actions that my property be destroyed in the meat eaten, and in the wood burnt. So as in some cases by consequent and not directly, and as its effect, a dispensation or licence may destroy and alter property" (t). tion of distinction when with Generally speaking, a licence is a mere voluntary sus- Revocapension of the licensor's right to treat certain acts as licence: wrongful, comes to an end by any transfer of the property with respect to which the licence is given (u), and is re- coupled voked by signifying to the licensee that it is no longer the interest. licensor's will to allow the acts permitted by the licence. The revocation of a licence is in itself no less effectual though it may be a breach of contract. If the owner of land or a building admits people thereto on payment, as spectators of an entertainment or the like, it may be a breach of contract to require a person who has duly paid his money and entered to go out, but a person so required has no title to stay, and if he persists in staying he is a trespasser. His only right is to sue on the contract (a): when, indeed, he may get an injunction, and so be indirectly restored to the enjoyment of the licence (y). But if a licence is part of a transaction whereby a lawful interest in some property, besides that which is the immediate subject of the licence, is conferred on the licensee, and the licence is necessary to his enjoyment of that interest, the licence is said to be " coupled with an interest" and cannot be revoked until its purpose is fulfilled: nay more, where the grant obviously cannot be enjoyed without an incidental licence, the law will (t) Vaughan C. J., Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 351. (u) Wallis v. Harrison (1838) 4 M. & W. 538, 8 L. J. Ex. 44. (x) Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M. & W. 838, 14 L. J. Ex. 161; Hyde v. Graham (1862) 1 H. & C. 593, 32 L. J. Ex. 27. (y) See Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace (1859) Joh. 333, where however the agreement was treated as an agreement to execute a legal grant. Executed licences. annex the necessary licence to the grant. "A mere licence is revocable; but that which is called a licence is often something more than a licence; it often comprises or is connected with a grant, and then the party who has given it cannot in general revoke it so as to defeat his grant to which it was incident" (3). Thus the sale of a standing crop or of growing trees imports a licence to the buyer to enter on the land so far and so often as reasonably necessary for cutting and carrying off the crop or the trees, and the licence cannot be revoked until the agreed time, if any, or otherwise a reasonable time for that purpose has elapsed (a). The diversity to be noted between licence and grant is of respectable antiquity. In 1460 the defendant in an action of trespass set up a right of common; the plaintiff said an excessive number of beasts were put in; the defendant said this was by licence of the plaintiff; to which the plaintiff said the licence was revoked before the trespass complained of; Billing, then king's serjeant, afterwards Chief Justice of the King's Bench under Edward IV., argued that a licence may be revoked at will even if expressed to be for a term, and this seems to have so much impressed the Court that the defendant, rather than take the risk of demurring, alleged a grant: the reporter's note shows that he thought the point new and interesting (). But a licensee who has entered or placed goods on land under a revocable licence is entitled to have notice of revocation and a reasonable time to quit or remove his goods (c). Again, if the acts licensed be such as have permanent (z) Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & (a) See further 2 Wms. Saund. (c) Cornish v. Stubbs (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 334, 39 L. J. C. P. 202; Mellor v. Watkins (1874) L. R. 9 Q. B. 400. results, as in altering the condition of land belonging to the licensee in a manner which, but for the licence, would be a nuisance to adjacent land of the licensor; there the licensor cannot, by merely revoking the licence, cast upon the licensee the burden of restoring the former state of things. A licence is in its nature revocable (d), but the revocation will not make it a trespass to leave things as the execution of the licence has made them. In this sense it is said that "a licence executed is not countermandable" (e). When a licence to do a particular thing once for all has been executed, there is nothing left to revoke. Whether and how far the licensor can get rid of the consequences if he mislikes them afterwards is another and distinct inquiry, which can be dealt with only by considering what those consequences are. He may doubtless get rid of them at his own charges if he lawfully can; but he cannot call on the licensee to take any active steps unless under some right expressly created or reserved. For this purpose, therefore, there is a material difference between "a licence to do acts which consist in repetition, as to walk in a park, to use a carriage-way, to fish in the waters of another, or the like," which may be countermanded without putting the licensee in any worse position than before the licence was granted, and "a licence to construct a work which is attended with expense to the party using the licence, so that, after the same is countermanded, the party to whom it was granted may sustain a heavy loss" (f). And this rule is as binding on a licensor's successors in title as on himself (g). But it is not applicable (in this country at any rate) to the extent of creating (d) Wood v. Leadbitter, note (*) last page. (e) Winter v. Brockwell (1807) 8 East 308. This class of cases is expressly recognized and distin guished in Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. at p. 855. (f) Liggins v. Inge (1831) 7 Bing. 682, 694, per cur, (g) Ibid, Expres sion of will. in or over land of the licensor an easement or other interest capable of being created only by deed (). In those cases, however, the licensee is not necessarily without remedy, for the facts may be such as to confer on him an interest which can be made good by way of equitable estoppel (i). This form of remedy has been extensively applied in the United States to meet the hardship caused by untimely revocation of parol licences to erect dams, divert water-courses, and the like (k). The grant or revocation of a licence may be either by licensor's express words or by any act sufficiently signifying the licensor's will; if a man has leave and licence to pass through a certain gate, the licence is as effectually revoked by locking the gate as by a formal notice (1). In the common intercourse of life between friends and neighbours tacit licences are constantly given and acted on. Distinc tion from We shall have something to say in another connexion (m) grant as of the rights or rather want of rights-of a "bare regards strangers. licensee." Here we may add that a licence, being only a personal right-or rather a waiver of the licensor's rightsis not assignable, and confers no right against any third person. If a so-called licence does operate to confer an exclusive right capable of (h) Wood v. Leadbitter, p. 323, above; Raffey v. Henderson (1851) 17 Q. B. 574, 21 L. J. Q. B. 49; Hewitt v. Isham (1851) 7 Ex. 77, 21 L. J. Ex. 35 (showing that conversely what purports to be a reservation in a parol demise may operate as a licence). (i) See Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington, N. Z. (1884) 9 App. Ca. 699, 53 L. J. P. C. 104, where the two principles do not appear to be sufficiently distinguished. being protected against a (k) Cooley on Torts, 307-310. It seems to have sometimes been thought in America that the only difficulty arises from the Statute of Frauds, which is of course a mistake: Wood v. Leudbitter, p. 323, above. The limits of the doctrine are in this country fixed by Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L. R. 1 H. L. 129. (1) See Hyde v. Graham, note (x) p. 323. (m) Chap. XII. below, ad fin. stranger, it must be that there is more than a licence, namely the grant of an interest or easement. And the question of grant or licence may further depend on the question whether the specified mode of use or enjoyment is known to the law as a substantive right or interest (n): a question that may be difficult. But it is submitted that on principle the distinction is clear. I call at a friend's house; a contractor who is doing some work on adjacent land has encumbered my friend's drive with rubbish; can it be said that this is a wrong to me without special damage? With such damage, indeed, it is (o), but only because a stranger cannot justify that which the occupier himself could not have justified. The licence is material only as showing that I was not a wrong-doer myself; the complaint is founded on actual and specific injury, not on a quasi trespass. Our law of trespass is not so eminently reasonable that one need be anxious to extend to licensees the very large rights which it gives to owners and occupiers. As to justification by authority of the law, this is of two Justificakinds: 1. In favour of a true owner against a wrongful possessor; under this head come re-entry on land and retaking of goods. 2. In favour of a paramount right conferred by law against the rightful possessor; which may be in the execution of legal process, in the assertion or defence of private right, or in some cases by reason of necessity. tion by law. A person entitled to the possession of lands or tenements Re-entry (n) Compare Nuttall v. Bracewell (1866) L. R. 2 Ex. 1, 36 L. J. Ex. 1, with Ormerod v. Todmorden Mill Co. (1883) 11 Q. B. Div. 155, 52 L. J. Q. B. 445; and see Gale on Easements, 5th ed. 315. Contra the learned editors of Smith's (0) Corby v. Hill (1858) 4 C. B. herein of |