It would be a very singular state of affairs if the Chancellor, admittedly clothed with full power to appoint and remove masters of his court, is powerless to remove or perpetually suspend a solicitor who has been guilty of malpractice in his court.

was declaratory, and that the main object | occasionally appointed as masters men who of the law was to provide for the effect of were not licensed as attorneys or solicitors. the expulsion of an attorney for malpractice upon his office as solicitor in chancery, and the effect of the expulsion of a solicitor in chancery upon his office as attorney at law. In my judgment, the plain truth is that the Supreme Court has always exercised an inherent power in disciplining its officers, and the above-quoted provision of the practice act has never been accepted as limiting that power.

[10] 8. I am not informed whether or not, in so-called disbarment proceedings before the Supreme Court, a rule has ever been entered affecting the office which the convicted attorney may have held as a Supreme Court commissioner. I have never heard that any rule has ever been entered expressly purporting to destroy the convicted attorney's status as a solicitor in chancery.

9. Some of the reported cases which recognize the inherent power of every court to expel its attorneys or solicitors for malpractice refer to the fact that the power of removal flows from, or is connected with, the power of appointment. In our anomalous system of admissions here in New Jersey, as we have seen, attorneys at law and solicitors in chancery from the start have been appointed by the Governor. The view has been indicated above that this power was first vested in the colonial Governor by the Presum- commission of Lord Cornbury, and then became an established custom. The appointment of attorneys at law therefore may be connected with the ancient practice according to which attorneys were forced upon the law courts by letters patent from the king, although this practice had ceased long before the settlement of the colony of New Jersey began. The Governor-Chancellor was a law judge (disassociated from equity) only as the president of the Court of Appeals. The law courts, where the attorneys had the most of their practice, were held by judges who were independent of the Governor, although appointed by him. And yet the Supreme Court exercises the power of disciplining its officers, these attorneys at law, by expulsion and suspension. In New Jersey, therefore, the power to expel and suspend is not connected with the power to ap

ably it has been thought that Mr. Paterson's law above cited covered the case and extended the force of the rule striking the attorney from the roll so as to deprive him also of his office of solicitor in chancery. But, in regard to the independent office of master in chancery, can it be seriously claimed that a rule of the Supreme Court striking an attorney from the roll, under Mr. Paterson's law or otherwise, can be deemed to operate so as to vacate the office of master in chancery, which the convicted attorney may happen to hold under appointment of the Chancellor? The same question may be asked in regard to the examiners in chancery. In the recent case of Bedle, 87 Atl. 100, where the rule entered by the Supreme Court merely purported to strike the convicted attorney's name from the roll, it was deemed advisable to prosecute an independ-point. ent proceeding in the Court of Chancery In England, as we have seen, the solicitors which resulted in an order purporting to expel Mr. Bedle from his office as solicitor, and also to remove him from his office of master. That the office of master is a thing entirely apart from that of a solicitor in chancery and may be dealt with separately is illustrated by the case In re H—C—, Jr., 81 N. J. Eq. 8, 85 Atl. 336. The respondent in that matter was both a solicitor and a master; yet the proposition to discipline him was only in regard to his office as master, although it might well have extended to both offices.

Under one construction of Mr. Paterson's law above set forth, the rule entered in the Supreme Court ipso facto may have effected the expulsion of Mr. Bedle from the office of solicitor in chancery, so that the order of the Court of Chancery to that effect was unnecessary, but I am unable to perceive any possible theory upon which such rule could operate to expel him from his office as master in chancery. There is no necessary connection between the office of solicitor in chancery and the office of master in chan

were actually appointed and commissioned by the judge of the court where they practiced, and these officers were never foisted upon the English Court of Chancery by letters patent from the king. Whether to-day the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, or either of these courts, have any inherent power to appoint their officers-these attorneys and solicitors, respectively-I do not now suggest. We are dealing solely with the power of removal and suspension which the Governor, the appointive power, has never exercised, so far as I am aware, certainly not since New Jersey became a state.

[11] 10. It may be said that the inherent power of removal, which the Court of Chancery of New Jersey might have possessed if it had been earlier asserted, has been lost by disuse. I do not think that there is any force in this suggestion. The business of the Court of Chancery has increased enormously during the last generation. There was little reason until a comparatively recent time for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Chancellor

the remedy by disbarment proceedings in the Chancellor, upon the other office as attorSupreme Court was deemed practically ade-ney at law which the solicitor may hold. The quate from all the cases which arose. Mal- sole question is whether the Chancellor has practice as a solicitor, fraud upon a client the power, which the English Court of Chanor court of any kind, constituted a ground cery had, to expel a solicitor from his office upon which the Supreme Court could strike for gross malpractice strictly in that office, an attorney and counselor at law from the whatever the effect of such expulsion may be rolls of the Supreme Court, and then, no in the courts of law. doubt, it was considered that Mr. Paterson's statute disbarred the derelict lawyer in all the courts, including the Court of Chancery. There was no occasion, therefore, until a very recent time, for the exercise of the inherent power of the chancellor to discipline his own solicitors, and, until very recent times, there seems to be hardly any trace of a case of gross malpractice strictly in the office of a solicitor in chancery.

[12] 11. It now remains in the last place to refer to any precedents which affect the disposition of this case because they are binding upon this court.

The language employed in some of the reported cases of disbarment proceedings in the Supreme Court, especially the older ones, must be read with the fact in view that little attention was paid to many of the most vital questions relating to the appointment of An inherent power of one of our courts is attorneys at law until the Branch Case was not lost by mere disuse during a period how-presented to the Supreme Court for considever long, in which there was practically no eration and decision, and that no attention occasion for its exercise. With the enormous whatever at any time seems to have been increase of business in the Court of Chancery paid to the most important questions relating during the present generation, the amount to the expulsion of these court officers, atof work done by lawyers as solicitors, as torneys, solicitors, proctors, and counselors. compared with the amount of work done by What our Supreme Court was doing in most lawyers as attorneys at law, has greatly in- of the cases was very practical business, in creased. The development of divorce busi- which it was not necessary to give very much ness also has multiplied the temptations of consideration to history or theory. In re unscrupulous members of the profession to Edmunds (not reported). This was a case of attempt frauds upon our laws and upon the forgery of a divorce decree presented to Court of Chancery. While 40 years ago, as Chancellor Runyon over 30 years ago. The our law reports show, cases of malpractice malpractice was that of a solicitor in chanby attorneys at law were far more common cery strictly, and not that of an attorney at than cases of malpractice by solicitors, I in- law, although the Supreme Court, no doubt, cline to think that at the present day the re- if the matter had been brought to its attenverse is true. In New Jersey, as in other tion, might have seen fit to disbar or strike states, there has of late been a great increase from the roll an attorney, who, as a solic of vigilance on the part of courts and baritor, had committed such a fraud and crime. associations, directed toward the protection Chancellor Runyon did not hesitate to exerof the courts and the public from frauds and cise jurisdiction in the case, and he adjudgother breaches of trust committed by men ed that the convicted solicitor should be who hold commissions as attorneys and solic- expelled from his office, although subsequentitors. It seems to me that the fact that, so ly, upon certain representations that were far as our reports show, the chancellors of made to him, he was induced to show mercy 50 and 75 years ago found no occasion to and stay the infliction of the penalty. This exercise the inherent power of disciplining case is directly in point, and I cannot see the solicitors of the courts, if such was the how it can be disregarded as a precedent. case, constitutes no argument in favor of the proposition that at the present day, under the present conditions, the Chancellor of the state should not exercise this ancient, inherent power.

In concluding this branch of our inquiry, it is well to make emphatic the narrow point which we are endeavoring to establish. The question is not as to the power of the Supreme Court to expel an attorney at law from his office or strike his name from the roll on the ground of fraud perpetrated strictly as a solicitor in chancery. The question is not as to the effect, under Mr. Paterson's statute or otherwise, of such expulsion upon the other office which the convicted at torney may hold as a solicitor in chancery. The question is not as to the effect, if any there be, of the expulsion of a solicitor from

In re Simpson, 21 N. J. Law, J. 109. In this case Judge Hudspeth, an experienced and courageous magistrate, presiding over the criminal courts of Hudson county, exercised the inherent power of the Hudson quarter sessions to control its officers, and sus pended two attorneys pending their indictment. They were acquitted, and the suspension was then vacated. This case illustrates the absolute necessity of clothing every court, under whose "direction" its officers, whether counselors, attorneys, solicitors, or proctors, perform their functions in the administration of justice, with absolute control over them, and with full power to suspend or even expel them. Is it possible that, if an attorney practicing in one of our criminal courts is convicted upon an indictment for bribery of jurors, the court is unable to sus

practicing daily before its bar, until his conviction of felony has been affirmed by the higher courts, or disbarment proceedings have been prosecuted to a finish in the Supreme Court?

[13] Nothing but plain provisions of the Constitution or of constitutional legislation, if there could be such on this subject, should be construed to deprive the Chancellor of the state of the great and wholesome, even necessary, power anciently beyond all doubt vested in his office to discipline lawyers who are guilty of malpractice as solicitors of his court, by indefinitely prohibiting them from further practice as such solicitors, or by imposing such briefer term of disqualification as he may deem appropriate and necessary for the administration of justice in his court. No matter what solicitors are or how they are appointed, or how they are stricken from the roll or permanently deprived of the office or offices which they hold under commission from the Governor, the Court of Chancery, unless it is to be considered inferior to hundreds of petty law courts all over the country, must exercise disciplinary power over its officers according to its own discretion, and cannot be deemed dependent upon any other court for the discharge of this important function relating to its own machinery and its own internal affairs.

In re Cahill, 66 N. J. Law, 527, 50 Atl. 119. In this case the sole charge against the defendant was of fraud and imposition practiced upon the Court of Chancery in a divorce suit. The distinguished Chancellor before whom the divorce suit was pending, and who discovered the evidence of fraud, thinking, no doubt, that the whole matter could be conveniently disposed of by the Supreme Court, had the evidence communicated to that court, and thereupon proceedings were had in the Supreme Court which culminated in an order suspending the defendant as an attorney of the Supreme Court for a period specified, and ending in a mandate or injunctive order that, until the period specified had expired, the defendant be "prohibited from practicing as an attorney or solicitor in any of the courts of this state upon pain of being stricken from the roll absolutely," if he should violate the order. [14] 13. Since the foregoing opinion was There is no question about the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to conduct this proceed- written, I have been enabled by the kindness ing and make this order, incongruous as the of a number of gentlemen to inspect or become acquainted with the contents of several exercise of such jurisdiction in the particu- commissions or "licenses" issued to “legal lar case may now seem. The Supreme Court, practitioners" by the colonial Governors and for its own protection, of course, has ample the Governors of the state under the Constipower to suspend attorneys who are proved tution of 1776, and also to obtain considerto have committed such a gross offense as able light upon some of the subjects under was proved against the defendant in that investigation from the records and files of case. Chancellor Magie subsequently regret- the Supreme Court. This new information ted that he had referred this case to the Su-illustrates the views and inferences herepreme Court, and announced his determina- inbefore set forth, without, so far as I can tion that, if another case arose of misfea- now recall, making any qualification of those sance or malpractice, committed by a practi- views and inferences necessary. tioner strictly and exclusively in relation to his office as solicitor in chancery, and having no connection with the office of attorney at law, he would not burden the Supreme Court with the investigation of the matter in the first instance, but would try the case himself, and, if the offense should be proved, discipline the officer of his own court in the matter and to the extent which he deemed fitting.

A commission bearing date November 18, 1717, was issued by Governor Hunter appointing one John Reed as examiner of the "Court of Chancery" in the "province of New Jersey in America." This commission runs in the name of the king, but is attested under the seal of the province of New Jersey by Robert Hunter, Esq., who is styled "Our Capt. General and Governor in Chief of our Provinces of New Jersey, New York and Territories thereon depending in America and Vice Admiral of the same," etc.

The report has come down that Governor

12. If all the opinions and surmises in regard to the nature and status of a solicitor of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey herein before set forth should be deemed er-Hunter held a Court of Chancery in New roneous, if it may be supposed that there is a single office in New Jersey which combines the functions of the English attorney at law and the English solicitor in chancery, as I understand is the case in what are called the code states, where not law and equity, but the administration of law and equity, has been more or less consolidated, it still remains true to-day that every lawyer, let his official status and title be what they may, when he practices as a solicitor in the Court of Chancery, is "under the direction" of that

Jersey and in New York in 1718 (Field's Prov. Courts of N. J. 112; Clevenger & Keasbey on the Courts of N. J. p. 121), and presumably the appointment of John Reed as an examiner was made in order to meet the requirements of the business of that court. And yet Governor Hunter, who was the chancellor, with all the powers in New Jersey of the Lord Chancellor in England, saw fit to issue this commission in the name of the king in pursuance of the powers conferred upon him and originally upon Lord

sibly a fee paid for the commission deter- | the said State." This form of license, I unmined the form of the appointment. It is al- derstand, has continued in use until the so worth while, perhaps, to note that the present day. It would seem that the word commission does not recite that Governor "and" italicized in the above quotation, Hunter was the Chancellor of the state, while should be taken as "or." This form of liit does recite that he was Vice Admiral. cense, together with the form of oath appearing at the top of the roll of attorneys in the Supreme Court for the first time in 1843, hereinafter described, indicates that at a comparatively recent date, but before the Governor of the state had ceased to be the Chancellor, the notion, perhaps somewhat hazy, that there was a single office entitled "attorney at law and solicitor in Chancery" began to prevail at least to some extent in New Jersey.

The commission issued by Governor Livingston in 1784, appointing Mr. Richard | solicitors in Chancery." Stockton an attorney at law, is substantially In the minutes of the November term, 1802 in the same form as the one above described, | (p. 486), it is stated that Charles Ewing, havissued by Governor Franklin in 1763, excepting that the enumeration of the Governor's titles concludes with the words "Chancellor and Ordinary." This commission to Mr. Stockton is also "under the hand and Seal at Arms" of Governor Livingston.

mean himself "in the practice of an attorney at law and solicitor in chancery of New Jersey."

The plaintiff was the only witness as to the facts surrounding the accident. He was a traveling salesman of electric clocks accustomed to railway travel, and on the morning of the accident was intending to take an early train from Hartford to Waterbury, and to remain away two days. Being late, he walked rapidly through the station, carrying his traveling bag in one hand and an

Any argument based upon the form of words employed in these old commissions and these old court records, in my judgment, would have very little force. These documents show that, during the long period which they cover, more or less vague ideas were entertained and anomalous practices | electric clock, weighing about nine pounds, followed in regard to the induction of legal practitioners into the offices of attorney, solicitor, and proctor. The fact that every lawyer from the start held all three of these offices made the phraseology used in referring to them largely a matter of form, and also led to indefiniteness of thought and in-platform a trainman was making ready to accuracy of expression.

1. CARRIERS (§ 318*)-ACTION FOR INJURY TO PASSENGER-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TAKING UP PASSENGERS.

In an action by a passenger for an injury caused as he was attempting to board a train after it had started, evidence held not to show that he had already boarded the train and reached a place of safety when a jerk occurred, which threw him to the ground.

in the other, rushed up the stairs to the station platform, and saw that the train was already moving at about two miles an hour. The rear car directly opposite the top of the stairs was an express car, and forward of that was a passenger car upon whose rear

close the gate, but, seeing the plaintiff, flung it wide open again. The plaintiff then shifted his bag and clock into the right hand and made a dash for the car; the trainman shouting to him to look out for the ice, referring to two patches on the station platform. Plaintiff ran about 45 feet, caught the rear handrail with his left hand, and had his left foot only on the rear step, when a sudden violent jerk of the car threw him backward to the station platform, and his right foot was crushed under the wheels of the following express car. The plaintiff then weighed 215 pounds, and wore an overcoat reaching below his knees. He testified that the speed of the train had probably increased somewhat while he was attempting to catch it. The negligence alleged is in so operating the train that the jerk occurred, and in giving no warning thereof, and in making up

[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. 88 1270, 1307-1314; Dec. Dig. the train with an express car in the rear of 318.*]

The act of a trainman in throwing open the gates of a passenger car, after the train had started, for a passenger to attempt to board the train was not an assurance that the attempt could be safely made, and, though an invitation, it was no more than an invitation to assume a self-evident risk.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. 88 1154-1159, 1161-1166; Dec. Dig. § 287.*]

the passenger car, whereby the safety of passengers who might be thrown from the passenger car was unnecessarily dangerous.

Stewart N. Dunning and Alexander W. Creedon, both of Hartford, for appellant. John T. Robinson and Francis W. Cole, both of Hartford, for appellee.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). The controlling question in the case is whether the jury could reasonably have found that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care in attempting to board the train under the circumstances stated in his testimony.

[1] It was also claimed that the plaintiff had so far succeeded in boarding the train that he was already in a place of safety when the jerk occurred which threw him to the station platform, so that his previous conduct, even if imprudent, had nothing to do with the accident. This last claim is un

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford tenable. The plaintiff described in detail his County; Joseph P. Tuttle, Judge.

Action by Joseph J. Kopacka against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

position when the jerk occurred. At that time his left hand gripped the railing behind the step, his right hand was occupied with the traveling bag and clock, his left foot was on the lower step, and his right foot raised to