Agreements in fraud of another person in a fiduciary relation, are void. This includes agreements of agents for a profit or commission unknown to their employer. In a Connecticut case a person intending to purchase a piano took with her another person in whose advice as to pianos she had great confidence. A secret promise by a piano dealer to pay this person a commission if a piano was purchased was held not enforcible because of the deceit practiced upon the purchaser of the piano.20 It is also held that agreements in fraud of the marital rights of either husband or wife are void. Thus, a secret conveyance of real property by a person who is engaged to be married, is a fraud upon the other party to the marriage contract, and the same has been held with reference to conveyances of personal property by a husband or wife in expectation of death. Agreements by which fictitious bids are made or by which competition is prevented at public auctions, are generally held void. § 84. Illegality Distinguished from Fraud. Fraud as a defense to a contract because of making the consent unreal must be distinguished from an illegal agreement to commit a fraud. Where A contracts with B in reliance upon a false representation by B, the contract may be voidable because of the fraud. Where A and B agree to perpetrate a fraud on C, the agreement is void because of the illegality of its purpose. AGREEMENTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY § 85. In General. There are many things which the law regards as so mischievous and harmful to the public that it will not permit them to be the subject matter of a valid contract, even though they be not forbidden by statute or by the common law. "The common law will not permit individuals to oblige themselves by a contract either to do or not to do anything, where the thing to be done 20 Bollman v. Loomis, 41 Conn. 581. or omitted is in any degree clearly injurious to the public''21 or contravenes some established interest of society. It is not necessary that the particular contract be one injurious to the public; it is sufficient if on principle it contravenes a public interest. The public policy of one State or nation may be different from that of others, and may differ from its own public policy of an earlier or later period. The principal kinds of agreements generally held contrary to public policy, may be classified as follows: (1) Agreements tending to injure the public service. (2) Agreements tending to pervert or obstruct legal process. (3) Agreements tending to encourage litigation. (4) Agreements contrary to good morals. (5) Agreements affecting freedom or security of marriage. (6) Agreements in restraint of trade. (7) Agreements affecting duties to the public and third persons. § 86. Tending to Injure Public Service. Since the public has a deep interest in the due performance of their duties by all public officers, it follows that all agreements tending to interfere with or injuriously affect the performance of such duties, are contrary to public policy and, therefore, void. The public needs the most capable and efficient servants that can be secured and, therefore, agreements involving the sale of a public office or to secure an appointment or recommendation to the same, for a consideration, are void.22 Under this principle comes an agreement to pay to another person a portion of the emoluments of a public office which the promisor is seeking, in consideration of an agreement for aid in procuring it,23 and for the same reason, as well as for want of consideration, an agreement to pay a public officer an additional compensation for performing his public duty is void. "The rewards of these 21 West Va. Trans. Co. v. Pipe-Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 46 Am. Rep. 527. 22 Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899. 23 Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168. officers are established by law; their services are to be performed for those legal rewards; and other private rewards for acts which are required from them as public duties, must be regarded as corrupt and illegal exactions.''24 The same rule forbids the assignment by public officers of their unearned fees or salaries because of the probability that they will not perform their duties as efficiently after such an assignment,25 and where a pension is granted "not exclusively for past services, but as a consideration for some continuing duty or service, then, although the amount of it may be influenced by the length of the service which the party has already performed, it is against the policy of the law that it should be assignable."26 Pensions granted to soldiers and sailors of the United States are unassignable by statute.27 Agreements to use secret influence with public officers for a consideration are void, because of the tendency to use corrupt means. Concerning such agreements the Supreme Court of the United States has said: "They tend to introduce personal solicitation, and personal influence, as elements in the procurement of contracts; and thus directly lead to inefficiency in the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds."28 "Lobbying Contracts". Such agreements to render services in procuring action by the legislative body of the nation, a State, or a municipality by personal solicitation of the legislators or by other objectionable means, are universally held contrary to public policy because the consideration for such services is paid for "other arguments, persuasions, or inducements than such as directly and legitimately bear upon the merits" of the matter at issue.29 Agreements for purely professional services to be ren 24 Weaver v. Whitney, 1 Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 11. 25 Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, 17 Am. Rep. 273. 28 Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 54, 17 L. ed. 868. dered openly do not violate these principles and are, therefore, valid. Agreements for a consideration for such services as drafting petitions to be presented to the legislature, preparing and making public arguments before legislative committees or heads of departments, or prosecuting claims before an executive department, or making speeches for a candidate for public office, are perfectly valid and legitimate if the one receiving a consideration for so doing does not conceal his interest in the matter.30 Such services rest on the same principle as legal services rendered in a court of justice. Agreements which interfere with the proper conduct of elections are obviously against public policy. Thus it has been held that promises to pay money for one's vote, to pay the proprietor of a newspaper to secure its support for the promisor's nomination, to pay a voter's traveling expenses, or to release an existing debt in consideration of the debtor's using his influence and doing what he could to procure the creditor's election are void, because their influence is against the public good.31 § 87. Tending to Pervert or Obstruct Legal Process. Under this classification come agreements to suppress evidence, agreements tending to cause perjury or influence testimony, agreements to stifle criminal prosecutions, and agreements to oust the civil courts of jurisdiction in proper cases. Thus, a promise to pay a witness $150 for testifying, which was to be reduced one-half if the promisor did not succeed in his case, is void.32 And the same is true of an agreement to procure witnesses to swear to a certain state of facts.33 An agreement not to prosecute a person for a crime is itself a crime and also void on grounds of public policy, because of the tendency to tempt men to transgress the law. A civil injury for which damages might be recovered may 30 Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 22 L. ed. 623. 31 Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546. 32 Dawkins v. Gill, 10 Ala. 206. 33 Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 Ill. 422, 33 N. E. 44. lawfully be compromised, even though it grow out of the same act as the crime, provided there is no agreement not to prosecute. Agreements to refer disputed matters to arbitration and providing that no suit may be brought thereon, are void because of their purpose to "oust the jurisdiction of the courts". Agreements having this purpose are frequently incorporated in building contracts and insurance policies, but will be sustained only where the amount of the damages alone is to be submitted to the arbitrator for determination as a condition precedent to suit. Where the agreement is in that form it is held that no right of action arises upon the breach of the agreement until the damages have been fixed by the arbitrator, but that then suit may be brought to recover such damages.34 An agreement by which all disputed matters arising out of a contract, and, therefore, including the question of whether there was a breach of the agreement, is void even though stated as a condition precedent. § 88. Tending to Encourage Litigation. Agreements which amount to maintenance or champerty are void under this principle. Maintenance is an officious intermeddling in a suit by one who has no interest therein by assisting either party in keeping up unnecessary litigation. If there is an agreement between the intermeddler and the party to the litigation to divide the fruits of the litigation, it becomes champerty. Under modern law maintenance is probably "confined to cases where a man improperly, and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encourages others either to bring actions or to make defenses which they have no right to make. ''35 Whether an agreement of an attorney to prosecute a suit upon a contingent fee is held champertous, depends in most States upon whether he agrees to prosecute the litigation at his own expense or whether the expenses of the litigation are to be paid by his client and the payment of attorney's fees 34 Hamilton v. Insurance Company, 136 U. S. 242, 34 L. ed. 419. 35 Findon v. Parker, 11 Mees. & W. 675, 682. |