evidence to show that such child was not procreated by the husband, the law will not allow the presumed status of the child to be taken away merely on the balance of probability. The evidence must, on the contrary, not only be such as to raise in the mind of a judge or jury strong doubts, but it must be such as to produce a judicial conviction that the child was not procreated by the husband:" (See also Atchley v. Sprigg, 33 L. J. 345, Ch.; 10 L. T. 16.)

Cross-examination.-At the conclusion of the evidence of each witness the defendant will have a right to cross-examine, and in doing so he may put any questions which are relevant to the issue, or which have the effect of testing the credibility of the witness; and this latter, however wide it may be of the main subject of inquiry. But if the question have neither the effect of testing the witness's credibility, nor be relevant to the inquiry, it cannot be put (R. v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 456; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 5th ed. 145); and if an irrelevant question be put, or one put for the purpose only of testing the credibility of the witness, the party putting it must be satisfied with his answer, and he cannot adduce evidence in contradiction: (Spenceley v. De Willott, 7 East, 109; Harris v. Tippet, 2 Camp. 637; Palmer v. Trower, 8 Exch. 247; Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91.)

This point was much considered in Reg. v. Gibbons (5 L. T. 805; 31 L. J., M. C. 98),

which was a case argued before all the judges. It appeared that one Anne Bishop having, on the 29th of March, been delivered of a bastard child, an application for an order of affiliation against one Harmer, whom she alleged to be the father, came on for hearing on the 28th of the following June. She was then cross-examined on the part of Harmer as to whether she had not connection with the present defendant in the previous September. She denied it, and the present defendant was afterwards called as a witness on behalf of Harmer, and he swore that he had had connection with her, as imputed by the question put to her. For this evidence he was afterwards indicted for perjury, and upon being convicted the judge reserved the point as to whether or not the evidence given on the hearing by the defendant was material, it being insisted on his behalf that it was not material, as the question put to Anne Bishop as to having had connection with him went merely to her credit (such connection, even if it had taken place, having had nothing to do with the paternity of the child), and therefore her answer ought to have been regarded as conclusive, and that the evidence therefore of the defendant in contradiction was inadmissible and illegal, and not material to the question raised before the justices. All the judges (excepting Crompton, J. and Martin, B.) were of opinion that the conviction was valid, for that whilst the answer of the

woman ought to have been taken as conclusive, yet as the justices did in fact (though irregularly) receive the evidence of the defendant in contradiction, it was relevant, and so the subject of an indictment for perjury. In delivering the judgment of the majority of the judges (eleven) COCKBURN, C.J. said: "We are of opinion that the conviction was right and ought to be affirmed. It is quite clear that the question put to the principal witness in the case was a pertinent question, and one which she was bound to answer. It is true that the question had not reference to the main issue of paternity then before the Court; but it had immediate reference to the question arising upon and subordinate to that, viz., how far she was deserving of credit. Possibly, if she had answered the question in the affirmative, it might not have effected the decision of the magistrates; but she was bound to answer, and I therefore entertain no doubt that if she had answered the question falsely she might have been indicted for perjury. I agree that, it being a question affecting her credit, and relevant only on that ground, all parties ought to have been bound by the answer she gave; but the magistrates thought proper to admit the evidence of the defendant in contradiction. That was not in point of law admissible, but, being admitted, it had reference to what was a material question on the inquiry," &c. Mr. Justice Crompton and Mr. Baron Martin, whilst thinking that the evidence of the

defendant was not relevant, held with the rest of the Court that the answer of the woman ought to have been taken as conclusive, and that it was not open to contradiction. It will be observed that in this case the question of connection with the defendant Gibbons was not material to the issue, inasmuch as, even if it had been established that such connection had taken place, it would not have negatived the fact of Harmer's being the father of the child. The question went merely to the credit of the woman, and her answer ought to have been taken as conclusive, she herself being liable to an indictment for perjury if the testimony were false. But although evidence cannot be adduced to contradict a witness as to facts which go only to his credit, yet, if such evidence is also material to the fact in issue, it is not open to such objection. Thus upon an application for an order of affiliation against A., the woman deposed to a connection with him in a certain month, which she swore produced her pregnancy. Upon crossexamination she was asked as to her having in the same month had connection with B., which she denied. A. then proposed to call witnesses to prove such connection with B., whom the justices refused to hear upon the ground that the denial of the woman was conclusive. Upon a case stated, the Queen's Bench held that the justices were wrong in their decision. BLACKBURN, J., in giving judgment, said: "No doubt

the justices made a mistake. The woman had sworn that the man was the father, and she was asked as to another person having had connection with her about the time when conception must have taken place, and, having denied this, it was proposed to call a witness, not so much to contradict her as to show that another person was the father of the child. The evidence was improperly rejected:" (Garbutt (app.) v. Simpson (resp.), 32 L. J., M. C. 186; 8 L. T. 423; see also Reg. v. Holmes and another, 41 L. J., M. C. 12.)

It may here be prudent to advise parties applying for an order of affiliation to be careful to provide in the first instance for the forthcoming of the most satisfactory evidence in support of the application; for although, upon an appeal by the putative father against an order of affiliation, the woman will not be confined alone to the evidence she produced before the justices at petty sessions, but may support her case by other testimony, yet, as no power of appeal is given to her against a decision at petty sessions adverse to her application, such a decision may in its results, under some circumstances, be final and conclusive against her.

The Defence. When the case of the complainant is concluded, the defendant (if the bench are of opinion that any case is made out calling for an answer) will enter upon his defence, and will either rely upon the insufficiency of the case as