Williams v. G. W. the "proximate cause was "the first negligent act which drove the carriage and horses into the excavation." In fact, it was a natural consequence that frightened horses should bolt off the road; it could not be foreseen exactly where they would go off, or what they might run against or fall into. But some such harm as did happen was probable enough, and it was immaterial for the purpose in hand whether the actual state of the ground was temporary or permanent, the work of nature or of man. If the carriage had gone into a river, or over an embankment, or down a precipice, it would scarcely have been possible to raise the doubt. Williams v. Great Western Railway Company (b) is a Rail. Co. stronger case, if not an extreme one. There were on a portion of the company's line in Denbighshire two level crossings near one another, the railway meeting a carriageroad in one place and a footpath (which branched off from the road) in the other. It was the duty of the company under certain Acts to have gates and a watchman at the road crossing, and a gate or stile at the footpath crossing; but none of these things had been done. "On the 22nd December, 1871, the plaintiff, a child of four and a-half years old, was found lying on the rails by the footpath, with one foot severed from his body. There was no evidence to show how the child had come there, beyond this, that he had been sent on an errand a few minutes before from the cottage where he lived, which lay by the roadside, at about 300 yards distance from the railway, and farther from it than the point where the footpath diverged from the road. It was suggested on the part of the defendants that he had gone along the road, and then, reaching the railway, had strayed down the line; and on (b) L. R. 9 Ex. 157, 43 L. J. Ex. 105 (1874). Cp. Hayes v. Michigan Central Rail. Co. (1883) 111 U. S. 228. the part of the plaintiff, that he had gone along the open footpath, and was crossing the line when he was knocked down and injured by the passing train." On these facts it was held that there was evidence proper to go to a jury, and on which they might reasonably find that the accident to the child was caused by the railway company's omission to provide a gate or stile. "One at least of the objects for which a gate or stile is required is to warn people of what is before them, and to make them pause before reaching a dangerous place like a railroad" (c). House. In Bailiffs of Romney Marsh v. Trinity House (d), a Bailiffs of Romney Trinity House cutter had by negligent navigation struck on Marsh v. a shoal about three-quarters of a mile outside the plaintiffs' Trinity sea-wall. Becoming unmanageable, the vessel was inevitably driven by strong wind and tide against the seawall, and did much damage to the wall. It was held without difficulty that the Corporation of the Trinity House was liable (under the ordinary rule of a master's responsibility for his servants, of which hereafter) for this damage, as being the direct consequence of the first default which rendered the vessel unmanageable. Nurdin. Something like this, but not so simple, was Lynch V. Lynch v. Nurdin (e), where the owner of a horse and cart left them unwatched in the street; some children came up and began playing about the cart, and as one of them, the plaintiff in (c) Amphlett B. at p. 162. (d) L. R. 5 Ex. 204, 39 L. J. Ex. 163 (1870); in Ex. Ch. L. R. 7 Ex. 247 (1872). This comes near the case of letting loose a dangerous animal: a drifting vessel is in itself a dangerous thing. In The George and Richard, L. R. 3 A. & E. 466, a brig by negligent navi gation ran into a bark, and disabled (e) 1 Q. B. 29, 10 L. J. Q. B. 73 Contrasted cases of non liability and liability: Cox v. Burbidge, Lee v. Riley. . the cause, was climbing into the cart another pulled the horse's bridle, the horse moved on, and the plaintiff fell down under the wheel of the cart and was hurt. The owner who had left the cart and horse unattended was held liable for this injury. The Court thought it strictly within the province of a jury "to pronounce on all the circumstances, whether the defendant's conduct was wanting in ordinary care, and the harm to the plaintiff such a result of it as might have been expected" (ƒ). It will be seen that on the whole the disposition of the Courts has been to extend rather than to narrow the range of "natural and probable consequences." A pair of cases at first sight pretty much alike in their facts, but in one of which the claim succeeded, while in the other it failed, will show where the line is drawn. If a horse escapes into a public road and kicks a person who is lawfully on the road, its owner is not liable unless he knew the horse to be vicious (g). He was bound indeed to keep his horse from straying, but it is not an ordinary consequence of a horse being loose on a road that it should kick human beings. without provocation. The rule is different however if a horse by reason of a defective gate strays not into the road (f) This case was relied on in being shored up and projecting into fendant's truck, which whirled round and struck and injured the plaintiff, who was on the sidewalk. Held, the defendant was liable. If the case had been that the shafts of the truck remained on the sidewalk, and the plaintiff afterwards stumbled on them in the dark, it would be an almost exact parallel to Clark v. Chambers (3 Q. B. D. 327, 47 L. J. Q. B. 427; see below). (g) Cox v. Burbidge (1863) 13 C. B. N. S. 430, 32 L. J. C. P. 89. but into an adjoining field where there are other horses, and kicks one of those horses. In that case the person whose duty it was to maintain the gate is liable to the owner of the injured horse (h). tan Rail. Co. v. Jackson. The leading case of Metropolitan Rail. Co. v. Jackson (i) Metropoliis in truth of this class, though the problem arose and was considered, in form, upon the question whether there was any evidence of negligence. The plaintiff was a passenger in a carriage already over-full. As the train was stopping at a station, he stood up to resist yet other persons who had opened the door and tried to press in. While he was thus standing, and the door was open, the train moved on. He laid his hand on the door-lintel for support, and at the same moment a porter came up, turned off the intruders, and quickly shut the door in the usual manner. The plaintiff's thumb was caught by the door and crushed. After much difference of opinion in the courts below, mainly due to a too literal following of certain previous authorities, the House of Lords unanimously held that, assuming the failure to prevent overcrowding to be negligence on the company's part, the hurt suffered by the plaintiff was not nearly or certainly enough connected with it to give him a cause of action. It was an accident which might no less have happened if the carriage had not been overcrowded at all. Unusual conditions brought about by severe frost have Nonmore than once been the occasion of accidents on which for con (h) Lee v. Riley (1865) 18 C. B. N. S. 722, 34 L. J. C. P. 212. Both decisions were unanimous, and two judges (Erle C. J. and Keating J.) took part in both. Cp. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10 (i) 3 App. Ca. 193, 47 L. J. liability sequences untenable claims for compensation have been founded, the of unusual things: Blyth v. ham Water works Co. state of Courts holding that the mishap was not such as the party charged with causing it by his negligence could reasonBirming- ably be expected to provide against. In the memorable "Crimean winter" of 1854-5 a fire-plug attached to one of the mains of the Birmingham Waterworks Company was deranged by the frost, the expansion of superficial ice forcing out the plug, as it afterwards seemed, and the water from the main being dammed by incrusted ice and snow above. The escaping water found its way through the ground into the cellar of a private house, and the Occupier sought to recover from the company for the damage. The Court held that the accident was manifestly an extraordinary one, and beyond any such foresight as could be reasonably required (k). Here nothing was alleged as constituting a wrong on the company's part beyond the mere fact that they did not take extraordinary precautions. Sharp v. The later case of Sharp v. Powell (1) goes farther, as the story begins with an act on the defendant's part which was a clear breach of the law. He caused his van to be washed in a public street, contrary to the Metropolitan Police Act. The water ran down a gutter, and would in fact (m) (but for a hard frost which had then set in for some time) have run harmlessly down a grating into the sewer, at a corner some twenty-five yards from where the van was washed. As it happened, the grating was frozen (k) Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781, 25 L. J. Ex. 212. The question was not really of remoteness of damage, but whether there was any evidence of negligence at all: nevertheless the case is instructive for com parison with the others here cited. Cp. Mayne on Damages, Preface to the first edition. (7) L. R. 7 C. P. 253, 41 L. J. C. P. 95 (1872). (m) So the Court found, having power to draw inferences of fact. |