by the front of the machine and then run over. There was testimony that the "game was played with no order or system, except signals from one boy to another, but that each ran where and as he pleased and that each ran as fast as he could, and the purpose of the game was to reach one of the goals before it was occupied by the 'puss." There was an unobstructed view of the motor car for four hundred feet.

The plaintiff did not testify. It was his contention that, because of the injuries, he had no recollection of the way in which the accident happened. Two witnesses testified that at the time of the accident "they were looking out for automobiles," and just before the plaintiff started to run across the street he "looked both ways."

As the machine left the defendants' garage, Kulda, a laborer employed by the defendants, was sitting in the front seat but not behind the wheel. Grosier, the owner's chauffeur, was standing near the car. To him the defendants' superintendent said, "Don't let Kulda take the wheel." Kulda was not licensed to operate an automobile and never had operated one with the knowledge of the defendants or their superintendent. Grosier started the machine and after proceeding a short distance changed places with Kulda who took the wheel. Kulda did this so as to "acquire a knowledge of the operation of automobiles and to operate them a certain number of miles for the purpose of getting a license," although in testing the machine he could better determine its condition by running it himself.

There was no evidence that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care. In running across the street "as fast as he could" to reach the opposite goal before it was occupied, he was using the highway as a playground; and he made no effort to avoid the motor car or to save himself from harm. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all that he did was to "look both ways" before starting to run across. That is not enough to show the use of the care required of a boy of his years, under the circumstances disclosed. There was nothing to prevent his seeing the motor car for four hundred feet, if he looked, and to run at full speed across the public highway while engaged in play, without looking or using some precaution to avoid a visible danger, is a plain neglect to use proper care, and as matter of law

prevents recovery. Gleason v. Smith, 180 Mass. 6. Russo v. Charles S. Brown Co. 198 Mass. 473. Kyle v. Boston Elevated Railway, 215 Mass. 260. Godfrey v. Boston Elevated Railway, 215 Mass. 432. Mills v. Powers, 216 Mass. 36.

As the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care and cannot recover, it is unnecessary to consider whether Kulda in driving the car was acting within the scope of his employment.

Exceptions sustained.

Judgment for the defendants under St. 1909, c. 236.

JACKSON AND NEWTON COMPANY vs. SAMUEL A. FULLER. SAME vs. SAME.

Present: RUGG, C. J., DE COURCY, CROSBY, PIERCE, & CARROLL, JJ.

Practice, Civil, Auditor's report. Witness, Impeachment.

Where at the trial of an action at law an auditor's report is offered in evidence, if one of the parties objects to certain findings of the auditor, he has no right to ask to have these portions of the report excluded or stricken out, as the report must be admitted as it stands or not at all, and his proper remedy, if the report contains objectionable matter, is to move to have it recommitted to the auditor for change or modification.

The testimony of a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of his general reputation "for honesty and veracity." The proper inquiry for that purpose is in regard to the witness's reputation for truth and veracity.

Where an auditor's report has been admitted in evidence at a trial, the credibility of a witness who testified before the auditor cannot be impeached by evidence of his bad reputation as to truth and veracity introduced at the trial at which he has not testified.

TWO ACTIONS OF CONTRACT, the first on a promissory note and the second on an account annexed for the price of window frames, doors, door frames, blinds, mouldings, sheathings, stair rails, base boards, cleats and other like things. Writs dated June 12, 1913.

In the Superior Court the cases were tried together before Lawton, J. The plaintiff offered in evidence the report of an auditor in favor of the plaintiff. The exception of the defendant to the admission of portions of the auditor's report as well as other ex

ceptions of the defendant are stated in the opinion. The judge admitted in evidence the whole of the auditor's report. Evidence was introduced by the defendant at the trial.

“The defendant asked to be allowed to put in evidence to show that the general reputation for honesty and veracity" of the witness Donkin, mentioned in the opinion as having testified before the auditor, was bad. The judge refused to allow this, and the defendant excepted.

The defendant asked the judge to give the following instructions: "6. As bearing on the entries on plaintiff's books and sale slips (with reference to the defendant guaranteeing Donkin's account) the jury may take into consideration the contents of plaintiff's letters to the defendant dated February 24th and 26th, 1913, wherein it states: 'From our standpoint, it looks as though the goods were used in your houses and that you should pay,' and give it such weight as they think it is entitled to."

"13. The plaintiff, not being a party to the contract annexed to the auditor's report, cannot take advantage of it. That contract did not inure to the plaintiff's benefit, and it was improperly and erroneously admitted in evidence by the auditor and annexed to his report.

"14. If the jury find, as a fact, that any of the findings of the auditor is based on the contract annexed to his report, then I charge you that you are to disregard such findings in toto unless you find, as a fact, that such findings are supported by other competent evidence."

The contract referred to in the thirteenth and fourteenth requests and the judge's instructions on the subject are described in the opinion.

The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiff in both cases, in the first case in the sum of $263.63 and in the second case in the sum of $433.16. The defendant alleged exceptions.

S. A. Fuller & C. Toye, for the defendant, submitted a brief.
L. S. Thierry, for the plaintiff.

CARROLL, J. One of these actions is to recover upon a promissory note; the other is for goods sold and delivered. The cases were tried before an auditor who found for the plaintiff. In the Superior Court the defendant objected to certain findings of the auditor and to their introduction in evidence. The judge per

mitted the whole report to be read to the jury. There was no error in this ruling. Ordinarily if either party objects to the report, a motion should be made to recommit it to the auditor for change or modification; otherwise the entire report is received. Fair v. Manhattan Ins. Co. 112 Mass. 320. Fisher v. Doe, 204 Mass. 34, 39.

One Donkin, who was not a witness at the trial before the jury, had testified before the auditor. The defendant asked to be allowed to put in evidence that his general reputation "for honesty and veracity" was bad. This evidence was not competent; but, even if the question had asked for Donkin's reputation for truth and veracity, it would have been incompetent. The credibility of a witness may be impeached by showing that his reputation for truth and veracity is bad, but the credibility of one who is not a witness at the trial cannot be so impeached, although he testified at the former hearing before the auditor.

The plaintiff asked a witness, called by the defendant, whether any lumber was sold to the defendant to be used on two of the houses in question; he introduced evidence showing that the defendant purchased the hardware used in the erection of the houses; and the defendant admitted he purchased all the hardware. This evidence was excepted to by the defendant. It was properly admitted. It tended to show that Donkin was not acting as the owner of the property, but as Fuller's agent; and that Fuller in fact was the owner of the houses.

The letters of November 1, January 8 and January 13 from the plaintiff to the defendant were excepted to. The letter of November 1 was written before the note in suit was given. It refers to the enclosed statement and asks for a check or thirty days' note. As bearing on the consideration of the note this letter was admissible. No harm was done the defendant by the letters of January 8 and January 13, even if they were inadmissible, which we do not intimate, especially in view of the defendant's own evidence, that after giving the note the plaintiff demanded of him the amount due on the account annexed, and the defendant's letter of January 8, wherein he denied responsibility for the materials furnished, except as paid for by the promissory note, and asserted that Donkin was the principal.

The defendant's sixth request was based on a certain detached

portion of the evidence which the judge was not required to give. A contract in writing between Helen P. Foster and S. Isabella Fuller, relating to a lot of land in Watertown, was in evidence before the auditor. Helen P. Foster was a sister-in-law of Donkin, and S. Isabella Fuller was the wife of the defendant. The judge fully instructed the jury that the relations between Fuller and Donkin were of no importance except as bearing on the question of agency; that the ownership of the houses was in itself of no importance except as throwing light on the question as to whether Donkin was or was not Fuller's agent. The eighth request was waived. The thirteenth and fourteenth requests were refused properly. Exceptions overruled.

PATRICK MCCARTHY'S CASE.

Suffolk. March 15, 1917. — April 6, 1917.

Present: RUGG, C. J., DE COURCY, CROSBY, PIERCE, & CARROLL, JJ.

Workmen's Compensation Act.

Under St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 22, as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 8, the Industrial Accident Board has power to authorize the redemption of the liability of the insurer under the workmen's compensation act for compensation to an injured employee by the payment of a lump sum, after a weekly payment has been continued for not less than six months, only "in unusual cases where the parties agree and the board deems it to be for the best interest of the employee or his dependents;" and when the board, after having made all the requisite findings, has authorized the payment of a lump sum, such payment is a full settlement for all compensation, general and specific, under the act, and both the insurer and the employee are bound by it.

Accordingly such a settlement by the payment of a lump sum under an agreement which stated, "Said payments are received in redemption of the liability for all weekly payments now or in the future due me . . . for all injuries received by me on or about the 22 day of December, 1913," was held to be a bar to a claim by the employee for compensation for loss of vision that had not been made at the time of the approval of the lump sum, even if blindness caused by the injury developed after the six months' period and was unknown at the time of the settlement.

APPEAL to the Superior Court under St. 1911, c. 751, Part III, §§ 11, 16, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, §§ 14, 15, from a decision