&c. Upon an objection taken that the order did

not show that the summons was served before the 15th of September, or that the defendant appeared upon that day, it was held that it was no defect that the order did not state that the summons was served on the 15th of September, or that the parties appeared on that day, so as to authorise an adjournment to the 22nd, as it was stated that the defendant was duly served with the summons, and that he appeared by attorney at the hearing on the 22nd; and also that it did sufficiently appear that the application for the order was made within forty days of the service of the summons.

In the case of Ex parte Harrison (19 L. T. 114; 16 Jur. 726), several points of practical importance relative to bastardy orders were decided. It was held, 1st. That it is no objection to an order of affiliation that it is made after the lapse of twelve months from the birth of the child, if, in fact, the complaint of the woman was made within that period. 2nd. Nor that the summons was not issued till many months after it was applied for. 3rd. Nor that the order directs payment of the weekly sums for a period longer back than thirteen weeks, it being their duty to enforce payment for not more than thirteen

weeks.

4th. Nor that it was made more than forty days after service of the summons, the hearing having been adjourned from time to time, and the first hearing having been within the proper time.

Order bad in part only.-Upon the subject of

the sufficiency of these orders, it may here be mentioned, that if an order is bad in part only, that part which is good may be enforced, provided it is clearly distinguishable from, and is in no way dependent upon, that part which is bad. This proposition was fully established in The Queen v. Green (20 L. J., M. C. 168); Ex parte Colley (16 L. T. 319). In that case it appeared that on the 25th of February, 1850, one Elizabeth Colley gave birth to a bastard child. On the 14th of May following she applied to justices for a summons against the putative father. On the 4th of June the justices made an order, whereby the father was ordered to pay 2s. 6d. per week from the birth of the child, &c. The defendant having disobeyed this order, an application was made to the justices for a warrant for the arrears, but upon its being represented to them that they had exceeded their jurisdiction in ordering payment from the birth of the child, which was more than two months anterior to the application, they refused to interfere, notwithstanding the mother, previous to her application for such warrant, had served the father with a notice, abandoning all claims arising upon the order for any weekly payments prior to the 14th of May, the date of her application. Upon this, a rule was obtained, calling upon the justices to show cause why they should not issue their warrant for the arrears due from such 14th of May. Upon the argument it was contended, in opposition to the rule, that the

order, being bad in part, was bad altogether. In giving judgment in favour of the rule, Mr. Justice ERLE said, "It seems to me that the doctrine established by the three cases which have been cited-The Queen v. Maulden (8 B. & C. 78); The Queen v. St. Nicholas, Leicester (3 A. & E. 79); and The Queen v. Winster (19 L. J., M. C. 185) is that this Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction, will, if they can clearly sever the bad part of an order from the good, quash the order for the bad part, and leave it to stand as to the residue. The case of The Queen v. Stoke Bliss (6 Q. B. 158), which, at first sight, appears to be against the rule, that the order may be good in part and bad in part, in reality confirms it. The order in that case, which was bad as to the judgment, was held not maintainable as to the costs, but was quashed as bad altogether, on the ground that the giving of costs was merely ancillary to the judgment, and that the two parts of the order could not be clearly severed. the very distinction which the Court points out in that case, is an adjudication that the principle is a true one, and that where the line of demarcation can be clearly pointed out (as in this case), the order may be supported as to the good part. I do not think that it was necessary for the woman, who gave notice that she had abandoned all claim under the bad part of the order, to have it brought up by certiorari, for the purpose of having it quashed as to that part; and I am of

But

(See

opinion that I am warranted by the decisions referred to in making this rule absolute." also Reg v. Peck, 20 L. T. 393.)

Order wholly bad may be treated as a Nullity.An order of affiliation void for defects appearing upon the face of it is altogether a nullity, and may be treated just as if the justices who made it had never heard the case at all; and it is not necessary to proceed either by way of appeal or writ of certiorari, in order to quash it. Where, therefore, such a defective order (bad for omitting to state that the evidence had been heard by the justices in the "presence and hearing" of the putative father) had been made and served but not acted upon, and upon a second application in the same matter two justices made another valid order of affiliation, it was held that they had jurisdiction to make such second order, although the first had not been got rid of, upon appeal or by writ of certiorari: (Reg. v. Brisby, 18 L. J., M. C. 157.) In giving judgment, PARKE, B., said, "Then the question here is, whether the first order made did not become equivalent to no order at all. Now I take it, as it was not an order which could be enforced against the putative father, it had no binding effect upon the mother, and must be treated as altogether null and void, and the parties be considered in the same situation as if the first justices had declined to make any order at all, or having drawn up an order had refused to sign it; and that being so, the

second justices has jurisdiction to make the order in question." In the foregoing case the applicant, before applying for the second summons, tendered the defendant a sum sufficient to cover all costs actually incurred in consequence of the first order, which he declined to take. It does not, however, seem necessary to pay or tender such costs in order to give the justices jurisdiction to make a second order under such circumstances.

The subject was much considered in the case of Reg. v. Lanyon (27 L. T. 355) before Mr. Justice QUAIN at Chambers, who took time to consider the question, and ultimately delivered a written judgment. The facts were these: A summons on bastardy came on to be heard before two justices in the 30th Jan. 1872, when they adjudicated that the defendant was the father of the child, and ordered him to pay 2s. a week from the date of its birth towards its maintenance. An order in writing was, thereupon, drawn up by the clerk, signed by the justices who adjudicated, and was served upon the defendant. It was, however, subsequently ascertained that in this document the sum of 2s. 6d. had been inserted where that of 2s. only ought to have appeared, and that the date of the birth of the child had been altogether omitted. No proceeding was, therefore, taken to enforce it, and the defendant refused to make any payment to the complainant. In this state of things the complainant in the following May applied to