Opinion of the Court.

Henderson v. Cabell, 83 Tex., 541; White v. Bank, 98 Cal., 166; 2 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 740; Phelps v. Mutual, etc., Assn., 112 Fed. Rep., 453.

The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state are, properly authenticated, entitled to have such faith and credit given to them in every court of the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken. Art. 4, Sec. 1, U. S. Const.; U. S. Compiled Statutes, 1901, 677, Sec. 905; Railroad Co. v. Ferry Co., 119 U. S., 615; Old Wayne., etc., Assn. v. McDonough et al., 164 Ind., 321.

What is insisted upon is this: That having litigated the question of the service in the Hancock circuit court, having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon that issue only, and having had a full hearing thereon upon his own and other affidavits setting out all the facts he now seeks again to set up, he is bound by the decision of the Hancock circuit court, upon this question which he himself submitted so long as such decision stands unappealed from, and not attacked in a direct proceeding for fraud upon the court. This decision made the service good, and Albright was in Hancock circuit court by virtue of the service itself.

SHAUCK, J. The record does not permit the proposition that the judgment of the circuit court

Opinion of the Court.

of Hancock county was rendered against Albright without service of summons upon him. It distinctly appears that a summons was issued and a return of personal service thereof was made and this return was in accordance with the fact. Since the answer admits the personal service of summons in the action, the only proposition which the defendant in error can make in opposition to the jurisdiction of the court in Indiana is that in order to get opportunity for personal service his adversaries had decoyed him into that state by false representations and had thus abused the process of the court. The determination of that question was peculiarly for the court whose process was alleged to have been abused. He invoked its authority by a motion to quash the writ and set aside the return. Its decision was adverse to him and as he did not resort to a superior court of Indiana, or resorted unavailingly, for a reversal of its judgment he cannot be permitted to litigate that question again in this state. This conclusion is well sustained by the cases cited in the briefs and with respect to it the courts below appear to have been in accord.

But the judge of the court of common pleas was of the opinion that although in the circumstances appearing the defendant could not be permitted to again contest the jurisdiction of the Indiana court. over his person the demurrer to his answer should be overruled to the end that he might assert in the courts of this state rights which he alleged against other parties to the note on which suit was brought in the court of Indiana, although they

Opinion of the Court.

are not parties here. What rights he thought it permissible to assert here appear from the special findings of the jury in consideration of which he rendered judgment in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the general verdict against him. Respecting the special findings it is to be observed that they all relate to rights of Albright against persons who were parties to the suit in Indiana although not parties here; that they are rights arising out of the relations of parties to the note which was the foundation of the suit in the circuit court of Indiana, and that they concern facts which were existent when the suit was brought and passed to judgment in that state. Discriminating attention to these suggestions will readily exclude from controlling consideration here most of the legal propositions which are urged and the cases which are cited by counsel for the plaintiff in error. In view of the numerous decisions of the state and federal courts upon the subject of res adjudicata and the credit which the federal constitution requires to be given to the judgments of other states, original discussion of the subject is not needed and perhaps would not be interesting. In Goodrich v. Jenkins, 6 Ohio, 43, in accordance with both earlier and later decisions of this court, it was said as the basis of decision: "The rule is inflexible in this country. In an action upon the transcript of a judgment, in a sister state, nothing can be pleaded or proved, that could have been pleaded and proved in the original

Syllabus.

action, whether it was so pleaded and proved or not."

The common pleas court erred in overruling the demurrer to the answer and in rendering judgment in favor of the original defendant notwithstanding the verdict against him, and the circuit court properly rendered judgment on the general verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

SPEAR, C. J., DAVIS, PRICE, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur.

THE STATE OF OHIO V. DAVIS.

Indictment under Section 30 of Free Banking Act-Section 3821-85, Revised Statutes-Relating to embezzlement by bank officersBank officer charged with abstracting, without authority, of certificates of said bank-Not an offense under laws of OhioSuch certificates not shares of stock, funds or moneys-But merely receipts of payment for shares-Banking laws.

Where an indictment under Section 30 of the Free Banking Act (Revised Statutes, 3821-85) charges the defendant as an officer of a bank with abstracting, misapplying and embezzling property of the bank, to-wit, certificates of the stock of such bank of the value of fifty dollars per share on which only sixty per cent. thereof had been paid, which certificates of stock had theretofore been pledged to such bank as security for moneys theretofore received by him, which abstraction was without authority from the other officers or directors of such bank, with intent to injure and defraud the bank, and that he did so injure and defraud the bank, such indictment does not charge an offense under the laws of Ohio, because

1st. Such certificates are not shares, but only receipts or acknowledgments that defendant had paid sixty per cent. on each share;

Statement of the Case.

and by virtue of Section 11 of the Free Banking Act (Revised Statutes, 3821-70) the bank had a lien on the shares allotted to the defendant and had complete control over the assignment and transfer of the same, and therefore the possession of such certificates gave to the bank no additional rights or benefits. 2nd. Such certificates are not moneys, funds or credits of such bank, within the meaning of Section 30 of the Free Banking Act (Rev. Stat., Sec. 3821-85).

(No. 12751-Decided October 31, 1911.)

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Columbiana county.

The defendant in error was indicted jointly with Corwin D. Bachtel, by the grand jury of Stark county, Ohio, for abstracting, misapplying and embezzling personal property of the Canton State Bank. The defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it did not state an offense under the laws of Ohio, which demurrer was overruled. Subsequently, on motion of the defendants, the venue was changed to the adjoining county of Columbiana, and thereafter the proceedings occurred in that county. The defendant, Bachtel, having died before the trial, the court directed the jury, on the trial of the defendant in error, to return a verdict of not guilty on the second and third counts of the indictment. The first count of the indictment charges the defendant in error as follows, to-wit:

"That William L. Davis and Corwin D. Bachtel, late of said county, on or about the 13th day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand