more barbarous murder could not be imagined or conceived by the mind of man. For the sake of filthy lucre he had deprived the poor trader of his life, and had drugged him with drugs for days before he had done the fatal deed.* It was marvellous how the hand of God had brought the criminal here to justice. Let no idea of pardon or of mercy cross

your mind, for the gates of mercy are closed against you in this world. On Thursday morning next you must die. The last sentence of the law was then formally passed. His death, it would appear, was a torturing one, as the rope broke; and previous to his being again conducted to the gallows it was necessary to strengthen him with a draught of wine whilst seated on his coffin; for it was the barbarous custom of those times to place before the eyes of the condemned the coffin that should be in a few hours his resting-place!

The singular detection of M'Cann created, as may be supposed, a

*

great sensation in Galway. When men remembered that he had been foremost in all charitable undertakings, and had been equally liberal to all Christian sects; when they spoke of his industrious and blameless life, and of his apparent want of all compunction after the perpetration of the fearful deed, they marvelled much, though, indeed, they could find a parallel in the celebrated case to which we have alluded, the case of Eugène Aram.t M'Cann's case is still remembered in the city of the tribes, and it is invariably pointed to as an evidence that the hand of God will one day work out the detection of the murderer.

It is satisfactory to know that the wretched man confessed his guilt on the gallows, and that this is one amongst the many cases which illustrates the truth of the popular belief, that punishment must follow upon crime,

"There is a day of vengeance still, Linger it may, but come it will!"

+ Newgate Calendar.

DR. MCCоSH thinks it " no way to the credit of British thought, and least of all to that of the Scotch metaphysicians, that we have not in our language a history of the Scottish School of Philosophy." His volume on the Scottish philosophy is intended to supply this defect; and it is likely to be a useful manual to those interested in the lives of the many Scottish philosophers, whose love of wisdom has not issued in results of sufficient importance to obtain for them a niche in any of the cyclopædias of biography. But we cannot look on this book as a history of Scottish philosophy unless Reid and Stewart and their followers are to be regarded as exclusively entitled to the rank as representatives of their country in philosophical speculation.

It was not to be expected that a series of magazine articles on various Scottish philosophical writers could be converted into a history of Scottish philosophy, biographical, expository, and critical, by the mere expedient of arranging the papers chronologically, prefixing some general remarks, and filling up the interstices with a few semihistorical, semi-theological reflections in the shape of padding. The true historian must do more than this-the historian of philosophy especially must do much more than this. The increasing purpose that runs through the ages, the gradual widening of the thoughts of men

these are not subjects which admit of fragmentary and disjointed treatment. Philosophical history teaches no lesson when it is so written.

ness.

Again, it is above all things necessary for the historian of philosophy to be a man of broad sympathies, to be himself a humble, earnest, and unbiassed seeker after truth, and to be able to appreciate these qualities in others. In this essential qualification Dr. McCosh is not only deficient, but lamentably deficient. His sympathies are narrow, more than sectarian in their narrowHe estimates the value of every system of philosophy he deals with according as it is or is not consistent with the creed he has himself adopted; and he is not sufficiently alive to the fact that philosophical error, not less than philosophical truth, has its history, and that the history of error necessarily forms the most voluminous part of the history of philosophy, because error is manifold while truth is one.

A few quotations will illustrate these statements. What philosophical value, for example, is there in an estimate of David Humethat eager, inquisitive, restless sceptic,-we are describing him at a period of his life when he had not yet attained that contentment in scepticism which characterized his maturer years-by a historian who intrusively wishes that there had been a friend at hand to direct him

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"For some years past it has been well known in literary circles in Edinburgh that there was a scandal about David Hume in his younger years. Having been kindly allowed to look into the ecclesiastical records which bear upon it, I find that there was a charge brought but no evidence to support it. A woman did, March 5, 1734, charge Mr. David Hume, brother to Ninewells, as being the father of her child.' But this woman had previously had three illegitimate children; she had refused to say who was the father of her child when David Hume was in the country, though it was known he was leaving, and she brought the charge after he was gone. The Presbytery of Chirnside, when the case was brought before them, rebuked the woman for

her conduct, and there is no other record of the matter."

Yet once more, in this very sketch of Hume, the prejudices of the historian come obnoxiously to the front. In the latter years of his life Hume lived in Edinburgh, "on intimate

terms with Robertson and Blair, and at times mingled in their ecclesiastical counsels (sic). Many of the younger ministers reckoned it an honour to be admitted to his society, and he encouraged them to associate with him. These circumstances have led some to think that the leading moderate ministers of that period must have been infidels in secret, and acting hypocritically in professing Christianity; but there is no ground for such a charge. They believed sincerely in the doctrines of natural religion and in the Word of God as inspired to teach a pure morality and the immortality of the soul. But it is equally clear that they had no faith in the peculiar Bible doctrines of grace; and Hume was delighted to find them frowning on all religious earnestness, and advancing so rapidly on the road to deism and philosophic indifference."

Here the prejudice crops out, not only of a dogmatist, whose philosophical views are allied to what Comte describes as the rudimentary or theological, and Mill as the volitional stage of human speculation; not alone of a man whose mental horizon is bounded by the barriers which his own Church has erected in restraint of the inborn desire of the unfettered soul

"To follow knowledge like a sinking star,

Beyond the utmost bounds of human thought."

Dr. McCosh's prejudice is a still deeper form of bigotry. It is the prejudice of the adherent of the veriest sect of a sect; of one who cries aloud, like Paul at the council in Jerusalem, "Men, brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee! "

The Scottish philosophy, according to Dr. McCosh, "is distinguished by very marked and decided features, which we may represent as deter

mined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles." We do not quite understand what may be meant by these words. Probably the misfortune is our own, and arises from our want of appreciation of the higher forms of metaphorical literature. In any case, Dr. McCosh remedies the matter by enumerating three features as characteristic of the Scottish philosophy :

1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really.

2. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation; and

3. By the observations of consciousness principles are reached which are prior to, and independent of, experience.

In this enumeration we are disposed to agree, under the reservation that these features, while they may be called characteristic of Reid's school of philosophy, are not by any means distinctive features. Many systems of philosophy other than the Scottish school proceed on the method of observation, professedly and really, notably that of Auguste Comte. All employ selfconsciousness as the instrument of observation; because they must of necessity do so, no knowledge whatever being possible except through self-consciousness. That principles prior to, or independent of, experience are reached by this method is also the doctrine of Reid and his followers. But is the philosophy of James Mill foreign to Scotland, and are all philosophers to be excluded from their country's roll of sages who hold that our whole knowledge is the result of experience? And is Ferrier not a Scottish philosopher, because he holds the doctrine of Malebranche and Berkeley as to the nature and origin of our knowledge?

We claim for Scottish philosophy a higher place in the history of universal thought than Dr. McCosh

Of the "common-sense school," in Dr. McCosh's meaning of the terms, Dr. Thomas Reid may be regarded as practically the founder, though his followers carry their idolatry too far when they claim for him the merit of being the first philosopher who ever followed the dictates of common sense in his reasonings. His successors in the history of Scottish philosophy have been, among others, Dugald Stewart, Dr. Thomas Brown, and Sir William Hamilton. The living representatives of the school, as far as they are known to us, are Professor Fraser, of Edinburgh, and Dr. James McCosh. It is curious to note that all systems of philosophy have their three stages. They grow up; they culminate in the hands of some great thinker; then they have their period of decadence. In this case three names may be said to be typical of these three periods in the history of the philosophy of common sense. The names are Reid, Hamilton, and -McCosh!

The advent of common sense is the beginning of Scottish philosophy, according to Dr. McCosh. In what manner she was coaxed to lend her aid to philosophy, and by what devices philosophy was induced to accept that aid, we are fortunately able to

declare from authentic records. In

or about the year 1764, apparently in a fit of either disgust or despair, Dr. Reid addressed his divine mistress in the following eloquent

terms:

"Admired philosophy! daughter of light! parent of wisdom and knowledge! if thou art she, surely thou hast not yet arisen upon the human mind, nor blest us with more of thy rays than are sufficient to shed a darkness visible upon the human faculties, and to disturb that repose and security which happier mortals enjoy who never approached thine altar, nor felt thine influence! But if, indeed, thou hast not power to dispel those clouds and phantoms which thou hast discovered or created, withdraw this penurious and malignant ray; I despise philosophy, and renounce its guidance—let my soul dwell with common sense."

It must not be inferred from this passage that Reid regarded the antagonism between philosophy and common sense as a war à l'outrance; or that he really meant anything more, by the threatening and seemingly abusive language with which he concludes the above apostrophe to the daughter of light, than to urge the errant damsel to walk no longer in the counsel of the ungodly, but rather to return to the pleasant ways and peaceful paths of wisdom, under the guidance of Dr. Thomas Reid.

Reid thought that philosophy and common sense ought to be allies, and not enemies; and all true philosophers are at one with him on this point. The question at issue among such thinkers is not whether common sense is worthy of credit, but what does common sense say? As Reid very well puts it, "Philosophy has no other root but the principles of common sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this rcot, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rcts."

What, then, are these principles of common sense? Where are they to be found, and by what criterion are they to be distinguished? And what are the "clouds and phantoms," discovered or created by philosophy, which are to be dispelled by their aid?

A complete answer to these questions would occupy more space than we have at our command, and would of itself be a compendium of philosophy according to the commonsense school. We must confine ourselves to a very brief statement of the condition in which Reid found Scottish philosophy, and the condition in which he left it.

He was born in 1710; but his earliest work, the " Inquiry into the Human Mind," which is regarded by most of his followers as his best, was not published till 1764. His "Essays on the Intellectual Powers" appeared in 1785, and his "Essays on the Active Powers" in 1788. He died in 1796.

Chronologically, therefore, Reid was the contemporary of David Hume, who was born in 1711 and died in 1776; but, in the history of philosophy, Hume is earlier in date, his "Treatise on Human Nature having been published in 1737, and bis "Essays" in 1741.

Of other writers in the English language, the two who exercised most influence on Reid were Locke, whose "Essay on the Human Understanding" first saw the light in 1690; and Bishop Berkeley, whose “ Principles of Human Knowledge" appeared in 1710, the year of Reid's birth; and were followed in 1713 by the celebrated "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous."

On the Continent the founder of modern metaphysic was Descartes, born 1596, died 1640-a thinker of the very first order, and a devoted idealist. Of his successors, Malebranche was perhaps the most familiarly known to Reid through