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PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW
CHAPTER 41 OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS Article 1. Short title (§ 1).
2. Future estates; charitable uses; accumulation of in
come; trust estates (S$ 10–23). 3. Agreements in writing; without consideration; fraudu
lent; factors (S$ 30-45). 4. Contracts for the conditional sale of goods and chattels
Article 5 was added by L. 1911, ch. 571, which also renumbered former article 5, making it article 6.
Article 6 (bis), was added by L. 1913, ch. 600. As enacted, there was neither article heading nor syllabus of sections and these have been added for fecility of reference.
Article 7 was added by L. 1911, ch. 248. As enacted there was neither article heading nor syllabus of sections and these have been added for facility of reference.
Section 1. Short title.
§ 1. Short title. This chapter shall be known as the “Personal Property Law.”
The original Personal Property Law was chapter 47 of the “ General Laws," being L. 1897, ch. 417.
This section was derived from the Personal Property Law of 1897, § 1. The part of that section not included in the present section 1 was made $ 10, infra.
*Article 1 of the Personal Property Law of 1897 was “ Future estates; accumulation of income; trust estates (88 1-9). In the consolidation of 1909 the provisions of article 1 of the Personal Property Law, except the portion included in present section 1, were made a part of present article 2.
The report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation is dated June 26, 1907, and the Consolidated Laws were enacted in 1909. The legislation for 1908 was examined by the board and any changes that affected the laws as reported in 1907 were embodied in the laws as reported by the board to the legislature of 1909.
Section 2 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “Suspension of ownership’ is now covered by section 11.
Section 3 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “Income of trust fund not alienable; merger,” is now covered by section 15.
Section 4 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “ Validity of directions for accumulation of income,” is now covered by section 16.
Section 5 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “Anticipation of directed accumulation,” is now covered by section 17.
Section 6 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, Power to bequeath executed by general provision in will,” is now covered by section 18.
Section 7 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “ Disaffirmance of fraudulent acts by executors and others,” is now covered by section 19.
Section 8 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “When trust vests in supreme court,” is now covered by section 20.
ion 9 of the Personal Property Law of 1897, “ Investment of trust funds," is now covered by section 21. Term “
personal property” generally: see GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW, 39.
L. 1909, cha 45
Future Estates, Charitable Uses, etc.
88 10, 11
FUTURE ESTATES; CHARITABLE USES; ACCUMULATION OF
INCOME; TRUST ESTATES
Section 10. Definitions.
11. Suspension of ownership.
13. Certain educational and other charitable
authorized. 13-a. Trusts for care of cemetery lots, etc. 14. Certain gifts for charitable and educational uses
regulated. 15. When income of trust fund is not alienable. 16. Validity of directions for accumulation of income. 17. Anticipation of directed accumulation. 18. Power to bequeath executed by general provision in
will. 19. Disaffirmance of fraudulent acts by executors and
others. 20. When trust vests in supreme court. 21. Investment of trust funds. 22. Commissions of trustees. 23. Revocation of trusts upon consent of all persons
§ 10. Definitions. The term "income of personal property,” as used in this article, means the income or profits arising from personal property, and includes the interest of money and the produce of stock.
This section was derived from the Personal Property Law of 1897, § 1, pt. What personal property includes: see GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW, § 39.
Accumulations and anticipation of directed accumulation: see REAL PROPERTY LAW, S8 61, 62.
Advancements of real and personal estates: see DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, 88 96, 99.
§ 11. Suspension of ownership. The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be suspended by any limitation or con
*Article 2 of the Personal Property Law of 1897 (8$ 20–29), “ Agreements not in writing; without consideration; fraudulent,” is now covered by article 3.
dition, for a longer period than during the continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument containing such limitation or condition; or, if such instrument be a last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being at the death of the testator. In other respects limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject to the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property.
This section was derived from the Personal Property Law of 1897, § 2.
The report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation (1907), page 3924, has the following notes relating to this section: “In the technical language of the common law, which by constitutional limitation is expressly binding on the Judiciary, in the absence of Legislative changes, a 'will' refers to real property; a 'testament' refers to personal property. This section refers to a testament and the usual technical language should be employed.” This note refers to the first sentence of this section,
“ The rule against perpetuities expressed in this section has been lately held, since L. 1893, ch. 701, to have no further application to charitable use:3 : Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122; Matter of Griffin, 167 id. 71, 81. This being so, it should be plainly stated in a statute consolidating the laws relating to charities. At common law, charitable or public uses were not subject to the rule against perpetuities, except as to the time of vesting in possession, which could not be postponed beyond the legal limit. Marsden on Perpetuities, 24, 295; Challis on Real Property, 157. This was a wise exception, recojnized in this state, and should be continued. Rose v. Rose, 4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 108. The phrase 'except as to the time of vesting in possession ’ is the technical one employed in the law relating to charitable uses to express that such uses must vest within the time limit prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.”
1. Generally, 10
1. In general, 13
Personal property not alienable in certain cases : see infra, 15. Suspension of power of alienation of real property: see REAL PROPERTY LAW, $ 42. Charitable trusts as affected by statute against perpetuities: seo infra, § 12 note. Trusts for care of cemetery lots: see infra, § 13-a; REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 114-a.
Gift in violation of mortmain statute as void or voidable: see 10 Ann. Cas. 1030 note. Trust of indefinite duration for maintenance, repair, etc., of residence or homestead as offending rule against perpetuities: see Ann. Cais. 1914B 551 note. Validity of reservation of mineral rights in perpetuity: see Ann. Cas. 1912D 886 note. Validity of partial or limited restraint on alienation of fee simple estate: see 7 Ann. Cas. 319 note. Effect of perpetuity upon contemporaneous or prior interest: see 5 Ann. Cas. 431 coie. Effect of doctrine as to possibility of issue extinct in determining whether rule against
perpetuities has been violated: see 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 867 note. May a child en ventre sa mere be considered as in being for purpose of rule against perpetuities: see 4 B. R. C. 492 note. Right to damages for breach of option contract which not specifically enforceable because it contravenes the rule against perpetuities: see 4 B. R. C. 292 note.
Rule stated.- Under the present section of the statute there can be no limitation of personal estate by a single instrument by which the power of absolute disposition is suspended for any other or longer period than the continuance of two lives. Bailey v. Buffalo Loan, etc., Deposit Co., (1915) 213 N. Y. 525, 107 N. E. 1043, reversing judgment 159 App. Div. 933, 144 N. Y. S. 1104; In re McCoy, (1906) 51 Misc. 441, 101 N. Y. S. 539; Adams v. Berger, (1891) 27 Abb. N. Cas. 429, 18 N. Y. S. 33; Casey v. Casey, (1914) 161 App. Div. 427, 146 N. Y. S. 348; Carrier v. Carrier, (1915) 167 App. Div. 405, 153 N. Y. S. 509; Mansbach v. New, (1901) 58 App. Div. 191, 68 N. Y. S. 674, affirmed (1902) 170 N. Y. 585, 63 N. E. 1119; Grout v. Van Schoonhoven, (1844) 1 Sawy. Ch. 336; Taylor v. Gould, (1851) 10 Barb. 388; Banks v. Phelan, (1848) 4 Barb. 80; Van Vechten v. Van Veghten, (1840) 8 Paige 104; De Peyster v. Clendining, (1840) 8 Paige 295, affirmed 26 Wend. 21; Hannan v. Osborn, (1834) 4 Paige 336; Coster v. Lorillard, (1835) 14 Wend. 265. But by means of two separate and distinct instruments the owner of an expectant estate in personalty may suspend the absolute ownership for more than two lives in being. New York Life Ins., etc., Co. v. Cary, (1908) 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E. 598, reversing 120 App. Div. 264, 105 N. Y. S. 125.
When power of alienation suspended. The power of alienation is suspended only when there are no persons in being by whom absolute ownership can be transferred. Williams v. Montgomery, (1896) 148 N. Y. 519, 43 N. E. 57, modifying judgment 68 Hun 416, 22 N. Y. S. 1033; Sawyer v. Cubby, (1895) 146 N. Y. 192, 40 N. E. 869, reversing judgment 73 Hun 298, 26 N. Y. S. 426; Deegan v. Trade, (1895) 144 N. Y. 573, 39 N. E. 692, affirming 75 Hun 39, 26 N. Y. S. 989; Hope v. Brewer, (1892) 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558, 18 L. R. A. 458; Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, (1884) 96 N. Y. 201; Robert v. Corning, (1892) 89 N. Y. 225; In re Perry, (1905) 48 Misc. 285, 96 N. Y. S. 879; Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., (1913) 156 App. Div. 644, 141 N. Y. S. 1065, affirmed (1913) 209 N. Y. 429, 103 N. E. 706; Wells v. Squires, (1907) 117 App. Div. 502, 102 N. Y. S. 597, affirmed (1908) 191 N. Y. 529, 84 N. E. 1122; Hang v. Schumacher, (1900) 50 App. Div. 562, 64 N. Y. S. 310, judgment modified (1901) 166 N. Y. 506, 60 N. E. 245; Gott v. Cook, (1839) 7 Paige 521, affirmed 24 Wend. 641, 35 Am. Dec. 641; Walker v. Steers, (1891) 14 N. Y. S. 398, 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 654; Pfaler v. Roberg, (1885) 3 Dem. 360; Brown v. Mutual Trust Co., (1885) 22 Wkly. Dig. 395.
Method of suspension of ownership.- The absolute ownership of property is suspended in one of two ways, either by the creation of future estates vesting upon the occurrence of some future and contingent event, or by the creation of a trust which vests the estate in trustees. Steinway v. Steinway, (1900) 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312, affirming 24 App. Div. 104, 48 N. Y. S. 1046; In re Robert, (1906) 112 App. Div. 732, 98 N. Y. S. 809.
Necessity of certainty of limitation.— In determining the validity of estates under the present section relating to perpetuities it is not sufficient that the estates attempted to be created may, by the happening of subsequent events, be terminated within the prescribed period. The estates, to be valid, must be so limited that in every possible contingency they will absolutely terminate at such period. Matter of Wilcox, (1909) 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497, reversing order 125 App. Div. 152, 109 N. Y. S. 564; Central Trust Co. v. Egleston, (1906) 185 N. Y. 23, 77 N. E. 989, reversing 110 App. Div. 893, 96 N. Y. S. 1117, which affirmed 47 Misc. 475, 95 N. Y. S. 945; Herzog v. Title Guarantee, etc., Co., (1903) 177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A. 146, reversing 85 App. Div. 549, 83 N. Y. S. 548; Underwood v. Curtis, (1891) 127 N. Y. 523,