Limitation of actions. Suspen sion of the (unless it be the Governors Act already discussed and disposed of) applicable to the present case." The times in which actions of tort must be brought are fixed by the Statute of Limitation of James I. (21 Jac. 1, c. 16) as modified by later enactments (n). No general principle is laid down, but actionable wrongs are in effect divided into three classes, with a different term of limitation for each. These terms, and the causes of action to which they apply, are as follows, the result being stated, without regard to the actual words of the statute, according to the modern construction and practice : Six years. Trespass to land and goods, conversion, and all other common law wrongs (including libel) except slander by words actionable per se (o) and injuries to the person. Four years. Injuries to the person (including imprisonment). Two years. Slander by words actionable per se. Persons who at the time of their acquiring a cause of statute by action are infants, married women, or lunatics (p), have the period of limitation reckoned against them only from disabili ties. (n) See the text of the statutes, Appendix C. (0) See Blake Odgers, Digest of Law of Libel, 2nd ed. 520. (p) Plaintiffs imprisoned or being beyond the seas had the same right by the statute of James I., but this was abrogated by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97 (the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856), s. 10. The existing law as to defendants beyond seas is the result of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 [al. 16], s. 19, as explained by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12. As to the retrospective effect of s. 10, see Pardo v. Bingham (1869) 4 Ch. 735, 39 L. J. Ch. 170. the time of the disability ceasing; and if a defendant is beyond seas at the time of the right of action arising, the time runs against the plaintiff only from his return. No part of the United Kingdom or of the Channel Islands is deemed to be beyond seas for this purpose (2). If one cause of disability supervenes on another unexpired one (as where a woman marries under age), the period of limitation probably runs only from the expiration of the latter disability (r). Where damage is the gist of the action, the time runs only from the actual happening of the damage (s). Justices of the peace (t) and constables (u) are protected Protection of justices, by general enactments that actions against them for any constathing done in the execution of their office must be brought within six months of the act complained of. The enforcement of statutory duties is often made subject by the same Acts which create the duties to a short period of limitation. These provisions do not really belong to our subject, but to various particular branches of public law. bles, &c. of con The operation of the Statute of Limitation is further Exception subject to the exception of concealed fraud, derived from cealed the doctrine and practice of the Court of Chancery, which, fraud. whether it thought itself bound by the terms of the statute, or only acted in analogy to it (x), considerably modified its (a) See last note. (r) Cp. Borrows v. Ellison (1871) L. R. Ex. 128, 40 L. J. Ex. 131 (on the Real Property Limitation Act, 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27); but the language of the two statutes might be distinguished. (8) Backhouse v. Bonomi (1861) 9 H. L. C. 503, 34 L. J. Q. B. 181; Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (t) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 8. Conclu sion of General Part. literal application. Where a wrong-doer fraudulently conceals his own wrong, the period of limitation runs only from the time when the plaintiff discovers the truth, or with reasonable diligence would discover it. Such is now the rule of the Supreme Court in every branch of it and in all causes (y). A plaintiff may not set up by way of amendment claims in respect of causes of action which are barred by the statute at the date of amendment, though they were not so at the date of the original writ (≈). It has often been remarked that, as matter of policy, the periods of limitation fixed by the statute of James are unreasonably long for modern usage; but modern legislation has done nothing beyond removing some of the privileged disabilities. We have now reviewed the general principles which are common to the whole law of Torts as to liability, as to exceptions from liability, and as to remedies. In the following part of this work we have to do with the several distinct kinds of actionable wrongs, and the law peculiarly applicable to each of them. (y) Gibbs v. Guild (1882) 9 Q. B. Div. 59, 51 L. J. Q. B. 313, which makes the equitable doctrine of general application without regard to the question whether before the Judicature Acts the Court of Chancery would or would not have had jurisdiction in the case. (2) Weldon v. Neal (1887) 19 Q. B. Div. 394, 56 L. J. Q. B. 621. SECURITY for the person is among the first conditions of Prelimicivilized life. The law therefore protects us, not only nary. against actual hurt and violence, but against every kind of bodily interference and restraint not justified or excused by allowed cause, and against the present apprehension of any of these things. The application of unlawful force to another constitutes the wrong called battery: an action which puts another in instant fear of unlawful force, though no force be actually applied, is the wrong called assault. These wrongs are likewise indictable offences, and under modern statutes can be dealt with by magistrates in the way of summary jurisdiction, which is the kind of redress most in use. Most of the learning of assault and battery, considered as civil injuries, turns on the determination of the occasions and purposes by which the use of force is justified. The elementary notions are so well settled as to require little illustration. "The least touching of another in anger is a battery" (a); What (a) Holt C. J., Cole v. Turner (1705) 6 Mod. 149, and Bigelow L. C. 218. shall be said a battery. What an assault. "for the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner" (b). It is immaterial not only whether the force applied be sufficient in degree to cause actual hurt, but whether it be of such a kind as is likely to cause it. Some interferences with the person which cause no bodily harm are beyond comparison more insulting and annoying than others which do cause it. Spitting in a man's face is more offensive than a blow, and is as much a battery in law (c). Again, it does not matter whether the force used is applied directly or indirectly, to the human body itself or to anything in contact with it; nor whether with the hand or anything held in it, or with a missile (d). Battery includes assault, and though assault strictly means an inchoate battery, the word is in modern usage constantly made to include battery. No reason appears for maintaining the distinction of terms in our modern practice and in the draft Criminal Code of 1879 “assault" is deliberately used in the larger popular sense. "An assault" (so runs the proposed definition) "is the act of intentionally applying force to the person of another directly or indirectly, or attempting or threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, if the person making the threat causes the other to believe (e) |