land in England; but, irrespective of those provisions, at the common law an English ship on the high seas is English territory. The place to give jurisdiction to the justices is where the mother resides at the time of her application. Therefore I think the justices were right."

Guardians, application for an order by.-The recent statute of the 36 Vict. c. 9, by sect. 5, empowers the guardians of a union or parish, under certain circumstances, to apply for an order of affiliation. The section runs thus:

"When a bastard child becomes chargeable to a union or parish, the guardians may apply to two justices having jurisdiction in the union or parish, in petty sessions, and thereupon such justices may summon the man alleged to be the father of the child to appear before any two justices having the like jurisdiction, to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to contribute towards the relief of the child, and upon his appearance, or, on proof that the summons was duly served on him, or left at his last place of abode six days at least before the petty sessions, the justices in such petty sessions shall hear the evidence of the mother, and such other evidence as she or the said guardians may produce, and shall also hear any evidence tendered by or on behalf of the person alleged to be the father; and if the evidence of the mother be corroborated in some material particular by other evidence to the satisfaction of

the said justices, they may adjudge the man to be the putative father of such bastard child; and they may proceed to make an order upon such putative father to pay the guardians or one of their officers such sum, weekly or otherwise, towards the relief of the child during such time as the child shall continue or afterwards be chargeable, as shall appear to them to be proper; and any payment so ordered to be made shall be recoverable by the relieving officer or other officer appointed to receive it in the manner provided by the said recited Act for the recovery of payments under an order obtained by the mother; provided as follows:

1. That no payments shall be recoverable

under such order except in respect of the

time during which the child is actually in receipt of relief:

2. That an order under this section shall not be made, and, if made, shall cease, except for the recovery of arrears when the mother of the child has obtained an order

under the said recited Act, or this Act: 3. That nothing in this section shall be deemed to relieve the mother of a bastard child

from her liability to maintain such child : 4. That any person upon whom an order is made under this section shall have the same right of appeal against such order as in the case of an order obtained on the application of the mother:

5. That if after an order has been made under this section the mother should apply for an order under the said recited Act, or this Act, the order made under this section shall be primâ facie evidence that the man upon whom the order is made is the father of the child."

When the summons may be applied for.—The statute points to two conditions under which the summons may be applied for: first, by "any single woman who may be with child; " secondly, "who may be delivered of a bastard child after the passing of this Act." An application may thus be made either before or after the birth of the child; but if made after the birth, it is subject to the qualifications, first, that it be made within twelve months from the birth of the child, the term month (by sect. 74 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101) meaning calendar month; or it may be made even after that period upon proof that the man alleged to be the father has paid money for its maintenance within the first twelve months after its birth; "or at any time within the twelve months next after the return to England of the man alleged to be the father of such child upon proof that he ceased to reside in England within the twelve months next after the birth of such child;" from which latter provisions it would seem that the application may be made at the distance of many years from the birth of the child, if it can be proved that within the first.

year the alleged father has paid money for its maintenance; or that the application has been made within the twelvemonths next after the return of the man to England, provided it can be proved that he ceased to reside in England within the twelvemonths next after the birth of the child.

When the application for a summons has been duly made within the twelvemonth it is immaterial to the validity of the subsequent order that the summons itself did not issue until after the expiration of the twelvemonth. In Potts V. Cumbridge (27 L. J., M. C. 62; 30 L. T. 257) it appeared that on the 22nd of March, 1856, a woman was delivered of a bastard child, and that on the 30th of April following she applied to a justice for a summons against one Potts, whom she alleged to be the father; but no summons was issued in consequence of her being unable to ascertain where he was living, he having left his home, the justice telling her to apply to the bench for a summons as soon as she could ascertain his residence. On the 30th November in the following year (1857) she accordingly applied, having shortly before ascertained that Potts was living at Cambridge. A summons was thereupon issued reciting the former application and the renewal of it, and the case was heard on the 14th of December, 1857, when Potts did not dispute the facts, but insisted that the summons was issued upon the second application, and there

fore that the proceedings were bad as being too late. An order, however, having been made upon the hearing, and a case being granted under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, for the opinion of the Court above, such Court (Queen's Bench) held that the proceedings were regular. In giving judgment, Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.,'said: "I am of opinion that these proceedings are strictly regular. The mother of the child applied to the justice upon the 30th of April, within twelve calendar months after the birth, and was desired by him to apply again to the bench as soon as she could ascertain where the defendant was living, when she should have a summons. She did not discover the defendant's residence till some short time before the 30th of November, 1857, upon which day she goes and makes a second application. The first application was quite regular. On the second application, which must be taken to be a continuation of the first, the summons was issued. That was as soon as the justice thought that it would be useful; and all the proceedings from the 30th of November to the making of the order are unexceptionable and unexcepted to. It was entirely on account of the absence of the putative father that the order was not more speedily enforced." So, too, Mr.

Justice COLERIDGE said: "The Act requires that the application should be made within twelve months after the birth of the child, and the justice is thereupon to issue his summons.

If