is no proof, that he either possessed or exercised any such power; and, unless this be proved, the text from Job remains in full force.

I am inclined however to think, that, instead of this point being capable of proof, we may easily shew, so far as we can judge from actions, that the Abrahamic patriarchs neither possessed nor exercised any judicial power of inflicting legal punishment on those members of their vast households who might be guilty of idolatry. That they were commissioned to punish the neglect of circumcision by death, is carefully recorded' but, while no hint is given that a similar power was delegated to them in the case of idolatry, their conduct, when that sin was discovered among them, distinctly proves that they did not exercise it. What for instance, if I may so speak, was the legal practice of Jacob under such circumstances? After he had re

turned with his family from Mesopotamia into Palestine, and when he was directed to build an altar to God at Beth-El and to dwell there, we find him saying to his household and to all that were with him; Put away the strange gods that are among you, and be clean, and change your garments. The command was speedily obeyed: for we read, that they gave unto Jacob all the strange gods which were in their hand and all their ear-rings which were in their ears; and Jacob hid

Gen. xvii. 14.

2 Gen. xxxv. 1, 2.

them under the oak which was by Shechem'. In this narrative we may behold the conduct of a pious master of a family, correcting an abuse among his dependents, and giving orders that it should be forthwith removed: but we shall vainly seek for any higher exertion of authority. Of whatever precise nature the idolatry might be, Jacob evidently speaks, not as a magistrate, but as the master of a family. Not the least hint is given, that he took any legal cognizance of the offence, or that he treated it as an iniquity to be punished by the judge, he himself acting as a magistrate in the case. We read not of any penalty, which these idolaters incurred: we hear nothing of any judicial sentence passed upon them. They are simply required to give up their strange gods and to abstain from all future idolatry: but no punishment awaits them for their past offence. Their case is left in the hands of God: for Jacob plainly acts, as if he felt himself possessed of no legal authority to punish them, in his character of a patriarchal judge, for the sin which they had committed.· Thus we have as distinct a proof as can well be desired, that, in the days of Jacob and consequently in the days of Esau, there was no law in existence, under which idolatry was determined to be an iniquity punishable by the judge; that is to say, an iniquity which he was bound to

Gen. xxxv. 4.

coërce by pains and penalties, just as he would coërce robbery or murder. But, if no such law existed in the family of Jacob who was chosen to be the progenitor of God's peculiar people, it is perfectly gratuitous and improbable to suppose, that Esau should be the first to enact it for the government of Idumèa.

In fact, if we recollect the principles on which the Mosaical law against idolatry was founded, we shall clearly perceive that it could only have been enacted under a Theocracy. As God was king in Israel, idolatry was high-treason: and on that account it was to be punished in this world by the civil magistrate. The offence, under this its true aspect of a civil crime, was necessarily peculiar to the Levitical polity. Under no other form of government could the crime be so committed, as to warrant the interference of the judge. Hence, under the code of Moses, idolatry was to be punished with death: but, under the Christian Dispensation, though the sin is no less strictly forbidden, yet it is viewed as a matter between God and a man's own conscience; being no longer high-treason, it is not made cognizable by the civil magistrate. Now the polity of Idumèa was not a Theocracy. Therefore it could not have made idolatry punishable by the judge'.

1 It may be said, that, if in Christian countries men have often been punished for their religious opinions by the civil magistrate, men may likewise have been punished for idolatry by the civil magistrate of primitive Idumèa: for Christian

The argument then will at length stand as follows. Job is represented by the author of the book which relates his trials, as speaking of a law under which idolatry might be punished by the civil magistrate. But no such law was in existence, until it was delivered to Moses from mount Sinai. Therefore the author of the book must have flourished subsequent to the delivering of that law. But, if he flourished subsequent to the delivering of it, he could not have been Job himself; because Job flourished at an earlier period'.

As the passage now under consideration thus distinctly proves, that Job himself could not have been the author of the book: so it will likewise prove, agreeably to what seems to have been God's plan in communicating his written word to mankind, that no one but an Israelite could have

governments are no more theocratic than that of Idumèa was. To this I reply, that there is a material difference between the two cases. Christian governments have been led into persecution from misapprehending the principle of the Levitical statute against idolatry. But the early Idumèans could have been liable to no such misapprehension, because the Levitical statute was not then in existence.

1

According to the Hebrew text, Job died seventeen years before the delivering of the Law from mount Sinai: and, though, according to the Greek, he did not die until thirteen years after it; we can scarcely deem it probable, if he were the author of the book, that he did not write it until he were on the point of dropping into the grave. We have no sufficient reason however to suppose, that exodus.

Job survived the

been its author. The law, respecting the punishment of idolatry by the civil magistrate, was strictly and exclusively a Levitical enactment. While an Israelite therefore, in writing the history of a foreigner, might easily and naturally be led to mention a law, which to himself was perfectly familiar though unknown in the country where the scene of action was laid it is clear, that no foreigner, in writing the history of one of his own countrymen, could ever introduce his hero, as familiarly recognizing the existence of a law and as speaking of its ordinary operation, when all the while no such law was to be found in his native code, but was quite peculiar to the code of another nation. Thus an English poet, in versifying a Spanish story, might inadvertently speak of a trial by jury: but no Spanish poet, in versifying one of his national tales, could ever allude to that institution as existing in Spain. Hence the important passage before us, not only disproves the claim of Job to be the author of the book which bears his name, but likewise proves that its real author must have been an Israelite.

3. The only point then, which now remains to be determined, is, to what Israelite the book ought to be ascribed?

Now we have already seen, from the passage which has recently been considered, that the book cannot have been written previous to the delivery of the Law from mount Sinai: and, not