the Court of first instance must necessarily be upheld, because the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut reversed his (the Principal Sudder Ameen's) decision, and remanded the suit. The Court observe that the points, which the Principal Sudder Ameen was bound to try, are most clearly laid down in the Court's judgment of the 28th December. The present decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen is vaguely worded, but so far as the Court can fix its meaning, they understand the Principal Sudder Ameen to rule, that the grounds of his judgment not having been considered by the Sudder Court to be tenable, nothing remains but to fall back upon the grounds of judgment assigned by the Court of first instance, and to decide accordingly. This mode of proceeding does not meet the requisition of the Court; if it did, the remand was superfluous, and the Court might have disposed of the case themselves when it was last before them. It is necessary that the Principal Sudder Ameen should exercise his independent judgment on the points set down for trial, and record a finding upon them. The Court are therefore constrained to remand the suit a second time to the file of the Principal Sudder Ameen. CASE No. 113 of 1851. S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of BICKRUM SINGH AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Appellants, versus JOWAHIR SINGH, (Defendant), Respondent. THIS suit is remanded a second time to the file of the Principal Sudder Ameen for the reasons stated in the Court's judgment in case No. 112 of this date. The 18th September, 1851. CASE No. 133 or 1849. Regular appeal from the decision of Syed Tussuddooq Hoossein Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of Azim gurh, dated 1st March 1849. MUTTRA PANDE AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus CHYT PANDE, (Plaintiff), Respondent. THE plaintiff sued to establish his sole title and right of possession in the maaffee village of Autroor, for the recovery of Rs. 2,700, wasilát, and for the reversal of certain orders of the revenue Courts specified in the plaint. He founded his claim on the grant of the village to his grandfather by the Rajah of Benares, on the issue in his favor of an arbitration award in a dispute relative to his right in the property, which had been contested by other claimants, and of a suit in the Civil Court instituted to set aside the award, and on continuous possession up to the year 1844, when the defendants' names were first recorded in the proprietary column by order of the revenue authorities. The defendants, in answer to the suit, maintained that the mouzah had been originally acquired by a common ancestor prior to the rent-free grant, that the circumstance of the grant having been issued in the name of plaintiff's grandfather, singly, was not conclusive against their participation in its benefits, and that they had enjoyed them uninterruptedly jointly with the plaintiff. They further denied that their interests were affected by the issue of the former suits, which had been carried on between plaintiff and other claimants. The Principal Sudder Ameen entered at some length into the oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties, and, considering the plaintiff's claim established, on the grounds set forth in the decision, he decreed the suit minus the wasilât. In appeal, the defendants, appellants, have renewed a plea urged in the lower Court. They plead that the decree is for the proprietary right, whereas the suit was brought merely for the rentfree rights. This objection is without force. There is no evidence to show that the maaffee and proprietary right have ever been disjoined, and the object of the plaint and proofs are clearly directed to the recovery of all the rights in the property, which the other party were in possession of. With regard to the merits of the case, I concur in the lower Court's conclusions from the evidence. The only point to be considered in the case is the proof, which the record affords, of the respondent's sole possession prior to the orders of the revenue Courts in 1844. This has been furnished by the evidence to the grounds of claim detailed in the plaint, which shows that the respondent appeared singly in defence of the maaffee right, and was in possession for a series of years prior to 1844, besides making good his sole title in the Civil Courts against all claimants up to that year, and that the appellants' names were recorded by the revenue Courts in 1844 without any preliminary enquiry. The appellants' evidence is of an inconclusive character, and the decision in their favor of a Court of another district in a suit of a parallel nature relating to another mouzah, which has been produced by their vakeel, cannot be allowed to influence the decision in this case, the material point of possession having been overlooked in the decision quoted. The decision is affirmed with costs. The 20th September, 1851. Present: CASE No. 90 or 1851. { A. W. BEGBIE, Judges. H. W. DEANE, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of W. P. Masson, Esq., Officiating Judge of Goruckpore, dated 31st January 1851. KISHUN DUTT, (Defendant), Appellant, versus RAMJEEAWUN, (Plaintiff), Respondent. FOR the particulars of this case see pages 19 and 20 of the printed decisions for zillah Goruckpore, for January last. A special appeal was admitted to determine "whether the Judge's decision ought not to be reversed, on the ground of its resting on a finding at variance with the plaintiff's own statement of the facts of the case, and as being contradictory in itself, and opposed to the rule contained in the Circular Order of the 13th September 1843, which prescribes, "that Judges shall confine themselves to the adjudication of the point or points at issue between the parties, as set forth by themselves." The Court remark, that the certificate of special appeal correctly states the defects in the Officiating Judge's decision. The plaintiff rests his claim on the assertion that the bond was executed in his own favor exclusively, and without reference to the general interests of the firm of which he had been a partner. This statement is met by the counter-assertion of the defendants, that though the bond was drawn up in plaintiff's name, the ། amount was lent by, "and was actually due to the, firm," and the Sudder Ameen, being of opinion that the statement of the defendant was the true one, and that the debt had been repaid, dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The Officiating Judge finds, that the debt was owing "to the firm collectively;" a supposition directly opposed to the plaintiff's own statement; and finding which, the Officiating Judge should have dismissed the plaintiff's claim, as fraudulent. The Judge goes on to say, "The money was lent by plaintiff; to plaintiff he gave the bond, which was drawn in plaintiff's name; legally speaking defendant knew nothing of the other three, and, unless from plaintiff, until the law declared otherwise, or the person to whom plaintiff might transfer the bond, he could not have a quittance: the receipt from the three is therefore invalid." These remarks are obviously inconsistent with what the Judge has stated previously, as to the debt being due to the firm, collectively." The concluding part of the Officiating Judge's decree renders his meaning still more obscure. He makes a supposition that the plaintiff acted as "the manag ing partner for the firm," and that "excepting the landed property, all the property had been divided," and records his opi nion, that, under this view of the case, the plaintiff was entitled "to sue for himself on this bond." This version of the case is purely hypothetical, as the plaintiff himself does not make any statement to this effect. The Court are compelled, with advertence to the foregoing observations, to annul the Officiating Judge's decision, and to remand the case for fresh adjudication. The 20th September, 1851. A. W. BEGBIE, Present: H. W. DEANE, CASE NO. 195 of 1851. Judges, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of Moulve Mohumed Luteef Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of Goruckpoor, dated 29th January 1851. DEENDYAL SINGH AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus MUHESH DUTT AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Respondents. THIS was a suit to obtain possession of 28 beegahs of land valued at Rs. 289; to have the names of the plaintiffs entered in the survey papers, as proprietors; and to amend the Settlement proceedings under date 21st October 1837, and 1st January 1838. Plaintiffs stated that 101 beegahs of land had been given to them to be held free of rent, by the ancestor of defendants, in 1105 Fuslee, and had ever since remained in their possession; but, on an enquiry instituted under the provisions of Regulation IX. of 1833, the maaffee tenure had been abolished. The land so resumed had, at the time of survey, been indicated by plaintiffs as their property, and they applied for the settlement to be made with them, which was done on the 26th July, 1837. Subsequently, the defendants, in collusion with the surveying Ameen, contrived to cut off 28 beegahs from his land, and to get it within their own boundary; and consequently, at the settlement, plaintiffs were allowed to engage for no more than 72 beegahs. For a long time this fraud of the defendants remained unknown to plaintiffs, and was only discovered when the former attempted to take possession of the 28 beegahs. The defendants, in reply, urged, that the land had been included in their village at the measurement of 1244 Fuslee, and that, consequently, the suit was barred by the law of limitation. They averred, that plaintiffs had indicated to the surveying Ameen no more land than they actually possessed, viz. 72 beegahs, of which, consequently, the settlement had been made with them. Their statement, as to the quantity of land being 101 beegahs, was altogether untrue. The extent of their original rent-free land was only 52 beegahs, to which, at the time of the measurement, they had fraudulently added on 21 beegahs, and caused this also to be included in the measurement. The Moonsiff passed a decree in favor of the plaintiffs (with exception of two who had withdrawn from the suit,) but attached to his order the condition, that, until the decreeholders and the two plaintiffs, who had withdrawn from the suit, should agree to a division of the land, made in such a manner as to form two distinct and compact parcels, the decree should not take effect. The Principal Sudder Ameen upheld the Moonsiff's order. A special appeal was admitted to try, 1st, whether the Principal Sudder Ameen was justified in assuming the dispossession of the plaintiffs from the date of the settlement made with the defendants; 2nd, whether the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen is not vitiated by the insertion of a condition, which opposes an obstacle to its execution. The Court are of opinion that the lower Courts are not in error in finding the dispossession of the plaintiffs from the date of the Settlement. It is true that the khusreh or survey paper, by which the disputed land was included in the defendant's village, was prepared more than twelve years before the institution of the suit, but the Court look upon that document as. merely preliminary to the Settlement. The act of recording, |