Argument for Relator. for the benefit and protection of those of abnormal status, the juvenile act of this state. P. & A. Anno. G. C. Sec. 1639, et seq.; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. St., 48; In re Sharp, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 Pac. Rep., 563, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 886; Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah, 473, 88 Pac. Rep., 609, 120 Am. St. Rep., 935; Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 103 Wis., 651; Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis., 328; Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St., 184; House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St., 197; Jarrard v. State, 116 Ind., 98, 17 N. E. Rep., 912; Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass., 203, 6 N. E. Rep., 830, 55 Am. St. Rep., 452; Kelley, Petitioner, 152 Mass., 432, 25 N. E. Rep., 615; State v. Brown, 50 Minn., 353, 36 Am. St. Rep., 651; State v. Howard, 126 La., 354; Sawyer v. El Paso & N. E. Ry. Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App., 106, 108 S. W. Rep., 719. There seems to be no serious claim advanced by the numerous counsel appearing for the relator that the act in question deprives the employer of any rights under Sections 5 and 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution, unless it is the right to be sued in a court, which right is not ordinarily highly prized; and no such claim is made by counsel representing the Ohio Manufacturers' Association. But we note that counsel representing the Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., the American Ship Building Co. and others, are much concerned over the deprivation of the employe of the right to maintain an action in court, and to have a trial by jury, while the American Federation of Labor has employed counsel to file a brief herein on their Argument for Relator. behalf in support of the constitutionality of the law. We contend that the employe has no constitutional right of action for mere negligence. It is only for injuries "done" him that he has a constitutional right to resort to the courts for redress, and for such injuries the act has not undertaken to deprive him of that privilege. 4. Interference with freedom of contract. The principles involved in this act have already been sustained by this court, first in this regard, that there is a good and valid consideration for said contract. Railway Co. v. Cox, 55 Ohio St., 497. As to the optional features of the act and those restraining the liberties of contract, it is insisted. by those who seek to destroy the act, passed as it was through the combined effort of the labor world, that the laborer is deprived of his constitutional guaranty of liberty of contract, in that he may not contract his labor on terms of his own. choosing, and that he is deprived of a portion of his wages without his consent. The private liberty of contract may be restrained to the extent that the public welfare may reasonably require it. Tiedeman's Lim. of Police Power, Sec. 1; Thorpe v. R. & B. R. Rd. Co., 27 Vt., 149; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S., 11; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S., 169; Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S., 160; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S., 703. Argument for Relator. 5. Impairment of existing contracts. Surely it is competent for the legislature to change the rules of law applicable to defenses in personal injury actions, so as to affect actions brought for injuries subsequently suffered by employes who may happen to have subsisting contracts of hire at the time the law goes into effect. We submit that this court is already committed to the logical doctrine that rights under a contract of this kind are of no higher dignity than the right to make a contract of the same kind under the police power. State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St., 289. 6. Arbitrary classification. Another objection of the defendant is that Section 20-1 of the Ohio compensation act is in violation of Article I, Section 2, Ohio Constitution, in that said act is not of uniform operation upon individuals in the state. It is claimed by the opponents to the constitutionality of the act in question that it is unconstitutional because the legislature has limited the act to cover employments in which five or more persons are regularly employed, and that these limitations are in violation of Article I, Section 2, of the constitution of the state, which provides that "Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit," etc. That such a limitation is a reasonable exercise of the police power has been decided by abundance of authorities: St. Louis Con. Coal Co. v. Illinois, Argument for Relator. 185 U. S., 203; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S., 539; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S., 79; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S., 129; State v. Evans, 130 Wis., 381. Is the act an unreasonable exercise of the police power in that it does not operate uniformly upon persons within the same category? A police regulation to be reasonable must equally affect all those subjects of legislation which stand in the same situation with respect to the evil to be remedied. This principle, however, as always understood, does not preclude classification. Many authorities might be cited upon this point, but we content ourselves with the following: Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kane v. Erie Ry. Co., 67 C. C. A., 653; Miller v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St., 214; Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 81 Miss., 507, 34 So. Rep., 533, 62 L. R. A., 407, 95 Am. St. Rep., 476. The supreme court of the United States has frequently passed upon this question, and we shall refer to only a few well considered cases in support of our proposition. L. & N. Rd. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S., 36; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S., 114; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S., 593; El Paso & N. E. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S., 87; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S., 463. The supreme court of Ohio has always upheld the reasonable classification of subjects for legislative action, and in all cases of doubt as to the wisdom of the classification made by the legislature, unless the classification is clearly arbitrary and based on no reason whatever, the doubt has Argument for Relator. been resolved in favor of the right of the legislature so to classify, and in favor of the constitutionality of the law. Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St., 283; State v. Hanlon, 77 Ohio St., 19; Railway Co. v. Horstman, 72 Ohio St., 93; Gentsch v. State, 71 Ohio St., 151; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St., 661. Who can say that a line drawn at five is arbitrary and unreasonable and that if drawn at fifty would not be so? That is a matter which, in the nature of things, must be left largely to the discretion of the law-making power. And so the cases hold, without number, and in no tribunal so uniformly as that of the supreme court of the United States. Magoun v. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S., 293; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S., 267; Field v. Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S., 618; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S., 106; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S., 557; People v. Coon, 67 Hun, 525; Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S., 452. Classification is permissible under Section 26, Article II, of the state constitution, which provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state." State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St., 63; Driggs v. State, 52 Ohio St., 51; Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St., 295; Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St., 79. 7. Conferring judicial powers. The phrase "due process of law" has application in our problem, not only to the rights created by the act, but also rather to the remedy provided |