King, or of any other person, that he laboured under mental derangement. At the trial, the libel was proved in the usual manner, and it was admitted by the counsel for the defendants, that the libel imputed that the King laboured under insanity, and that the assertion was untrue; but it was urged to the jury, that the defendants believed the fact to be true, and that they were warranted in so doing by rumours which had been prevalent on the subject. The Lord Chief Justice, in his address to the jury, after stating the import of the publication, proceeded as follows:-"To assert falsely of his Majesty, or of any other person, that he labours under the affliction of mental derangement, is a criminal act. It is an offence of a more aggravated nature to make such an assertion concerning his Majesty, than concerning a subject, by reason of the greater mischief that may thence arise. It is distinctly admitted by the counsel for the defendants, that the statement in the libel was false in fact, although they assert that rumours to the same effect had been previously circulated in other newspapers. Here the writer of this article does not seem to found himself upon existing rumours, but purports to speak from authority; and inasmuch as it is now admitted that the fact did not exist, there could be no authority for the statement. In my opinion, the publication is a libel calculated to vilify and scandalize his Majesty, and to bring him into contempt among his subjects. But you have a right to exercise your own judgment upon the publication, and I invite you to do so." The jury found the defendants guilty. A person who publishes that which is calumnious concerning the character of another, must be presumed to have intended to do that which the publication is necessarily and obviously calculated to effect, unless he can shew the contrary; and the onus of proving it lies upon him (a).

By the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, twenty years is the time. of limitation in any writ of formedon; and consequently,

(a) Rex v. Harvey and Chapman, Ryl. 464; and see Rex v. Sir F. 2 B. & C. 257; S. C. 3 Dowl. & Burdett, 4 Barn. & Ald. 95.

twenty years is also the limitation in every action of ejectment, for no ejectment can be brought unless the lessor of the plaintiff is entitled to enter on the lands; and by that statute no entry can be made, unless within twenty years after the right shall accrue. If a right of entry accrues to

"if

a person whilst non compos mentis, and he afterwards dies under disability, his heir may, notwithstanding, enter (b); for the right of a non compos is not prejudiced by the laches of himself or those acting on his behalf. It is provided by the second section of the above act, any person or persons that shall be entitled to any such writ or writs, or that shall have such right or title of entry, shall be, at the time of the said right or title first descended, accrued, come, or fallen, within the age of one-and-twenty years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, that then such person and persons, and his and their heirs, shall or may, notwithstanding the said twenty years be expired, bring his action or make his entry as he might have done before this act; so as such person and persons, or his or their heir or heirs, shall, within ten years next after his and their full age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this realm, or death, take benefit of and sue forth the same, and at no time after the said ten years."

This

The ten years do not run at all while there is a continuance of disabilities, but they run without intermission from the time that the disabilities first cease (c). proviso of the statute has been construed to mean that the heir of every person, to whom a right of entry has accrued during any of the disabilities there stated, shall have ten years from the death of his ancestor to whom the right first accrued during the period of disability, and who died under such disability (d). And such clause extends only to the persons on whom the right first descended; and, when the statute has once begun to run, no subsequent disability

(b) Litt. s. 405; 4 Rep. 125; Gilb. Ten. 53, Watk. ed.; Burcher's case, Hob. 137.

(c) Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Taunt. 825.

(d) Doe v. Jesson, 6 East, 80.

will prevent its operation (e). And there is no distinction in that respect between the heir of one seised in fee, and the heir of a donee in tail (f).

By the third section of the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, all actions of trespass quare clausum fregit or otherwise, detinue, trover, account, and case, (except upon accounts between merchants), debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent, are limited to six years after the cause of action accrued; and actions of assault, menace, battery, mayhem, and imprisonment, must be brought within four years, and actions for words within two years, after the injury com

any

mitted. And, by the seventh section of that act, it is provided, "that if any person or persons that shall be entitled to any such action of trespass, detinue, action sur trover, replevin, actions of account, actions of debt, actions of trespass for assault, menace, battery, wounding, or imprisonment, actions upon the case for words, shall be, at the time of such cause of action given or accrued, fallen or come within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond seas, that then such person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so as they take the same within such times as are before limited, after their coming to or being of full age, of sane memory, at large, and returned from beyond the seas, as other persons having no such impediment should be done."

If a person abroad, of non-sane memory, comes into this kingdom and then goes abroad again, his non-sane memory continuing, his privilege as to being out of the kingdom is gone, but that as to non-sane memory will begin to run from the time he shall return to his senses (ƒ).

When the plaintiff would excuse himself for not commencing his action in time, by reason of his being under either of the disabilities mentioned in the statute, such disability must be specially stated in the replication; and it must be added, that the action was commenced within six years after the removal of it; and if the disability be traversed, the plaintiff must prove the existence and continuance of it (g). But the existence of any of the above disabilities does not prevent the right of suing during their continuance (h).

By statute 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 17, all suits and actions in the Court of Admiralty for seamen's wages, must be commenced within six years after the cause of suit or action arose. By the 18th section of this act, it is provided, if any persons, who shall be entitled to any such suit or action, shall be, at the time of any such cause of suit or action, non compos mentis, that then such persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, within six years after being of sane memory.

(ƒ) 2 Atk. 614.

(g) Peake on Evidence, p. 275; 13 East, 439. (h) Chandler v. Vilett, 2 Saund. R. 121 a, n. 5.

The general rule of law is, that all sales in open market shall be good, not only between the parties, but as to all other persons. Sales in market overt, by a stranger, will bind an infant, or feme covert, having interest in the goods, either in their own right, or as executors or administrators; and it will also bind idiots, persons insane, beyond the sea, or in prison (i).

SECTION II.

Of Proceedings at Law against Lunatics.

ALTHOUGH a non compos is not liable to the ordinary punishment for crimes (j), yet, if he commit a trespass against the persons or property of others, or do them bodily injury, he is compellable to make satisfaction in damages, to be recovered by a civil action; for, in such cases, the intention is immaterial, if the act done be prejudicial (k).

The Courts of common law will not discharge a defendant who has been arrested out of custody on filing common bail, on the ground that he was insane at the time of the arrest (1), or afterwards became so (m); nor will they discharge his bail, on the ground of the insanity of their principal, although a commission of lunacy may have issued against him, under which he has been found a lunatic (»). The Court also refused to enlarge the time for the bail to render their principal, on an affidavit, that he was a lunatic,

(i) 2 Inst. 713; and see Long on Sales of Personal Property, p. 103. (j) See post, Chap. xii. sect. 1. (k) See 2 East, Rep. 104; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Bac. Abr. tit. Idiots and Lun. (E); 2 Roll's Abr. 547, pl. 4; Bacon's Elements of the Laws of England, p. 31; 1 Hale's P. C. 16.

(1) Nutt v. Verney and Others, 4 Term Rep. 121.

(m) Kernot and Another v. Norman, 2 Term Rep. 390.

(n) Ibbotson v. Lord Galway, 6 Term Rep. 133; Steel v. Alan, 2 Bos. & Pull. 362. See ante, pp. 356, 357.