the apprentice was of tender years, and unable to provide for himself. Rex v. Friend, R. & R. C. C. 20. An indictment against a woman for manslaughter, in neglecting to supply an infant of tender age with sufficient food, is bad, if it does not state a duty to supply the child with food; but, if the indictment charges that the person not supplied with food was imprisoned by the party accused, that sufficiently shews the duty to supply food. Reg v. Edwards, 8 C. & P. 611-Patteson. deceased was his apprentice :-Held, that this was sufficient proof of the allegation of the apprenticeship in the second count, but not of that in the first count. Reg. v. Crumpton, Car. & M. 597-Patteson. Semble, that where the charge is, that the prisoner received a child as an apprentice, an indictment, importing that a former master, with the child's consent, bound the child to the prisoner, will be sufficient evidence of the receiving as an apprentice, though such indenture is executed by a stranger as trustee for the former master, and not in the former master's name. Rex v. Friend, R. &. R. C. C. 20. Injuring Persons by Wanton or By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 35, whosoever, having the charge of any carriage or vehicle, shall, by "wanton or furious driving or racing, A count charged that a lunatic was the illegitimate child of the defendant, a female, who had means for the comfortable support and maintenance of both, whereupon it became her duty to take 9. proper care of him, but that she did not take proper care of him, but kept and confined him in a dark, cold and unwholesome room; neglected to provide him with proper clothing; permitted him to become dirty; allow- or other wilful misconduct, or by ed the room to become foul, so as to "wilful neglect, do or cause to be cause unwholesome smells; and kept "done any bodily harm to any perhim without proper air, warmth and “ son whatsoever, shall be guilty of exercise necessary for his health, to "a misdemeanor, and, being convicthis damage and peril. Judgment "ed thereof, shall be liable, at the arrested first, because no duty was "discretion of the court, to be imshewn, and secondly, because it was prisoned for any term not exceednot shewn that the conduct of the de- " ing two years, with or without fendant had, or must have occasion-"hard labour." (Former provision, ed actual injury. Reg. v. Pelham, 1 Geo. 4, c. 4.) 8 Q. B. 959; 10 Jur. 659; 15 L. J., M. C. 105. (c) Evidence. 10. Indictment for Murder and Manslaughter. 66 Form.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, An indictment for manslaughter s. 6," in any indictment for murder or stated in a first count, that the de- " manslaughter, or for being an acceased was the apprentice of the pris- Icessory to any murder or manoner, and that it was the duty of " slaughter, it shall not be necessary the prisoner to provide the deceased "to set forth the manner in which with proper nourishment and medi- or the means by which the death cine, and charged the death to be" of the deceased was caused, but it from neglect. A second count charg- "shall be sufficient in any indictment ed that the deceased, "so being such" for murder to charge that the deapprentice as aforesaid," was killed" fendant did feloniously, wilfully by the prisoner by over-work and "and of his malice aforethought beating. No evidence was given of "kill and murder the deceased; and any indenture, but a witness proved "it shall be sufficient in any indictthat the prisoner told him that the" ment for manslaughter to charge "that the defendant did feloniously "kill and slay the deceased; 66 "And it shall be sufficient in any "indictment against any accessory to any murder or manslaughter to "charge the principal with the mur"der or manslaughter (as the case "may be) in the manner hereinbe"fore specified, and then to charge "the defendant as an accessory in "the manner heretofore used and ac"customed." (Similar to former provision, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 4.) A coroner's inquisition is an indictment, within the above section, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to set forth therein the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused. Reg. v. Ingham, 5 B. & S. 257; 10 Jur., N. S. 968; 33 L. J., Q. B. 183; 12 W. R. 793; 10 L. T., N. S. 456; 9 Cox, C. C. 508. 66 By 9 & 10 Vict. c. 62, "it shall "not be necessary in any indictment or inquisition for homicide to al"lege the value of the instrument "which caused the death of the de"ceased, or to allege that the same "was of no value.' On an indictment for murder against several, one cannot be convicted of an assault committed on the deceased in a previous scuffle, such assault not being in any way connected with the cause of death. Reg. v. Phelps, 2 M. C. C. 240; Car. & M. 180. The indictment must state, that the act by which death ensued was done of malice aforethought. Rex v. Nicholson, 1 East, P. C. 346. was effected. Rex v. Sharwin, 1 East, P. C. 341, 421. An indictment for murder, which stated wounds as contributing to the death, need not have stated their length, depth, or breadth. Rex v. Mosley, 1 M. C. C. 97; 1 Lewin, C. C. 189; S. P., Rex v. Tomlinson, 6 C. & P. 370. An indictment for murder must state that the prisoner gave the deceased a mortal wound. Rex v. Lad, 1 Leach, C. C. 96. Where death proceeded from suffocation, by the swelling up of the passage of the throat, and such swelling proceeded from wounds occasioned by forcing things into the throat, the statement might be, that the things were forced into the throat, and the deceased thereby suffocated; and it was not necessary to mention the immediate cause of suffocation, namely, the swelling of the throat. Rex v. Tye, R. & R. C. C. 345. A. was charged with suffocating B. by placing both her hands about the neck of B:-Held, that she might be convicted, if B. was suffocated in any manner, either by A. or by any other person in her presence, she being privy to the commission of the offence. Rex v. Culkin, 5 C. & P. 121-Park, Parke, and Bolland. If the death of a deceased was charged to be by suffocation, by placing the hand on the mouth of the deceased, this allegation was made out, if the jury was satisfied that any violent means were used to stop the respiration of the deceas ed. Rex v. Waters, 7 C. & P. 250 In an indictment for manslaughter it is not necessary that it should specifically charge that it was by an-Denman. act of omission. Reg. v. Smith, 11 Cox, C. C. 210-Lush. Manner and Means of Death. Before these Enactments.]—An indictment for murder must have set forth particularly the manner of the death, and the means by which it In an indictment for murder, an allegation that it was committed "with a certain sharp instrument, to the jurors aforesaid unknown,' was sufficiently certain. Rex V. Grounsell, 7 C. & P. 788-Parke. An indictment, which stated the death to be by striking and beating the deceased with a piece of brick, was not supported by proof that the prisoner knocked him down with his fist, and that the death was caused by the deceased striking his head by falling on a piece of brick, in consequence of the blow. Rex v. Kelly, Car. C. L. 75; 1 M. C. C. 113; 1 Lewin, C. C. 193; Rex v. Wrigley, 1 Lewin, C. C. 127. Or by proof that he knocked him down by a blow upon the head, and that he was killed by a mortal wound received by falling on the ground. Rex v. Thompson, Car. Č. L. 75; 1 M. C. C. 139; 1 Lewin, C. C. 194. stick, and, in another count, by the throwing of a stone. The jury found the prisoners guilty of manslaughter, generally, on both counts, and the judges held the conviction right. Reg. v. O'Brian, 2 C. & K. 115; 1 Den. C. C. 9. A. and B. were indicted for the murder of C., by shooting him with a gun. In the first count A. was charged as principal in the first degree, B. as present, aiding and abetting him. In the second count, B. as principal in the first degree, A. as aiding and abetting. The jury convicted both, but said that they were not satisfied as to which fired the gun :-Held, first, that the jury was not bound to find the prisoners guilty of one or other of the counts only. Reg. v. Downing, 1 Den. C. C. 52; 2 C. & K. 382. Held, secondly, that, notwithstanding the word" afterwards" in the second count, both the counts related substantially to the same person killed and to one killing, and might have been transposed without any alteration of time or meaning. Ib. An indictment charging that the prisoner a musket loaded with gunpowder and a leaden bullet to, against, and upon M. G., felonious ly, &c., "did shoot, discharge, and send forth; and that he, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the musket aforesaid, then and there by the force of the gunpowder so shot, discharged, and sent forth as aforesaid, G. M. did strike," &c., was good, and the words "send forth," and the other added words which did not occur in the usual form, might be rejected as surplusage. Reg. v. Stokes, 2 C. & K. 536; 17 L. J., M. C. 116-C. C. R. In an indictment for murder by poisoning, it is sufficient, after alleging the administering the deadly poison, and the mortal sickness occasioned thereby, to aver" of which said mortal sickness and distemper the said E. S. died." Reg. v. Sandys, 2 M. C. C. 227; Car. & M. 345. An indictment for manslaughter that J. E. caused R. D. to become mortally sick, of which mortal sickness, especially of a mortal congestion A. was indicted for the manof the lungs and heart, occasioned by slaughter of B. by a blow of a hamthe means aforesaid, he died, prop- mer. No proof was given of the erly charged a death from a mortal striking of any blow, only of a scufcongestion caused by those means. fle between the parties. The apReg. v. Ellis, 2 C. & K. 470-Tin-pearance of the injury was consistdal and Rolfe. In a count for murder, the death was stated to be by a blow of a An indictment charged A. with giving a mortal wound to G. on the 27th of May, of which wound he died on the 29th of May; and that Y. and Z., on the day and year first aforesaid, were present, aiding and abetting A. the felony aforesaid to do and commit. The jury found all the prisoners guilty of manslaughter; and it was objected for Y. and Z., that the felony of A. was not complete till the death of G.; but the judges held the conviction right. Reg. v. O'Brian, 2 C. & K. 115; 1 Den. C. C. 9. ent with the supposition, either of a blow with a hammer, or of a push against the lock or the key of a door-Held, that if it was occasioned by a blow with a hammer, or any other hard substance held in the hand, it was sufficient to support an indictment; but otherwise, if it was the result of a push against the door. Rex v. Martin, 5 C. & P. 128-Park and Parke. In an indictment for manslaughter, it was not necessary to allege the causes merely natural which conduced to the death of the party; it was sufficient to allege truly the act with which the prisoner was charged, if that act accelerated the death. Rex v. Webb, 1 M. & Rob. 405; 2 Lewin, C. C. 196-Lyndhurst. Name of Deceased.]-If the name of the party killed is not known, it may be alleged to be a certain person to the jurors unknown. Rex v. Clark, R. & R. C. C. 358. from that day to the following Tuesday called by its name of baptism and its mother's surname, is sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the deceased was properly described by those names. Reg. v. Evans, 8 C. & P. 765-Erskine. An indictment charged the murder of Eliza Waters. The deceased was the illegitimate child of the prisoner, whose name was Ellen Waters; and a witness said, on the trial: "The child was called Eliza; I took it to be baptized, and said it was Eleanor Waters's child": Held, that it was not sufficient proof that the surname of the deceased was Waters. Rex. v. Waters, 1 M. C. C. 457. C. was indicted for manslaugh ter, in killing "a woman, whose name to the jurors is unknown.” C. cohabited with the woman, and sometimes said that she was his wife, and sometimes that she was not; and none of the witnesses had heard her called by any name: A bastard must not be described by his mother's name, till he has gained that name by reputation. Ib. Where a deceased illegitimate-Held, that if the jury was satischild had not been baptized, but the mother had, on two occasions, called it Mary Anne, a witness stating that the putative father had said he was a Baptist :-Held, that it was rightly described as a female child whose name was unknown. Rex v. Smith, 6 C. & P. 151; 1 M. C. C. 402; S. P., Rex v. Poulton, 5 C. & P. 329. In an indictment for the murder of a bastard child, the absence of a name is sufficiently accounted for by the child being described as "lately before born of the body of J. H." Reg. v. Hogg, 2 M. & Rob. 380-Denman. An indictment for child murder is bad for not stating the name of the child or accounting for the omission: no conviction for concealing the birth can take place. Reg. v. Hicks, 2 M. & Rob. 302-Coleridge and Maule. An illegitimate child, six weeks old, baptized on a Sunday, and fied that the deceased was not the wife of the prisoner, and that the name of the deceased could not be ascertained by any reasonable diligence, the description of the de ceased was proper; but that, if the jury should think that the deceased was the wife of the prisoner, the description was bad; for, although there was no evidence of her christian name, she was entitled to the surname of C., as being that of her hus band. Reg. v. Compbell, 1 C. & K. 82-Erskine. Indictment stated, that the pris oner, a single woman, on the 27th of August, 1844, brought forth a male child alive; that she afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, killed this child. Objec tion, that the indictment ought to have stated the name of the child, or that its name was unknown to the jurors, overruled at the trial, on the ground that there was no pre sumption, from the mere fact of birth, that the child had a name, it being a bastard; that the indictment afforded no presumption of its having acquired a name by reputa-jury, and obtained a rule nisi for a tion or baptism; that an averment that the name was unknown implied the acquisition of some name : -Conviction held right. Reg. v. Willis, 1 Den. C. C. 80; 1 C. & K. charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declaration; therefore, where a defendant had been convicted of per 722. An indictment for murder of a bastard child, described as Harriet Stroud, is not sustained by proof of a child christened Harriet, and only called by that name, though the mother's name was Stroud. The proper description is Harriet. A child "whose name is to the jurors unknown," is not good, because the name of Harriet was known. Reg. v. Stroud, 2 M. C. C. 270; 1 C. & K. 187. "Not named," is a good description of an unbaptized infant child in an indictment for its murder. Reg. v. Waters, 2 C. & K. 864; 1 Den. C. C. 356; T. & M. 57; 13 Jur. 130; 18 L. J., M. C. 50. But "not baptized" would be insufficient. Ib. S. P., Reg. v. Biss, 8 C. & P. 773. Amendment.]-A woman, charged with the murder of her husband, was described as A., the wife of J. O., late of the parish of S., in the county of W., labourer. The judge ordered this to be amended, by striking out the word wife, and inserting the word widow. Reg. v. Orchard, 8 C. & P. 565-Abinger, 11. Declarations in Articulo Mortis. When admissible.]-Nothing can be evidence in a declaration in articulo mortis which would not be so if the party was examined. Rex v. Sellers, Car. C. L. 233. It is a general rule in criminal cases, that dying declarations are admissible only where the death of the deceased is the subject of the new trial, pending which he shot the prosecutor, and on shewing cause against the rule for a new trial, an affidavit of the dying declarations of the prosecutor, relating to the transaction out of which the prosecution for perjury arose, was produced :-Held, that it was inadmissible. Rex v. Mead, 4 D. & R. 120; 2 B. & C. 605. Dying declarations are admissible only where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death the subject of the dying declaration. Reg. v. Hind, Bell, C. C. 253; 8 Cox, C. C. 300; 6 Jur., N. S. 514; 29 L. J., M. C. 147 ; 8 W. R. 421 ; 2 L. T., N. S. 253. Therefore, on an indictment for feloniously using certain instruments upon the person of a woman with intent to procure a miscarriage, her dying declaration is inadmissible. Ib. The declarations of a deceased made on the day he was wounded, and when he believed he should not recover, are admissible, though he did not die until eleven days afterwards; and though the surgeon did not think his case hopeless, and continued to tell him so until the day of his death. Rex v. Mosley, 1 M. C. C. 97; 1 Lewin, C. C. 79. To render the declaration of the deceased admissible on a trial for manslaughter, it must have been made by him under an impression of almost immediate dissolution; and it is not enough that the deceased should have thought that he should ultimately never recover. Rex v. Van Butchell, 3 C. & P. 629-Hullock and Littledale. A dying declaration is equal, in point of sanction, to an examination on oath, but the opportunity of in |