SWEENEY v. BROW. (No. 243.) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 10, 1914.) certified to this court upon an agreed statement of facts. [1] The deceit of the defendant alleged in the declaration is that, by reason of false repEQUITY (§ 429*)-DECREE-MOTION TO AMEND. resentations, the defendant induced the plainA decree of the superior court cannot be tiff to accept the defendant as surety upon a amended on complainant's motion in the Su- bond given to release an attachment of perpreme Court; the statutes authorizing no suchsonal property made in a suit in which the procedure. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. $ 1020-1033; Dec. Dig. § 429.*] Bill by Michael Sweeney against George H. Brow. On complainant's motion to amend decree entered in the superior court. Motion dismissed. Sheffield & Harvey, of Newport, for complainant. Waterman & Greenlaw, of Providence (Charles E. Tilley, of Providence, of counsel), for respondent. plaintiff in this suit was plaintiff and the Narragansett Narrow Fabric Company, a corporation, was defendant. To recover, in an action for deceit based on false representations, a plaintiff must show, not only that false representations have been made by the defendant to the plaintiff, but that, acting in reliance upon such false representations the plaintiff has been injured. [2] We must determine the case upon the facts included in the agreed statement. There are facts set out in the statement from which PER CURIAM. The complainant's motion it might be found that the defendant made to amend the decree entered in the superior the false representations alleged in the declacourt is dismissed. The statute does not pro-ration, and that the plaintiff acted upon the vide for the amendment of a decree of the su- same. Until the plaintiff obtains judgment in perior court through the procedure adopted its favor in its action against the Narraganby the complainant; neither does good prac-sett Narrow Fabric Company, the plaintiff's tice or justice require it. The rights of the parties can be fully protected by the superior court upon the coming in of the master's report, or by this court upon appeal from the final decree of the superior court. DUNN & McCARTHY v. BISHOP. (No. 4697.) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 10, 1914.) 1. FRAUD ( 9*)-DECEPTION CONSTITUTING FRAUD-INJURY FROM FRAUD. Plaintiff, in an action for false representations, must show, not only that false representations were made by defendant, but that, relying thereon, he was injured. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. 8; Dec. Dig. § 9.*] 2. FRAUD (§ 25*)-DECEPTION CONSTITUTING FRAUD-INJURY FROM FRAUD. In an action for deceit for inducing plaintiff to accept defendant as surety on a bond given to release an attachment made in a suit between plaintiff and a third party, plaintiff could not recover until he had obtained judgment against such third party, since, until then, the injury would be contingent and uncertain. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. 24; Dec. Dig. § 25.*] injury resulting from the defendant's deceit is entirely contingent and uncertain; for the event has not happened, and may never hap pen, which gives the plaintiff the right to look to the surety, and its action upon the false representations cannot be maintained. It is not a part of the agreed statement of facts, nor is it alleged in the declaration that the plaintiff has recovered judgment in its action against said Narragansett Narrow Fabric Company. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Decision is given in favor of the defendant for costs by nonsuit of the plaintiff. The papers in the case are sent back to the superior court, with the decision of this court certified thereon. (37 R. I. 46) COAKLEY v. MASON MFG. CO. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 7, MASTER AND SERVANT (8 872, New, vol. 16 Case Certified from Superior Court, Provi- an employer may bring himself within its provi dence and Bristol Counties. Action by Dunn & McCarthy against L. W. Bishop, certified to the Supreme Court. De cision for defendant and remanded to the superior court. Edward C. Stiness and Frederick W. O'Connell, both of Providence, for plaintiff. James E. Brennan, of Pawtucket, for defendant. PER CURIAM. This is an action of trespass on the case for deceit. The case was sions by filing with the Commissioner of Industrial Statistics a written statement that he accepts the provisions of the act and by giving reasonable notice of such election to workmen by posting and keeping continuously posted copies of such statement in conspicuous places about the working place. The act was approved April 29, 1912, and became effective in October following. Held, that an employer was not required to wait until after the act took effect before filing his acceptance, but that an acceptance filed five days before the act took effect would be regardthe benefits of the act from the very time that ed as valid and as conferring on the employer the act took effect. For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes Exceptions from Superior Court, Provi- | into consideration the great number of emdence and Bristol Counties; Willard B. Tanner, Presiding Justice. Action by Marian Coakley against the Mason Manufacturing Company. The court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's replication, and she brings exceptions. Exceptions over ruled. Albert B. West, of Providence, for plaintiff. Boss & Barnefield, of Providence, for defendant. ant. VINCENT, J. This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received on May 19, 1913, while in the employ of the defendThe defendant filed its plea, setting up its acceptance of the provisions of chapter 831 of the Public Laws of 1912, known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. To this plea the plaintiff filed a replication, averring that the statement filed by the defendant in acceptance of the act was filed with the Commissioner of Industrial Statistics September 26, 1912, while the act, by its provisions, did not take effect until October 1, 1912. To this replication the defendant demurred. The demurrer was sustained by the superior court and to that decision the plaintiff took an exception, bringing the case before this court. The acceptance of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not obligatory upon either the employer or the employé. If the employer desires to bring himself within the provisions of the act, he may do so by taking the steps therein prescribed, and the employé may exempt himself from the operation of the act by giving a notice to the employer. It is provided in and by section 5 of the act that an employer may bring himself within its provisions by filing with the Commissioner of Industrial Statistics a written statement to the effect that he accepts the provisions of the act, and by giving reasonable notice of such election to the workmen, by posting and keeping continuously posted copies of such statement in conspicuous places about the place where his workmen are employed. The Workmen's Compensation Act referred to was duly passed by the General Assembly, and received the approval of the Governor April 29, 1912, and became effective on October 1, 1912. The plaintiff claims that the acceptance of the defendant, filed September 26, 1912, five days prior to the day when the act went into effect, was void and of no effect whatsoever. It cannot well be disputed that every employer within the state was entitled to the protection of this law from the ployers within the state and the probability that a large part of them might desire to accept the provisions of the act, it cannot be presumed that the General Assembly intended that such acceptance should be deferred for any length of time after the beginning of the day when such act, by its terms, should become effective. In other words, we cannot reasonably assume that the General Assembly intended that employers should be deprived, even temporarily, of the benefit of the act, or that they were unaware of the practical impossibility of filing a large number of acceptances at the same moment, which would be necessary if all were to obtain the benefit of the act without delay. Besides, the act contains no provision for access to the office of the Commissioner of of the Commissioner, at the very inconvenIndustrial Statistics, or for the attendance ient and unusual hour of midnight. think that it may be more reasonably assumed that it was the purpose of the General Assembly, in making the act effective at a later date, to give employers an opportunity to become familiar with its provisions and to prepare and file their acceptances. If the General Assembly had the right to pass an act and make it effective at a later date, it would seem to reasonably follow that the acceptance, required by the act, might also be filed to take effect at the same time. While the act was not in effect, in the strict sense of the word, it had a potential existence prior to October 1st. It had been passed by both houses of the General Assembly and had received the approval of the Governor. Nothing further was required to bring it into effective existence except the lapse of time. We The acceptance in the present case was It remained filed on September 26, 1912. with the Commissioner of Industrial Statis tics without any effort on the part of the defendant to withdraw it, and we think that it must be presumed to have been filed by the defendant with the intention that it should take effect when the act went into effect on October 1, 1912. Such an intent is further evidenced by the undisputed fact that after the filing of the acceptance the defendant posted in its mill the notices required by the act. To hold that this acceptance was ineffective and void would, we think, baffle the intent of the General Assembly and curtail the rights of employers. The exception of the plaintiff is overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for further proceedings. SWEETLAND, J. (concurring). I am unable to agree with all the reasoning of the above opinion. It does not appear to me to set out a sound method of statutory construction, in so far as it holds that the act in question was in effect for any purpose before ute was a nullity; no rights could be acquired under it; no employer could be said with exactness to accept its provisions with legal effect, as the statute itself had no legal existence. The defendant corporation by its action of September 26, 1912, did not bring itself within the provisions of the statute, as no statute then existed. The purpose of the defendant can be readily understood. It was to give notice that it had "elected to become subject to the provisions of the act" when the statute should go into operation. Such election, however, to be effective, must be made under the act; and it could not be made under the act until the same had legal existence. as a legal act and was a nullity. There was no authority in the Commissioner of Industrial Statistics to receive it at that time as an acceptance filed with him under the act. He did, however, retain it in his office, and in justice and reason it may be held that that officer retained said written statement as the agent of the defendant to be placed on file October 1, 1912, for the purpose of accepting the provision of the act at that time; and, when on October 1st it appeared on the files of said commissioner, it must be regarded in law as filed on that day and constituting an acceptance of the provisions of the act at a time when said act was in force and effect. I am of the opinion that upon this ground the plaintiff's exception should be overruled; and I concur in the result of the above opinion. JOHNSON, C. J., concurs in opinion of (No. 4714.) (37 R. I. 133) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. June 29, 1914.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 288*) — ACTION FOR INJURY-QUESTIONS FOR JURY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. from the fall of a plank platform laid across the On evidence in a servant's action for injury steel framework of a building under construc tion, held, that the questions of his assumption of risk and contributory negligence were for the jury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1068-1088; Dec. Dig. 288.*] The opinion sustains the defendant's contention chiefly on the ground that the act "had a potential existence prior to October 1st," and that during the period of such "potential existence" the Legislature must have intended that acceptances of the act might be SWEETLAND, J. filed by employers to avoid the inconvenience of filing on October 1st and the possibility that an employer might be deprived of the SJOBERG v. P. E. HARDING CONST. CO. benefit of the law during some portion of the day of October 1st, because of the large number of employers who might desire to file acceptances upon that day. To say that an act has but a potential existence is to admit that it has no actual existence; that it is without existence. Thus the reasoning derives no force from that phrase. The General Assembly by explicit provision made the act take effect on October 1, 1912. If such had been its intention, it was within the legislative power, by use of proper language, to have made the act take effect at an earlier date for the purpose of filing written statements of acceptances. Such language, however, would have constituted a new. and added provision, not one necessarily and plainly to be implied from the general provision making the act take effect on October 1, 1912, or from any other provision contained in the act. For the court, in the absence of such express language, to read into the statute a provision of that nature would be to amend the statute under the guise of its construction. The court may be of the opinion that such an added provision would be desirable and tend to the convenience of employers, but the court cannot insert provisions into a law and say the Legislature must have intended this because it seems convenient and desirable to us. The province of the court is to interpret the words of a statute, or to construe the language of its provisions; it cannot add words or interpolate provisions. 2. MASter and ServANT (§§ 235, 289*)—MasTER'S LIABILITY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-RELIANCE ON CARE OF MASTER. A servant injured from the fall of a plank platform, laid across the steel framework of a building under construction, was not required certain whether it was secured to the beams beto inspect the platform before using it to asneath in such a way that it would not become displaced by the use of the platform; but, in trary, he might assume that it was properly conthe absence of any reason for thinking the constructed in the usual manner. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 710-722, 1089, 1090, 1092-1132; Dec. Dig. § 235, 289.*] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 219*)—Master's LIABILITY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-OBVIOUS DANGER. In such case, where plaintiff alleged negligence in that the planks of the platform were not long enough to cover two open spaces and rest on three floor girders, but it appeared from the platform itself that the planks did not rest upon three girders, and were not long enough to do so, plaintiff assumed the risk arising from using the platform resting on two girders only. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 610-624; Dec. Dig. 219.*] The situation, however, does permit a view favorable to the contention of the respondent which does no violence to fundamental rules of statutory construction. After deliberation, I am of the opinion that it should be adopted. The attempted filing of acceptA master must furnish his servant reasonance on September 26, 1912, was meaningless ably safe appliances and a reasonably safe place 4. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 107*)-MASTER'S LIABILITY SAFE APPLIANCES AND PLACES FOR WORK IN GENERAL. to work, and is liable for the negligent performance of such duty, although delegated to another; yet when an appliance or structure is not permanent, and its erection and operation is a mere detail of the work his servants are employed to perform, he discharges his duty toward them when he provides suitable material for the construction of the appliance or structure, and uses reasonable care in the selection of competent servants to do the work, though it is otherwise where it is built under his direction and furnished for use as a completed struc ture. It appears from the transcript of evidence that on August 5, 1912, the day on which said injuries were received, the defendant, as a contractor, was constructing in the city of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 199-202, 212, 254, 255; | Providence a steel frame building having Dec. Dig. § 107.*] 5. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 201*)-MASTER'S LIABILITY SAFE APPLIANCES AND PLACE FOR WORK-MASTER'S KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT OR DANGER. An injury to a servant who, in the exercise of due care, was ignorant of a defect in a temporary staging due to the negligence of a fellow servant, of which defect the master had actual or constructive knowledge, and neglected to remedy it, but permitted the servant to use it without warning, renders the master liable since his negligence subsequent to that of the fellow servant must be held to be the proximate cause of the injury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 515-534; Dec. Dig. 201.*] 6. MASTER AND SERVANT (8 286*)-ACTION FOR INJURY-QUESTION FOR JURY-NEGLI GENCE. On evidence in a servant's action for injury from the falling of a plank platform laid across the steel framework of a building under construction, held, that the question whether the platform was reasonably safe for the use to which it was put was for the jury. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1006, 1008, 10101015, 1017-1033. 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. 286.*] 7. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 286*) - ACTION FOR INJURY-QUESTION FOR JURY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK. On evidence in such action held that the questions whether the master had undertaken to construct the platform and furnish it to the plaintiff as a completed structure, and whether he had notice of the condition of the platform before directing the servant to use it, were for the jury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. $$ 1001, 1006, 1008, 10101015, 1017-1033, 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. § 286.*] Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Chester W. Barrows, Judge. Action by Victor D. Sjoberg against the P. E. Harding Construction Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for judgment on the verdict. John P. Brennan, of Providence, for plaintiff. Boss & Barnefield, of Providence, for defendant. SWEETLAND, J. This is an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received through the negligence of the defendant. The case was tried before a justice of the brick walls, which building was to be about 25 feet in height when completed; that the plaintiff, as a carpenter, was an employé of the defendant working upon said building; that the brick walls of the building had been nearly completed, and the interior steel frame, including the framework of the main floor, was in place and bolted together. The framework of the main floor consisted of steel girders and cross girders, with open In the spaces between the cross girders. evidence these open spaces are called "bays," and, according to the testimony of some witnesses, were about 10 feet across. The permanent floor was to be of concrete, but had not been laid on said August 5th. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for about three weeks previous to said day, and had been working in an open lot near said building making wooden frames or forms to be used in the concrete construction about the building. George D. Miller was the defendant's superintendent having full charge of the work. about half after 10 o'clock in the forenoon, On the day in question, at Mr. Miller directed the plaintiff to go to work upon the roof. To get to the roof the plaintiff was obliged to pass over a so-called run or way, placed upon the steel girders of the main floor, to a platform consisting of three planks laid side to side across two steel floor girders and over one open space or bay. The plaintiff was then obliged to go up a ladder to the roof. The foot of said ladder was placed in the lip of a steel girder, which was not a part of the permanent construction of the floor, but was laid across the steel floor girders. The ladder was further held securely by being tied with a rope to the steel framework at the roof. Before noon the plaintiff left his work on the roof, came down said ladder and across the platform, and then returned to the roof in safety. At 12 o'clock noon the plaintiff came down the ladder again; and, when he stepped from the ladder to the platform, the plank on which he stepped in some manner became displaced from the girders, on which it had rested, the plank and the plaintiff fell into the cellar, and the plaintiff was severely injured. The defendant based its motion for the direction of a verdict in its favor upon the claim that the evidence showed that the plaintiff had passed over the platform three times before the accident, must have seen do so. The plaintiff must be held to have assumed the risk arising from using a platform which rested on two girders only. the manner in which the platform was con- | platform did not rest upon three floor gir structed, and hence the plaintiff, in using ders, and that they were not long enough to the platform, had assumed the risk of any displacement of the planks; also that, according to the testimony, the plaintiff was plainly guilty of contributory negligence in stepping from the ladder to the platform without first satisfying himself that the planks were securely placed upon the girders; and, further, that the evidence failed to disclose any negligence on the part of the defendant. [1, 2] We think that the questions of the assumption of risk by the plaintiff and of the plaintiff's contributory negligence properly were submitted to the jury. According to the testimony of a number of witnesses, a platform like the one in question is usually secured to the beams beneath in such a manner that the platform and the planks composing it will not become displaced by the use of the platform. This construction on the underside of the platform cannot be seen by a person walking over it. There was no duty of the plaintiff which required him to inspect the platform before using it. In the absence of any reason for thinking the contrary, he had a right to assume that the platform was properly constructed in what some of the witnesses testify was the usual manner. The plaintiff and other workmen who used the platform before said accident testified that the platform appeared to be secure and safe to use. The plaintiff cannot be held in law to have assumed the risk of a defect of which he was ignorant, or of which he would not become aware by the exercise of ordinary care. There was testimony from which the jury properly might find that the plaintiff had no reason to sus pect that the platform was not securely constructed. It therefore cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence if he came down the ladder and stepped upon the platform as workmen usually do when they step from a ladder to a platform, the security of which they have no reason to question. The plaintiff testified that he came down the ladder in the ordinary manner, facing the ladder and stepping from rung to rung and from the lowest rung to the platform without making an examination as to the condition of each rung or an examination of the platform; and that this is in accordance with the ordinary custom of workmen. [3] The negligence of the defendant, which the plaintiff alleges, is that the platform was improperly and carelessly constructed, be cause made of planks which were not long enough to cover two open bays and rest on three floor girders, and also because the platform was not securely fastened to the girders on which it rested. The first of these alleged grounds of negligence may be disregarded. The floor frame was fully disclosed to view, and it was perfectly apparent, upon In support of his other alleged ground of negligence, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of several witnesses, who were carpenters, to the effect that it was customary to securely fasten such a platform as the one in question to the iron girders by construction on the underside of the platform; that, in circumstances such as existed at this building, a platform was unsafe which was not so secured; and that said platform was used by 25 or 30 workmen as a means of reaching said ladder, building material was carried over it and placed upon it, and in such use, unless the planks were secured, they were liable to become misplaced, and create a dangerous situation. As to this ground the defendant urged in support of its motion that it was not liable, and relied upon a principle, enunciated in a long line of cases, the authority of which cannot be questioned. [4] The general rule is that the master shall furnish to the servant reasonably safe appliances and a reasonably safe place to work, and that he is liable for the negligent performance of this duty, although he delegates it to another; yet the rule is equally well established that, when an appliance or a structure is not permanent and its erection and operation is a mere detail of the work his servants are employed to perform, the master has discharged his duty towards his workmen when he has provided suitable material for the construction of the appliance or the structure and has used reasonable care in the selection of competent servants to do the work; and that the master, in such circumstances, will not be held responsible for injury to one of his servants occasioned by a defect in such appliance or structure arising from the negligence of a competent coemployé of the injured servant. This, which may be regarded as an exception to the general rule as to the master's obligation, has particular application to circumstances where the appliance is portable or the structure is necessarily changing from time to time as the work progresses, and the erection, removal, adjustment, readjustment, and change clearly are necessary details of the work which the servants are doing. It has been followed frequently in cases involving injury to carpenters, painters, masons, and other structural workers, caused by defects in temporary stagings and scaffoldings erected by their fellow workmen as places on which to stand and do their work. This court has applied the principle in Laporte v. Cook, 22 R. I. 554, 48 Atl. 798, which case involved the constantly changing conditions which arise during the construction of a sewer; and has held that the use and application of materi |