loan a life insurance policy which is made payable to himself.

§ 26. Mortgage. A mortgage is a conditional transfer of property as security for some debt or engagement. Here we take still another step in advance of lien and pledge security. In modern law a chattel mortgage usually passes the general property, a real estate mortgage generally creates only a lien, but irrespective of this and irrespective of the fact that a chattel mortgage generally attaches to corporeal chattels and a real estate mortgage to land, each is only security for a debt, and, therefore, is classified as an incorporeal chattel.

§ 27. Stock. The capital stock of a corporation is the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the amount paid in or to be paid in by the stockholders for the prosecution of the business of the corporation, and for the benefit of the corporate creditors. A share of stock is a proportional part of such capital stock. It invests its owner with the right to participate in the management of the corporation, to share proportionally in the surplus profits and in the assets of the corporation upon dissolution after all debts and expenses have been paid. It is an intangible thing. The certificate of stock is the tangible representative of this incorporeal chattel, which is, therefore, classed as personal property. In like manner dividends, or the profits of a corporate business paid to stockholders according to the number of shares held, are a species of personal property.

§ 28. Indemnity, Warranty, Etc. The accessory contracts of indemnity, warranty and suretyship are other incorporeal chattels personal, which are in the nature of claims for money.

§ 29. Bequests. Bequests and distributive shares belong to the same class of incorporeal chattels personal as other claims for money. A bequest is a gift of personal property by will. A distributive share is that portion of the residue of another's personal estate to which a person is entitled after all debts and charges are paid. The

objects of personal property ownership of the deceased may have been corporeal chattels or incorporeal, but the objects of ownership so far as the rights of the legatee and distributee are concerned are incorporeal.

§ 30. Other Contracts. We have discussed contracts creating debts and other obligations to pay money. Executed contracts are not the objects of property, although they may create rights to corporeal chattels, matters already considered. There remain those executory contracts whose obligation is something other than to pay money. There are many such: contracts containing a promise to convey land, a promise to lease a chattel real, a promise to sell chattels, a promise to make a bailment, a promise to insure, a promise to make a loan, a promise to marry, a promise to perform services as a servant, or as a bailee, or as a professional man, or as an agent, or as a partner; and they are all the objects of personal property. They are incorporeal chattels personal. The promisee in each one of them, as we have learned, has at least a qualified property right, and if his right is dissociated from a promise, or obligation, on his own part, he may have an absolute property right therein.14

§ 31. Good Will. The good will of a business is another incorporeal chattel personal. It is not corporeal in any way, and yet it is an important object of ownership, especially when the right thereto is purchased and it becomes the object of a right in personam. The good will of a business consists in the probability that old customers will continue to deal with the old firm or establishment and all the other advantages of the firm other than its capital and stock. A man's name may be a part of the good will.15

§ 32. Trade-Mark. A trade-mark is another species of incorporeal chattel personal. A trade-mark is a name, symbol, emblem, or mark used by a person to indicate, either by itself or by association, that the article to which it is affixed is manufactured or sold by him, or that he carries on business at a particular place. It may consist of the 14 Willis on Contracts, 172-177. 15 Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514.

name of a person or firm when it indicates with exactness the origin or ownership of the goods to which applied. Every man has the absolute right to use his own name in his business even though it may interfere with the business of another if he does so honestly and fairly. It may consist of a device, as a drum on a label, or a fanciful word, as "Eureka", when in a secondary sense, that is, by association and repute, although not proprio vigore, (of its own force) it indicates origin and ownership. An arbitrary combination of numbers and letters may indicate origin by association. But words descriptive of the quality, character, composition, or kind of article to which it is applied, as "gold medal", or "cough remedy", or geographical names (except as to people outside the place), or color, or form, or a patent name, are not the subject of trade-mark, for such words are open to all the world. The right to have the world refrain from interfering with one exercising the attributes of property over this incorporeal chattel is not absolute, for a person has no right to dispose of the same apart from the business with which it is connected.16

§ 33. Copyright. An author or painter has an absolute property in his unpublished manuscript, lectures, letters, and paintings; and such persons, or their assigns, etc., may have a qualified property in their works after publication by conforming to the requirements of the law of Congress with reference to copyright. During the period of the copyright the owner may exercise all the prerogatives of property. The right not to have others publish unpublished works, and the right not to have others interfere with publication after copyright is secured, are both rights which relate to incorporeal chattels personal.

According to our present laws of Congress the following things are the subject of copyright: "any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine arts." A single page may 16 Celluloid Mfg Co. v. Cellonite Mfg Co., 32 Fed. 94.

be copyrighted, or blank forms, but not the opinions of judges. Copyrights are granted for the term of twentyeight years from the time of recording the title, with the right of renewal for another period of twenty-eight years. The person who may take out a copyright is the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor, or assigns, etc., or a foreigner domiciled here at the time, or a citizen of a foreign State when his State gives the same rights to our citizens.17

§ 34. Patent. A patent is still another incorporeal chattel personal. A patent is understood to refer to the instrument securing to inventors, for a limited time, the exclusive right to their own inventions. In the United States the whole matter is governed by laws of Congress. The time for which a patent may last is seventeen years. One can only have a qualified property therein. Any person is entitled to the privileges of the patent laws. In order to be patentable the thing for which the patent is sought must be both new and useful to society. It may be an "art" where the essentials are the use of the apparatus or materials in new processes, methods, or relations; or a "machine", a function or mode of operation embodied in mechanism; or "manufacture", anything apart from machinery made by man's industry and art; or "composition of matter", medicines etc., or any new and useful improvements thereof. It must not be known or used by others in this country, nor patented nor described in this or any foreign country before the invention or discovery, nor more than two years prior to application, nor in public use, nor on sale in this country for more than two years prior to application, unless abandoned. So long as the right lasts, like copyright, the owner may possess, use, and dispose of his right for the term of the patent.18

§ 35. Persons in Whom the Right Resides. This is the third element of a legal right of property. The persons who may have the rights of property may be natural or

17 Compiled Statutes of U. S., 1901, 4952, 35 Stat. L. 1080.

18 For fuller treatment, see Article on "Patents and Copyrights"; and also see U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 4886-4887.

artificial; they may be one or many; they may be the original owners or acquire the ownership from others. In the case of incorporeal chattels, they are generally known as promisees, or assignees, as chattels are most frequently created by contracts. Promisees may be either joint, or several. In the case of corporeal chattels, they are generally known as owners. Owners may be joint, or in common, or in severalty.

Joint promisees are those jointly entitled to the performance of a legal obligation. They must sue jointly and a release of one operates as to all, and if one dies the other may sue alone. Several promisees are those who are individually entitled to the performance of a legal obligation. They may sue separately, and if one dies his personal representative may enforce his obligation. Joint ownership is where two or more persons are joined together, having the unities of time, title, interest, and possession. There may be joint owners of incorporeal chattels, as in a patent right, in a legacy, and in stock. The doctrine of survivorship generally applies, that is, if one of two joint owners dies, the other becomes the sole owner.

Ownership in common is where two or more persons own property with only the unity of possession. The doctrine of survivorship does not apply to ownership in common.

Ownership in severalty is where a person owns property in his sole right.

§ 36. Persons under Obligation or Duty. The fourth element of the legal right of personal property is the person, or persons, against whom the same is available. What has been said about the persons in whom the right resides also generally applies here. In the case of all rights in personam, whether of contract, quasi-contract, or remedial, the person, or persons, against whom the right is available, are said to be under obligation; in the case of all rights in rem, they are said to be under duty. The nature of their duties and obligations of course measure the extent of the other persons' rights, and this topic has already been considered. Rights in personam are available against only