petition must be presented within three months after the return of the inquisition.

An idiot may traverse the inquisition, but must appear in person at the trial to be inspected (b); for idiocy, it is said, may be discerned (c).

A woman having been found an idiot by inquisition, prayed by herself and counsel, that she might have leave to traverse the inquisition; and, after her examination, an order was made accordingly, upon condition that she would appear in person at the trial at the next assizes, or whenever it was brought on (d).

An idiot is never permitted to traverse by attorney. Thus, where application was made on behalf of an idiot to traverse by attorney, Lord Hardwicke desired precedents of such a liberty to be produced; but as no precedent could be found of an idiot having traversed by attorney, although several where lunatics had, his Lordship directed the idiot to appear in person, and, having done so, leave was given to traverse (e).

A lunatic, or person of unsound mind, may traverse the inquisition, either in person, or, with the Lord Chancellor's permission, by attorney (f); he may, however, be required to appear in Court in person, for the purpose of being examined (g).

The private examination for the purpose of the traverse is merely to satisfy the Lord Chancellor, that it is the wish of the party to exercise such right, which, it is said, cannot be refused (h). Where the party found to be a lunatic had appeared before the Lord Chancellor, and claimed by petition the right to traverse, an order was made that he should be at liberty to do so (i). And where the lunatic was confined in prison for debt, and a petition to traverse the inquisition had been presented, the Lord Chancellor ordered an habeas corpus, returnable immedi

ately, to issue to the Marshal of the King's Bench, to bring the lunatic before the Chancellor at the sitting of the Court two days afterwards (k).

Where a party had been found a lunatic under two inquisitions, the Court refused to allow him to traverse the second; but such inquisitions, not being conclusive, may be again questioned in actions at law or by suits in equity (7).

The heir of a non compos cannot traverse the inquisition after his death, for the party on every traverse may be required to appear in person. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke observed, "a trial by inspection is the proper trial by the Lord Chancellor as to the person, when there has been a solemn trial in the lifetime of the lunatic, who is bound, himself, to say, that after his death, when he cannot appear in person, and cannot be inspected by the jury, it should still be open to a traverse by the heir-at-law, carries a great absurdity with it, particularly in the case of idiocy, where the Crown grants the custody and profits of his estate during his life" (m). But the inquisition of a coroner finding a party felo de se may be traversed by his administrator, on the ground that the party was of non-sane memory, and that the coroner had refused to receive evidence of such fact (n).

The Lord Chancellor will sometimes discharge a commission and inquisition without putting the party to the expense and trouble of a traverse or monstrans de droit, provided, on inspection and examination, he be fully convinced of the soundness of his understanding. And the party may apply either personally to the Chancellor to be inspected, or his friends may sue out a writ, returnable in Chancery, for that purpose (o).

(k) In re Sir G. O. P. Turner, 15 April, 1824.

(0) 9 Rep. 31 a; Bac. Abr. tit. Idiots and Lunatics, (B); Vin. Abr. (1) 3 Atk. 184. See ante, p. 63; tit. Lunatics, (E.2.); F. N. B. 233, post, Chapters ix., x.

(m) In re Roberts, 3 Atk. 312. (n) Ripley v. Oldfield, Sir T. Jones, 198; S. C. 2 Show. 199; Skinn. 45.

ed. 1794; Staundf. de Pr. Reg. 36; Wingate's Maxims, 123; In re Heli, 3 Atk. 7, 635; 3 Bl. Comm. 332. See ante, p. 81, and post, Ch. v. s. 11.

In a case, where it appeared that a party who had been found an idiot was not so, all former proceedings were discharged (p).

But a motion, that a person who had been found a lunatic, and since recovered his understanding, might be inspected, and make a settlement of his estate, was refused; and it was directed that such settlement should be made by fine, in order that the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas might examine the party (q).

The Crown cannot traverse an inquisition, but a melius inquirendum may be granted on behalf of the Crown; and if, upon the melius inquirendum, it be found for the Crown, the party may traverse the inquest (r).

The alienee of a lunatic, or other person having a title to, or interest in, his land, may traverse an inquisition as well as the lunatic himself (s); and, if both the lunatic and the alienee traverse, and the former is found a lunatic at the time of the alienation, the alienee is bound (t). But a traverse taken by a non compos will not bind a purchaser, unless he is a party to, or consents to be bound by, such proceeding (u).

Leave to traverse is sometimes granted upon terms, such as upon condition that some third person, who claims under conveyances from the party, will agree to be bound by the event of the traverse (x). And a party submitting to be bound by a traverse, and afterwards refusing to be bound by it, is guilty of a contempt of Court (y).

A

person who has entered into a contract with a non compos for the purchase of any portion of his property, is such an equitable alienee and owner thereof as will give him a right to traverse the inquisition.

The petitioner, as having an interest in respect of a con

(p) Darwin's case, Ley. 25. (q) Anon. 1 Vern. 155.

(r) 8 Rep. 168 b; In re Roberts, 3 Atk. 6; and see Knight v. Duples

sis, 2 Ves. sen. 555; 4 Madd. 313.

(s) 15 Vin. Abr. tit. "Lunatic," (L); Skinn. 178.

(t) In re Roberts, 3 Atk. 312. (u) Ex parte Roberts, 3 Atk. 7. (x) See Bull. N. P. 212; 3 Atk. 184.

(y) Ex parte Roberts, 3 Atk. 308; 4 Bro. C. C. 238, n.

tract with the lunatic for the purchase of two advowsons, impeached the execution of the commission, and prayed that the inquisition might be quashed, or that the petitioner might be at liberty to traverse. Lord Chancellor Eldon decided, that a person who had become the bona fide owner in equity of two advowsons under a contract, was a party aggrieved by the finding of the jury, and had a right to traverse, and granted leave for that purpose to the petitioner; the issue being, whether the party was a lunatic at the time of the inquisition, and at the period to which the lunacy was carried back and since (~). And a person who had entered into a contract with another person, who was afterwards found a lunatic from a period antecedent to the date of the contract, was allowed to traverse the inquisition (a). And in one case, the passing of a decree against a defendant in a suit in Chancery was stayed for the purpose of giving liberty to the defendant to traverse an inquisition (b). Sir William Grant, however, is reported to have expressed a doubt in a case where the alienation was overreached by an inquisition finding the party a lunatic with lucid intervals, whether the alienee, relying on the fact that the contract was executed during a lucid interval, could establish that fact by a traverse; an issue in such a case being the proper and effectual remedy (c).

In a case where a lady, who was entitled to a very considerable fortune, and had just attained the age of twenty-one years, but who was represented to be of very weak and infirm mind, had been carried off to Flanders, and there married by a gentleman; and the lady was afterwards found a lunatic under a commission taken out by her mother, Lord Chancellor Thurlow would not allow the husband liberty to traverse the inquisition, thinking that the way in which he had obtained the lady precluded him from being entitled to any assistance from the Court; and that the lady was in the most proper hands under the care of her mother, whose duty it was to discuss the marriage most seriously, and to see

(z) Ex parte Hall, 7 Ves. 260.
(a) Ex parte Morley, 9 Ves. 478.
(b) Attorney-General v. Park

hurst and Others, 1 Ch. Cas. 112.

(c) Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; and see Ex parte Ferne, 5 Ves. 832.

whether she could not, in that manner, get rid of the gentleman's pretensions (d).

In a case, where a petition praying leave to traverse an inquisition of lunacy was presented by an entire stranger, without any interest, and an objection was taken upon that ground, and because no reason appeared for impeaching the inquisition; Lord Chancellor Eldon said, "this petitioner does not qualify himself by any interest; and he did not recollect any instance, in which the Court had permitted a mere stranger to traverse the inquisition. His Lordship would not say, without further consideration, when it might be necessary to decide the point, whether the Court would permit it or not. Whatever might be the rule in such a case, he hoped the wisdom, policy, and humanity of the law, with regard to these unhappy persons, would never be disappointed; his own experience enabled him to say, the Court had not been in the habit of discouraging any fair and reasonably provident application, with regard to the situation of a person allowed to be a lunatic; if, in the execution of the commission, he is more pressed than a tender and humane consideration of his circumstances authorize; as of a person not allowed to be a lunatic, but made the object of a commission. The present petition, as far as his Lordship could perceive upon the affidavits, laid no foundation whatever for impeaching the commission in any one circumstance that took place at the period of the finding of the jury; the petition must therefore be dismissed with costs, it being ill founded and most rashly preferred” (e).

Lord Eldon observed in another case, that any individuals, who suppose their interests affected by the acts which the lunatic has done, have a right to apply to the Great Seal for leave to traverse the inquisition, which is never refused in any proper case (ƒ).

It has been decided, that where an action has been commenced on the petty-bag side of the Court of Chancery, but tried in the Court of King's Bench, that an application for a new trial must be made in the latter Court, which is (d) In re Fust, 1 Cox, 418. (e) Ex parte Ward, 6 Ves. 579.

(f) 2 Wilson & Shaw, 520.