Present: CASE NO. 34 or 1850. The 26th May, 1851. A. W. BEGBIE,} H. W. DEANE, Judges, Special appeal from the decision of Mr. J. Mercer, Principal Sudder Ameen of Furruckabad, dated 23rd September 1850. RAJAH JUGGUT SINGH, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus ISHREE, (Defendant), Respondent. In this case, the plaintiff sued for enhancement of rent, and obtained a decree, though with some abatement of his claim, in the Court of the Moonsiff. The Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed the suit, and, eventually, it was remanded by the Sudder Court, in special appeal, to the Principal Sudder Ameen's file. The suit has been dismissed a second time, and a special appeal has been admitted "to try whether the decision of the Principal "Sudder Ameen, rejecting the claim of the plaintiff to levy "enhanced rent, is not founded on a wrong principle." The Court are of opinion that, under the above certificate, the judgment of the Principal Sudder Ameen cannot be allowed to stand. The Moonsiff would appear to have gone fully into the case, and to have fixed the rates of rent payable by the defendant on recognized principles, and in conformity to facts duly ascertained. The Principal Sudder Ameen, while reversing the Moonsiff's decision, has done little more than consult the existing jummabundee of Settlement, and, being of opinion that the rates therein laid down are equitable, he has passed a decree accordingly; and he has fallen into the additional error of declaring that the rates are not alterable during the currency of the Settlement. The Principal Sudder Ameen is unmindful of the fact, that it is to establish a right to levy an enhanced rent on the existing jummabundee that this action is laid; and that the cognizance of this matter does not terminate with the enquiry instituted by the Collector at the Settlement, but is at all times vested in the Courts of law. Section 9, Regulation XXX. of 1803 declares, "if a dispute shall arise between the ryots or other under-tenants, and the persons from whom they may be entitled to demand pottahs, regarding the rate of the pottahs (whether the rent be payable in money or kind), it shall be determined in the Court of Adawlut of the Zillah in which the lands may be situated, according to the rates established in the pergunnah for lands of the same description and quality as those respecting which the dispute may arise, or according to the legal and established rights of the parties, whether the same be ascertainable by written engagements or defined by the laws and regulations, or defined on general and local usage, which may be proved to have existed from time immemorial, this Regulation, not being meant to define or limit the actual right of any description of landholders or tenants, which can be properly ascertained and determined by judicial investigation;" and, further, Section 9, Clause 1, Regulation VII. of 1822, is as follows, "it being understood, and declared, that all decisions on the demands of the zemindars shall hereafter be regulated by the rates of rent and modes of payment avowed and ascertained at the Settlement, and recorded in the Collector's proceedings, until distinctly altered by mutual agreement or after full investigation in a regular suit." It was not open to the Principal Sudder Ameen to dispense with the "full investigation," above prescribed, and it was incumbent on him to show, before reversing the decree of the inferior Court, that the conclusion at which the Moonsiff had come, and on the strength of which he, to a certain extent, recognized the plaintiff's claim, cannot be borne out, that the facts are other than the Moonsiff has found them, or the arguments by which he supports his judgment fallacious. The Court are constrained to remand the suit a second time to the Principal Sudder Ameen, in order, that he decide it anew with reference to the above remarks. Present: CASE No. 65 or 1851. The 26th May, 1851. A. W. BEGBIE, Judges, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of C. Allen, Esq. Judge of Furruckabad, dated 18th December 1849. BOODHEEA, (Plaintiff), Appellant, versus BHOWANNEE PERSHAD AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Respondents. THE particulars of this case will be found at pages 152 and 153 of the printed decisions for Furruckabad for the year 1849. A special appeal was admitted to try, "whether the Collector was competent, under the circumstances of the case, as stated by the Principal Sudder Ameen and Judge, to remit the balance of rent claimed by the plaintiff." The present appellant is the son of the original plaintiff Boodh Seya, by whom his title, to the amount sued for, has been made over to the appellant. The Court are unanimously of opinion that this appeal must be rejected under the circumstances of the case, as set forth by the Principal Sudder Ameen and Judge: the Collector must be regarded as the representative of the proprietor of the estate, with full powers to act in such manner as might appear to him beneficial to the interests so entrusted to him. The proprietors appear to have been quite willing that the estate should be placed under the Collector's management, and it is unreasonable, as well as unjust, in any of them now to come forward and repudiate the Collector's acts. If the Collector was competent to grant a farming lease, he was also competent to remit such portion of the rent as appeared to him to be called for. The appeal is dismissed, with costs. Case No. 132 of 1850. S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of Moulvee Mohumed Abdool Azeez Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of Goruckpore, dated 30th October 1849. PRAG SINGH AND OTHERS, (Defendants), Appellants, versus NONIDH SINGH AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Respondents. THIS was a suit to obtain possession, as birteeahs, of a 5-anna 4-pie share of mouzahs Ugyawun Khutan and Dondopore. The Moonsiff of Deorya gave a decree in favor of the plaintiffs' claim, which was upheld in appeal by the Principal Sudder Ameen. A special appeal was admitted to try, "whether the plaintiffs ought not to have been nonsuited by the Principal Sudder Ameen, on the plea urged by the appellants in his Court, viz. that the causes of action regarding each of the three villages were distinct, and that, consequently, the claims to all ought not to have been included in one suit. "Secondly, to determine, whether the plaintiffs, having neglect. ed to prefer their claim to the Settlement Officer, when they had the opportunity of doing so, are entitled to institute a suit under the provisions of Section 23, Regulation VII. of 1822, to set aside the decision of the Revenue Authorities." The Court are of opinion that the objection stated in the first point of the certificate of special appeal is fatal. It is quite clear that the birt sunnuds, upon which the plaintiffs base their claim to the shares in the respective villages, are two distinct documents, quite unconnected with each other, that for the share in mouzah Ugyawun, purporting to have been granted in 1206 Fuslee, and that for the shares in mouzahs Kutha and Daudupore, being dated in 1207 Fuslee. The Court cannot acquiesce in the validity of the plea urged by the respondents, that because their claims to engage were disallowed in one and the same date, they were, therefore, entitled to contest those decisions in a single suit. It appears that the Settlement Officer held separate proceedings in each of the three cases, and even allowing that a single suit in regard to mouzahs Kutha and Daudupore might not be irregular, in consequence of the birt putr for those two villages being one and the same, this concession cannot possibly be made in favor of the claim in mouzah Ugyawun, the birt putr for which is an entirely distinct document. The * Ali Buksh, appellant, versus Oomeida Begum, respondent, 11th June 1850. S. D. A., R. N. W. P. precedent* cited by the respondents vakeel in support of his view is not applicable to the present case: the circumstances being quite different. The irregularity, in thus uniting in one suit two claims having no connection with each other, is so serious, that the Court are of opinion, that although the objection was not urged by the defendants in the Court of first instance, it was not the less necessary for the Principal Sudder Ameen to notice it, when urged in the petition of regular appeal. On the grounds above stated, the Court feel themselves compelled to nonsuit the plaintiffs; and it is therefore unnecessary to record any opinion on the second point in the certificate. Present: The 26th May, 1851. CASE No. 208 of 1850. A. W. BEGBIE, Judges, S. S. BROWN, Offg. Judge. Special appeal from the decision of Tussuddoog Hoossein Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of Azimgurh, dated 15th May 1850. BABOO JYENATH SINGH AND OTHERS, (Plaintiffs), Appellants, versus RAMJEEAWUN SINGH, (Defendant), Respondent. THIS was a suit to recover Rs. 972-10, principal and interest, of a bond. Two other persons, besides the present appellant, were impleaded by the plaintiff, viz. Bhowannee Buksh Rai and Oodut Rai. The Sudder Ameen passed a decree in favor of the plaintiff against all the defendants, of whom Ramjeeawun alone appealed. The Principal Sudder Ameen, holding the bond not to be proved, reversed the Sudder Ameen's decision, and dismissed the claim as respected all three defendants. A special appeal was admitted to try "whether, under the circumstances of the case, the Principal Sudder Ameen was justified in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, as respects the defendants Bhowannee Buksh Rai, and Oodut Rai who did not defend the suit in the Sudder Ameen's Court, or prefer any appeal from that Officer's decision." Previously to the Court's entering on the adjudication of the point specified in the certificate of special appeal, an objection was raised by the vakeel of the respondent to the proceedings of the appellant, which, he argued, were irregular, in that he had not made the two other defendants, Bhowannee Buksh Rai and Oodut Rai, (in regard to whom he sought an amendment of the Principal Sudder Ameen's decree), respondents. The Court admit the validity of the respondent's objection, which they regard as fatal to the appeal, and a bar to any adjudication of the question, to try which the certificate of special appeal was granted. It is absolutely necessary, for the ends of justice, that the parties, whose interests are liable to be injuriously affected by the result of an appeal, should be made respondents in the Appellate Court. As a decree in an original suit may not be passed against a party not made a defendant, so a decree in appeal is barred against parties who have not been |