dent, but I am of opinion that the claim is not cognizable in the Civil Court. Construction 1301 refers only to decrees of the Civil Courts, a suit for the execution of a summary decree of the Collectorate will not, in my opinion, lie in the Civil Court." The action was brought to try the title of the defendant to a house, which had been released on her objection from an attachment made by the Revenue Authorities in execution of a decree obtained by the plaintiff in a summary suit, and is not therefore identical, as the Judge supposes, with a suit for the execution of a summary award; but the Court are of opinion that the claim is not cognizable, although the grounds for this conclusion are different from those assumed by the Judge. The cause of action is the impediment to the sale of the house offered by the defendant's objection, but the law has not vested the Revenue Authorities with the power of selling real property in execution of their summary awards other than that on which the arrear has accrued, the restriction on this point in Constructions 4 and 496 having heen extended to the Revenue Courts by Act VIII. of 1835. The attachment having been made in contravention of this rule, no valid cause of action is left in the suit. The appeal is dismissed. CASE No. 110 OF 1851. Judges, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of J. P. Gubbins, Esq., Judge of Dehlie, dated 26th August 1850. JYERAM, (Defendant), Appellant, versus KISHEN LALL, (Plaintiff), Respondent. THE case will be found in the decisions of the month. A special appeal was admitted to try, whether the Judge could proceed to dispose of the merits of the case without recording his decision on the plea of limitation. It appears that on the first hearing of the appeal, the Judge overlooked the plea of limitation, and remanded the case to the Moonsiff for an irregularity, and on the revival of the appeal considered himself precluded from entertaining the plea, being of opinion that the appellant should have either appealed the omission to this Court, or have applied for a review of judgment on the point. It has however been ruled in the decision of the 30th August 1848, No. 117, that a special appeal will not lie from an order of remand, and the same rule is applicable to an intermediate application for a review of judgment. The Judge was therefore fully competent to rectify the omission on the renewal of the appeal, and it is essentially necessary to the integrity of his decision that the defect should be supplied. The decision is annulled, and the case is remanded for that purpose. CASE No. 66 OF 1851. S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of C. Allen, Esq., Judge of Furruckabad, dated 21st December 1849, OOMED RAI, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus HEERA LALL, RAM PERSHAD AND HUNWUNT SINGH, (Defendants), Respondents. THE particulars of this case are in the decisions of the month. A special appeal was granted to try, whether, under the circumstances of the case, the Judge was right in rejecting the doctrine of the Moonsiff, that "heirs should pay their ancestor's debts before they alienated any ancestral property." It appears that the heirs, after succeeding to the property on the death of their father, pledged a portion of it in 1842 for a debt owing by them to the respondents Heera Lall and Ram Pershad, and in the following year disposed of the remainder by private sale to Hunwunt Singh. The mortgagees afterwards obtained a decree, and bringing the property to sale in execution, purchased it themselves; Hunwunt Singh also obtained a decree on a suit brought by him to establish his purchase. In the mean time, appellant sued the heirs, in 1843, for a bond debt of their father's, and obtaining a decree, brought the same property again to sale, and purchased it himself, but being unable to obtain possession has brought this action. The Court do not see any reason for interference in the Judge's decision. Collusion is not alleged, and it rested with the appellant to prosecute his claim against the heirs of his debtor in proper time. He failed to do so, and it would be too much to affirm, that the fact of a simple bond debt, unaccompanied by any pledge, is in itself sufficient to tie up the hands of the suc cessors to the debtor's property from its disposal for their own uses, and to invalidate its transfer, whether private or under decree of Court, until such debt were satisfied. The rule of Hindoo Law which renders heirs liable for ancestral debts, as regards the ancestral property that may have come into their possession, supposes a prompt prosecution of claims on the part of the creditors. The appeal is dismissed. Present: The 16th June, 1851. CASE No. 13 or 1851. A. W. BEGBIE, Judge, Special appeal from the decision of H. AMANUT ALI AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus LOOTF ALI AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Respondents. THE particulars of this case are given in the printed decisions of the month. The suit was brought for possession and division, and registry as sharers in one-eighth of a mouzah which had been assigned for the support of a shrine, with mesne profits, and for a proportionate share in the shrine offerings. The claim also included a house alleged to have been acquired in private property by plaintiffs' ancestor, and was preferred by them as members of the body of mootuwullees attached to the shrine. Defendants pleaded that the suit was not consistent with the object of the endowment, of which defendants claimed to be the sole mootuwullees, and they denied the rest of the claim. The Principal Sudder Ameen in his decision recognized the purpose and character of the endowment, and refused to admit the full claim which would have created a private right in it in favor of the plaintiffs. He accordingly limited his decree to a recognition of their right to partake for the future as mootuwullees in the net income and offerings of the shrine to the extent of a oneeighth share. The claim to the house was dismissed, and the mesne profits were disallowed. In appeal the portion of the decision now under special appeal in this case was upheld by the Judge. A special appeal was granted to try whether a claim to share in the profits of a village, or other property, the whole profits of which have been appropriated to religious purposes by the founder of the endowment, can be heard in the Civil Courts or not. The Court observe that the particular point which the certificate was granted to try has not been pleaded by the special appellants, whose objections to the suit were based on the incompetency of the plaintiffs to lay claim to, or of the Courts to decree, a share in a religious endowment. In this respect some incongruity may be remarked in the object of the suit, and the decrees of the lower Courts, the Principal Sudder Ameen having decreed something different from the object of the suit, and the Judge, on the appeal of the defendants, having overlooked this defect in the decree, and upheld it as a decree for the suit on the property, but apart from these defects, which the certificate does not touch, the Court do not find in the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen any thing alien to the purpose of the endowment, the management of such establishments being understood to consist in the appropriation of the receipts and offerings to the expenses of the religious service, and in the participation of the persons attached to the shrine in the surplus, according to their hereditary shares, which they would enjoy by virtue of their office as mootuwullees, and not as private persons. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Present: The 16th June, 1851. Case No. 12 of 1851. A. W. BEGBIE, Judge, Special appeal from the decision of H. AMANUT ALI AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus LOOTF ALI AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Respondents. THIS appeal is connected with the case No. 13, and is an appeal from the order of the Judge allowing mesne profits to plaintiffs, in reversal of this part of the decision of the lower Court. The claim to wasilát was a consequent to the claim to a share in the endowment property preferred by the plaintiffs in their suit, but the Principal Sudder Ameen having refused to recognize a private right in endowment property, the wasilát claim necessarily fell to the ground. The Judge in allowing wasilat in appeal passed an order inconsistent with the finding of the Principal Sudder Ameen, which his decision in other respects upheld, and the appeal is therefore decreed with reversal of the Judge's decision, and with costs. Present CASE No. 23 of 1851. Special appeal from the decision of C. C. Jackson, Esq., Officiating Judge of Meerut, dated 27th September 1850. KHYRATEE RAM AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus MUSSUMAT SEETOO AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Respondents. THE decision of the Judge is in the volume of decisions for the month. The suit was brought for the redemption of a mortgage. The defendants, amongst other pleas, objected that a balance of principal and interest still remained due to him in the mortgage transaction, besides other sums due on bonds, the liquidation of which was a condition of the mortgage contract. The Moonsiff finding that the amount deposited in Court fell short of the principal still due, exclusive of an item of Rs. 285 for interest, followed the rule of practice laid down for such cases in the precedents quoted by him, and dismissed the suit, adding, that under these circumstances, it would not be necessary to enter upon the other items. On appeal from the plaintiff's, the Judge permitted them to pay into Court the balance of the principal, and without adverting to the unsatisfied item of interest, decreed the suit. It was further declared that the mortgagee was not responsible for other debts asserted to have occurred subsequently. A special appeal was admitted to try the correctness of the Moonsiff's and Judge's finding on the points of, 1st, whether the Moonsiff had acted in conformity with law in omitting to decide the pleas of the defendants in regard to the ikrarnamah and bonds, which it is urged should be liquidated before the release of the estate; and 2nd, whether the Judge has acted according to law and precedent in receiving the balance of Rs. 25, and declaring the estate liable to redemption. The course to be pursued by the Courts in a suit for redemption, when a balance is found to be still due, has been laid down in many precedents, of which it will be sufficient to cite the latest, 30th May 1850, No. 156, and it consists in dismissing the suit at once on prima facie evidence being found to the fact of the mortgagers not being in a position to sue in consequence of such balance. This course was properly taken by the Moon |