to compel them as a condition of remaining in his employment to pay to the association, of which the defendants are officers, the sums of money demanded of them by said association for reinstatement as members thereof." It needs no discussion to show that such intentional and harmful interference with the plaintiff's business renders the defendants liable, unless there appears a legal justification for their conduct. No such justification is disclosed. There was no real trade dispute between the parties. As there was in fact no strike at the plaintiff's store at any time since July 9, 1915, it is unnecessary to consider what the defendants properly might do under a legal strike. See Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association, 221 Mass. 554; M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394. The validity and effect of the alleged agreement between the parties is likewise immaterial, because of the finding that if ever in force it had been terminated by mutual consent. See Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166. The peaceful persuasion act, (St. 1913, c. 690,) need not be considered, as it does not purport to justify attempts to persuade which are a part of an unlawful or actionable conspiracy. The boycotting of the plaintiff's business by the defendants was based upon the false statement that his employees were out on a strike, and it was carried on for the purpose of compelling the plaintiff, with whom they had no trade dispute, to discharge his employees or to coerce them to pay the sums of money demanded of them by the association. Plainly it was unlawful. Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, and cases cited. New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198. The plaintiff argues that the damages awarded by the master are inadequate. But we cannot revise that finding in the absence of the evidence. In view of the persistent unlawful acts of the defendants even while the case was on trial, and their intention to continue the same unless restrained by the court, the plaintiff is entitled to have them enjoined from proclaiming the existence of a strike of the plaintiff's employees, and from interfering with his business by keeping pickets and displaying banners about his store for the purpose of preventing the public from trading with him. He is also to recover from the defendants the sum of $100 and his costs of suit, and to have execution therefor. Decree accordingly. WALDO R. CUTTER & another vs. EDWARD H. CUTTER. Middlesex. January 9, 1917. - March 2, 1917. Present: RUGG, C. J., LORING, BRALEY, DE COURCY, & CARROLL, JJ. Res Judicata. Equity Jurisdiction, Res judicata. Equity Pleading and Practice, Appeal from interlocutory decree. In a suit in equity for an accounting brought against one of four tenants in common by the other two surviving tenants in common after the death of the fourth, the defendant filed a plea in bar setting up as res judicata a decree in a former suit in equity against the same defendant for an accounting, where it appeared that the plaintiffs in the two suits were not the same, the administrator of the estate of the deceased tenant in common having been a plaintiff in the earlier suit, and that the dates covered by the accounting in the earlier suit, which related only to the period terminating with the death of the fourth tenant in common, were none of them included in the second suit, it was held, that, not only were the items and the periods covered by the two suits wholly different, but the parties were not the same and there was no splitting of a single cause of action, because the agency for which an accounting was sought in the first suit presumably ended upon the death of the fourth tenant in common, so that the plea of res judicata should be overruled. Where in a suit in equity the defendant demurred to the bill and appealed from an interlocutory decree overruling his demurrer, and, without waiving his demurrer or his appeal, filed a plea in bar, which was sustained by an order followed by a final decree dismissing the bill, from which the plaintiff appealed, this court, after reversing the decision of the court below and ordering the entry of a decree overruling the plea in bar, declined to consider the defendant's appeal from the interlocutory decree overruling his demurrer, on the ground that his demurrer was not properly before this court, the case not being ripe for judgment in the court below. BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on June 24, 1914, for an accounting as stated in the opinion. The defendant demurred to the bill, and his demurrer was overruled by McLaughlin, J. The defendant appealed from the interlocutory decree overruling his demurrer. The defendant then, not waiving his demurrer nor his appeal from the interlocutory decree overruling it, filed a plea in bar setting up the defence of res judicata as stated in the opinion. The case was argued upon the plea before Irwin, J., who made an interlocutory decree allowing it and later made a final decree, reciting that the plea in bar had been sustained by an interlocutory decree, and ordering that the bill be dismissed, and that the plaintiffs pay to the defendant costs amounting to $25.16. The plaintiffs appealed. W. R. Buckminster, for the plaintiffs. J. Cummings, for the defendant. DE COURCY, J. Charles S. Cutter, the plaintiffs Waldo R. Cutter and Annie M. Easte, and the defendant, Edward H. Cutter, were tenants in common of certain real estate in Arlington, according to the allegations in the bill. On October 3, 1904, they entered into an agreement by which the defendant was to manage part of the property and collect the rents and profits as the general agent of the tenants in common, was to pay a rent for the occupation of the Summer Street house, and, with his brother Charles, was to hire a portion of the common property for agricultural purposes. Charles S. Cutter died on August 20, 1909. The defendant continued to occupy the Summer Street house, to collect the rents and profits, and to do other acts as agent until March 12, 1912, when partition was made of the property. The present plaintiffs and one Hall, the administrator of the estate of Charles S. Cutter, on March 20, 1913, filed a bill for an accounting against the defendant, and a final decree was entered in their favor on January 24, 1916. The present bill for an accounting was filed on June 24, 1914; and the defendant has pleaded in bar thereto the adjudication in the earlier case. When the allegations of the present bill are compared with those of the earlier one (a copy of which is annexed to the defendant's plea), it is apparent that the causes of action are not the same, and that the parties are different. In the 1913 suit the defendant was charged with collecting and refusing to account for the rents and profits until August 20, 1909, which was the date of the death of Charles S. Cutter, one of the tenants in common. The administrator of the estate of Charles was one of the plaintiffs. The master's report discloses that the rents and profits for which the defendant was charged were those collected by or due from him up to August 1, 1909; and of the payments credited to him the only ones subsequent to that date were for the 1909 taxes and a bill for legal expenses in connection with a proposed new street, incurred some time before. The decree included interest from November 2, 1909, because the master found that the demand for an accounting was not made until about October 1, 1909. The present bill is brought by the two tenants, who, with the defendant, have owned the property since the death of Charles. It seeks for an accounting of the rents and profits collected by the defendant from that time until March 12, 1912, the date of the partition. As already appears these items were not included in the former accounting as matter of fact. As matter of law the plaintiffs are not precluded from recovering them. The plea of res judicata should have been overruled. The parties in the two suits are not the same, and the times covered by the accounting are different. And there is here no splitting of a single cause of action. That is so, not only because the account did not constitute an entire demand, see Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. 409, but also because the agency for which an accounting was sought in the first suit presumably terminated on the death of one of the principals. The defendant's appeal from the interlocutory decree overruling his demurrer is not properly before us, as the case is not ripe for judgment in the Superior Court. Weil v. Boston Elevated Railway, 216 Mass. 545, and cases cited. The decree must be reversed, and a decree entered overruling the plea in bar, with costs. So ordered. JOHN CASHMAN vs. DUMMER B. BEAN & another. Essex. January 10, 1917.- March 2, 1917. Present: RUGG, C. J., LORING, BRALEY, DE COURCY, & CARROLL, JJ. Contract, Construction, Monuments govern distances. Equity Jurisdiction, Specific performance. Party Wall. Covenant, Against incumbrances. Words, "More or less." Where an agreement in writing to sell and convey real estate describes the property as having a frontage on a certain street of "sixty feet more or less" and as being bounded on its other sides by a certain river and by an alleyway and as being all the property owned by the sellers "at this location," the statement of the distances being accompanied by the words "more or less" or the word "about," and where the purchase price named is a round sum of money, the street, the river and the alleyway are monuments which control the stated distances, and, if upon a survey of the property it turns out to be of less area than that indicated by the figures in the description and the frontage on the street turns out to be only about seven eighths of sixty feet, this gives the purchaser no right to have a deduction made from the price. In a suit in equity to enforce the specific performance of an agreement in writing to sell and convey certain real estate to the plaintiff, where the plaintiff has agreed to pay as the purchase money a certain round sum "in cash upon the delivery of a warranty deed free and clear of all encumbrances, except such mortgages as are already outstanding against said property and two leases" named, if it is alleged that the property is subject to other valid easements consisting of a party wall and a passageway, it is a question to be determined whether these incumbrances exist and whether they diminish the value of the property, and if it is found that they do exist and diminish the value and that the defendant cannot remove them, and the plaintiff still insists on specific performance, he is entitled to have a proportionate deduction made from the amount of the purchase money and the conveyance ordered can be drawn so as to except the party wall and the passageway from the covenant of warranty. Whether the existence of a party wall is an incumbrance on real estate which its owner has agreed to convey by a warranty deed "free and clear of all encumbrances," depends upon the character of the party wall agreement. Even where a party wall is an incumbrance upon the title to real estate, its existence may be a benefit to the property, so that in a suit in equity to enforce a contract to convey the real estate free from incumbrances no reduction of the purchase price should be made on account of it. Whether the existence of the party wall diminishes the value of the property is a question of fact. BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on June 14, 1915, to enforce the specific performance of a contract in writing dated March 20, 1915, by which the defendants agreed to sell and convey to Frederick H. Tilton, the plaintiff's assignor, certain real estate on Merrimack Street in Haverhill for the price of $75,000, of which $1,000 already had been paid, alleging that the real estate in question was deficient in area and subject to certain incumbrances, and that the defendants refused to make any deduction from the purchase price on account of such deficiency and incumbrances; and praying for an order for the conveyance of the real estate to the plaintiff in accordance with the contract and that the defendants might be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the damages caused by such deficiency and incumbrances. The contract sought to be enforced was as follows: "Haverhill, Mass., Received of Frederick H. Tilton, Trustee, one thousand dollars ($1000.00), on the purchase price of the property numbered |