Of other public authorities. Indian Act, in the like position with an officer executing an apparently regular civil process, namely, that he is protected if he acts under orders given by a person whom he is generally bound by the rules of the service to obey, and of a kind which that person is generally authorized to give, and if the particular order is not necessarily or manifestly unlawful (0). The same principles apply to the exemption of a person acting under the orders of any public body competent in the matter in hand. An action does not lie against the Serjeant-at-arms of the House of Commons for excluding a member from the House in obedience to a resolution of the House itself; this being a matter of internal discipline in which the House is supreme (p). The principles of English law relating to the protection XVIII. of of judicial officers and persons acting under their orders have in British India been declared by express enactment (Act XVIII. of 1850). 1850. Acts of quasijudicial discretion. 4.-Quasi-judicial Acts. Divers persons and bodies are called upon, in the management of public institutions or government of voluntary associations, to exercise a sort of conventional jurisdiction analogous to that of inferior courts of justice. These (0) See per Willes J. in Keighly v. Bell (1866) 4 F. & F. at p. 790. In time of war the protection may perhaps be more extensive. As to criminal responsibility in such cases, cf. Stephen, Dig. Cr. Law, art. 202, Hist. Cr. Law, i. 200-206. (p) Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 271, 53 L. J. Q. B. 209. As to the limits of the privilege, see per Stephen J. at p. 283. As to the power of a colonial legislative assembly over its own members, see Barton v. Taylor (J. C. 1886) 11 App. Ca. 197, 55 L. J. P. C. 1. quasi-judicial functions are in many cases created or confirmed by Parliament. Such are the powers of the universities over their officers and graduates, and of colleges in the universities over their fellows and scholars, and of the General Council of Medical Education over registered medical practitioners (7). Often the authority of the quasijudicial body depends on an instrument of foundation, the provisions of which are binding on all persons who accept benefits under it. Such are the cases of endowed schools and religious congregations. And the same principle appears in the constitution of modern incorporated companies, and even of private partnerships. Further, a quasi-judicial authority may exist by the mere convention of a number of persons who have associated themselves for any lawful purpose, and have entrusted powers of management and discipline to select members. The committees of most clubs have by the rules of the club some such authority, or at any rate an initiative in presenting matters of discipline before the whole body. The Inns of Court exhibit a curious and unique example of great power and authority exercised by voluntary unincorporated societies in a legally anomalous manner. Their powers are for some purposes quasi-judicial, and yet they are not subject to any ordinary jurisdiction (r). natural and spe cial rules, if any, The general rule as to quasi-judicial powers of this class Rules of is that persons exercising them are protected from civil liability if they observe the rules of natural justice, and also the particular statutory or conventional rules, if any, which may prescribe their course of action. The rules of observed. natural justice appear to mean, for this purpose, that a man is not to be removed from office or membership, or other (9) See Allbutt v. General Council, fc. (1889) 23 Q. B. Div. 400; Leeson v. General Council, &c. (1889), 43 Ch. Div. 366. (r) See Neate v. Denman (1874) 18 Eq. 127. must be Absolute discre tionary powers. wise dealt with to his disadvantage, without having fair and sufficient notice of what is alleged against him, and an opportunity of making his defence; and that the decision, whatever it is, must be arrived at in good faith with a view to the common interest of the society or institution concerned. If these conditions be satisfied, a court of justice will not interfere, not even if it thinks the decision was in fact wrong (s). If not, the act complained of will be declared void, and the person affected by it maintained in his rights until the matter has been properly and regularly dealt with (t). These principles apply to the expulsion of a partner from a private firm where a power of expulsion is conferred by the partnership contract (u). It may be, however, that by the authority of Parliament (or, it would seem, by the previous agreement of the party to be affected) a governing or administrative body, or the majority of an association, has power to remove a man from office or the like without anything in the nature of judicial proceedings, and without showing any cause at all. Whether a particular authority is judicial or absolute must be determined by the terms of the particular instrument creating it (r). (s) Inderwick v. Snell (1850) 2 Mac. & G. 216 (removal of a director of a company); Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881) 17 Ch. Div. 615 (expulsion of a member from a club); cf. 13 Ch. D. 352. (t) Fisher v. Keane (1878) 11 Ch. D. 353, 49 L. J. Ch. 11 (a club case, no notice to the member); Labouchere v. Wharncliffe (1879) 13 Ch. D. 346 (the like, no sufficient inquiry or notice to the member, calling and proceedings of general meeting irregular); Dean v. Bennett (1870) 6 Ch. 489, 40 L. J. Ch. 452 (minister of Baptist chapel under deed of settlement, no sufficient notice of specific charges either to the minister or in calling special meeting). (u) Blisset v. Daniel (1853) 10 Ha. 493; Wood v. Woad (1874) L. R. 9 Ex. 190, 43 L. J. Ex. 190. Without an express power in the articles a partner cannot be expelled at all. (v) E. g. Dean v. Bennett, supra (power judicial); Hayman v. Governors of Rugby School (1874) 18 Eq. 28, 43 L. J. Ch. 834 (power absolute). whether ministerial: On the other hand there may be question whether the Questions duties of a particular office be quasi-judicial, or merely duty judiministerial, or judicial for some purposes and ministerial cial or for others. It seems that at common law the returning or Ashby. presiding officer at a parliamentary or other election has White, &c. a judicial discretion, and does not commit a wrong if by an honest error of judgment he refuses to receive a vote (~): but now in most cases it will be found that such officers are under absolute statutory duties (y), which they must perform at their peril. 5.-Parental and quasi-parental Authority. of parents and per sons in loco parentis. Thus much of private quasi-judicial authority. There Authority are also several kinds of authority in the way of summary force or restraint which the necessities of society require to be exercised by private persons. And such persons are protected in exercise thereof, if they act with good faith and in a reasonable and moderate manner. Parental authority (whether in the hands of a father or guardian, or of a person to whom it is delegated, such as a schoolmaster) is the most obvious and universal instance (z). It is needless to say more of this here, except that modern civilization has considerably diminished the latitude of (x) Tozer v. Child (1857) Ex. Ch. 7 E. & B. 377, 26 L. J. Q. B. 151, explaining Ashby v. White, Ld. Raym. 938, and in 1 Sm. L. C.; and see the special report of Holt's judgment published in 1837 and referred to in Tozer v. Child. There is some difference of opinion in America, see Cooley on Torts, 413, 414. (y) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 82. As to presiding officers under The Ballot Act, 1872, Pickering v. James (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 489, 42 L. J. C. P. 217; Ackers v. Howard (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 739, 55 L. J. Q. B. 273. (2) Blackstone, i. 452. See modern examples collected in Addison on Torts, 6th ed. p. 145. Of custodians of lunatics, &c. what judges or juries are likely to think reasonable and moderate correction (a). Persons having the lawful custody of a lunatic, and those acting by their direction, are justified in using such reasonable and moderate restraint as is necessary to prevent the lunatic from doing mischief to himself or others, or required, according to competent opinion, as part of his treatment. This may be regarded as a quasi-paternal power; but I conceive the person entrusted with it is bound to use more diligence in informing himself what treatment is proper than a parent is bound (I mean, can be held bound in a court of law) to use in studying the best method of education. The standard must be more strict as medical science improves. A century ago lunatics were beaten, confined in dark rooms, and the like. Such treatment could not be justified now, though then it would have been unjust to hold the keeper criminally or civilly liable for not having more than the current wisdom of experts. In the case of a drunken man, or one deprived of self-control by a fit or other accident, the use of moderate restraint, as well for his own benefit as to prevent him from doing mischief to others, may in the same way be justified. Of the master of a ship. 6.-Authorities of Necessity. The master of a merchant ship has by reason of necessity the right of using force to preserve order and discipline for the safety of the vessel and the persons and property (a) The ancient right of a husband to beat his wife moderately (F. N. B. 80 F. 239 A.) was discredited by Blackstone (i. 445) and is not recognized at this day; but as a husband and wife cannot in any case sue one another for assault in a civil court, this does not con cern us. |