be declared invalid, on the ground that those, whose supposed rights are put up to sale, have no actual rights in the property exposed to sale.”

The Court hold that there is nothing in the law which prevents the Judicial tribunals from declaring the wajib-ul-urz drawn up at the settlement fraudulent and void, even when the suit is not brought, in express words, to set the settlement aside. In the case before the Court, the paper first drawn up at the settlement, the kyfeeyut nuqsha putteedaree, dated in September 1841, is not indeed congruous with the wajib-ul-urz dated in the following month, October 1841, but the settlement roobakaree refers to, and acknowledges, both, consequently, the object of the suit is, though not in precise words, to set aside the settlement.

On the second point of the certificate, although the judgment of the lower Court is somewhat confusedly worded, the Court do not understand the Principal Sudder Ameen to rule that the sale is invalid, because the party, whose rights were sold, had no rights, but that the auction purchasers of those interests have in reality purchased nothing.

The appeal is, for the above reasons, dismissed.

CASE No. 215 of 1850.

Judges,

H. W. DEANE, Offg. Judge.

Special appeal from the decision of G. Blunt, Esq., Judge of Allygurh, dated 31st January 1850.

MEWA RAM, (Defendant), Appellant,

versus

RAJAH TEEKUM SINGH, (Plaintiff), Respondent.

THE English decrce of the Zillah Court gives the history of the case. The plaintiff is the talooquadar: the settlement of mouzah Jusrana was made with Bukshee and Khosal, mooquddum biswahdars: and the defendant, Mewa Ram, is the purchaser of the mouzah, when it was sold for arrears of Government Revenue accruing during the settlement, which had been made with Bukshee and Khoshal. The Judge and the Principal Sudder Ameen have tried a wrong issue, their enquiries having been directed towards the question of proprietary right,

and having found that Bukshee and Khoshal possessed no pro prietary right, they have reversed the auction sale, as if it were a matter dependent upon the decision. The Judge, in the concluding passage of his decree, prefers the claim of the plaintiff to that of the mooquddums, "in whose place, as purchaser of their mooquddummee rights, the present appellant, (Mewa Ram), now stands," and the sentence indicates the error into which he has fallen.

A special appeal was admitted to try, "whether the fact found by the Zillah Court, that the hiswahdars, with whom the settlement was made, did not possess any proprietary right in the village, can affect the title of the defendant, who purchased mouzah Jusrana at a sale for the recovery for arrears of revenue due from mouzah Jusrana itself, the settlement having been proprietary, and the sale having taken place under Regulation XI. of 1822."

The Court are of opinion that the question of proprietary right in no way affects the case. The land is pledged to the Government for the revenue assessed thereupon, and is liable to sale when balances occur without reference to the validity of the title of the party with whom a proprietary settlement has been made. That the settlement was proprietary is clear from the proceedings of the Revenue authorities, dated 21st May 1835, and 5th September 1835. It is not indeed disputed that the parties, with whom the settlement was made, were supposed to be persons possessing heritable and transferrible rights in the soil, such as are described in Section 10, Regulation VII. of 1822, and are now commonly known by the term "mooquddum biswahdars," and whether they really were so, or not, does not alter the tenure by which the land was held. The title of the "engager" (such is the word used by the law), is not to be impeached.

The point, moreover, has been definitively determined in the case of Ranee Sheo Koonwur, &c., appellants, versus Sheodial Singh, &c., respondents, decided by this Court on the 26th August 1850. One of the pleas of the plaintiffs was, that "the defaulters having no actual rights, the sale was invalid;" and to this it had been replied by Government, who had been made a defendant, that "they held a lien on the land, which is perpe. tually hypothecated to them for the public revenue." This principle was fully recognized by the Court, who held that Section 29, Regulation XI. of 1822, was decisive upon the question. That Section enacts that "no claim of right founded on any act of the original engager, or any plea impeaching the title by which the said engager may have held, shall be allowed to impugn the right of the Revenue authorities to make the sale, or to bar or affect

the title and interest conveyed to the purchaser by the sale." The purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue purchases from the Government the proprietary right in the land, not the rights and interests of an individual; or, using another mode of expression, he purchases a "title" not liable to impeachment, which is the same thing. When, therefore, the Judge regards the appellant, Mewa Ram, as "standing in the place" of those who have no rights, he misapprehends the law, and forgets the one great principle that the land is hypothecated to Government for the revenue assessed thereon.

Under this view of the law, the Court reverse the decisions of the Courts below, and dismiss the claim of the plaintiff.

CASE NO. 167 or 1850.

Judges,

H. W. DEANE, Offg. Judge.

Special appeal from the decision of S. S. Brown, Esq., Judge of Goruckpore, dated 9th February 1850.

BRIJ LALL, (Plaintiff), Appellant,

versus

BYJOO NAEK, AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Respondents.

FULL particulars of this case will be found at page 47 of the printed decisions of the Zillah Courts for February 1850.

A special appeal was admitted to try, "whether the Judge has not erroneously ruled, that the alienation of the mouzahs, which are the subject of suit, on the 8th June 1847, was a valid alienation, inasmuch as the Court had, on the day previous, viz., 7th June 1847, passed an order that these properties be brought to sale in satisfaction of certain decrees against the proprietor thereof."

On this case being brought up for hearing in special appeal, the vakeels of the respective parties put in a soolehnamah, and requested that it be accepted by the Court as a decree. As there appears to be no objection to this mode of proceeding, it is ordered, that the soolehnamah be received, and the suit decided agreeably to its provisions. It is to be clearly understood that the Court pass no opinion on the point raised in the certificate of special appeal.

CASE No. 185 of 1850.

} Judges,

H. W. DEANE, Offg. Judge.

Special appeal from the decision - of J. S. Boldero, Esq., Judge of Agra, dated 30th April 1850.

HOLASEE SINGH AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Appellants,

versus

TEEKARAM AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Respondents.

THE printed decisions for April 1850 give the particulars of this case.

A special appeal was allowed to try, "whether the lower Courts were not wrong in disposing summarily and without enquiry of the plea of the plaintiffs, that the punchayet formed by order of the Revenue authorities did not act in conformity to the rules laid down in Section 7, Regulation IX. of 1833.

It appears that a claim was preferred before the Revenue authorities by the plaintiffs to engage, as proprietors, for a tenbiswah share in several mouzahs, and that their claim was referred to arbitration. The punchayet delivered in an award unfavorable to the plaintiffs. In a suit afterwards brought in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen, the plaintiffs urged various objections to the award, all of which the lower Court disposed of by describing them to be mamoolee objections, and nonsuited the plaintiffs. The Judge affirmed the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen.

The Court remark that the objections put forward by the plaintiffs to the award of the arbitrators have not, in the present instance, been tried. It was not sufficient for the Principal Sudder Ameen to designate them as mamoolee objections, but he should have stated distinctly his reasons for regarding them as of no force. The judgments of both the lower Courts are accordingly annulled, as incomplete, and the suit is remanded to the Principal Sudder Ameen's file in order that the pleas adverted to be duly disposed of.

CASE NO. 197 of 1850.

Judges,

H. W. DEANE, Offg. Judge.

Special appeal from the decision of J. S. Boldero, Esq., Judge of Agra, dated 29th May 1850.

PIRBHOO LALL, (Defendant), Appellant,

versus

NOOR KHAN, (Plaintiff), Respondent.

FOR the particulars of this case, the reader is referred to the printed decisions of the Zillah Courts for May 1850, page 24. A special appeal was granted to try," whether it was competent to the Civil Courts to entertain an action for the reversal of orders passed by the Criminal authorities under Act XXI. of 1841, such proceeding being apparently opposed to the principle declared in Construction 1158, and especially laid down by this Court in their letter to the Judge of Saharunpore, No. 481, of 28th April 1849, in a case analogous to the present, viz. the case of Ramboj and others, versus Jydial and others."

The Court are clearly of opinion that the plaintiff in this suit has no legal ground of action. The Magistrate, under the law "for the better prevention of local nuisances," ordered the removal of a wall, by means of which the plaintiff was found to have encroached on a public thoroughfare. The plaintiff might, if he chose, have applied for the jury or punchayet described in Section 3 of the Act, but he did not so apply. In the Construction 1158, the general principle is declared, that whenever it has been the intention of the legislature to render a summary decision open to review by a suit in the Courts, specific provisions to that effect has been made in the Regulations; and, moreover, in their letter to the Judge of Saharunpore, referred to in the certificate, this Court delivered their opinion in the following terms. "As stated above, no such provision is contained in Act XXI. of 1841, and consequently, according to the general principle laid down by the Court in Construction No. 1158, the Civil Court is not empowered either to entertain an action for the reversal of the Deputy Magistrate's order in the case under reference, or to issue an injunction for the purpose of staying execution thereof."

The judgments of both the lower Courts are, with reference to the above, reversed, and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed.