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closure, Asberry, the sheriff, had been empowered to sell the property reconveyed to Hood to pay what remained due on the mortgage debt. The prayer of the bill of Norton, as stated in the petition for mandomus, was that Norton "be decreed to be the owner, in his capacity as assignee of said bankrupt, of all the property described in his said bill, from the twenty-ninth day of December, 1868, (when said Hood filed his petition to be decreed a bankrupt,) and entitled to recover the rents and revenues thereof from the said Hood and Frellsen; that said Hood be ordered to transfer to complainant the property reconveyed to him by said Frellsen as aforesaid; that the mortgage put upon the same by said Hood in favor of said Frellsen be canceled, annulled, and erased, and the sale thereof, under said executory process foreclosing said mortgage, or any other process against said Hood, be enjoined and prohibited; that said Frellsen be ordered and decreed to convey to complainant one-half of the Black Bayou plantation, which he had retained by some arrangement with William Alling, the purchaser, and to pay the complainant the sum of $16,000, received from said Alling for the sale of the other half of said plantation, together with the interest thereon from the date of said sale, and for general relief, process," etc.

Answers were filed and testimony taken. After hearing, the district court entered a decree declaring "that the judgment in favor of Henry Frellsen against Govy Hood, in the parish of Carroll, in the year 1866, and the executions thereunder in 1868, with the sales and conveyances by the sheriff, as shown in the record, have been established as valid and operative, and that no fraud, collusion, nor malpractice is established against him; that these proceedings entitle him to property so conveyed to him, discharged of any claim of the plaintiff in this suit;" and further declaring "that whatever surplus may arise from the sale of the property under the process in favor of Henry Frellsen, which is described in the plaintiff's bill and which is now held by the sheriff, and has been levied on the planta tions known as the Home Place and Hood & Wilson Place, the said surplus shall not be paid to said Hood, but shall be paid to the com plainant, after deducting such costs as this court may decree shall be paid out of the same." The injunction which had been allowed restraining the sheriff from the execution of the process was dissolved, and he was permitted to proceed, but was to dispose of the surplus that might remain in his hands after the payment of the debt specified in the process as due to Frellsen, and the costs of suit, as directed by the district court of the United States. Leave

was granted the complainant to apply for further orders regulating the sale in respect to time, and appraisement and sale on credit, according to the laws of Louisiana. The sheriff was directed to make a return of his sale to the district court of the United States, and the question of costs was reserved until the coming in of the return.

From this decree an appeal was taken to the circuit court, where, on the twenty-seventh of May, 1882, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the decree appealed from was not a final decree within the meaning of that term as used in the statute regulating appeals from the district to the circuit court. The writ now asked for is to require the circuit court to set aside its order of dismissal and take jurisdiction.

*We have had occasion at the present term, in Bostwick v. Brinker-* hoff, 1 SUP. CT. REP. 15; Grant v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. Id. 414; and St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Exp. Co., ante, 6, to state the rule applicable to the determination of the question here involved, and we there say: "A decree is final for the purpose of an appeal

when it terminates the litigation between the parties, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined." Under this rule, we think, this appeal was well taken. The decree settled every question in dispute between the parties, and left nothing to be done but to complete the sale under the proceedings in the state court for foreclosure, and hand over to Norton any surplus of the proceeds there might be after satisfying the debt due Frellsen, as stated in the process under which the sale was made. The case stands precisely as it would if Frellsen were proceeding in the district court for the foreclosure of his mortgage, and a decree had been entered establishing his rights, ascertaining the amount due to him, and ordering a sale of the property and the payment to Norton of the surplus after discharging the mortgage debt. Here the bill was filed by Norton to set aside the proceedings for foreclosure and obtain a conveyance of the mortgaged property. The court refused to set aside the proceedings or to order a conveyance, but did order the sale to go on, and that the proceeds, after the mortgage was satisfied, be paid to Norton. It adjudged the case on the merits in favor of Frellsen as against Norton, and in favor of Norton as against Hood. The bill was not dismissed in form because it asked relief both as against Frellsen and Hood, and relief was granted as against Hood. It was in legal effect dismissed as to Frellsen when the decree was entered in his favor on all the questions in which he was interested. The writ of mandamus asked for is granted, but without costs.

(107 U. S. 402)

HAHN v. UNITED STATES.

(April 9, 1883.)

CUSTOMS OFFICERS-PORTS OF ENTRY AND PORTS OF DELIVERY-DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS OF FINES, PENALTIES, ETC.—Practice of Treasury DEPARTMENT-CLAIM UPON FUND DISTRIBUTED-CON

STRUCTION OF ACT OF CONGRESS.

A person was surveyor of customs at the port of Troy, New York, a port of delivery and not a port of entry, in the collection district of the city of New York, from June 13, 1872, to May, 1876. At various times during the period from June 13, 1872, to June 22, 1874, there was a surveyor of customs at the port of New York, which was a port of entry, and surveyors of customs at two other ports, which were ports of delivery and not ports of entry, all of said ports being in said collection district. In accordance with the uniform practice of the treasury department, under section 1 of the act of March 2, 1867, c. 188, (14 St. at Large, 546,) the secretary of the treasury distributed to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, one-fourth part of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York between June 13, 1872, and June 22, 1874, and paid no part thereof to the surveyor at Troy. He sued the United States in the court of claims in May, 1877, claiming to share equally with the collector and the naval officer at the port of New York, and all the surveyors in the district, in said one-fourth, under the provisions of section 1 of said act. As said provisions had been repealed by section 2 of the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, (18 St. at Large, 186,) and as congress had not interfered with such construction while the act was in force, and as the claimant had raised no question in regard to such construction until March, 1874, and had been informed by the treasury department in June, 1874, that it adhered to such construction, and had not complained again until March, 1877, but had permitted moneys to be distributed under such view until he sued, the court of claims held that, as such construction did not appear unreasonable, and might well have been reached in the exercise of a sound judgment, all the circumstances of the case were such, regarding the statute as ambiguous, as to justify the applica tion of the principle of interpretation that the contemporaneous construction of those who had been called upon to carry the law into effect was entitled to great respect, and it refused to interfere with such construction. This court being satisfied with the decision of the court of claims, and with the grounds above stated as assigned by it therefor, affirmed its judgment.

BLATCHFORD, J. This case comes before this court on an appeal by the claimant, Emanuel Hahn, from the judgment of the court of claims finding in favor of the United States, and dismissing the petition of the claimant. The following were the material facts found by that court:

403

"(1) On the thirteenth of June, 1872, the claimant was appointed surveyor of customs at the port of Troy, New York, and continued to act as such officer until May 28, 1876. (2) During that period, from June 13, 1872, to June 22. 1874, Alonzo B. Cornell was surveyor of customs at the port of New York to March 31, 1873, and George H. Sharpe from March 31, 1873, to June 22, 1874; Isaac N. Keeler was surveyor of customs at the port of Albany; and from April 28, 1874, Frank P. Norton was surveyor of customs at the port of Port Jefferson; all in the collection district of the city of New York. (3) There was collected and paid into the treasury of the United States, from the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York, between June 13, 1872, and April 28, 1874, the sum of $839,819.40, and more, and between April 28 and June 22, 1874, $14,604.11, and more, after making the deductions required by law; of which sums, in the distribution made by the secretary of the treasury, one-fourth part was paid to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, and none thereof was paid to the claimant, which distribution was made in accordance with the uniform practice of the treasury department, under the law of March 2, 1867, c. 188, (14 St. 546.) (4) During the same period, between June 13, 1872, and June 22, 1874, there was paid into the treasury, from fines incurred at the port of Troy, aforesaid, on persons for not surrendering licenses of canal-boats, as required by law, the sum of $1,000, of which, in the distribution thereof by the secretary of the treasury, one-fourth was paid to the claimant as informer or seizing officer, and no other share was allowed to him."

On these facts the claimant contends that under the provisions of section 1 of the act of March 2, 1867, c. 188, (14 St. at Large, 546,) he was entitled, for the period from June 13, 1872, to April 28, 1874, to share equally with the collector, the naval officer, and two other surveyors in the collection district of the city of New York in the onefourth part of the said sum of $839,819.40, and thus to recover onetwentienth part of said sum, and for the period from April 28, 1874, to June 22, 1874, to share equally with the collector, the naval officer, and three other surveyors in said collection district, in one-fourth part of said sum of $14,604.11, and thus to recover one twenty-fourth part of said sum.

The statute in question was in these words:

"That from the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under the provisions of the laws relating to the customs, there shall be deducted such charges and expenses as are by law in each case authorized to be deducted; and in addition, in the case of the forfeiture of imported merchandise of a greater value than $500 on which duties have not been paid, or in case of a release thereof, upon payment of its appraised value, or of any fine or composition in money, there shall also be deducted an amount equivalent to the duties in coin upon such merchandise, (including the additional duties, if any,) which shall be credited in the accounts of the collector as duties re

ceived, and the residue of the proceeds aforesaid shall be paid into the treasury of the United States, and distributed, under the direction of the secretary of the treasury, in the manner following, to-wit: one-half to the United States. one-fourth to the person giving the information which has led to such seizure. or to the recovery of the fine or penalty, and if there be no informer other than the collector, naval officer, or surveyor, then to the officer making the seizure; and the remaining one-fourth to be equally divided between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor, or such of them as are appointel for the district in which the seizure has been made, or the fine or penalty incurred, or, if there be only a collector, then to such collector."

The findings in this case show (1) that the moneys claimed were the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York; (2) that the claimant was not the surveyor at the port, but was a surveyor at another port in the same collection district; (3) that the secretary of the treasury actually distributed onefourth part of the distributable sums to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, and paid no part to the claimant; and (4) that such distribution was made in accordance with the uniform practice of the treasury department, under the said act of 1867. From these findings it is to be understood that it was the uniform practice of the treasury department, under the act of 1867, to distribute one-fourth part of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York (such as the proceeds in this case were) to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at that port as such collector, naval officer, and surveyor; such one-fourth part not including any part of any share which under said statute goes to the informer or to the officer making the seizure. The demand made by the claimant in this case in his petition has, no reference to the one-fourth part which the statute awards to the informer or the seizing officer.

The controversy arises over the meaning of these words in the act of 1867: "The remaining one-fourth to be equally divided between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor, or such of them as are appointed for the district in which the seizure has been made, or the fine or penalty incurred." It is said in substance, in the opinion of the court of claims in this case, reported in 14 Ct. of Claims R. 305, that the secretary of the treasury, in the practice spoken of, proceeded on the view that the port of New York was the only port of entry in said collection district; that the ports of Albany, Troy, and Port Jefferson, though ports in said collection district and ports of delivery, were not ports of entry; that the statute spoke only of "the collector, naval officer, and surveyor;" that the words "or such