of Georgia, at the time of their grant, held to the territory in dispute, had been fairly and legally conveyed to the purchasers, under J. and Williamson-That the note in litigation was therefore endorsed for a good and valuable consideration, which had not failed. The Jury were of the same opinion, and pronounced
Where a cross walk constructed of flagstones and paving blocks extending across a city street from sidewalk to sidewalk and crossing in the middle of the street a reservation, which had been laid out under St. 1894, c. 324, § 1, and over which parallel tracks of a street railway were operated, was removed from the roadway on each side and was left across the reservation when the macadam surface of the roadway on each side of the reservation was changed to a smooth and hard "bitulithic" pavement, there was no abandonment of the cross walk as a whole as matter of law. Welch v. Boston Elevated Railway, 87.
Even if a title in fee can be lost by abandonment, the abandonment of land owned in fee by a railroad corporation is not to be inferred from mere nonuser. Boston & Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 286.
The mere fact that, during a year and nine months which elapsed after a plan, incorporated into deeds by reference and showing a private way, was recorded and before a deed of the premises to the plaintiff, no tenant of any lot shown thereon, which had been built up in one story stores, had used the way in question, was not evidence that the way had been abandoned. Lagorio v. Lewenberg, 464.
An acknowledgment of satisfaction contained in a receipt and an indorsement of satisfaction upon executions was held to be an equivocal act open to explanation by evidence as to the amount actually received. Lait v. Sears, 119.
Upon a motion to strike from the files in an action of tort an agreement for judgment and judgment satisfied upon the ground that it was procured by fraud, it was held that it was not necessary to consider whether the agreement for judgment satisfied, if it had been valid, would have operated as an accord and satisfaction, because it was voidable for fraud and had been avoided by striking it from the files rightly. Scott v. Bevilacqua, 554.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
The heirs at law and next of kin of a widow, who left a document purporting to be a will that has been presented for probate but has not yet been allowed,
may maintain a petition in the Probate Court to revoke a decree of that
court by which the decedent when seventy-one years of age had adopted
a man of less than half her age as her son, alleging that the decree of adop-
tion was procured by the exercise of undue influence upon the weak mind
of the widow and by a fraudulent concealment of the facts from the Probate
Court. Raymond v. Cooke, 326.
Upon the evidence at the hearing of the petition above described it was held
that it was right for the justice who heard the case to refuse to rule that
on the evidence it could not be found that the adoption was procured by
the undue influence of the adopted son. Ibid.
In the same case it was held that the respondent's answer to a bill for instruc-
tions filed by the executor of the will of the widow and the respondent's
declaration in an action at law brought by him against the executor on an
alleged promise of the testatrix to leave him all her property were admissible
in evidence to show the claims made by the respondent against the estate
of the widow. Ibid.
Where a person adopted under R. L. c. 154, § 1, by a husband and wife as the
child of both has inherited or acquired by will property from each of his
adopting parents and after the death of both of them dies intestate, under
§ 7 of the same chapter all his property acquired by himself or by gift or in-
heritance from either of his adopting parents must be distributed according
to the provisions of R. L. cc. 133, 140, "among the persons who would have
been his kindred if he had been born to his adopting parent in lawful wed-
lock," without regard to the respective amounts received by such adopted
child from each of his adopting parents. MacMaster v. Fobes, 396.
In the case in which the above point was decided, it appeared that the adopted
child also had inherited from her natural father a certain sum of money,
and by a decree, assented to by all parties interested, it was ordered that,
in accordance with the provision contained in R. L. c. 154, § 7, this property
should "be distributed in the same manner as if no act of adoption had taken
place." Ibid.
In the provisions of R. L. c. 154, § 6, which state the effect of an adoption,
the words "succession to property" do not relate to the right of adopting
parents as the next of kin of their son by adoption to receive the damages
recovered by the administrator of his estate under St. 1907, c. 375, for neg-
ligently causing his death. Boutlier v. Malden, 479.
If a boy seventeen years of age, who has been adopted by a man and wife,
is killed by the negligence of the servants or agents of a corporation, in an
action by the administrator of his estate under R. L. c. 171, § 2, as amended
by St. 1907, c. 375, to recover damages for his death, his adopting parents
under R. L. c. 154, § 6, have the rights that his natural parents would have
in the absence of adoption and as his next of kin are entitled to receive the
damages recovered. Ibid.
The provision of St. 1874, c. 372, § 107 (now re-enacted in substance in St.
1906, c. 463, Part II, § 80), that "no length of possession or occupancy of
land belonging to a railroad corporation, by an owner or occupier of ad-
joining land shall create any right to such land of the corporation in such
Adverse Possession (continued).
adjoining owner or occupier, or any person claiming under him," is not
restricted in its application to land within the location or right of way of
the railroad corporation. Boston & Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 286.
Nor to land acquired by the corporation by the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain. Ibid.
Such statute applies to land outside the location purchased by the corpora-
tion for railroad purposes with a genuine purpose to devote it to railroad
uses. Ibid.
Whether the statute quoted above would apply to land acquired by a railroad
corporation ultra vires, was mentioned as a question which there was no
occasion to consider. Ibid.
The statute quoted above does not contravene art. 6 of the Declaration of
Rights. Ibid.
At the trial of an issue framed on an appeal from a decision of the Land Court,
whether the respondent acquired title by adverse possession to any por-
tion of the land claimed by the petitioner, evidence of an assertion of a
right by the respondent adverse to the petitioner more than twenty years
before the filing of the petition and of conduct by him under a claim of right
in converting the land into an artificial water basin and using it for the cul-
tivation of cranberries was held to make proper a refusal of a request of the
petitioner for a ruling that, "upon all the evidence, the respondent did not
acquire title by adverse possession to any portion of the land claimed by
the petitioner." Barker v. Kennard, 586.
The determination of the rights gained through open, notorious and adverse
use of land for cultivation of the cranberry for more than twenty years
after the erection of a dam in no way is affected by the provision of R. L.
c. 196, commonly known as the mill act. Ibid.
The bare relationship of father and daughter (especially where the daughter
is married and is not a member of her father's family) does not constitute
the daughter an agent of the father authorized to receive the father's motor
car from a garage where he had placed it for repairs. Doyle v. Peerless
Motor Car Co. of New England, 561.
Scope of Authority or Employment.
The driver of a motor truck belonging to a contracting company, who, after
dumping his last load for the day of broken stone in a vacant lot where he
has been ordered to dump it, is returning from that place and is on his way
to the garage where he is to put up the truck, is acting within the scope of
his employment, and, if he drives carelessly in front of a street railway car,
his employer is liable for injuries caused by his negligence. Regan v. John
L. Kelly Contracting Co. 58.
In a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act, it appeared that a
person whom the employee told of his injury was the foreman of the em-
ployer's construction department and that the injured employee worked
under him and received orders and instructions from him, and it was held
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