which would affect the future happiness of the parties, will justify a breach of contract. Atchinson v. Baker, 2 Peake, 104. But if a man knowingly promises to marry a loose and immodest woman, he is bound by such promise. Per Lord Tenterden C. J., ibid. To entitle the defendant to a verdict on the ground of the bad character of the plaintiff, it is not sufficient to show that charges (as of pecuniary dishonesty and perjury) were made against him, which he promised, but failed to explain: He must go further in order to bar the action, and show that the charges were well founded. Baddeley v. Mortlock, Holt, 151. To show the general bad character of the plaintiff a witness may state what has been said by third persons; and it is not necessary to produce those persons. Foulkes v. Sellway, 3 Esp. 236., antè, p. 32. Misrepresentation, or wilful suppression of the real circumstances of the family and previous life of the plaintiff, is a good defence to the action. Wharton v. Lewis, 1 C. & P. 531. If a female plaintiff is privy to her father's representations respecting her, his letters are evidence for the defendant to show deceit on her part; although she will not be answerable for particular expressions. But a false representation, made orally by the father to a third person in the absence of the plaintiff and without her privity, and by such person communicated to the defendant, is not admissible. Foote v. Hayne, 1 C. & P. 547.

ASSUMPSIT ON AN AWARD.

In assumpsit on an award, the plaintiff must prove the submission and award and the performance by himself of any conditions precedent put in issue by the pleas. Where the submission is by a judge's order, which has been made a rule of court, it is sufficiently proved by production of the rule. Still v. Halford, 4 Camp. 17. If the time for making the award has been enlarged, and the award made within the enlarged time, the plaintiff must show, if it be put in issue, that the enlargement was duly made according to the terms of the submission or by the consent of the parties. If the enlargement was irregularly made, such irregularity is waived by the appearance of the parties without objection before the arbitrator after the enlargement. Re Hick, 8 Taunt. 694. Lawrence v. Hodgson, 1 Y. & J. 16. The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had notice of the award; for he is bound to take notice of the award, as well as the plaintiff. 2 Saund. 62. a (n). As to the proof and effect of an award, see antè, pp. 100. and 151.

Defence.

Where the declaration on an award is in the form of indebitatus assumpsit, the defendant, under the general issue, may object that there is a variance between the award declared on, and that produced in evidence. Where the count is special, the admissibility of such proof depends on the plea. Corruption or misconduct of the arbitrators is not matter of defence; at least where application might have been successfully made to the court to set such award aside. Wills v. Maccarmick, 2 Wils. 148. Braddick v. Thompson, 8 East, 344. Brazier v.

Bryant, 3 Bing. 167. Nor can the award be impeached on the ground that the decision of the arbitrator has proceeded on a mistake. Johnson v. Durant, 2 B. & Ad. 925. Ashton v. Poynter, 1 C. M. & R. 738. But he may insist on a defect on the face of the award which avoids it.

ASSUMPSIT ON AN ATTORNEY'S BILL.

In an action upon an attorney's bill, the plaintiff must prove, under the general issue, his retainer by the defendant, which may be shewn by showing that the defendant attended at his office, and gave directions: 2. That the business was done, which may be proved by a clerk, or other agent, who can speak to the existence of the causes and the business in respect of which the charges are made, and can prove the main items, without proving every item to have been done. Philips v. Roach, 1 Esp. D. N. P. 10. If there are no taxable items in the bill, it will also be necessary to give general evidence of the reasonableness of the charges. Proof of a judge's order referring the bill to be taxed, and of the defendant's undertaking to pay what shall appear to be due, and of the master's allocatur, will be sufficient proof both of the retainer and of the business having been done. Lee v. Jones, 2 Camp. 496.

Where the demand is for fees, charges, or disbursements, at law or in equity, the plaintiff cannot recover until the expiration of one (lunar) month or more after he has delivered to the party or parties to be charged therewith, or left for him or them at his or their dwelling-house or last place of abode, a bill of such fees, charges, and disbursements, subscribed with the proper hand of such attorney or solicitor; 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23.; and he must, therefore, prove the delivery of such bill. But he must be put to such proof by a special plea; the general issue is not now sufficient. Lane v. Glenny, 7 A. & E. 83. Intelligible abbreviations will not vitiate the bill. The name of the court in which the business has been done, is not required to be stated in the bill by 3 Jac. 1. c. 7., nor, as it seems, by 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23. Reynolds v. Caswell, 4 Taunt. 193. Frowd v. Stillard, 4 C. & P. 512. In an action by two attorneys, partners, a bill signed in the name of the firm is sufficient. Smith v. Brown, 1 C. & J. 542.

Costs, charges, and disbursements.] Where the demand is partly for taxable items, and partly for items not taxable, it has been held that the plaintiff may recover for charges or disbursements not taxable, provided he has delivered no bill at all; but where he has delivered a bill irregularly, he cannot; and, therefore, where a single item for business done in court is inserted in the bill, it must be proved to have been signed and delivered according to the statute. Winter v. Payne, 6 T. R.645. Mowbray v. Fleming, 11 East, 285. And where the plaintiff had been employed in defending a cause, and had done other business not taxable, and had delivered separate bills, Lord Tenterden ruled, that all ought to have been included in one bill, and that the second bill ought to have been delivered a month before the action. Thwaites v. Mackerson, M. & M. 199. James v. Child, 2 C. & J. 678. But where a bill is delivered according to the statute, containing various taxable

items, some items of which are not sufficiently described according to the provisions of the statute, the plaintiff may recover the residue of the bill. Waller v. Lacy, 1 M. & G. 54.

The following have been held to be taxable items, viz. preparing a warrant of attorney (Sandom v. Bourn, 4 Camp. 68.; Painter v. Lindsell, 6 New Ca. 197.; Wilson v. Gutteridge, 3 B. & C. 157.); a dedimus potestatem (Ex parte Prickett, 1 N. R. 266.); an affidavit to hold to bail. (Winter v. Payne, 6 T. R. 645. So items for attending and examining bail, and attending the plaintiff in several actions against the defendant, and arranging to take cognovits therein. Watt v. Collins, R. & M. 284. So attending and advising a party who has been served with a writ. Smith v. Taylor, 7 Bing. 259. So the obtaining a bankrupt's certificate. Collins v. Nicholson, 2 Taunt. 321. Ford v. Webb, 3 B. & B.241. So attending at a lock-up-house and obtaining the defendant's release and filling up the bail bond. Fearne v. Wilson, 6 B. & C.87. Attesting a replevin bond. Wardle v. Nicholson, 4 B. & Ad. 469. So where the attorney proceeds only for costs out of pocket. Miller v. Towers, Peake, 102. But a bill for conveyancing alone is not taxable; Anon. Tidd, 329.; nor is preparing an affidavit of a petitioning creditor's debt and bond to the chancellor for a commission of bankrupt, a taxable item; the affidavit having never been sworn, nor the commission issued ; Burton v. Chatterton, 3 B. & A. 486.; nor searching at the judgment office; Fenton v. Correa, R. & M. 262.; nor working a country commission; though it is otherwise in the London court of bankruptcy, which is made a court of law and equity by statute. Harper v. Williams, 9 Dowl. P. C. 618., S. C. 2 M. & G. 815. Money, paid by an attorney in consequence of his undertaking to pay debt and costs, is not a disbursement within the statute. Prothero v. Thomas, 6 Taunt. 196. Where a bill contains taxable articles, and a separate demand for money lent on a distinct occasion, the latter may be recovered, though the bill was not regularly signed. Heming v. Wilton, M. & M. 529. Hill v. Humphreys, 2 B. & P.343. But where a bill containing taxable items, and also an item for 31. for money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant for the purpose of paying costs, had not been properly delivered, it was held that the 31. could not be recovered. Smith v. Taylor, 7 Bing. 259. A distinction has been taken in these cases between items which have no reference to the plaintiff's professional character, and items which, though not taxable, have such reference; and in the former case it seems that he may recover, though a bill may have been irregularly delivered. See Miller v. Towers, Peake, 102. And it has been held that an attorney, not having delivered any bill to his client before action brought, but particulars of demand containing some taxable items after action brought, cannot recover for an item not taxable, if such item be in respect of business done or money paid to his client's use in his character of attorney. Wardle v. Nicholson, 4 B. & Ad. 469.

A bill must be delivered under the statute for business done at the quarter sessions (Clarke v. Donovan, 5 T. R. 694. Sylvester v. Webster, 9 Bing. 388.); or the Insolvent Debtors' Court (Smith v. Wattleworth, 4 B. & C. 364.); or the county court; Wardle v. Nicholson, 4 B. & Ad. 469. So a bill for business done in a criminal prosecution in the court of Great Sessions of Caermarthen was held taxable; Lloyd v. Maund, Tidd, 330.; but see 2 Meriv. 500. But business done in the House of Lords on the prosecution of an appeal is not taxable. Williams v.

Odell, 4 Price, 279. A signed bill need not be delivered by an attorney suing for business done in the Middlesex Court of Requests; Becke v. Wells, 1 C. & M. 75.; nor for business done under a commission of bankruptcy. Hamilton v. Jones, 4 M. & P. 869. Crowder v. Davies, 3 Y. & J. 433.

An agreement entered into by a client with his attorney to pay him at a certain specified rate for business to be done, is not binding, or, at all events, is not conclusive, upon the client. Drax v. Scroope, 2 B. & Ad. 581.

Though an attorney of one court may, with the consent and in the name of an attorney of another court, practise in the latter court, yet if he practises there in his own name he cannot recover his fees. Latham v. Hyde, 1 C. & M. 128. S. C. 3 Tyr. 143. See Hockley v. Bantock, 2 Myl. & K.437. So in an action by several partners, attornies, for business done in the Palace Court, it appearing that only one of the plaintiffs was an attorney of that court, it was held that they could not recover. Arden v. Tucker, 1 M. & Rob. 191.

An attorney's bill cannot be recovered on an account stated, though the amount has been admitted, without proof of the delivery of a bill. Eicke v. Nokes, 1 M. & Rob. 359.

Delivery of the bill.] The bill should not only be delivered, but left with the defendant. Brooks v. Mason, 1 H. Bl. 290. Showing and explaining the bill, without a regular delivery, is not sufficient. Crowder v. Shee, 1 Camp. 437. It is not sufficient to prove that the bill was delivered at a particular place, not shown to be the defendant's abode, and that the defendant afterwards delivered it to his attorney's clerk. Eicke v. Nokes, M. & M. 305. An indorsement on the bill in the handwriting of the plaintiff's clerk, since dead, proved to have existed at the time of the date, and stating that a copy was on such a day delivered to the defendant, together with proof that it was the clerk's duty to deliver the bill, and that such an indorsement was usually made in the course of business, will be sufficient primâ facie evidence of the due delivery. Champneys v. Peck, 1 Stark. 404. See the cases cited, antè, p. 36.

To whom.] A personal service is not necessary, but a delivery to an agent appointed by the party to receive it, will be sufficient. Per Lord Ellenborough C. J., Finchett v. How, 2 Camp. 277. Thus the delivery of the bill to the attorney of the party is good. Warren v. Cunningham, Gow. 71. Vincent v. Slaymaker, 12 East, 372. So a delivery to one of several persons, who has been authorised to act for the others, is a delivery to all; Finchett v. How, 2 Camp. 277.; and seems sufficient in an action against any one of them. Crowder v. Shee, 1 Camp. 437. Thus, where an attorney had been retained jointly by several parties to defend several suits against each, in the subject matter of which they had a common interest, it was held that the delivery of a bill to one was sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain a joint action against all. Oxenham v. Lemon, 2 D. & R. 461.

At what time.] The bill must be proved to have been delivered one (lunar) month before the commencement of the action. The Nisi Prius record was formerly sufficient primâ facie evidence, when made up of a term commencing more than one month after the delivery of the bill,

that the action had not been brought too soon, and made it incumbent on the defendant to prove, if the fact was so, that the action was commenced too soon by producing a copy of the writ (Webb v. Pritchett, I B. & P. 263.; Rhodes v. Gibbs, 5 Esp. 163.); or the declaration Harris v. Orme, 2 Camp. 497 (n). But now, by the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 W, 4. c. 39. s. 11., the issuing of the writ of summons is for all purposes the commencement of the suit. Alston v. Underhill, 1 C. & M. 492. And the date of the issuing appears on the Nisi Prius record.

At what place.] Leaving the bill at the defendant's counting-house is not sufficient. Hill v. Humphreys, 2 B. & P. 343. It seems that it is sufficient to leave it at his last known place of abode, and it is no answer for the defendant to show that he had left that place of abode, without also showing that he had a later known one. Wadeson v. Smith, 1 Stark. 324.

Proof of the bill. The bill may be proved by a copy or duplicate original, without any notice to produce the bill delivered. Anderson v. May, 2 B. & P. 237. Colling v. Treweek, 6 B. & C. 394. A mistake in the date of the items, which does not mislead, will not vitiate the delivery of the bill. Williams v. Barber, 4 Taunt. 806. Where the bill has been taxed, the master's allocatur is not conclusive against the plaintiff on a plea of nunquam indebitatus, but only strong evidence that no more is due. Beck v. Cleaver, 9 Dowl. P. C. 111.

Cases in which a bill need not be delivered.] A signed bill need not be delivered, though containing taxable items, when it is due from one attorney or solicitor to another attorney or solicitor; 12 G. 2. c. 13. s. 6.; though the defendant only became an attorney after the business was done, and before action brought; Windsor v. Herbert, 7 M. & W. 375.; Wildbore v. Bryan, 8 Price, 677. And such a bill is not within the statute, 3 Jac. 1. c. 7. s. 1. Sandys v. Hornby, 1 M. & Rob. 33. Nor need the executor or administrator of an attorney deliver a bill. Williams v. Griffith, 10 M. & W. 125. Nor the assignee of an insolvent attorney. Lester v. Lazarus, 2 C. M. & R. 665. To setoff a bill, it has been held sufficient to deliver it in time for the plaintiff to have it taxed before the trial. Martin v. Winder, 1 Doug. 199 (n), Tidd. 335. But in Murphy v. Cunningham, 1 Anstr. 198., a regular delivery was held necessary, though Martin v. Winder was cited, contrà. In Bulman v. Birkett, 1 Esp. 449, it is said to have been held by Lord Kenyon, that it was not necessary that a month's time should intervene between the delivery and the action.

Defence.

Where a bill has been delivered containing taxable items, the defendant cannot object to the reasonableness of the charges at the trial. Anderson v. May, 2 B. & P. 237. Lee v. Wilson, 2 Chilly's R. 65. The delivery of a former bill is conclusive against an increase of charge on any of the same items contained in a subsequent bill, and strong presumptive evidence against any additional items; but real errors or omissions are to be allowed for. Loveridge v. Botham, 1 B. &. P. 49.