that Hindoo Singh has destroyed all trace of the ancient houndary, and on which the order passed was, that Choha should sue for possession. In fine, the Court are of opinion that suits tenable under Section 3, Regulation II. of 1805 must of necessity be rare, regard being had to the facility of redress which our system affords, and that the present is not one of those rare cases. The Court accordingly reverse the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen, and dismiss the claim of the plaintiffs. CASE No. 16 of 1851. { S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of C. C. Jackson, Esq., Officiating Judge of Meerut, dated 7th September 1850. GUNESH RAI AND MUNOHUR LALL, (Plaintiffs), Appellants, versus GIRDHAREE LALL AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Respondents. THE printed decisions for September 1850 contain the particulars of this case. A special appeal was granted to try, whether the Judge should not have nonsuited the plaintiffs, instead of dismissing their claim. In the opinion of the Court, the decision of the Judge is incorrect, with reference to the point raised by the certificate. The Sudder Ameen dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs, and the Judge in appeal confirmed the Sudder Ameen's order. The Judge remarks, "I consider the claim made in no way supported by the evidence produced, and a debt arising out of joint transactions in Shamlee, zillah Saharunpore, cannot be made the subject of a suit in this zillah, by one of the party concerned having subscribed his name to an entry in the books of a party at Meerut, even were that fact duly established in evidence, which is not the case." In other words, the fact pleaded has not been found, and even had it been found, it would not have rendered cognizable at Meerut a claim arising "out of joint transactions in Shamlee on the Judge's own shewing, therefore, he had no jurisdiction, and as the penalty which attaches to the institution of a suit in a zillah other than that in which it is legally cogni zable, is nonsuit, not absolute dismission, the decree is faulty; and the Court have to observe further that when an order for nonsuit is necessitated by the circumstances of a case, all comment on the merits of the claim should be forborne. The Court annul the decision passed by the Judge, and nonsuit the plaintiffs. CASE No. 17 OF 1851. S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of C. C. RAM BUKSH, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus GUNGA PERSHAD, (Defendant), Respondent. THE Volume of the printed decisions for August 1850 give the particulars of this case. A special appeal was granted to try, whether the Judge was warranted in setting aside the decision of the arbitrators in this case, in the absence of any proof that the award was given through partiality or corruption. The Court are unanimous in thinking that the Judge's decision must be reversed. The suit was brought to redeem a mortgage, and while it was under trial in the Court of the Moonsiff, the parties consented to decide it by arbitration. A majority of the arbitrators gave an award in favor of the plaintiff, and the Moonsiff passed a decree in conformity to their finding. The defendant having appealed to the Judge, the latter remarks thus. "The cause of action in this suit arose forty years ago, and the claim is on a mortgage, for which the plaintiff can produce no documentary evidence; and it is positively denied by the defendant. The pleadings were consequently at issue on that point, and until sufficient proof was established of the fact of the mortgage, the Court could not, under Clause 4, Section 3, Regulation II. of 1805, entertain the suit. The Moonsiff, consequently, refrained from enquiring into the merits of the case, though he quotes that Regulation as authority for retaining it on his file. In my opinion, proof of mortgage should have been obtained to enable him to do so; but then, not being authorized to investigate it, he refers it to the decision of arbitrators, agreed to by the parties, a majority of whom decide in favor of plaintiff, without giving any reasons for their decision, and the defendant protests against it as obtained by corrupt means; but it is confirmed by the decision of the Moonsiff, in which I do not concur, because the suit could not be legally entertained by the Moonsiff until the mortgage, and subsequent forcible or fraudulent occupation, had been satisfactorily established by evidence, which not being produced, the case should have been dismissed. I decide in favor of appellant, with costs." The Court do not find in Clause 4, Section 3, Regulation II. of 1805, the meaning which the Judge has put upon it. The words of that law are, " provided further, that no length of time shall be considered to establish a prescriptive right of property, or to bar the cognizance of a suit for the recovery of property, in cases of mortgage, or deposit, wherein the occupant of the land or other property may have acquired or held possession thereof as mortgagee or depository only, without any proprietary right; nor in any other case whatever wherein the possession of the actual occupant or of those from whom his occupancy may have been derived, shall not have been under a title bona fide believed to have conveyed a right of property to the possessor." By the Moonsiff's citation of the above, the Court understand him simply to rule that as efflux of time does not operate in bar of the right to redeem a mortgage, the present action is not vitiated because not laid within the period fixed for the institution of suits of other descriptions. And the award is not invalid, as the Judge holds, because the arbitrators did not assign reasons, and because the defendant protests against the award: in cases in which the award is not sufficiently specific, the matter may indeed be referred back to the arbitrators; and the award may be set aside altogether, not, however, on the mere protestation of the losing party, but on proof to the satisfaction of the Court* that the arbitrators have been guilty of gross corruption or partiality. On no other ground is a Court competent to set The Court, for the reasons above stated, annul the decision of the Judge, and pass a decree in favor of the plaintiff. Present: CASE NO. 20 OF 1851. Special appeal from the decision of W. P. Masson, Esq., Officiating Judge of Goruckpore, dated 18th September 1850. RAJAH OODENARAIN MULL, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus JANKEE NATH, tewarree, (Defendant), Respondent. THE printed decisions for September last, give the history of this case. A special appeal was allowed to try, whether it was competent to the Judge to entertain an appeal on the part of Jankee Nath, who had not been made a defendant in the Court of first instance; also, whether the Judge should have dismissed the claim of the plaintiff on the ground of the minority of the defendant LokeNath. The Court hold that the decision of the Judge cannot, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, be interfered with. It is quite true, that in ordinary cases no one may appeal from a decision in a suit to which he was not a party. But the present is a special case. The appellant, when the suit was under trial by the Moonsiff, objected that the defendant was a minor and under his guardianship. The Moonsiff, believing from the evidence placed before him, that the defendant was of full age, overruled the objection on the point of minority, and gave the plaintiff a decree against the defendant; the appellant re-asserted his objection before the Judge, and it is evident that there was no way of bringing to the test the validity of so vital an objection, but by allowing the appellant to intervene. For, both in the Moonsiff's Court and in that of the Judge, the defendant declared himself to be of full age, and even had he adopted an opposite course, and had carried up to the Judge an appeal from the Moonsiff's decision on the ground of minority, his appeal would, as a matter of course, have been thrown out, as one which the Court could not entertain unless performed by his guardian in his behalf; or in other words, the appellant, Jankee Nath, tewarree, would, in the case supposed, have received a suggestion from the Court to do that which he has now done of his own accord. is not enough that the defendant persists in the averment of his majority; the point is one which it is essential to try, for otherwise the interest of a minor would be at the mercy of any one It who might succeed in practising on his weakness and inexperience. The propriety of admitting interveners "for some just reason," has, the Court remark, been expressly recognized by MacPherson in his Treatise on the procedure of the * Page 428. Civil Courts, and without any doubt, the obligation of a guardian to protect the interests of his ward constitutes a just reason for the guardian's interference. The Court therefore dismiss the appeal. CASE No. 21 OF 1851. S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. (Special appeal from the decision of W. P. Masson, Esq., Officiating Judge of Goruckpore, dated 18th September 1850. RAJAH OODENARAIN MULL, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus JANKEE NATH, tewarree, (Defendant), Respondent. THIS case is precisely similar to case No. 20 decided this day. For the same reasons, the Court dismiss the appeal. CASE NO. 48 or 1850. Judges, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Regular Appeal from the decision of SHEOODUHUN SINGH AND DOORGA PERSHAD SINGH, (in formá pauperis), (Plaintiffs), Appellants, versus SHEO PERSHAD AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Respondents. THIS was a suit to set aside the auction sale of mouzahs Choorasec, &c., and to recover wasilât, the total claim being estimated at Rs. 7,113-6: plaintiffs' case is thus stated. The mouzah in |