It is a fundamental principle of construction that the language of statutes and Constitutions must be construed, if possible, in its ordinary and usual sense.

In the second place, the results of interpreting this language to mean that the fifteen-day period begins as soon as the bills have been forwarded to the mayor might be very unfortunate. The method of transmission is not provided for either in the Constitution or by statute. I am informed that it has been customary to employ either messengers or mail. In the case of a bill being transmitted by messenger, if for any reason he failed to deliver it within the fifteen days, the whole purpose of this constitutional provision might be defeated. The Legislature, on the expiration of fifteen days, not having received the bills back from the mayor, would have the right to enact them into law even though no opportunity had been given to the city authorities for a hearing on a bill or for accepting or rejecting the same. The same thing might be true if for any other reason the bills fail to reach their destination. A construction which might make possible such results is, under the principles to which I have already alluded, to be avoided unless clearly compelled by the language of the Constitution, and this consideration is an additional reason which inclines me to take the view that the word "transmit" here used must be taken in its usual or ordinary sense and includes delivery.

The indorsement which the statute requires the clerk of the house to place upon the original bill to be presented to the Governor and upon the certified copy thereof to be transmitted to the mayor, is not declared by the statute to be presumptive or conclusive evidence of any fact. If the language of the section quoted makes the indorsement a certificate of anything, it is of a mere conclusion and not of a fact. It is probably true that this indorsement of the date of transmission is binding on the Executive in the absence of any proof or facts of the time of the actual delivery of the bill, but it is my opinion that where, as in this case, the undisputed facts disclose that the bills did not reach the mayor until the 3d of May, and those facts are brought to your attention, the presumption of the indorsement is overcome.

If the above conclusions are sound, it follows that the bills in question were transmitted to the mayor of New York on the 3d

of May rather than on the 1st and that he, therefore, had until the 18th of May, under the Constitution, in which to return them to you with the acceptance of the city.

I am also of the opinion that the word "return" as used in the provision of the Constitution in question, means the actual delivery of a bill to the Executive Chamber or Governor. The same considerations to which I have already referred in respect to the meaning of the word "transmit" apply with equal force here.

The second question which might be presented is whether if the fifteen-day period mentioned in the Constitution would bring the last day upon Sunday, the time for the return of these bills would be extended to include the following day. This question, of course, is eliminated if the conclusions at which I have arrived in reference to the meaning of the word "transmit" are sound. If the courts should take the view, however, that the date of forwarding the bills is the date of their transmission, it would still be open to argument that the bills were returned in time by being delivered into your possession on Monday, the 17th instant. While the question is a doubtful one, I have finally reached the conclusion that this argument should not prevail. Although many decisions hold that in interpreting the meaning of a Constitution, the language must be read in the light of existing statutes and that the principles of interpretation applicable to statutes are also applicable to Constitutions, I am, nevertheless, of the opinion that the provision of the Statutory Construction Law which states that wherever a certain event is to be performed within a certain number of days and the last day falls upon Sunday, the time is to be extended to include the following Monday, is limited in its scope to the interpretation of statutes. There is sufficient doubt upon this question, however, to furnish an additional reason why the bills should be considered as having been returned in time, rather than that you should be precluded from considering them on their merits.

Very respectfully yours,

EDWARD R. O'MALLEY,
Attorney-General.

Indians.

Oneida Tribe. Treaty of 1788. Reservation of certain tract of land near Oneida lake and Fish creek, for occupation and use of tribe. Whether Treaty of 1795 again reserved such lands. Annuities provided by Treaty of 1788. Why pay-ments are not continued.

(See opinion, October 26, 1909.)

STATE OF NEW YORK,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

ALBANY, June 17, 1909.

Hon. CHARLES E. HUGHES, Governor of the State of New York, Capitol, Albany, N. Y.:

Dear Sir. I have the honor to report herewith upon the matters referred to me by your communication of April 15, 1909, inclosing a letter and papers from Arthur C. Parker, Esq., attorney for certain Indians of the Oneida tribe.

Mr. Parker states that these Indians claim they have not received the rentals for land reserved for their use about Oneida lake and Fish creek in accordance with the terms of a treaty made between the Oneida Nation and the People of the State of New York on September 22, 1788, and that they desire to know if they can still use and occupy or enjoy the rentals of these lands reserved by the said treaty.

As these questions involved the examination of the records of events extending over a very long period of time and involved a large amount of research, my report has necessarily been delayed. The records show that these same claims have been made several times heretofore, but the records of the disposition of such claims are obscure and indefinite, consequently, the examination, which included a search of treaties, legislative documents. and reports of committees, and records in various State departments, has taken a considerable period of time.

The treaty of 1788 reserved to the Oneida Indians a tract of land one-half mile in breadth on each side of Fish creek; all right and title in and to this land was conveyed by the Oneida

tribe, some portions to the State and some portions to individual Indians, to be held in severalty by them, by treaties dated September 15, 1795, March 5, 1802, and March 21, 1805, respectively, the last-mentioned treaty disposing of "all the lands belonging to the Oneida Nation along the Fish Creek." (Records, Secretary of State: volume 2, pages 171-173, 191, 213 and 218.) As to the lands about Oneida lake, I understand Mr. Parker has reference to three tracts of land, each one-half mile square on the north shore of Oneida lake, concerning which the said treaty of 1788 says: " and especially there shall forever remain ungranted by the People of the State of New York one-half mile square at the distance of every six miles of the lands along the northern bounds of the Oneida Lake * * and to remain as well for the Oneidas and their posterity as for the inhabitants of the said state to land and encamp on."

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I find that the same claim in reference to these three quartersections of land was made in the early 70's and was referred to a committee appointed by the Governor to investigate them. This committee reported (Senate Document No. 79, vol. 4, 1874) that no treaty could be found conveying or releasing the rights of the Oneida tribe in these lands along the north shore of Oneida lake. The committee also reported a considerable amount of testimony, some of the witnesses being aged Indians of the Oneida tribe, all of which testimony tended to substantiate the claim that the Oneidas then owned and had never released their treaty rights in and to these particular three pieces. The committee's report also showed that it had been claimed on the part of some of the State officials that the Oneida's rights to these parcels had been ceded by the treaty, but that the treaty itself could not be found or produced.

There is included in this report a copy of a treaty made between the Oneida tribe and the People of the State of New York on September 15, 1795, concerning which the committee's report says: "In the treaty of September 15, 1795, the piece of land on the Onondaga river and the reservations on the north side of Onondaga (meaning Oneida) lake are again reserved, but not mentioned in subsequent treaties." In my judgment this is incorrect. The treaty of 1795 did not again reserve to the Indians

the lands on the north shore of Oneida lake, but, on the contrary, this treaty conveyed and released to the People of the State of New York all the Oneida Indians' right, title and interest in and to these three parcels.

A careful examination of this treaty of 1795 shows that the Indians ceded a large part of the land within the boundary and on the southern and western sides of the reservation established by the treaty of 1788, but from this tract, ceded by the treaty of 1795, there were excepted certain lands formerly granted to the Stockbridge Indians and there was also excepted one mile square on the east side of the Stockbridge lands, but there was included in the conveyance, not as a part of the lands still reserved, but as a part of the lands ceded and conveyed by this treaty of 1795: "All the lands lying on the north side of the Oneida lake appropriated and set apart to the use, benefit and behoof of the said nation of Indians at the treaty aforesaid (treaty of 1788), and also the land at the fishing place in the Onondaga river, mentioned in the treaty aforesaid."

While the language used in the treaty may seem at first to be ambiguous, upon an analysis of the whole language it seems clear to me. Here were tracts of land on the north shore of Oneida lake, on which the Indians had reserved the right to encamp, although it was never claimed they owned them. The parcels were all outside of the boundary of the reservation established by the treaty of 1788 and formed no part of nor were they even contiguous to the lands ceded by the treaty of 1795. If, as stated in the report of the committee above referred to, the treaty of 1795 had not intended to cede and convey these three parcels, there would have been no mention made of them. If the treaty had intended to except these parcels from the conveyance it would have repeated the word "excepting" in the clause describing these parcels, but, on the contrary, the treaty, after conveying a certain tract with certain exceptions, adds to and include in the lands conveyed these three parcels and the fishing place on Onondaga river.

It, therefore, seems to me that the committee above referred to was clearly in error in stating that these lands along the north shore of Oneida lake were again reserved by the treaty of 1795,