Vol. III.] NOTES OF NEW BOOKS. [No. 1. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE S [OCTOBER TERM, 1875.] INVESTMENT OF TRUST FUNDS IN CONFEDERATE BONDS. Horn v. Lockhart dis FIELD, J. tinguished. KNOTTS v. STEARNS. The decree, after ordering a sale of the property, also provided for the investment of the proceeds in bonds or stocks of the Confederate States, or of any state belonging to the Confederacy, or of the city of Richmond. The proceeds were invested in bonds of the Confederacy, and the investment was approved by the court. It is now contended that the decree of sale was invalid because of the direction for the investment of the proceeds, and the subsequent approval of the investment made, the counsel of the appellants insisting that aid was thus directly given to the rebellion. The case of Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wallace, 570, which is invoked by the appellants, lends no support to their pretensions. That was the case of an executor in Alabama seeking to escape an accounting and payment to legatees of proceeds of property of the estate in his hands sold previous to the war, and retained by him for years after he had been called to a final account by the probate court of the state, by alleging a voluntary investment of the proceeds in bonds of the Confederate government. Those bonds were issued for the express purpose of raising funds to carry on the war then waged against the United States. The investment was, therefore, held to be illegal, because it constituted a direct contribution to the resources of the Confederate government, thus giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States; and the character of the transaction in this respect was not deemed to have been changed by the fact that the investment was authorized by the existing legislation of the state, and was approved by the subsequent decree of its probate court. A voluntary proceeding in aid of a treasonable organization could not be thus freed from its original unlawfulness. There is no analogy between that case and the one at bar. Here no action is sought to be upheld which was taken in aid of the insurrectionary government. The sale in question was not made with any reference to that government, but solely to raise a fund which would yield an income for the support of the widow and children, and was, therefore, a lawful proceeding. The widow and the guardian were not compelled to take the bonds of the Confederate government; they were allowed the option of investing in such bonds, or bonds of any of the states of the Confederacy, or bonds of the city of Richmond. Having deliberately selected the securities of the insurrectionary government in which to place their money, it would be a strange thing if complaints could now be heard from them against the title of the purchaser of the property, who had nothing to do with the disposition of the money, on the ground that the court did not preserve them from the folly of that invest ment. We perceive no error in the decree of the court below, and it is accordingly affirmed. NOTES OF NEW BOOKS. CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE U. S. FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. Reported by William B. Woods, the Circuit Judge. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. With the growth of litigation in the federal courts have come new series of United States Courts reports. We venture nothing in expressing the conviction that they have generally been timely and useful additions to our legal literature, particularly where, as in the present instance, they have tended to define and harmonize the practice of an entire circuit. Vol. III.] NOTES OF NEW BOOKS. [No. 1. The volume before us merits special notice as containing numerous opinions having relation to the great questions that were incidental to the rebellion and an exceptional number of decisions upon federal practice. These are, probably, its most pronounced features, although it is in no sense wanting in interest in other respects. Its merit is enhanced by the fact that the cases are to be regarded as really "selected," and as marked precedents covering a very wide range. As a whole, we know of no more comprehensive volume of federal reports. The opinions are chiefly by Judges Bradley and Woods. In nearly every instance the facts are stated by the court without any explanation of the points of counsel — a circumstance which we are inclined to regret, especially in view of the masterly ability of the bars of several of the districts in the Fifth Circuit, whose representatives appear only by name. The series is happily inaugurated by the Circuit Judge, and will be gratefully accepted by the profession in his circuit as another evidence of his industry and ability in the performance of the grave and delicate duties that have devolved upon him. THE LAW OF HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS. San Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co. A convenient and conscientious work, prepared with much judgment and satisfactorily exhaustive. CASES ON WARRANTY. Cleveland: Ingham, Clarke & Co. This collection embraces the English and American cases, the most important in extenso. It is not without some merit. The mechanical features of the work are bad enough to call for remark. AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE is offered by Messrs. Cockroft & Co. of Chicago. The same firm have Forsyth's History of Trial by Jury. JUDGE COOLEY'S WORK ON TAXATION is ready for delivery. Callaghan & Co, Chicago, publishers. LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY have published a treatise on the Law of Taxation, by Francis Hilliard; also Vol. II. of Bishop's Commentaries on the Law of Married Women. THE AMERICAN LAW TIMES. NEW SERIES. FEBRUARY, 1876. - VOL. III., No. 2. NOTES OF OPINIONS, DECISIONS, AND ORDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCTOBER TERM, 1875. Monday, December 15, 1875. No. 52. R. K. Sewall, administrator, &c., appellant, v. J. W. Jones et al. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the decree of the said circuit court, with costs, and remanding the cause, with directions to enter a decree in favor of the defendant. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Clifford. This was an action to recover for the infringement of a patent for preserving corn, originally granted to one Isaac Winslow, of which Jones is the assignee. It is here held that the Winslow patent had been anticipated in its substantial merits by a patent to one Durand, granted in 1810, and that it is therefore void for want of novelty. It having been alleged that Winslow was not the original discoverer of the process claimed by him, but that he learned it in France, the court say on this head that it is a settled principle of patent law that, to entitle a plaintiff to recover for violation of a patent, he must be the original inventor, not only as regards the United States, but as to other parts of the world. Even if the plaintiff did not know that the discovery had been before made, still he cannot recover, if it has been in use, as described in public prints. Reversed. No. 3 (original). The State of Florida, complainant, v. E. C. Anderson et al. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court, ordering decree and perpetual injunction against the defendants. This is a suit by the state to enforce its lien upon the Jacksonville, Pensacola, & Mobile Railroad, under a mortgage made in 1870, in exchange for state bonds issued in aid of the road. By this exchange the state took $3,000,000 of the first mortgage bonds of the road, and $1,000,000 of the bonds of the Florida Central Railroad Company, in consideration of its issue to the company of $4,000,000 of bonds to hasten the completion of certain roads which had been consolidated in pursuance of the act incorporating it and authorizing the aid. The interest on these bonds not being paid, and a balance remaining due on a trustee's sale made in the interest of the state to the companies of certain of the roads consolidated, this suit was brought, and the decision is that the defendants ought to be enjoined from selling, taking possession of, or interfering with the line of railroad extending from Lake City to the Chattahoochee River, and from Tallahassee to St. Marks, so as to impede or obstruct the state in taking possession and procuring it to be condemned and sold in payment of the purchase money and interest claimed. The receiver of the property heretofore appointed is continued until the property can be delivered up to the proper authority. VOL. III. No. 42. J. Sherman Hall et al., plaintiffs in error, v. R. A. Lanning et al. the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Bradley delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the judgment of the 2 In error to Mr. Justice said circuit Vol. III.] NOTES OF OPINIONS, DECISIONS, AND ORDERS. [No. 2. court, with costs, and remanding the cause, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. Dissenting, Mr. Chief Justice Waite, Mr. Justice Strong, and Mr. Justice Hunt. This was an action of debt brought on a judgment rendered in New York against the plaintiffs in error as partners. Lybrand questioned the judgment, alleging that he had not been served with process, and did not appear, and that he was not a partner with Hall at the date of the judgment, and had not been for more than six months before. The decision below was that the judgment was conclusive against Lybrand, notwithstanding his plea and his non-residence in New York. It is here held that after the dissolution of a copartnership, one of the partners, in a suit brought against the firm, has no authority to enter an appearance for other partners living out of the state, and who have not been served with process, and that a judgment against all partners founded on such an appearance may be questioned by those not served with process in a suit brought thereon in another state, and will not bind them. No. 44. The Phillips & Colby Construction Co., plaintiff in error, v. Mark T. Seymour et al. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the judgment of the said circuit court, with costs, and remanding the cause for further proceedings, in conformity with the opinion of this court. In this case, Seymour & Co. obtained a judgment against the Construction Company of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company for a breach of the contract under which Seymour & Co. were building sections of the road. It was here insisted that the court erred in permitting a recovery beyond the amount earned by the work done, inasmuch as the alleged insolvency of the Construction Company, or failure to pay, had been brought about by the failure of Seymour & Co. to complete certain portions of the road, covered by their contract, as early as stipulated; that a recovery for prospective profits in case of the successful completion of the entire route given to the contractors, either by themselves or others, as sub-contractors, should not be allowed, because the damages were too remote. The court sustained this view, and reversed the judgment as to such special damages. No. 58. Ira P. Nudd et al., plaintiffs in error, v. George B. Burrows, assignee. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause, with costs and interest. This was an action by the defendant, here assignee in the bankruptcy of one Emmons, to recover certain money and property received of the bankrupt by the plaintiffs in error. The claim was that the property received was stock, bought largely on credit, at a time when Emmons was hopelessly insolvent, and that this fact was at the time known to the defendants, and that the transaction amounted to a fraudulent preference of creditors. The court below found the allegation true, having admitted as evidence the declarations of Emmons concerning the purchase of the stock, and the payment to the plaintiffs in error, notwithstanding the declarations were not made in the presence of either of them or brought to their knowledge. The court here affirm the judgment, sustaining the theory of the assignee that the evidence was competent, being the declarations of a fellow-conspirator. No. 57. The First Unitarian Society of Chicago, plaintiff in error, v. H. Floyd Faulk ner et al. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause, with costs and interest. This was an action by the architects to recover of the society for plans for a church edifice. The defence was that the plans were to be for such an edifice as could be built for a certain sum, whereas the lowest bid received was for upward of $20,000 more than that specified. The court below admitted evidence of certain utterances of the pastor of the church, which was favorable to the architects, and the verdict was for them. The judgment entered upon the verdict is here affirmed, the court being of the opinion, upon the whole case, that the recovery was reasonable. No. 21. George C. Roberts, appellant, v. William F. Ryer. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York; and No. 46. George C. Roberts, appellant, v. Joseph Buck, Jr. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the decrees of the said circuit courts in these causes, with costs. This was a suit for the infringement of a patent for an improvement in refrigerators. The decision below dismissed the bill, holding that the patent was void for want of novelty, and that decree is here affirmed. No. 46. Roberts v. Buck. Same court; same decision. Vol. III.] NOTES OF OPINIONS, DECISIONS, AND ORders. [No. 2. No. 75. James H. Woodford et al., plaintiffs in error, v. The Canastota National Bank. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. Mr. Chief Justice Waite announced the decision of the court, affirming the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause, with costs and interest, on authority of Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, and Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Buffalo v. Dearing, decided at the present term. (See Am. L. T. for Jan. 1876, p. 2.) No opinion deliv ered. No. 50. Isaac N. Bressler, plaintiff in error, v. Nelson Maxson et al. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Mr. Chief Justice Waite announced the decision of the court, dismissing the writ of error in this cause for the want of jurisdiction, on authority of St. Clair v. Lovington, 18 Wall. 628, and Moore v. Robbins, 18 Wall. 588. No opinion delivered. No. 759. The County of Warren, plaintiff in error, v. George O. Marcy. No. 760. The County of Warren, plaintiff in error, v. Augustus T. Post. No. 761. The County of Warren, plaintiff in error, v. The Portsmouth Savings Bank. Mr. Chief Justice Waite announced the decision of the court, denying the motions to dismiss these causes. opinion delivered. Monday, January 10. No No. 66. August F. Ludwig et al., appellants, v. The Propeller Free State, &c. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the decree of the said circuit court with costs. In this case the court affirmed the decrees below, holding that in a case of collision on the Detroit River between the propeller and a scow owned by the appellants, the scow was at fault in changing her direction after, by certain manoeuvres, she had induced the propeller to believe she would hold her course, and under the circumstances of the case the propeller was not charged with the duty of slackening her speed, because, in the opinion of her master, formed in view of the movements of the scow, there was no danger of a collision. No. 80. Henry M. Nebbett, appellant, v. James E. McFarland. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the decree of the said circuit court, with costs. No. 94. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, plaintiff in error, v. Hattie B. Tisdale. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the judgment of the said circuit court, with costs, remanding the cause, with directions to award a new trial. This was an action by the wife to recover upon a policy of insurance on the life of her husband. There was some evidence to the effect that he had been seen alive subsequent to his reported death. The court ruled that the letters of administration issued upon the estate of the husband to the wife made such a primâ facie case of death as cast the burden of proof upon the company. From this decision the case came here, where the question is whether in such a case, where the right of action depends upon the death of the insured, letters of administration upon the estate of such person, issued by the proper probate court, afford legal evidence of his death. It is here held that upon all the authorities, and upon a full consideration of the theories of the text writers on evidence, which are very conflicting, such letters are not sufficient proof of death, and the judgment is reversed. No. 62. Richard L. Wallach et al., appellants, v. John Van Riswick. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the decree of the said supreme court, with costs, and remanding the cause for further proceedings, in conformity with the opinion of this court. Charles S. Wallach, a brother of ex-mayor Wallach, of Washington, was an officer of the Confederate army during the war, and while thus engaged his real estate in Washington was confiscated, Van Riswick becoming the purchaser at the sale. At the date of the confiscation there was an incumbrance on the property for $5,000, which was held by Van Riswick. After the war Wallach returned to the city, and his wife joined him in a deed of the property to Van Riswick, the consideration being a considerable sum. Upon the death of Wallach his children brought this action, claiming that after confiscation no title remained in their father to convey, and that therefore nothing was passed by the deed to Van Riswick, and they, as his heirs, had a right to redeem. To this bill the court below sustained a demurrer, and the cause came here, where it is held that the obvious meaning of the legislation on the subject is that the proceedings for confiscation and sale shall not affect the owners of the property after the termination of the offender's natural life; that after his death, the land shall pass to or be owned by the heirs as if it had not |