest. In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the If the views of this court have undergone no same claim or demand, and its effect as an esmodification since it decided Buck v. Colbath, toppel in another action between the same par3 Wall., 334 (70 U. S., XVIII., 257), this argu- ties upon a different claim or cause of action. ment ought to end here." Parties should not In the former case, the judgment, if rendered be encouraged to speculate on a change of the upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to law when the administrators of it are changed. a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the Courts ought not to be compelled to bear the claim or demand in controversy, concluding infliction of repeated arguments by obstinate parties and those in privity with them, not only litigants, challenging the justice of their well as to every matter which was offered and reconsidered and solemn judgments. See, also, ceived to sustain or defeat the claim or deWright v. Sill, 2 Black,544 (67 U. S., XVII.,333). mand, but as to any other admissible matter If it was not competent to show who the real which might have been offered for that purparty in interest in that action was, this court, pose. Thus, for example; a judgment rendered in common with all of the courts in this country upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the and in England, and the elementary writers, validity of the instrument and the amount due have been a great many years laboring under a upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that mistake. Freeman, on Judgments, lays down perfect defenses actually existed, of which no the rule in this way: "For the purpose of show-proof was offered, such as forgery, want of coning that parties not named in the record were sideration, or payment. If such defenses were the real parties in interest and conducted the not presented in the action, and established by suit in the name of others, who were only nom competent evidence, the subsequent allegation inal parties, parol evidence may always be of- of their existence is of no legal consequence. fered, and when the showing is made, the real | The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate, when applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law, upon any ground whatever. But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action. The difference in the operation of a judgment in the two classes of cases mentioned is seen through all the leading adjudications upon the doctrine of estoppel. Thus, in the case of Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346, the defendants were held estopped from averring title to a mine, in an action of trespass for digging out coal from it, because, in a previous action for a sim ilar trespass, they had set up the same title, and it had been determined against them. In commenting upon a decision cited in that case, Lord Ellenborough, in his elaborate opinion, said: "It is not the recovery, but the matter alleged by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds, which creates the estoppel. The recovery of itself in an action of trespass is only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same injury; but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contending to the contrary of that point or matter of fact, which, having been once distinctly put in issue by them, or by those to whom they are privy in estate or law, has been, on such issue joined, solemnly found against them." And in the case of Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cow., 120, it was held by the Supreme Court of New York that a verdict and judgment in the Marine Court of the City of New York, upon one of two notes given upon a sale of a vessel, that the sale was fraudulent, the vessel being at the time unseaworthy, were conclusive upon the question of the character of the sale in an action upon the other note between the same parties in the Court of Common Pleas. The rule laid down in the celebrated opinion in the case of The Duchess of Kingston was cited, and followed: That the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a plea at bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question in another court" These cases, usually cited in support of the doctrine that the determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit between the same parties upon a different cause of action, negative the proposition that the estoppel can extend beyond the point actually litigated and determined. The argument in these cases, that a particular point. was necessarily involved in the finding in the original action, proceeded upon the theory that, if not thus involved, the judgment would be inoperative as an estoppel. In the case of Miles v. Caldwell, reported in the 2d of Wallace, 35 [69 U. S., XVII., 755], a judgment in ejectment in Missouri, where actions of that kind stand, with respect to the operation of a recovery therein, as a bar or estoppel, in the same position as other actions, was held by this court conclusive, in a subsequent suit in equity between the parties respecting the title, upon the question of the satisfaction of the mortgage under which the plaintiff claimed title to the premises in the ejectment, and the question as to the fraudulent character of the mortgage under which the defendant claimed, because these questions had been submitted to the jury in that action, and had been passed upon by them. The court held, after full consideration, that in cases of tort, equally as in those arising upon contract, where the form of the issue was so vague as not to show the questions of facts submitted to the jury, it was competent to prove by parol testimony what question or questions of fact were thus submitted and necessarily passed upon by them; and by inevitable implication also held that, in the absence of proof in such cases, the verdict and judgment were inconclusive, except as to the particular trespass alleged, whatever possible questions might have been raised and determined. But it is not necessary to take this doctrine as a matter of inference from these cases. The precise point has been adjudged in numerous instances. It was so adjudged by this court in the case of Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, reported in the 24th of Howard, 333 [65 U. S., XVI., 650]. In that case, an action was brought upon a special parol contract for the use of Sickles' cut-off for saving fuel in the working of steam engines, by which the plaintiffs, who had a patent for the cut-off, were to attach one of their machines to the engine of the defendants' boat, and were to receive for its use three fourths of the saving of fuel thus produced, the payments to be made from time to time when demanded. To ascertain the saving of fuel an experiment was to be made in a specified manner, and the result taken as the rate of saving during the continuance of the contract. The plaintiffs in their declaration averred that the experiment had been made, the rate of saving ascertained, and that the cut-off had been used on the boat until the commencement of the suit. In a prior action against the same defendant for an installment due, where the declaration set forth the same contract in two counts, the first of which was similar to the counts in the second action, and also the common counts, the plaintiffs had obtained verdict and judgment; and it was insisted that the defendant was estopped by the verdict and judgment produced from proving that there was no such contract as that declared upon; or that no saving of fuel had been obtained; or that the experiment was not made pursuant to the contract; or that the verdict was rendered upon all the issues and not upon the first count specially. The circuit court assented to these views, and excluded the testimony of fered by the defendants to prove those facts. But this court reversed the decision, and held | had recovered a judgment in a former action that the defendants were not thus estopped. against the defendant for rent under the same agreement, which had accrued after the alleged determination of the tenancy, in which action the defendant did not set up the defense pleaded in the second action. On demurrer, the replication, after full argument, was held bad. În deciding the case, Mr. Justice Willes said: "It is quite right that a defendant should be estopped from setting up in the same action a defense which he might have pleaded, but has chosen to let the proper time go by. But nobody ever heard of a defendant being precluded from setting up a defense in a second action because he did not avail himself of the oppor "The record produced by the plaintiffs," said the court, "showed that the first suit was brought apparently upon the same contract as the second, and that the existence and validity of that contract might have been litigated. But the verdict might have been rendered upon the entire declaration, and without special reference to the first count. It was competent to the defendants to show the state of facts that existed at the trial, with a view to ascertain what was the matter decided upon by the verdict of the jury. It may have been that there was no contest in reference to the fairness of the experiment, or to its sufficiency to ascertain the pre-tunity of setting it up in the first action. *** mium to be paid for the use of the machine at the first trial, or it may have been that the plaintiffs abandoned their special counts and recovered their verdict upon the general counts. The judgment rendered in that suit, while it remains in force, and for the purpose of maintaining its validity, is conclusive of all the facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs; but when it is presented as testimony in another suit, the inquiry is competent whether the same issue has been tried and settled by it." I think we should do wrong to favor the introduction of this new device into the law." Mr. Justice Byles said: "It is plain that there is no authority for saying that the defendant is precluded from setting up this defense." Mr. Justice Keating said: This is an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to extend the doctrine of estoppel far beyond what any of the authorities warrant." The language of the Vice-Chancellor, in the case of Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, 100, It is not believed that there are any cases go- 115, is sometimes cited as expressing a differing to the extent that, because in the prior ac-ent opinion; but, upon examining the facts of tion a different question from that actually determined might have arisen and been litigated; therefore, such possible question is to be considered as excluded from consideration in a second action between the same parties on a different demand, although loose remarks look ing in that direction may be found in some opinions. On principle, a point not in litigation in one action cannot be received as conclusively settled in any subsequent action upon a different cause, because it might have been determined in the first action. Various considerations, other than the actual merits, may govern a party in bringing forward grounds of recovery or defense in one action, which may not exist in another action upon a different demand, such as the smallness of the amount or the value of the property in controversy, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of the litigation, and his own situation at the time. A party acting upon considerations like these ought not to be precluded from contesting, in a subsequent action, other demands arising out of the same transaction. A judgment by default only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or complaint evidence in an action upon a different claim. The declaration may contain different statements of the cause of action in different counts. It could hardly be pretended that a judgment by default in such a case would make the several statements evidence in any other proceeding. Boi leau v. Rutlin, 2 Exch., 665, 681; Hughes v. Alexander, 5 Duer, 493. The case of Howlett v. Tarte, 10 C. B. N. S., 813, supports this view. That was an action for rent, under a building agreement. The defendant pleaded a subsequent agreement, chang: ing the tenancy into one from year to year and its determination by notice to quit before the time for which the rent sued for was alleged to have accrued. The plaintiff replied that he that case, it will appear that the language used in no respect conflicts with the doctrine we have stated. In that case, a bill had been filed in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, by the next of kin of an intestate, against A. and others, for an account of an estate and of certain partnership transactions. A decree was rendered against A., upon which the next of kin brought actions in England. A. then filed a bill there against the next of kin and personal representative of the intestate, stating that the intestate's estate was indebted to him, and alleging various errors and irregularities in the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the island, and praying that the estate of the intestate might be administered, the partnership accounts taken, and the amount of the debt due to him ascertained and paid. A demurrer to the bill was allowed for want of equity, on the ground that the whole of the matters were in question between the parties, and might properly have been the subject of adjudication in the suit before that court. It was with reference to the necessity of having the subject of particular litigation, as a whole, at once before the court, and not by piecemeal, that the Vice-Chancellor said: "In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of court correctly, that when a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in and of adjudication by a court of competent jurisdic tion, the court requires the parties to bring forward their whole case, and will not, except under special circumstances, permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in controversy, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of the case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to the points upon which the court was required by the parties to form an opinion, and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising | fact that a party may not have shown that he reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." There is nothing in this language applied to the facts of the case, which gives support to the doctrine that, whenever in one action a party might have brought forward a particular ground of recovery or defense, and neglected to do so, he is, in a subsequent suit between the same parties upon a different cause of action, precluded from availing himself of such ground. If, now, we consider the main question presented for our determination by the light of the views thus expressed and the authorities cited, its solution will not be difficult. It appears from the findings in the original action of Smith, that the County of Sac, by a vote of its people, au thorized the issue of bonds to the amount of $10,000, for the erection of a court-house; that bonds to that amount were issued by the County Judge, and delivered to one Meserey, with whom he had made a contract for the erection of the court-house; that immediately upon receipt of the bonds the contractor gave one of them as a gratuity to the County Judge; and that the court-house was never constructed by the contractor, or by any other person pursuant to the contract. It also appears that the plaintiff had become, before their maturity, the holder of twenty-five coupons, which had been at tached to the bonds, but there was no finding that he had ever given any value for them. The court below held, upon these findings, that the bonds were void as against the County, and gave judgment accordingly. The case coming here on writ of error, this court held that the facts disclosed by the findings were sufficient evidence of fraud and illegality in the inception of the bonds to call upon the holder to show that he had given value for the coupons; and, not having done so, the judgment was affirmed. Reading the record of the lower court by the opinion and judgment of this court, it must be considered that the matters adjudged in that case were these: that the bonds were void as against the County in the hands of parties who did not acquire them before maturity and give value for them, and that the plaintiff, not having proved that he gave such value, was not entitled to recover upon the coupons. Whatever illegality or fraud there was in the issue and de livery to the contractor of the bonds affected equally the coupons for interest attached to them. The finding and judgment upon the in validity of the bonds, as against the County, must be held to estop the plaintiff here from averring to the contrary. But as the bonds were negotiable instruments, and their issue was authorized by a vote of the County, and they recite on their face a compliance with the law providing for their issue, they would be held as valid obligations against the County in the hands of a bona fide holder taking them for value before maturity, according to repeated decis ions of this court upon the character of such ob ligations. If, therefore, the plaintiff received the bond and coupons in suit before maturity for value, as he offered to prove, he should have been permitted to show that fact. There was nothing adjudged in the former action in the finding that the plaintiff had not made such proof in that case which can preclude the present plaintiff from making such proof here. The gave value for one bond or coupon is not even presumptive, much less conclusive, evidence that he may not have given value for another and different bond or coupon. The exclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff was erroneous, and for the ruling of the court in that respect the judgment must be reversed and a new trial had. Upon the second question presented, we think the court below.ruled correctly. Evidence showing that the action of Smith was brought for the sole use and benefit of the present plaintiff was, in our judgment, admissible. The finding that Smith was the holder and owner of the coupons in suit went only to this extent: that he held the legal title to them which was sufficient for the purpose of the action and was not inconsistent with an equitable and beneficial in terest in another. Judgment reversed and cause remanded, for a new trial. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Ten bonds, each for the sum of $1,000, were issued by the County for the purpose of erecting a court-house in the county seat of the County; and it appears that the bonds were made pay able to bearer, one each succeeding year, till the whole were paid, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum. Four of the bonds are the subject of the present controversy, and the defense is, the estoppel of a prior judgment in favor of the County in a suit brought to collect certain of the interest warrants annexed to the bonds. Sufficient appears to show that the bonds were in due form, and that they contain the recital that they "Were issued by the County, in accordance with the vote of the legal voters thereof, at a special election holden on the day therein mentioned, pursuant to a proclamation made by the County Judge, according to the statute of the State in such case made and provided." Annexed to the bonds were the coupons for the payment of the annual interest, and the plaintiff in the prior suit, being the holder of twentyfive of the coupons, instituted the suit to recover the amount, and he alleged in his declaration that he was the holder and owner of the same; that he received the coupons in good faith before their maturity, and that he paid value for the same at the time of the transfer; that the bonds and coupons were issued by the County under and by virtue of a legal and competent authority, and that the same are valid and legal claims against the Corporation. Most of the allegations of the declaration were denied in the answer; but the defendants did not specifically deny that the plaintiff paid value for the coupons at the time he became the holder and owner. Special findings of the facts were made by the court, from which it appears that the question whether a court-house should be built, and whether a tax sufficient to liquidate the expense should be levied, were duly submitted to the voters of the County; that the propositions were adopted at a special election held for the purpose; that the County Judge made the contract for the erection of the court house; and that he duly executed the ten bonds in question, and ing of his case; but the defendant may, if he delivered the same to the contractor, in pursu- can, give evidence that the consideration was ance of the contract. illegal, that the instrument was fraudulent in Proof of a satisfactory character was exhibits inception, or that it had been lost or stolen ited that the contract between the Judge and the contractor was made in the county where the Judge resided: but the court found that the bonds were signed, sealed, and delivered by the Judge during his temporary absence in another county; and the findings show that the plaintiff became the owner and holder of the coupons before maturity and after the proceedings were correctly entered in the minute-book; nor is it found that the plaintiff had any notice whatever of the supposed irregularities. Evidence of fraud in the inception of the contract is entirely wanting, except what may be inferred from the unexplained fact that the contractor gave one of the bonds, as a gratuity, to the County Judge as soon as he delivered the same to the contractor. Beyond all doubt, the contractor proved to be unworthy, as he never performed his contract, or paid back the consideration. before it was negotiated to the plaintiff; and, if the defendant proves such a defense, it will follow that it must prevail, unless the plaintiff proves that he gave value for the instrument in the usual course of business, in which event he is still entitled to recover. Fitch v. Jones, 5 El. & Bl., 238; Smith v. Braine, 16 Q. B., 243; Hall v. Featherstone, 3 Hurls & N., 287; Collins v. Gilbert [ante, 170]. Applying that rule to the case as it was first presented, it would seem that the plaintiff should have prevailed, as it is clear that the defendant did not give any sufficient evidence to show that the consideration of the instruments was illegal, or that they were fraudulent in their inception, or that they had been lost or stolen before the plaintiff became the holder of the same, without notice of any prior equities. Suffice it to remark, in this connection, that these views were urged against the former judgJudgment was rendered for the defendants in ment; but they did not prevail, and the judgment the court below, and the majority of this court was rendered for the defendant, which is unreaffirmed the judgment, holding that the evi-versed and in full force. Suit is now brought updence showed that the bonds were fraudulent in their inception, and that the plaintiff could not recover, inasmuch as he did not prove affirmatively that he paid value for the bonds. Authorities are not necessary to show that the transferee of a negotiable instrument made payable to bearer, subsequent to its date, holds it clothed with the presumption that it was negotiated to him at the time of its execution, in the usual course of business and for value, and without notice of any equities between the prior parties to the instrument. Goodman v. Harvey 4 Ad. & E.,870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 365 [61 U. S., XV., 941]; Noxon v. De Wolf, 10 Gray, 346; Ranger v. Cary, 1 Met., 373. Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money on a given day, and, being drawn and executed in a given mode, for the very purpose that they may be separated from the bonds, it is held that they are negotiable, and that a suit may be maintained on them without the necessity of producing the bonds to which they were attached. Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 544 [62 U. S., XVI., 210]: White v. R. R. Co., 21 How., 575 [62 U. S., XVI., 221]; Aurora v. West, 7 Wall., 105 [74 U. S., XIX., 50]; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall., 121 [69 U. S., XVII., 859]. Possession of the instrument is plenary evidence of title, until other evidence is produced to control it, the holder being entitled to the same privileges and immunities as an indorsee of a bill of exchange or promissory note payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. He is not sub ject to any equities as between the promisor and original payee, nor to the set off of any debt, legal or equitable, which the latter may owe to the former. Pettee v. Prout, 3 Gray, 503. on the bonds to which those coupons were attached and the sole question of any importance is, whether the judgment in the former case is a bar to the present suit. Nothing can be more certain in legal decision than the proposition that the title to the bonds and coupons are the same, as the coupons were annexed to the bonds when the bonds were executed and delivered to the original holder, in pursuance of the contract for building the court house; and it is equally certain, that if it could be proved in defense that the consideration was illegal, or that the instruments were fraudulent in their inception, or that they had been lost or stolen before they were negotiated to the holder, the defense would apply to the bonds as well as the coupons. Before proceeding to examine the legal question, it should be remarked that the former suit was prosecuted in the name of a different plaintiff; but the theory of the present defendants is that the present plaintiff was the real owner of the coupons in that action, and that the action was prosecuted for his sole use and benefit. Testimony to prove that theory was offered in the court below, and the majority of the court now hold that evidence to prove that proposition was properly admitted. Assume that to be so, and it follows that the parties, in legal contemplation, are the same; nor can it be denied that the cause of action, within the meaning of that requirement, as expounded and defined by decided cases of the highest authority, is the same as that in the former action, the rule being that the legal effect of the former judgment as a bar is not impaired, because the subject matter of the second suit is different, provided the second suit involves the same title and depends upon the same question, Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346. Title and possession are one and inseparable to clothe the instrument with the prima facie presumption that it was indorsed at the date of Holders of negotiable securities, as well as its execution, and that the holder paid value every other plaintiff litigant, are entitled to a for it and received it in good faith in the usual full trial upon the merits of the cause of action; course of business, without notice of any prior but if in such a trial judgment be rendered for equities. Evidence to show that he paid value the defendant, whether it be upon the verdict for the instrument is unnecessary in the open- | of a jury or upon a demurrer to a sufficient dec |