[Johnson v. Crow et al.] privilege only, it may be revoked at any time. To make it a contract there must be an equivalent: Cooley's Con. Lim. 280, 281, 282. It cannot give up the right of eminent domain: Id. 281, 282, 283, 343; Greenl. n. to 2 Cruise, p. 67; 14 Ill. 321. Nor confer an exclusive privilege without what the legislature considered an equivalent in value to the citizens. The supplemental act of April 15th 1867, which grants to Joseph Kreamer the exclusive right and privilege of a ferry for one mile above and below his house, where his ferry at that time existed, may be of immense injury not only to the people of Millersburg, a flourishing town, but to the whole travelling public which may desire to pass that way. It grants a monopoly in perpetuity for two miles of river frontage, if the supplement can be construed to be a contract. When that whole country comes to be densely peopled the inconvenience may be felt as great as the bridge to the people of Binghamton, with its exclusive privilege along the river. These thoughtless grants of the legislature, made when the country is comparatively new, become intolerable in a future day. Yet, if a contract, we must sustain it. There is nothing whatever contracted or ordered to be done by the supplement in consideration of the privilege. It is a mere gift, which may be reclaimed and revoked by the legislature at any time. It is urged, however, that Kreamer had expended several hundred dollars on the ferry after this supplement was passed, and before the grant to the Crows by the Act of 1872. Everything which could be required for a ferry, either for public convenience or private benefit, was enjoined by the Act of 1866. It is not shown that this work was in addition, and if it was, it was merely voluntary, outside of the requirements of the law. If a man does merely what he was required by his contract to do, in consequence of some new promise, it furnishes no new consideration. If A. promises B. that if he will immediately pay him the one-half of the sum then due on his bond he will forgive him the residue, it furnishes no bar to the recovery of the whole. Kreamer has failed to show that he expended a dollar in consequence of this supplement beyond and above what he was bound to do before its enactment, consequently there is no consideration for this additional privilege. It could be revoked or disregarded by the legislature at any time. Was it revoked? That depends on the proper construction of the Act of April 12th 1872, Pamph. L. 1130. This statute does not, in terms, repeal the Act of 1867, but it is entirely inconsistent with its provisions. It substantially revokes the supplement on which the claim is founded, by entirely disregarding it, and conferring the same privilege on another. The rights granted by it are in effect conferred on the Crows, who owned the land on the west side of the river, and who claimed the privilege of landing their boats at any place along the Millersburg front, not actually occupied by Kreamer or his grantee. This grant is an implied [Johnson v. Crow et al.] repeal of that given to Kreamer by the supplement. Implied repeals are not to be favored, but when a later law is entirely inconsistent with an earlier one, the latter is at an end, according to the legal maxim, leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The legislature could not by a repeal affect the rights of Kreamer, under the Act of 1866, it was a contract; the Act of 1867 conferred a mere gift, which could be revoked, and was by the grant to the Crows." This appeal was taken by complainant, who assigned for error the dismissal of his bill. J. W. Simonton and A. J. Herr, for appellant.-A grant of a ferry franchise, if exclusive in terms, is a contract on the part of the legislature making the grant, if accepted and acted upon, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by a subsequent grant to another person which would interfere with the original grant: Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. The Acts of 1866 and 1867 are to be construed together, and are, as a whole, to be taken as the grant and contract in this case, the obligation of which it was not in the power of the legislature to impair by the Act of 1872, because of the clause in the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts: The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51; Cooley's Const. Law 281, and cases there cited; The Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Barr 442; Humphreys v. Peques, 16 Wall. 244; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Id. 454; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Id. 430; Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Id. 439; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 699. The legislature having granted to the appellant the right to the use of the river, within certain defined bounds, for a ferry, cannot grant, and have not title to grant, any right or use of the same river for the same purpose within the same defined limits. Not on the ground that there is any implied contract that the first grantee of the franchise shall have exclusive right within such limits as might affect the amount of tolls which he might receive, but on the principle that all the right and title which was in the state passed by the first grant: Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87. Eugene Snyder and W. A. Sponsler, for appellees.-The legislature could not grant to Kreamer the right to land on another man's property. Such a grant would be the taking of private property for private use: Chambers v. Furry, 1 Yeates 170; Cooper et al. v. Smith, 9 S. & R. 32; Chess v. Manown, 3 Watts 219; Conway v. Taylor's Executors, 1 Black 629. Two or more ferries may be granted between certain points on the same waters; Gates v. Anderson, 13 Ills. 413; Bush v. Peru Bridge Co., 3 Ind. 21; Fay et al., Petitioners, 15 Pick. 243; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. [Johnson v. Crow et al.] 524; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 216; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 16 How. 524. Grants of exclusive privileges by the state are not favored, and can only be sustained on good considerations. The exclusive grant in the Act of 1867 was a mere gratuity, and had no consideration to support it. It was not a contract, therefore, and within the protection of the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States: Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra; Rector of Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 302; Tricker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 524; West Wisconsin Railroad v. Supervisors of Trempeleau County, 3 Otto 595; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561; Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, supra. The judgment of the Supreme Court was entered May 27th 1878, PER CURIAM.-The opinion of the learned judge of the Common Pleas sufficiently vindicates his conclusion. The great rivers of the Commonwealth are held as the common property of all the citizens of the state for public use. No presumption will arise that the legislature intends to part with any portion of the public domain, unless upon the most clear and express terms. A privilege to a private person to use the public right for his private gain, will not be deemed exclusive unless the intent of the legislature is perfectly clear. All these great rights are held in trust for the general good, and the representatives of the people must be deemed to be not guilty of a breach of this trust, or a dereliction of duty. Hence nothing less than a plain contract between the state and the individual for an adequate consideration can bind the hands of the state and prevent the repeal of a mere privilege. Conceding for the occasion merely that the Act of 21st March 1866, contained a contract for a perpetual privilege granted to Joseph Kreamer to keep a ferry, over the Susquehanna at Millersburg, it contained no grant of an exclusive privilege. The privilege, therefore, was subject to the undoubted right to grant similar privileges to others. Therefore, when by the Act of April 15th 1867, the legislature made the right of Joseph Kreamer exclusive, it conferred a new right, which it protected by a penalty upon others infringing it; but required no new duty, and no compensation to the state. The mere fact that the title of the act was, "A supplement to an act, &c," does not import a consideration. It was not an enlargement of powers under the former act to give it further effect, and to be taken as a part of the former grant, but it was an enlargement by way of a new and greater grant. No consideration appearing for the new contract, and the state desiring to protect Kreamer merely by a penalty, it would be contrary to the rule of presumptions as to duties and powers of the legislature to suppose a binding contract [Johnson v. Crow et al.] under the Act of 1867. The Act of 1872, conferring a ferry right on Isaac Crow, was therefore no unconstitutional interference with the rights of Joseph Kreamer. Judgment affirmed. Southern Pennsylvania Iron and Railroad Co. versus Stevens's Exr's. 1. The court submitted to the jury first: what was the purpose of a char ter of a corporation, and second: whether that purpose had been changed by a supplement to the original act, with a view to perpetrate a fraud on a subscriber to the stock. Held, that this was not error. 2. By the supplement to an act incorporating an iron and railroad company the name of the company was changed, authority was given to purchase and cancel the original stock and the main purpose of the new company was to be that of a general transportation company. Held, that it was a fair question for the jury, whether a combination to change the fundamental purpose of the original act by the supplement and divert the stock of an original subscriber to this new end, was not a fraud upon him, and if they so found an action for the amount of this original subscription could not be sustained. May 21st 1878. Before AGNEW, C. J., MERCUR, Gordon, PaxSON, WOODWARD and TRUNKEY, JJ. SHARSWOOD, J., absent. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon county: Of May Term 1877, No. 175. Assumpsit by the Southern Pennsylvania Iron and Railroad Company against Oliver J. Dickey and others, executors of Thaddeus Stevens, deceased, to recover the sum of $28,500 with interest, the balance due on a subscription of Mr. Stevens to the capital stock of the Caledonian Iron, Land and Railroad Company, the name of which was subsequently changed to that of the company plaintiff. The suit was originally brought in the Common Pleas of Lancaster county, but the venue was afterwards changed to Lebanon county. At the trial it appeared that Thaddeus Stevens was the owner of a large tract of land in Franklin county, Pennsylvania, which was known as the Caledonian Iron Works. Stevens united with Daniel V. Ahl and others, and procured the passage of the Act of March 22d 1867, Pamph. L. 542, to incorporate the Caledonian Iron, Land and Railroad Company whereby the company was authorized to purchase and hold lands, manufacture iron, lumber and fire-brick, and to mine coal, ore, fire-clay and other minerals, and to construct and operate a railroad to connect its lands and works with other railroads. Among the subscriptions to the stock was one of Mr. Stevens for 300 shares. On the 3d of June 1867 the governor issued his letters patent, but no organization of the company took [Southern Penna., &c., Railroad Co. v. Stevens's Ex'rs.] place prior to Mr. Stevens's death. After his death in 1868, Ahl arranged with one Jones to construct a railroad to an estate owned by Ahl called Mount Pleasant, for which purpose Jones was to furnish the means. They obtained control of the charter of the Caledonia Company and then obtained the passage of two acts as supplements thereto, viz: the acts of February 20th 1869, Pamph. L. 230, and April 30th 1869, Pamph. L. 879 and 1439, whereby the name of the company was changed to the Southern Iron and Railroad Co. Among the powers thereby conferred was authority to purchase and cancel the original stock of the company, and it was also given the powers of a general transportation company. The railroad was then built to the Mount Pleasant estate, but it was of no use whatever to the Caledonian Iron Works, as it is thirty miles distant therefrom. In their general charge, the court, Pearson, P. J., inter alia, said: "You have heard this case fully and elaborately argued on numerous questions of law, and the court is urged to decide it as such, yet in our opinion there are a few important questions of fact. to be determined by the jury, which will be submitted for your consideration. 1st. What was the original object, scheme and design of the law under which this company was incorporated, and to which Mr. Stevens subscribed his money? And 2d. Has that object been entirely perverted and changed by the supplemental law under which this corporation was formed and carried on, and was the change effected with the view or attempted to be used for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud on the estate of Mr. Stevens ? "What was the object and design of the Act of the 22d of March 1867, under which this company was incorporated? It is entitled an act to incorporate the 'Caledonian Iron, Land and Railroad Company. Originally the title of an Act of Assemby was looked upon. as an unimportant part, though occasionally called into aid in its construction. It is now of the very essence of the statute, the amendment to the constitution in 1874, requiring the subject of the bill to be clearly expressed in the title. It is made an essential part of the act. The location is again expressed in the body of the first section, and the business to be carried on is mainly described in the 5th sect.; among other things to make lumber, manufacture iron, &c., and to mine ore, coal and fire-clay, limestone, &c. The 6th sect. gives power to construct railroads in connection with the works, as we would understand it, to enable it to reach to and connect with other railroads. The proceeding on this subject is to be under the Act of 1849. Before any organization of the company had taken place by the election of officers, or other acts done, after the enactment of several supplements, not important to be consid ered, one was passed on the 30th April 1869, changing the style and title of the Caledonian Iron, Land and Railroad Company to the Southern Pennsylvania Iron and Railroad Company,' to exist |