ised in claiming the fees he did, under the 19th section of the Salvage Act. But I think that as Lloyds' agent he made legal charges against the plaintiffs; and his set-off is an answer to the action. E. T. 1853. COATES WORTH v. WALSH. MOORE, J. During the argument, I thought the keeping the goods might be considered as part of the original service of the defendant, but I have satisfied myself that the 19th section is applicable to salvage only; and that the detention of goods to satisfy the salvagors of the vessel was not contemplated by that section. The action is maintainable to recover back the money of the plaintiffs, whose it was; but I concur in thinking the defendant entitled to the set-off in his capacity of Lloyds' agent, and not as receiver of droits. If entitled to rely on that set-off against Chadwick, the ship-owner, he is equally entitled to rely on it against the plaintiffs, who were Chadwick's agents. MACKAY, on behalf of Stephen Dickson, moved to make absolute a conditional order, that the said Stephen Dickson be discharged from May 3, 5. A, being a pri- under a ca. sa., the custody of the governor of the Richmond Bridewell, on the ground that the warrant of committal was defective, in not averring the Insolvent and setting forth respectively with sufficient certainty, or at all, the an several facts, proceedings, notices, matters and things necessary by law to ground the assumed jurisdiction in this case to commit; and on the ground that the Insolvent Court had no authority by law to commit said Dickson, being a prisoner in the Four Courts Marshal sea, for an alleged contempt, to the Richmond Bridewell. Court made an order on a creditor's petition, that A should file a schedule, pursuant to the 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107. A, having disobeyed this order, the In solvent Court issued a warrant of committal to the Richmond Bridewell for contempt. Held-that the 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, only authorised a committal to the Four Courts Marshalsea or Kilmainham, for contempt committed by a person in the county or city of Dublin, and that the custody of A, in Richmond Bridewell, was illegal. E. T. 1853. In re This committal was made under 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, s. 54, providing "That in case any assignee or other person shall disobey any "rule or order of the said Court, duly made by the said Court, for 66 66 enforcing the purposes and provisions of this Act, it shall and 'may be lawful for the said Court to order the person so offending "to be arrested and committed, as for a contempt of the said Court, "to the prison of the Marshalsea of the Four Courts, Dublin, or to "her Majesty's prison of Kilmainham, or to the common gaol of any county, city or place where he or she shall be, or where he or she shall usually reside, and there to remain without bail or mainprize, until such person shall have fulfilled the duty required "by this Act, or until the said Court shall make order to the contrary." Dickson had been previously in custody in the Four Courts Marshalsea under a capias ad satisfaciendum. 66 66 We say the Insolvent Court had no power to deal with Dickson; to give that Court jurisdiction, he should have been twenty-one days in execution without making satisfaction to his creditors. [CRAMPTON, J. This is a committal for contempt, how can we deal with it? The jurisdiction should appear on face of the committal, because the Insolvent Court is an inferior Court acting under a statutable jurisdiction. The 6th section defines the powers of the Commissioners. Where the insolvent is in custody in Dublin, the warrant for committal can only be to the Four Courts Marshalsea or Kilmainham. The words "common gaol" must exclude Dublin, and hence the other two prisons are named. Richmond Bridewell is not a common gaol, but Kilmainham is, and the statute expressly refers to it and the Four Courts Marshalsea. A person when committed for contempt is in criminal custody, not civil: Ex parte Higgins (a). The Prisons Act, 7 G. 4, c. 74, distinguishes the several gaols in Dublin, and the Four Courts Marshalsea thereby became the debtors' prison, being under the care of the Marshal. A distinct division was created for debtors, another for those committed for contempt. The 5 & 6 Vic., c. 95, abolished all other prisons for debtors in Ireland. The committal here should have been superadded to the (a) 9 Irish Law Rep. 414. In re DICKSON. detainers to the Four Courts Marshalsea, but the warrant is for a E T. 1853. Queen's Bench change of custody, and cannot be within the Insolvent Act. The Richmond Bridewell has no such division as the Marshalsea, and cannot be considered a general common gaol. The 7 G. 4, c. 74, s. 6, defines the several arrangements to be made in prisons; and by the 101st section of the same Act it is provided that persons arrested in inferior jurisdictions shall be committed to the county gaol. The 109th section sets out rules and regulations for the prisons, which are not applicable to the Richmond Bridewell, because it has no debtors' side. The 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 51, converted the Richmond Bridewell into one of the city of Dublin prisons, and provided that the Sheriffs of the county of the city should not be answerable for the custody of prisoners in any of them. The 12 & 13 Vic., c. 55, abolished Newgate; but even before that Act passing, the debtors hed been removed out of that prison. The custody is clearly illegal, and Dickson must be discharged. Meagher and Talbot, contra. Richmond Bridewell is a Sheriff's prison, and the Sheriff of the county of the city would be the person to bring the prisoner to the bar of this Court if he were to be here arraigned. The English Insolvent Act has a similar provision to the Irish, and there has been a decision which may guide in this case: Strad v. Anderson (a). An insolvent there had been ordered to file his schedule, under 1 & 2 Vic., c. 110, and he refusing, he was removed to a ward in the first class of the prison, pursuant to 11 & 12 Vic., c. 7. He petitioned the Court of Common Pleas to be removed to another ward, on the ground that 11 & 12 Vic., c. 7, applied only to cases where the order to file the schedule had been made previous to the passing of the Act; but the petition was dismissed. That case shows that it was believed to be the intention of the Legislature to apply a pressure to compel a prisoner to comply with the order of the Court. Here Dickson refused to set out in his schedule all his property. The Richmond Bridewell has been substituted for Newgate, and that was a common gaol of the city of Dublin; and if it were lawful (a) 19 Law Jour., N. S., C. P., 164. E. T. 1853. to commit to Newgate, it is equally so to commit to Richmond. The Queen's Bench offence here is a contempt, but scarcely one on civil process; at all events, it is a case within the 57th section of the Insolvent Act, and fully authorised the committal. In re DICKSON. Mackay replied, citing Ex parte Kinning (a); Edwards v. Robertson (b); 1 & 2 Vic., c. 110, s. 66. Cur. ad. vult. May 6. LEFROY, C. J. This case comes before the Court on an application to make absolute a conditional order for the discharge of Stephen Dickson from the custody of the governor of the Richmond Bridewell, on the ground that he was in illegal custody, and on other objections stated in the conditional order. Several objections have been urged, but the important objection is the want of jurisdiction in the Insolvent Court to commit Dickson to Richmond Bridewell for disobedience of the order of the Court. The 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, has been relied on in support of that objection. The 6th section provides that the Insolvent Court, or any Commissioner thereof, shall have the power of committing all persons guilty of any contempt of the said Court to the prison of the Marshalsea of the Four Courts, Dublin, or to her Majesty's prison of Kilmainham, or to the common gaol of any county in which such person shall be, or shall usually reside. It has been contended that the power of committal for contempt is confined to the Marshalsea and Kilmainham, and that this Act does not authorise a committal to any other prison, as by the Act these prisons are selected exclusively for offenders for the city and county of Dublin, and the words in the section, common gaol of any county," should be read as applicable only to the gaol of any other county. Looking at the previous Insolvent Acts, there appears a manifest distinction between them and the latter Act, as to dealing with contempts, and it gives a clear solution to any difficulty that may arise. The 1 & 2 G. 4, c. 59, was passed before the constitution (b) 5 M. & W. 520. (a) 4 Man. Gr. & Sc. 507. DICKSON. of the present Insolvent Court, and the jurisdiction then given E. T. 1853. Queen's Bench was exercisable in different Courts sitting in different counties; In re and the difference in the words in the present Act arose from the alteration in the jurisdiction. When that statute was in force, there was no Insolvent Court sitting permanently in Dublin; but the 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, provides that all proceedings and matters to be heard by the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors shall be had and determined by the said Court, at the Court-house, Ormond-quay, Dublin, unless the said Court shall at any time see cause to appoint its sittings in any other place. Then the 8th section directs the Commissioners to make circuits, and gives them certain powers when on circuit; the intention clearly being that the Court was to hold permanent sittings in the city of Dublin for the city and county, and for other counties circuits should be held at the several assize towns. The section giving the power of committal, instead of using the language of 1 & 2 G. 4, to commit to the common gaol of any county, says, "to the prison of the "Marshalsea of the Four Courts, Dublin, or to Her Majesty's prison "of Kilmainham, or to the common gaol of any county," thus providing for the exercise of committal in whatever place the Court may be. There is another section of the Act material to advert to, as tending to show that the Legislature, in passing the late Act, had before them the fact of there being other gaols in the city and county of Dublin than the two referred to; that is, the 58th section, which uses the words, "where such prisoner shall be in any gaol within "the county of Dublin, or the county of the city of Dublin, the said "Court shall order such prisoner to be brought before the said Court," &c. The selection therefore of the two gaols specified precludes the implication of any other gaol being contemplated, and shows that the jurisdiction of the Insolvent Court as to committals for contempt of the orders of the Court is confined to the Marshalsea and Kilmainham; it follows, therefore, that the custody in which Dickson now is, is not the gaol to which the jurisdiction to commit applies, and that therefore the custody is illegal; and on a return being made to the habeas corpus, we will discharge him. Order absolute. [Dickson was subsequently brought up under a habeas corpus, issued by the Court, and discharged.] |