explaining and furthering the provisions thereof. (See 1 Chit. Col. Stat. p. 22.) 53 Geo. 3, c. 141. grant annuities. The 53 Geo. III. c. 141, s. 8, enacts, "That all contracts for the purchase Contracts for purof any annuity or rent-charge with any person being under the age of twenty- chase of annuities one years shall be and remain utterly void, any attempt to confirm the same by persons under after such person shall have attained the age of twenty-one years notwith- age void. Endeavouring to standing. And that if any person shall either in person, by letter, agent, or induce infants to otherwise howsoever, procure, engage, solicit, or ask any person being under the age of twenty-one years to grant or attempt to grant any annuity or rentcharge, or to execute any bond, deed, or other instrument for securing the same, or shall advance or procure or treat for any money to be advanced to any person under the age of twenty-one years, upon consideration of any annuity or rent-charge to be secured or granted by such infant after he or she shall have attained his or her age of twenty-one years, or shall induce or solicit or procure any infant, upon any treaty or transaction for money advanced or to be advanced, to make oath or to give his or her word of honour or solemn promise that he or she will not plead infancy, or make any other defence against the demand of any such annuity or rent-charge, or the repayment of the money advanced to him or her when under age, or that when he or she comes of age he or she will confirm or ratify or in any way substantiate any annuity or rent-charge; every such person shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor. misdemeanor, and being thereof lawfully convicted in any court of excise, oyer and terminer or general gaol delivery, shall and may be punished for the said offence by fine, imprisonment, or other corporal punishment as the Court shall think fit to award.” cases. The 9th section of the same act enacts, "That all and every solicitors and Acting as solisoucitor, scriveners and scrivener, brokers and broker, and other persons or citors, &c. in such person, who from and after the passing of this act shall ask, demand, accept or receive directly or indirectly any sum or sums of money, or any other kind of gratuity or reward, for the soliciting or procuring the loan, and for the brokerage of any money that shall be actually and bona fide advanced and paid as and for the price or consideration of any such annuity or rent-charge, over and above the sum of ten shillings for every one hundred pounds so actually and boná fide advanced and paid, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor; and being convicted of such offence in any court of Misdemeanor. assize, oyer and terminer or general gaol delivery, shall and may for every such offence be punished by fine and imprisonment, or one of them, at the discretion of the Court; and that the person or persons who shall have paid or given any sum or sums of money, gratuity, or reward, shall be deemed a competent witness or witnesses to prove the same." Witnesses. On an indictment under this latter section, it is not necessary to prove Indictment for, that the defendant took the exact sum laid in the indictment, though it be &c. not laid under a videlicet. (Rex v. Gillham, 6 T. R. 265; 1 Esp. 285; see form of indictment, id. On the trial of such an indictment it must be left to the jury to consider, whether the excess of 10s. in the £100 were really taken as a fair charge for drawing the writings, &c. or whether it was not so taken as a device to avoid the statute. (Rex v. Gillham, 6 T. R. 265.) By stat. 29 Geo. III. c. 41, s. 27, and other acts respecting life annuities, Oath, &c. of eath of an annuitant's life may be made before a justice of the peace, who annuitant's life. shall give a certificate thereof without fee or stamp duty, in order to entitle such person to receive his annuity. By sect. 2 of stat. 56 Geo. III. c. 53, passed to amend the acts of 48 Certificates of Geo. III. c. 142; 49 Geo. III. c. 64; and 52 Geo. III. c. 129, for enabling lives of nominee abroad required. the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt to grant life annuities, it is enacted, "That in case any person who shall have been named as a nominee, on the continuance of whose life any annuity is to depend, shall after his or her nomination become resident in any kingdom or state in Europe in amity with his Majesty, or if he or she shall become resident in any other kingdom, state, or place beyond the seas, then and in every such case a certificate that such nominee was living on the day specified therein, (being some day after any annuity depending upon his or her life shall have become due,) granted under the hand and seal of the chief magistrate of any city, town, or place, or any other magistrate acting at the time as such, or for and in the place of any such chief magistrate where such nominee may be then living, shall be deemed sufficient and effectual for proving the continuance of the life of such nominee, and for the purpose of enabling the person entitled to the annuity dependent upon the life of such nominee to receive the same; provided no British minister, or consul, or governor, or person acting as such, shall be resident in such city, town, or place, although a British minister, or consul, or governor, or person acting as such may be resident in the kingdom, state, or settlement wherein such nominee shall be then living." Sect. 3. "To every such certificate as aforesaid there shall be affixed an affidavit or solemn affirmation made before any justice of the peace or magistrate in England or Scotland respectively, or if in Ireland before one of the barons of the exchequer there, by the person or persons entitled to the said annuity, or by the person applying to receive the same on his, her, or their behalf, that the matters contained in such certificate are, to the best of his or her belief, true; and that the person described or certified therein is the nominee or one of the nominees on whose life or lives the annuity whereof such half-yearly or other payment shall be claimed doth depend." What. To sessions, &c. Appeals of murder, &c. Abolished. Answer in Chancery, Proof of, see " Evidence," Vol. II. Apparel, see post "Assault." Appeal. THE term Appeal is used in two senses: First, it signifies a complaint and removal to a superior court of the judg ment of an inferior one, being in the nature of a writ of error, and in this sense it is used when applied to the removal of orders or convictions of justices out of sessions to the judgment of the court of sessions. In this sense it differs from the remedy by certiorari, not being, as the latter is, a common law right for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of a superior tribunal, but a qualified right given only by the special provisions of a statute. Secondly, it signifies an accusation by a private individual against another for some heinous offence, demanding punishment on account of the particular injury suffered, rather than for the offence against the public. This latter mode of appeal had fallen entirely into disuse until the case of Ashford v. Thornton, in 1818, 1 Barn. & Ald. 405, where full information may be gained on the subject. This case occasioned the passing of the 59 Geo. III. c. 46, which abolishes all appeals of treason, murder, felony or other offences. We will now notice the general law and practice relative to appeals in the first sense under the following order. As to appeals in particular cases, see the various titles throughout this work. I. When it lies in general, and parties to, 153. II. When Justices to inform Party of his Right to, 154. ! IV. Preliminary Steps; as 1st, Notice of, 159; 2d, Recognizance, &c. 163; 3d, Entering of Petition and Order for Hearing, 163; 4th, Effect of not taking such Steps, 163. V. Hearing and Trial, 165; Judgment, 167; and Adjournment, 172. VI. Entering and Respiting of, and Notice of Trial after same, 173. VII. Costs, 175. VIII. Forms, 176. I. When it lies in general, and Parties to. An appeal, as we have already seen, ante, p. 152, is not, like a certiorari, Only lies when a common law right; it lies only where it is expressly given by statute. given by statute. (R. v. Cashiobury, 3 Dowl. & Ryl. Mag. Ca. 485; R. v. Hanson, 4 Barn. 4.521; R. v. Justices of Oxfordshire, 1 Maule & Selw. 448.) On the other hand, a certiorari always lies unless expressly taken away. (Id.) The right of appeal must be given by express enactment, and cannot be Must be expressly extended by an equitable construction to cases not distinctly enumerated in given. the statute." (R. v. Justices of Surrey, 2 T. R. 509; R. v. Štock, 8 Ad. § E. 405; 3 N. & P. 420, S. C.; R. v. Recorder of Ipswich, 8 Dowl. 103; R. v. Justices of Warwickshire, 2 Jurist, 543, Q. B.; R. v. Justices of Yorkshire, West Riding, 1 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 325; 4 Per. & D. 68S, S. Č.; Paley on Cont. by Dorling, 268, 269.) But a right of appeal given generally by a statute cannot be defeated by inference; therefore, where an appeal was given against any matter not declared by a statute final and conclusive, and it was enacted that certain accounts should not be binding unless allowed by justices; an appeal was held to he against such allowance. (R. v. Justices of Cumberland, 1 Dowl. & Ryl. Mag. Ca. 240; 1 B. & Cres. 64, S. C.) As to the right of appeal under a subsequent statute, making the enactments of prior statutes applicable thereto, see R. v. Liverpool (Mayor), 3 D. & R. 275; R. v. Stock, supra; and R. v. Justices of Yorkshire, West Riding, supra; and post, "Excise," Vol. II.) In some cases the legislature has expressly excluded the right of appeal, Sometimes exand it has been held, that if an order of commitment be excepted out of the pressly excluded. appeal clause, as there must be a conviction apparent in the commitment, the conviction is not the subject of appeal. (R. v. Justices of Staffordshire, 12 East, 572.) In the recent amendments of the criminal law, a power of appeal is given When on summary conviction the sum adjudged to be paid shall exceed 51., or the imprisonment adjudged shall exceed one calendar month, or the conviction take place before one justice. (See the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 30, s. 38, post, "Malicious Injuries to Property," Vol. V.; and the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s.72, post," Larceny," Vol. III.) For particular cases in which the right of appeal is given, see the various titles throughout this work. The party to whom the right of appeal is given, is termed the appellant. Who appellant. The statute giving the right of appeal sometimes points out the party who Who respondent. is to be the respondent: when this is not the case, the party to whom the statute directs the notice of appeal to be given, is usually the respondent. (Post, 161.) If a statute gives a right of appeal to a "person who shall think himself Who a "party aggrieved," those words mean a person who is immediately aggrieved by the aggrieved." act done, and not to one who is consequentially aggrieved. (See R. v. Justices of Middlesex, 3 B. & Adol. 938; post, 161.) If trustees are enabled by a local act to sue or be sued in the name of one of them, he may appeal under the words "party grieved," though not personally aggrieved; and notice of appeal and recognizance may be given and entered into by him only. (R. v. Justices of Surrey, 5 Ad. & E. 701, n.) 3. To what Sessions. When justices to inform party of his right of appeal. II. When Justices to inform Party of his Right of Appeal. In general there is no enactment requiring any information, by justices or others, to be given to a party of his right to appeal, and he is bound to know the law in this respect, or else lose the benefit of it. Where a statute in general terms requires the justices to make known to a party his right to appeal, it is necessary that they should inform him of the steps he should adopt towards enforcing his right; as of his giving them a notice in writing, as well as entering into a recognizance. (See per Lord Kenyon, R. v. Leeds, 1 T. R. 583.) But the necessity for this minute information may be waived, as in R. v. Justices of West Riding of Yorkshire, 3 M. & Sel. 493, where a defendant had been convicted by two justices for an offence against the 17 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 14; by section 20 of which the justices are bound to make known to the defendant, at the time of conviction, his right to appeal at the next general quarter sessions, and it appearing from the return to a mandamus that the justices had in fact made known to the defendant his right to appeal, whereupon he waved any intention of appealing by replying to them that he thought he had better pay the penalty: the Court held, that the justices need not have gone on to inform him of the necessary steps to be taken in order to appeal. And Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said, "How could it be necessary for the convicting magistrate to proceed after the party had signified to them that he did not mean to appeal? The argument is founded upon a supposed necessity of engrafting the observance of all the provisions of the statute as they apply to another state of things, as was the case in R. v. Justices of Leeds, 4 T. R. 583, into this case, where the same reason for their observance does not exist. All that the statute positively requires is, that the justices shall make known to the person convicted his right to appeal-they did so; and if he had thereupon gone on to signify his intention to appeal, non liquet, that they would not also have proceeded to make known to him the further steps that were to be taken by him; but why should they do so nugatory an act as to inform him what he must do to appeal, and to enforce his right, after he had declined appealing and waved his right." (See 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 72; id. c. 30, s. 38.) To what sessions III. To what Sessions. The statute in general points out the sessions to which the appeal is to be appeal to be made. made. The appeal usually given by the legislature is not to the next general sessions, if there be such sessions holden distinct from the quarter sessions, but to the next quarter sessions. (R. v. Justices of London, 15 East, 632.) As to place. When no time fixed. To next sessions. As to Place.]-An appeal from a conviction by justices of a particular franchise must be to the sessions held for that franchise, and not to the general quarter sessions for the county. In the case of a conviction under 22 Car. II. c. 1, s. 6, which directs an appeal "to the judgment of the justices of peace in the next quarter sessions;" it was held, that an appeal from the conviction of corporation magistrates must be to the sessions of the borough. (South Moulton case, Skin. 122; Burr. 592, S. C.) As to appeals against orders of removal of the poor, post, see title " Poor," Vol. IV.; and Talfourd's Dick. Sessions, 632. As to Time.]—If there be no time pointed out by the statute as to when the appeal must be made, it must be made in a reasonable time. (R. v. Jus tices of Oxfordshire, 1 Maule & Sel. 448; R. v. Justices of Gloucestershire, 3 M. & Sel. 127; R. v. Justices of Herts, 3 M. & Sel. 459; post, 160.) The time for the appeal is in general limited to the next sessions after the conviction or act to be appealed against, or else to the sessions which shall be held after so many days from the conviction or act done. 3. To what Sessions. From what time Many difficult questions have arisen as to what time the term next session is to be calculated from-generally speaking, it means the next practicable estion after the principal act done; (see R. v. Justices of Essex, 1 B. & Ald. 210; R. v. Hendon, 2 D. & R. 249; 1 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 245, S. C.; such session is to R. v. Justices of Sussex, 15 East, 206; R. v. Thackwell, 6 D. & R. 61; 4 be reckoned. B. & C. 62; 3 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 121, S. C.; R. v. Justices of Suffolk, 8 Dol. 618; R. v. Justices of Cornwall, 6 Ad. & Ell. 894; R. v. Justices of Cheshire, 1 Dowl. N. S. 570;) but as no fixed rule can be well laid down, it is best to refer to the following decisions thereon. Under a statutory provision, giving an appeal from a conviction to the next Against a "judgquarter sessions, the sessions next after the conviction are intended, and not ment." the sessions next after the execution or levying of the penalty. (Roper v. Hyde, 1 Term Rep. 414.) This case arose on an appeal against a conviction on the (now repealed) 24 Geo. III. c. 31, for not entering horses liable to duty. Et per Ashhurst, J., "The words of the act are decisive, for it says, If any person shall find himself aggrieved by the judgment of any such justice, &c., he may appeal to the justices at the next general quarter sessions; therefore the plaintiff should have appealed to the sessions next after the judgment." Et per Buller, J. "The cases relative to appeals against orders of removal are very distinguishable from the present. All orders of removal are ex parte proceedings, and the other party cannot know any thing of them till the actual removal, but this conviction is more like a judgment of this Court than an order of removal. The grievance to the party is the judg ent, and not the execution. A writ of error will lie before execution, and in appeal is in the nature of a writ of error; it complains of the judgment. If a contrary construction prevailed, it would be such a snare to magistrates that they could never be safe, for the justices do not issue their warrants of execution till they know whether an appeal will be brought or not; and they could never know when the party found himself aggrieved, if he were not to appeal to the next sessions after the conviction." (Id.) Where an appeal was given within three months after conviction, the party Against a conhas three months to signify his intention of appealing, and is not bound to viction. appeal to the sessions which occurred within that time. The statute does not require the appeal to be lodged within this time, for that could not in some instances be done, as more than three months often intervene between the Epiphany and Easter Sessions. (R. v. Middlesex, 6 M. & Sel. 279.) The time from whence the right to appeal commences, where the act limits Against "cause of it after the "cause of complaint" arises, may be collected from the following complaint." decision:-By the late General Highway Act, 13 Geo. III. c. 78, s. 80, an appeal was given upon giving notice "within six days after the cause of the complaint arises." In R. v. Devon, 1 M. & Sel. 411, it was determined that the levy under, and not the signing of, the warrant of distress, was "the cause of complaint;" and therefore where a person assessed under this act had refused to pay, and a warrant of distress was signed and granted by two justices on the 4th of December, which was executed on the 12th, and the party thereupon gave notice of appeal within six days after the 12th of December, the sessions dismissed the appeal. But Lord Ellenborough ruled, upon a motion for a mandamus, that the party had appealed in time, it being within six days after he was actually damnified: "It is not necessary he should appeal on the warrant, for non liquet, that it would be proceeded upon." The appeal clause in the Turnpike Act, 4 Geo. IV. c. 95, s. 87, (now repealed,) is very similar; and where, under this statute, the justices made an order on the surveyor of a township to perform certain statute duty on a turnpike road, and to pay to the turnpike surveyor part of the composition, it was held that the order of the magistrates was not complete until the surveyor of the township was in possession of the order, and that the cause of complaint arose when the order was served; and the notice of appeal being given within six days after the service, a mandamus was issued to compel the Bessions to hear it. Bayley, J., observed, "That parties are often present in Court when rules are pronounced, but they are not bound to take notice of them until they are served. The surveyor may or may not be present when |