which was appurtenant to the mill. The owner of the mill property held by a prior parol reservation, a right to the use of the race on the adjacent property, and upon his subsequent acquisition of the legal title to both tracts, and his conveyance by deed with covenants of seizin, without mention of the easement, of the tract upon which the water privilege was claimed, it was held that the continued possession and use of this privilege, both before and after his obtaining title to the property, was sufficient notice of the original reservation, to put his grantee upon inquiry.' In delivering the opinion in this case, Mr. Chief Justice GIBSON, makes a distinction between the facts and those in the prior case of Woods v. Farmere. There it was decided in substance that an owner of distinct titles, who gives record notice of one of them, abandons, as to purchasers, the other, of which possession would otherwise be implied notice. "That, however," says the learned judge, "is not this case; for Isaac Silverthorn had but one title to the water-right, and held out neither notice nor pretence of any other." Without presuming to question the justice of this decision it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is exceptional to the rule announced in Woods v. Farmere, for the reason that the possession of the water-right, was clearly consistent with the defendant's ownership of the fee as it appeared by his recorded deed. But whether under the circumstances of the case his conveyance to plaintiff was inconsistent with a continuance of such right, is another matter.

$301. Exception to Rule Requiring Consistency. Another exception allowed in favor of the validity of notice of title by possession, of one who has executed and delivered an instru. ment inconsistent with the title claimed, which was placed upon record, was where the deed from the tenant in possession, merely gave his grantee instantaneous seizin, which was utterly divested by the contemporaneous re-conveyance to his

'Randall v. Silverthorn, 4 Penn. St., 173.

17 Watts, 385, Ante § 298.

grantor and two sons.1 Here it was held as against an attaching creditor of the first grantee, that the possession of the tenants was sufficient to put creditors on inquiry, notwithstanding the deed of such grantee was first recorded, and the attachment was levied and execution issued on the judgment was duly extended and recorded during the intermediate time between the recording of the two deeds; and there was no visible change of possession, the sons residing upon the premises as members of their father's family, as they had done before. From the report of this case it appears that the attachment was levied so soon after the recording of the deed to the debtor, that it is not probable that the credit from which the debt arose, was obtained upon the faith of the record title. The purpose of the transaction stands plainly revealed as a circuitous conveyance by the father to the sons, of an interest in the land, and the first grantee was employed as a mere conduit for the title. The facts of this case may be sufficient to reconcile one to an exception, to what may itself be regarded as an exception to the doctrine of notice by registration; but were the facts of a case the same, except that an innocent purchaser occupied the position of the attaching creditor in this case, the transitory nature of the title vested in the grantee whose deed was recorded would be no protection to the grantor's possession.

$302. Possession to Begin with Unrecorded Title. It has also been decided where possession by one's lessees or tenants was regarded as sufficient, that their tenancy must commence after the acquisition of the title evidenced by such possession. In other words, where at the time of the sale, the grantor was in possession by his tenants, who afterwards attorned to the grantee, the grantor's deed being unrecorded, this was held insufficient to charge even an attaching creditor of the grantor with notice of such unregistered conveyance.2

1 Webster v. Madox, 6 Me., 256.

2 Loughridge v. Bowland, 52 Miss., 546.

$303. Possession as Lessee Changed to Possession as Owner. So where one who held possession as lessee, and after the expiration of the term, remained a tenant at sufferance for a short time and then purchased the fee, it was decided that such possession would be referred to the original tenancy under which it commenced and would not stand for notice of the title under which she held at the date of the subsequent purchase.1

$304. The Rule in Mississippi. These cases seem to settle the law upon this question for the State of Mississippi, upon a theory peculiar to that jurisdiction. Drawing the inference of notice of title from the fact of possession by the claimant, is there regarded as resting with the neighborhood, or with the subsequent party to the title, instead of with the court or jury. Elsewhere, possession derives its force as a circumstance tending to fix notice of a prior equity or non-registered conveyance upon subsequent parties, from the fact that it is suflicient to put them upon inquiry and for a failure to inquire. mala fides is imputed to them. Here it seems requisite, not only that the subsequent party must have notice of the possession, but his mind must be free from doubt as to the character of such possession before he inquires. Other courts decide that the notice inferred from possession shall be of such title as the possessor had at the time of the subsequent purchase, limiting the application of the principle to cases where the tenant in possession has not estopped himself from relying upon his possession as notice, by placing upon record a title inconsistent with that claimed, or a different title which is perfectly consistent with his possession. In the latter event, his possession will be referred to his record title. These cases, however, decide that possession by a purchaser after his term expires, will be referred to his original lease which is not a matter of record. There seems to be a difference of principle upon which these cases are decided from that governing those elsewhere determined, which we will not attempt to reconcile.2

'Claiborne o. Holmes, 51 Miss., 146.

'It is decided in a recent case, that a son who occupied certain premises

$305. Creditors Affected with Notice. From authorities already cited, as well as upon general principles, it is quite clear that subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers are not the only parties who may be affected by this species of implied notice, but that it may be invoked against creditors of the grantor.1

$306. Possession of Chattels. The doctrine that the purchaser of chattels from one who has no possession thereof at the time of his purchase takes the same with full notice of all the rights of the one who has them in possession, is so well established as not to require the citation of authorities in its support. Possession is much more universally recognized as evidence of ownership in case of chattels than where the title to real property is involved. The inference follows naturally from the nature of the property and the manner of transferring the title thereto. Not only is possession notice of the interest of the possessor, but from the fact that the title to movable things is usually transmitted by manual delivery of the property, such possession is prima facie evidence of absolute ownership.2

the title to which was in his father, in subordination to his father's title, and who continued such possession after his father's death, would not be permitted to rest upon such possession, either before or after his father's death as notice to a subsequent purchaser from other heirs of a parol contract from his father to convey the property to him. Stone v. Cook, 79 Ill., 424.

1 Kent v. Plumer, 7 Me., 464; Webster v. Madox, 6 Me., 256; Newhall v. Pierce, 5 Pick., 450.

• Ante.

IV. NOTICE FROM TITLE PAPERS.

§307. General Statement of the Doctrine.

308. Equivalent to Actual Notice.

309. Treated as Constructive Notice.

310. Modifications of the Rule.

311. Recitals in Original Patent.

312. Illustration.

313. Sufficient if Recitals would Lead to Knowledge.

314. In Same Transaction.

315. Should be in Same Chain of Title.

316. Recitals Reasonably Certain.

317. Same.

318. Example of General Recital.

319. Uncertainty of Description.

320. Striking Peculiarities of Recital.

321. Recital in Will.

322. Limitations upon Effect of Recitals.

323. Recital of a Trust.

324. May be by Variety of Instruments.

325. Recital in Mortgages.

326. Books of Record.

327. Conveyance by Statute.

328. Facts which may be thus Brought Home to Purchaser.

329. Contract to Convey.

330, Vendor's Lien.

331. Who Affected.

332. Different Kinds of Property.

333. Stocks Transferred by Executor.

334. Personal Property.

335. Inquiry Extends to Examination of Papers.

336. Deed of Real Estate Containing Bill of Chattels.

§307. General Statement of the Doctrine. The notice to purchasers, of interests in the subject of the purchase, which is derived from the papers by which the title is transmitted, affected or incumbered, is for obvious reasons confined almost