law schools. I speak now from experience of 25 years ago, maybe they are somewhat more up-to-date than they were then. But I know, from Mr. Sherman's committee report that there seems to be very little being done with this subject in the law schools today; that they do absolutely nothing to prepare a lawyer for the practical side of his profession. They do not recognize that his profession has a business side as well as a professional side and that he must be prepared to run the business side of his profession as well as the strictly professional side. It is a new problem to the bar. It seems to be a problem which the law schools wholly overlook. And I think not only the profession of this state but of the country at large is greatly indebted to Mr. Sherman's Committee for calling the attention of the bar to this problem. It is a work of which the entire Bar Association may well be proud. Just as we pioneered the way on schedule of fees and on assessing fees properly, so now we are doing a pioneer work in this line.

I might say right here, in response to the telegram sent yesterday to Mr. Thomas Dent, a former president of this Association, I have a reply as follows:

June 10, 1921.

DEAR MR. HAY:

I wish to express thanks for the kind expression by the Illinois State Bar Association, as to my work as Necrologist, a notice of which expression has just been received.

HON. LOGAN HAY,

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS DENT.

President of Illinois State Bar Association.

The next is the report of the Committee on Masters

in Chancery.

The report was read by the Secretary as follows:

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MASTERS-IN-CHANCERY. To the President and Members of the Illinois State Bar Association, Assembled in Annual Meeting, 1921:

GENTLEMEN:

On behalf of the Committee on Masters-in-Chancery, I beg leave to refer you to our report of last year, to which by reason of the continuing pendency of the Constitutional Convention, there is nothing to be added. Under the circumstances it seems advisable to discontinue this special committee, and let the subject rest until we know the outcome of the Convention and its proposed new article on the judiciary department.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW R. SHERIFF, Chairman.

THE PRESIDENT:

The report of the Committee on Cor

porations Assuming to Practice Law without a License.

THE SECRETARY:

THE PRESIDENT:

There is no report.

Report of the Committee on Costs and Expenses of Litigation, Mr. Mecartney.

MR. MECARTNEY: Mr. Chairman. There was some accident in the mails or some misunderstanding with respect to this report to be presented at this meeting. Two years ago when Mr. Brown was President, the speaker was appointed chairman of the Committee on Costs and Expenses of Litigation, and we were asked to have a report in, in November at the mid-year meeeting in Chicago, November, 1919. The report was complete and was presented then just as I have it here in my hand. It was then supposed to be referred for action and further discussion to the Annual Meeting held last year in Chicago. The report was ready for action then and is in the same condition today.

(The report follows:)

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COSTS AND EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION.

Chicago, November 25, 1919.

TO HON. FREDERICK A. BROWN, President:

The undersigned Committee on Costs and Expenses of Litigation hereby tenders you the following report:

A report emanating from a body of lawyers, or from any public committee whatever, which would submit as its chief complaint that the "costs and expenses of litigation" are not great enough, would seem at first blush to be indeed a unique report in this day and generation, a day when the ultimate cost of litigation is so great as to have caused a widespread protest from the press and public generally throughout the length and breadth of the land.

Yet, the conclusion of this committee is that the existing "cheapness of litigation"-i. e. of the direct and taxable costs thereof-is probably the greatest single cause of the ultimate excessive cost of litigation.

In other words, the direct cost of litigation is so light as to directly encourage trivial litigation which in turn causes the flooding of our court dockets in the large centers of the country, which in turn causes abnormal delay in litigation, and this in turn of itself alone produces a distressingly large ultimate cost.

It is not the purpose of this committee to argue in full the merits of the suggestions it has to make. The subject has become old, and the utterances pro and con certain of our suggested measures, have become so worn and threadbare, that we prefer to merely schedule our suggested changes in our court practice which we think will if adopted, work to reduce the ultimate cost. Discussion is not now the order of the day. The call is for an active sacrificial campaign for the adoption of concrete methods of relief at the points where the existing system particularly oppresses.

One great trouble or handicap to the progress of practice reform in Illinois and perhaps the same thing is true in other states—is the failure generally and persistently to recognize the vast difference in results produced by our existing system of practice in different communities. The two extremes in Illinois are the great modern metropolis, Chicago, and the thoroughly rural communities of the state. (No great call for practice reform comes from the latter).

Our legislators recognized this difference over fifty years ago, when they divided our state communities for the purpose of taxing costs into counties of the first, second and third classes. But it is now found that this division, which affected only clerical costs, has resulted, at the present day, in only a shade of practical difference

between the classes. The one community of the third class—that is, Cook County, that is, Chicago, chiefly-demands a bill of substantive costs to checkmate the evil of trivial litigation which thrives under cover of this great metropolis and thrives chiefly because it has such

a cover.

And when we are told that the court dockets of this big city have become so clogged that the average life of a contested lawsuit-that is, one contested through to the very end-is now and for the past twenty years has been from five to seven years, it is high time that the bar of Chicago in particular rouse itself for a fight for the relief of the painful situation, and for this State Association also to lend its active co-operation and aid to the work of substantive practice reform.

It is also true that many cities in counties of the second class have felt the burden of the cheap and gradually cheapening-that is, relatively speaking-system of costs; and we are informed that in a number of these it usually takes one year or more to reach a cause in the ordinary course in the trial court. Hence, we repeat, the subject of lessening the ultimate "costs and expenses of litigation" in Illinois is one that now presses hard upon the conscience of the bar of the state at large and hence upon the members of this Association in particular.

1. In the judgment of this committee then, the chief and radical defect in our present court system is the absence of a substantial bill of costs-i. e., one having at least some substantial amount of attorney's fees taxed against the unsuccessful party, and particularly in litigation which the court specially finds to have been trivial, and in respect to trivial practices in the way of dilatory motions, etc., in pending litigation.

The most perfectly framed court system will ever be a comparative failure-particularly in big cities-without such a substantial bill of costs.

(1) Such taxed costs should not, however, particularly as respects ultimate costs taxed at the end of the suit or trial, amount to the full cost to the opposite party in the way of attorney's fees reasonably incurred by him. On the other hand, it should be substantial enough to act in fair repression of trivial claims, defenses or motions, etc.

(2) All such costs should not necessarily be paid to the party who has been wronged or to his solicitor; and they should be so light as to be free from any encouragement to attorneys to make motions or to take steps which would otherwise be really unnecessary. Hence, our suggestion is that at least half of the taxed attorney's fees should be paid into the county treasury.

(3) There is even now full power upon the part of judges to recognize, in many instances, in a practical way the merits of the rule of taxing attorney's fees, viz: Where either side to the litigation applies for a continuance of the cause. Such a matter is in the sole discretion of the court.

One great cost of litigation is in the chronic tendency on the part of judges to grant and on the part of lawyers to consent to repeated continuances where frequently there is no pretense upon the part of the applicant that he has a statutory ground therefor. Thus the client who has prepared for trial-which in many cases is the chief item of cost-is put to the cost of re-preparing and repreparing again simply on account of this practice of mistaken kindness upon the part of the lawyers generally, and this mistaken leniency on the part of the judges. Many instances in various jurisdictions in the state have come under the notice of the members of this committee, where trial judges grant such continuances only upon condition that the party applying therefor pay the estimated amount of witness fees accrued to date and also some small or nominal amount of attorney's fees to the party whose strict right to a trial was thus impinged by the granting of the continuance.

(4) We rather feel that a plank inserted in our code of ethics to the effect that while it is unethical for one counsel to attempt to take advantage of another who may have no statutory right to a continuance, and yet has been caught by unforeseen circumstances in a way that would embarrass him to proceed to a trial at the time, nevertheless the habitual consenting to continuances-beyond some short temporary period which would relieve the pressure, etc.-involves of necessity the substantive rights of the client, and that it is wrong and unethical for attorneys to consent to the same for motives of mere accommodation to the opposing lawyer.

(5) A liberal margin in the amount of the attorney's fees to be taxed should be provided for and fixed by statute.

The taxing of attorney's fees should always take into account the financial situation of the party affected, or at least when and if the party to be taxed is very poor or actually insolvent, the fee should be fixed at or near the minimum limit; and occasionally it should perhaps be remitted altogether.

2. Another great trouble with our present court practice system is that it leads to such a large proportion of re-trials. This encourages appeals to a vast extent. The hope of the defeated counsel is, that some error in procedure will occasion a reversal and a new trial, and hence will work to put off the day of ultimate reckoning— frequently to the great profit of the party appealing and to the great damage and loss to the other.