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is no rule of law that, because the circumstances took place some months before, they are not to be considered in the light of corroboration. I am very clearly of opinion that they ought."

When the summons is taken out more than twelve months from the birth of the child, it will be a necessary part of the applicant's proof that the putative father has, within such twelve months, paid money for the maintenance of the child; and such proof will be corroborative evidence, if given by testimony other than that of the woman (Reg. v. Berry, 28 L. J., M. C. 86), in which case Lord CAMPBELL, C.J. said: "As to the second objection, we never entertained the smallest doubt, clearly thinking that it was necessary to prove at the hearing the payment of money by the defendant as alleged; and further, that his payment of money for the maintenance of the child was corroborative evidence of the paternity." It is not, however, necessary that this proof of the payment of money, if given by the mother, should be corroborated in order to give jurisdiction : (Hodges v. Bennett, 29 L. J., M. C. 224.)

When the application has not been made within the twelve months after the birth of the child, in consequence of the man having ceased to reside in England within such twelve months, though made within the twelve months next after his return, the woman must give some affirmative evidence of these facts, and if unable

to prove them by other testimony she may call the man himself as a witness to prove them. Having already fully considered this subject (ante, p. 18) it is unnecessary to dwell further upon it.

The putative father himself may be called as a witness for the complainant (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 2), though for obvious reasons it will generally be undesirable for her to run the risk of the testimony he may give.

Of Applications by the Guardians. If the guardians of a union or parish seek for an order under the provisions of sect. 5 of the 36 Vict. c. 9 (ante, p. 8), it will be unnecessary for them to give any evidence as to the date of the birth of the child; they must prove, however, that the child is actually chargeable, and also give such evidence of its paternity as is required in a case of an application at the instance of the mother.

The Evidence when the Order is sought by a Married Woman.-In cases in which an order is sought by a married woman, great difficulties often arise in proving the non-access of the husband, since, notwithstanding the woman is a competent witness to prove her own adultery, she is not such to prove the non-access of her husband. The testimony of the husband or wife that, though living together, they have had no connection, and that therefore the offspring is spurious, has, on the general ground of decency,

morality, and policy, been uniformly rejected: (Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 594; Cope v. Cope, 1 Moo. & Rob. 269; 2 C. & P. 604; R. v. Mansfield, 1 Q. B. 444; Corn v. Shepherd, 6 Bing. 283.) And that rule excludes not only all direct questions, but all questions which have a tendency to prove or disprove that fact, unless they are put with a view to prove a different point in the case: (R. v. Sourton, 5 Ad. & Ell. 180; Wright v. Holdgate, 3 Car. & Kir. 158.) Nor is it affected by the circumstance that at the time of the examination of one of the parents the other is dead, because the rule has been established not simply on the ground that the tendency of such evidence is to promote connubial dissension, but on the broad basis of general public policy: (R. v. Kea, 11 East, 132.) If, therefore, it is necessary to prove non-access, such as that arising from the fact of the husband being abroad, imprisoned, or ill in a hospital, or the wife living notoriously separate from her husband and in a state of abandoned prostitution at the time when the child must have been conceived, such evidence must be given by other testimony than that of either the husband or the wife.

When a married woman has a child, the presumption is in favour of its legitimacy. Formerly, indeed, the presumption was that if the husband continued within the four seas, and was alive at the child's birth, such child would not be a bastard. But now the law allows inquiry, the

rule, however, being that those who dispute the fact of the child's legitimacy are bound to make out the contrary: (Per Cresswell, J., in Wright v. Holdgate, 3 Car. & Kir. 158.) In Hargrave v. Hargrave (9 Beavan, 552), Lord LANGDALE, M. R. said : "A child born of a married woman is in the first instance presumed to be legitimate. This presumption thus established by law is not to be rebutted by circumstances which only create a doubt and suspicion; but it may be wholly removed by showing that the husband was-first, incompetent; secondly, entirely absent so as to have had no intercourse or communication of any kind with the mother; thirdly, entirely absent at the period during which the child must in the course of nature have been begotten; fourthly, only present under such circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual intercourse. Such evidence as this puts an end to the question, and establishes the illegitimacy of the child of a married woman." In Saye and Sele Barony (1 Ho. Lords Cas. 507) it was held that the illegitimacy of a child born of a married woman is established beyond all dispute by evidence of her living in adultery at the time when the child was begotten, and of her husband then residing in another part of the kingdom, so as to make access impossible. In Cope v. Cope (5 C. & P. 604; 1 Moo. & Rob. 269), ALDERSON, B. said: "If a husband have access, and others at the

same time are carrying on a criminal intimacy with his wife, a child born under such circumstances is legitimate in the eye of the law. But if the husband and wife are living separate, and the wife is notoriously living in open adultery, although the husband have an opportunity of access, it would be monstrous to suppose that under these circumstances he would avail himself of such opportunity: (See also Morris v. Davies, 5 Cl. & Fin. 163; 3 C. & P. 215; Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 193; Gurney v. Gurney, 32 L. J. Ch. 456; 8 L.T. 380.) In Plowes v. Bossey (31 L. J. 681, Ch.; 7 L. T. 306), Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLEY thus clearly enunciates the law upon the subject.

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"A child born of a married woman is presays: sumed, primâ facie, to be legitimate-that is, to have been procreated by the husband-and our law respects and supports the legitimacy of such child; and, although it does not prohibit any person interested from making out the illegitimacy, it throws the onus probandi entirely upon such person. If the case is that the husband and wife never were together within the period during which, according to the law of nature, they must have been to make the child the child of both, or that they were together either in company with others or under circumstances making the fact impossible, the onus is on the person alleging such a fact to prove it. ... And further, when a person alleges the illegitimacy of the child of a married woman, and brings forward

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