ABATEMENT.

See PLEA IN ABATEMENT.

ACCOUNT STATED.

"To support an account stated, it is
essential that there should have been
a previous debt or dealing on which
a liability existed."-Per PIGOT, C. B.
E. Rainsford v. Eagar

ACT OF PARLIAMENT.
See STATUTE.

124

"It is a well established rule of law,
that in a grant, if the exception be
as large as the grant, the exception
will be void, because it would be
absurd to construe a grant as giving
with one hand, and taking back with
the other. The same principle is
applicable to the construction of Acts
of Parliament. It is a rule in con-
struing an Act of Parliament, that if
following literally the words used, it
would lead to an absurdity, the Court
would so modify and control these
words as would prevent that absur-
dity."-Per MOORE, J. Ex. Ch.
Davies v. Darcy
638

ACTION.

See PLEADING.

ADMINISTRATOR.

See CLERGY.

AFFIDAVIT.

See ATTORNEY.

CERTIORARI.

EJECTMENT.

FIAT.

JUDGMENT.

JURY.

SECURITY FOR Costs.

1. When affidavits are filed as cause
against a conditional order, a motion

Where an agreement has been acted on,
so that the parties to it cannot be
restored to their original position,
money paid under it by one party to
the other cannot be recovered in an
action of debt for money lent and
on the account stated, although the
plaintiff has taken I O Us for the
sums so advanced to the defendant;
and that, too, although the agreement
may not have been fully carried out,
and may not be such a one as would
be directly enforcible by reason of
the Statute of Frauds: the consi-
deration for the IO Us so given is
examinable. E. Rainsford v. Eagar.

AMENDMENT.

See IRREGULARITY.

JUDGMENT.

PLEADING.

SHERIFF, 5, 7.

120

A motion to amend a postea must be
made to the Judge by whom the

A

case has been tried; to amend the judgment in accordance therewith, to the Court of which it is a judgment, and to amend the transcript, where it is before a Court of Error, to the Court of Error. Anon. Cham. 119

APPEAL.

See COSTS.

JURISDICTION.

POOR-LAWS, 2. REGISTRY APPEAL.

APPRENTICE.

See ARBITRATION.

ATTORNEY.

AWARD.

ARREST.

See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

SHERIFF.

ASSIGNEE.

See BANKRupt.

JUDGMENT.
SCIRE FACIAS.
SUGGESTION.

ASSIGNMENT.

See ASSIGNEE.

ASSISTANT-BARRISTER. See CRIMINAL LAW. QUARTER SESSIONS.

ASSUMPSIT..

See PLEADING.

ATTACHMENT.

An attachment will not be granted against a witness for non-attendance at a trial, pursuant to a subpæna, unless he be called in Court by the crier, and a note taken of his nonattendance by the Judge's registrar. Q. B. O'Donnell v. O'Donnell 29

ATTORNEY.

See JUDGMENT.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY. 1. This Court has jurisdiction to admit as an attorney a person who has not served the ordinary apprenticeship,

on payment of the general fees. The exercise of this jurisdiction, which is rare, depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. A prae

tising Barrister was admitted as an attorney, without serving an apprenticeship, to wind up the business of his deceased brother, who was killed by an accident on a railway, he having been his brother's confidential adviser, acquainted with the suits then pending in his office, the Court being satisfied of his qualifications, and given distinctly to understand that the suits were to be conducted by him for the benefit of the family of the deceased. E. In re M'Nally

518

2. An attorney retained for the conduct of a Chancery suit, and accepting such retainer, thereby enters into a specific contract to carry on the proceedings, and cannot, without due notice, and before the suit is terminated, rescind that contract, and sue on a quantum meruit. Q. B. Coppinger v. Synnott 563

3. A person having been admitted an attorney, under very peculiar circumstances, without having served an apprenticeship, the order so admitting him was subsequently rescinded, on the ground of the suppression by him of a prominent fact amongst the circumstances on which his application was based, although the suppression did not appear to be with the intention of misleading or The utmost deceiving the Court.

candour, and the most full disclosure of facts are required by the Court upon such applications, which are most exceptional in their character. E. In re M'Nally

AWARD.

See PLEADING, 7.

BANKRUPT.

See INDEMNITY.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
SHERIFF.
TROVER.

576

BARRISTER.

BARRISTER.

See ASSISTANT-BARRISTER.

ATTORNEY.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 1. Case, by a corporation, as proprietors of Government stock, against the Bank of Ireland, for refusing to transfer this stock, and for permitting it to be transferred without their authority. The stock had been transferred under forged letters of attorney, purporting to be under the common seal of the corporation, which their agent had affixed to the letters of attorney, without their knowledge or consent, and for which he had been prosecuted by the corporation, and covicted.

The Judge told the Jury, if they believed the evidence, the letters of attorney were forgeries, and that believing them to be so, they were bound to find a verdict for the plaintiffs, unless they should be of opinion that the use made of the common seal of the corporation, whereby the defendants were imposed on and defrauded, was caused exclusively by the neglect or default of the plaintiffs; and that in considering whether the use so made of the common seal was the exclusive cause of the imposition and fraud practised on the defendants, they should consider whether there was any neglect or default on the part of the defendants in examining the letters of attorney, or inquiring into their genuineness; and if they were of opinion that there was such neglect or default, and that same in any degree contributed to said imposition and fraud, they should find for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs excepted to this charge, and required the Judge to tell the jury that the documents being forgeries, they should find for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the allegation of default or neglect by the plaintiffs; and also to direct the jury, that if they believed on the evidence that the plaintiffs did not previously au

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 671

thorise, and were not privy to, the affixing of the seal to the Fetters of attorney, and did not, by any subsequent act, adopt them, they should find for the plaintiffs. Held, on error from the Court below, allowing the exceptions, that the charge of the Judge was wrong, and that the exceptions were properly allowed.— (Dissentiente, PIGOT, C. B.) Ex. Ch. Bank of Ireland v. Evans' Charities

280

2. Upon a bill of exceptions taken by the plaintiffs to the charge of the Judge, the Court below awarded a venire de novo, upon which a verdict was had for the plaintiffs, the defendants not appearing, and judgment was entered thereon. The defendants brought a writ of error on this judgment. The transcript of

the record returned into this Court by the Court below omitted the proceedings on the first trial, the bill of exceptions and judgment thereon by the Court below, merely entering continuances of vice comes non misit breve from the award of the first venire to the entry of the verdict on the second trial. The plaintiffs in error alleged diminution, and this Court held that they were entitled to have those matters returned as Ibid part of the record.

3. Held, that the statute 28 G. 3, c. 31, having incorporated the exceptions into the postea, thereby made them part of the record, and that this Court was bound to consider them. (Dissentientibus, CRAMPTON, J., and PERRIN, J.)

Ibid

4. Kennedy v. Gregg (10 Ir. Law Rep. 559) commented on and doubted.

Ibid

5. A bill of exceptions should state what directions the Judge gave on the particular issue raised, as it is misdirection, not non-direction, which is the proper subject of a bill of exceptions. H. L. Anderson v. Fitzgerald 475

672 BILL OF EXCHANGE.

BILL OF EXCHANGE. See EVIDENCE.

FOREIGN LAW.

BOND.

See BREACHES.

BREACHES.

See SUGGESTION OF BREACHES.

BURGESS.

See REGISTRY APPEAL.

CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM. See EVIDENce.

PLEADING, 3. SHERIFF.

4. The conditional order is properly drawn up, by naming the prosecutor in the Court below the defendant in the order. Ibid

5. A writ of certiorari will be granted to return a charge, information and recognizance, on the application of a person arrested and bound over to keep the peace, on an information sworn before a police magistrate. though the applicant be not in actual custody, and not before the Court under a writ of habeas corpus. The writ will be granted even though it lead to ulterior proceedings against the Justice whose conduct is the subject-matter of inquiry. Ibid

1. Semble. The voluntary discharge of a debtor, in custody under a ca. sa. issued on foot of a judgment, does not deprive the creditor of his right to issue another execution under the statute 35 G. 3, c. 30. Q. B. Burns v. O'Leary 2. A plaintiff in a cause, having obtained the costs of two interlocutory motions, cach under the sum of £10, will not be allowed to consolidate the two sums, and thereby entitle him to issue a ca. sa., as such would be an evasion of 11 & 12 Vic., c. 28. Q. B. Waldron v. Jones

CERTIORARI.

See CORONER.

34

SETTING ASIDE PROCEEDINGS.

1. A certiorari lies to remove an order made by a Justice of the Peace, under the Petty Sessions Act, when the order was made without jurisdiction. Q. B. Regina v. Campbell 586

2. All orders made under this Act should be signed by the Justice, and should show, on the face of them, that he had jurisdiction to make the order. Ibid

3. In showing cause against an order nisi for a certiorari, it is no objection to the affidavit on which it was obtained, that it is not entitled in the cause. The affidavit, although sworn by a marksman, is not objectionable, because of the omission in the jurat

CHARGING ORDER. This Court will grant a charging order on a sum of money lodged in the Incumbered Estates Court to the credit of a judgment debtor. C. P. Browne V. Ellis 106 2. Where the defendant as executrix had recovered judgment against a third party, for a sum lodged in Court to the credit of the action, the Court, at the instance of a creditor who had obtained a judgment against the defendant as executrix, granted an order to charge that sum, pursuant to the 16 & 17 Vic., c. 113, s. 135. C. P. Buckley v. Devereux 3. Where the defendant, as executrix, had obtained a judgment against a third party for a sum of money, lodged in Court to the credit of the action, the Court refused to charge that sum with the payment of a judgment recovered against the defendant personally, there being nothing to show that she had a beneficial interest in the sum lodged in Court. C. P. Butler v. Devereux 108

CHOSE IN ACTION. See EVIDENCE.

FOREIGN LAW.

107